Goal systems theory
As Kruglanski et al. (Reference Kruglanski, Shah, Fishbach, Friedman, Chun, Sleeth-Keppler and Zanna2002; see also Wyer, Reference Wyer, Kahle, Lowrey and Huberin press) postulate, sequences of goal-directed actions can be stored in memory as complex concepts, or plan-goal schemas that are activated and used to attain the objective to which they pertain. Each schema consists of a goal concept preceded by a series of action concepts. The latter concepts, in turn, can refer to either cognitive or motor acts that in combination describe a means of attaining the goal at hand. The concepts that compose a plan-goal schema can exist at different levels of generality. Thus, deciding which of two products to buy and deciding which of two animals is larger might both contain elements of a more general plan-goal schema that pertains to making comparative judgments.
One feature of goal systems theory, equifinality, is particularly applicable to the phenomena identified by L&S. Equifinality refers to the fact that more than one plan-goal schema may accomplish the same objective. Put another way, several different plan-goal schemas might terminate in the same goal concept. When a goal is activated, different schemas might be applied, depending on situational features that happen to be salient at the time.
The equifinality construct is particularly useful in conceptualizing the indirect effects of negative feelings and emotions on behavior that is intended to cope with these reactions (Wyer, Reference Wyer, Kahle, Lowrey and Huberin press; see Wyer, Dong, Huang, Huang, & Wan, Reference Wyer, Dong, Huang, Huang and Wan2019). That is, experiencing a negative emotion presumably activates a desire to reduce or eliminate this aversive state and this goal might activate a plan-goal schema in a later situation and elicit behavior that is independent of the conditions that led the emotion to be eliminated.
Wyer et al. (Reference Wyer, Dong, Huang, Huang and Wan2019) analyze the indirect effects of numerous negative emotions, including embarrassment, jealousy and envy, guilt and shame, anger, fear, and nostalgia. As but one example, stimulating individuals to feel embarrassed in one situation activates a motive to avoid contact with people who are likely to evaluate them negatively. This goal, once activated, influences reactions to persons in quite unrelated situations (Wan & Wyer, Reference Wan and Wyer2020). Moreover, it increases preferences for dark glasses, which symbolically allow them to hide their face and restorative facial cream, which allows them to “save face” (Dong, Huang, & Wyer, Reference Dong, Huang and Wyer2013). The processes postulated by L&S are analogous. If engaging in immoral behavior motivates individuals to eliminate feelings of guilt, this motive could activate a plan-goal schema pertaining to “cleansing,” stimulating behavior that could symbolically attain this goal.
This conceptualization makes salient a further consideration concerning the priority that governs the selection of different means of coping with negative emotions. Symbolically “washing away” feelings of guilt may be only one of several ways of coping with the feelings elicited by an immoral act. For example, people might simply deny the importance of the act or justify its occurrence in terms of its potentially desirable consequences. It is unclear which strategy is used when all are potentially viable.
In this regard, studies of the use of hand washing as a strategy for coping with negative feelings (Xu, Zwick, & Schwarz, Reference Xu, Zwick and Schwarz2012; Zhong & Liljenquist, Reference Zhong and Liljenquist2006), participants are usually told explicitly to wash their hands before the dependent variable is assessed. Whether this behavior would occur spontaneously in the absence of situational demands is unclear. Symbolic coping strategies might have high priority outside the laboratory only when situational factors make the use of these strategies salient.
A final observation
L&S's conceptualization implicitly assumes that individuals interpret the physical acts they perform in a way that allows them to symbolically distance themselves from the emotion-eliciting event they are experiencing. This assumption is likely to hold in the paradigm they have used to demonstrate the phenomena. In the “hand washing” paradigm, for example, participants do not wash their hands until after the emotion-eliciting event (an immoral act, a gambling loss, and so on) has been made salient and the motivation to dissociate themselves from the event has been induced. In this case, they might spontaneously recognize the symbolic utility of interpreting their behavior as “cleansing” and act accordingly.
However, there are instances in which this might not be true. Suppose, for example, that individuals wash their hands before they think about the event that precipitates their negative emotions. In this case, it is unclear whether individuals would spontaneously interpret their behavior in a way that allows them to dissociate themselves from the event they encounter subsequently. They might not consciously interpret it in any way at all.
I know of no evidence that directly bears on this possibility. However results of a study by Dong, Dai, and Wyer (Reference Dong, Dai and Wyer2015) are suggestive. In this study, groups of participants who had engaged in synchronous exercises were later asked to perform a product preference task. Their behavior induced a “conformity” mindset, leading them to choose products that were normatively the most popular. Then participants performed the same exercises in time to a metronome, however, they apparently did not interpret the behavior as synchronous (e.g., “conforming”) and so it had no impact on their later product choices.
In Dong et al.'s study, there was no obvious motivation to reinterpret the synchronous behavior as “conformity” at the time the product preference task was performed. Be that as it may, the study points out that the interpretation of physical behavior in a way that has symbolic implications might not occur spontaneously and that conditions that discourage this interpretation might qualify the results that L&S report.
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Lee and Schwarz (L&S) provide considerable evidence that separation and connection are fundamental processes that are evident in both cognitive and motor behavior. They couch the phenomena they review within the framework of grounded cognition proposed by Barsalou (Reference Barsalou1999, Reference Barsalou2008) but apply it to procedures as well as single concepts. In this commentary, I discuss the mental processes underlying the phenomena from a somewhat different theoretical perspective that specifies the cognitive processes that underlie the phenomena.
Goal systems theory
As Kruglanski et al. (Reference Kruglanski, Shah, Fishbach, Friedman, Chun, Sleeth-Keppler and Zanna2002; see also Wyer, Reference Wyer, Kahle, Lowrey and Huberin press) postulate, sequences of goal-directed actions can be stored in memory as complex concepts, or plan-goal schemas that are activated and used to attain the objective to which they pertain. Each schema consists of a goal concept preceded by a series of action concepts. The latter concepts, in turn, can refer to either cognitive or motor acts that in combination describe a means of attaining the goal at hand. The concepts that compose a plan-goal schema can exist at different levels of generality. Thus, deciding which of two products to buy and deciding which of two animals is larger might both contain elements of a more general plan-goal schema that pertains to making comparative judgments.
One feature of goal systems theory, equifinality, is particularly applicable to the phenomena identified by L&S. Equifinality refers to the fact that more than one plan-goal schema may accomplish the same objective. Put another way, several different plan-goal schemas might terminate in the same goal concept. When a goal is activated, different schemas might be applied, depending on situational features that happen to be salient at the time.
The equifinality construct is particularly useful in conceptualizing the indirect effects of negative feelings and emotions on behavior that is intended to cope with these reactions (Wyer, Reference Wyer, Kahle, Lowrey and Huberin press; see Wyer, Dong, Huang, Huang, & Wan, Reference Wyer, Dong, Huang, Huang and Wan2019). That is, experiencing a negative emotion presumably activates a desire to reduce or eliminate this aversive state and this goal might activate a plan-goal schema in a later situation and elicit behavior that is independent of the conditions that led the emotion to be eliminated.
Wyer et al. (Reference Wyer, Dong, Huang, Huang and Wan2019) analyze the indirect effects of numerous negative emotions, including embarrassment, jealousy and envy, guilt and shame, anger, fear, and nostalgia. As but one example, stimulating individuals to feel embarrassed in one situation activates a motive to avoid contact with people who are likely to evaluate them negatively. This goal, once activated, influences reactions to persons in quite unrelated situations (Wan & Wyer, Reference Wan and Wyer2020). Moreover, it increases preferences for dark glasses, which symbolically allow them to hide their face and restorative facial cream, which allows them to “save face” (Dong, Huang, & Wyer, Reference Dong, Huang and Wyer2013). The processes postulated by L&S are analogous. If engaging in immoral behavior motivates individuals to eliminate feelings of guilt, this motive could activate a plan-goal schema pertaining to “cleansing,” stimulating behavior that could symbolically attain this goal.
This conceptualization makes salient a further consideration concerning the priority that governs the selection of different means of coping with negative emotions. Symbolically “washing away” feelings of guilt may be only one of several ways of coping with the feelings elicited by an immoral act. For example, people might simply deny the importance of the act or justify its occurrence in terms of its potentially desirable consequences. It is unclear which strategy is used when all are potentially viable.
In this regard, studies of the use of hand washing as a strategy for coping with negative feelings (Xu, Zwick, & Schwarz, Reference Xu, Zwick and Schwarz2012; Zhong & Liljenquist, Reference Zhong and Liljenquist2006), participants are usually told explicitly to wash their hands before the dependent variable is assessed. Whether this behavior would occur spontaneously in the absence of situational demands is unclear. Symbolic coping strategies might have high priority outside the laboratory only when situational factors make the use of these strategies salient.
A final observation
L&S's conceptualization implicitly assumes that individuals interpret the physical acts they perform in a way that allows them to symbolically distance themselves from the emotion-eliciting event they are experiencing. This assumption is likely to hold in the paradigm they have used to demonstrate the phenomena. In the “hand washing” paradigm, for example, participants do not wash their hands until after the emotion-eliciting event (an immoral act, a gambling loss, and so on) has been made salient and the motivation to dissociate themselves from the event has been induced. In this case, they might spontaneously recognize the symbolic utility of interpreting their behavior as “cleansing” and act accordingly.
However, there are instances in which this might not be true. Suppose, for example, that individuals wash their hands before they think about the event that precipitates their negative emotions. In this case, it is unclear whether individuals would spontaneously interpret their behavior in a way that allows them to dissociate themselves from the event they encounter subsequently. They might not consciously interpret it in any way at all.
I know of no evidence that directly bears on this possibility. However results of a study by Dong, Dai, and Wyer (Reference Dong, Dai and Wyer2015) are suggestive. In this study, groups of participants who had engaged in synchronous exercises were later asked to perform a product preference task. Their behavior induced a “conformity” mindset, leading them to choose products that were normatively the most popular. Then participants performed the same exercises in time to a metronome, however, they apparently did not interpret the behavior as synchronous (e.g., “conforming”) and so it had no impact on their later product choices.
In Dong et al.'s study, there was no obvious motivation to reinterpret the synchronous behavior as “conformity” at the time the product preference task was performed. Be that as it may, the study points out that the interpretation of physical behavior in a way that has symbolic implications might not occur spontaneously and that conditions that discourage this interpretation might qualify the results that L&S report.
Conflict of interest
None.