Cultural anthropologists credit the ecological success of humans to their ability to learn from each other and act collectively – cooperating, collaborating, and conforming in ways not apparent in other apes (e.g., Boyd et al. Reference Boyd, Richerson and Henrich2011; Tomasello Reference Tomasello2009; Reference Tomasello2014). By contrast, Baumeister et al. propose that human groups flourish when they encourage differentiation and independence, not simply belongingness. We agree. We also disagree, and that illustrates our point: Humans are continually converging and diverging with respect to each other. Explanations focused on conformity versus differentiation are too simple. Instead, groups function best when they are cooperative and argumentative – indeed, when they are argumentative because they are cooperative, working to achieve goals and realize values that are greater than individual interests or group norms (Hodges Reference Hodges2009; Packer & Miners Reference Packer and Miners2014).
We concur with Baumeister et al. that complementary forces of integration and differentiation are crucial to collective and individual functioning. However, we believe that integration and differentiation are not generally independent or sequential processes. Specifically, we propose that adopting collective identities leads individuals to behave as agentic group members – pursuing collective interests and group goals that are multifaceted. While these goals include cohesion and belonging, they also include change, innovation, improvement, and efficacy motives. Social identification and loyalty can thus drive role differentiation. Ironically, it may be those individuals who are not psychologically “submerged” in the group who are most likely to need and benefit from external mechanisms of individuation (e.g., accountability, incentives). Baumeister et al.'s review properly draws attention to the importance of differentiation; here we offer a sampler of research suggesting that it needs to be scaled up and integrated into a more complex set of dynamics.
In research on conformity and nonconformity, the lion's share of psychologists' attention has been devoted to the former. The assumption has been that if we understand what drives agreement, the inverse explains divergence; for example, if conformity arises from social identification, dissent must result from its absence. Recent approaches to divergence and dissent have challenged this assumption, however. Although identification with groups is often positively associated with conformity to group norms, the relationship is reversed if members perceive a norm as harmful to collective interests (e.g., Packer Reference Packer2008; Reference Packer2009; Packer & Chasteen Reference Packer and Chasteen2010). These findings demonstrate that identified group members are not simply norm followers; rather they are motivated to pursue what they perceive as the larger interests of their groups.
Similarly, group interests are often multifaceted and people vary in how they understand collective goals, which allows them to pursue distinct but nevertheless group-oriented courses of action. For example, drawing on research showing that low-level (concrete) construals tend to orient people toward stability goals – and high-level (abstract) construals toward change and improvement goals – Packer et al. (Reference Packer, Fujita and Chasteen2014) found that different construal levels altered the relationship between collective identification and conformity to group norms. Strongly (vs. weakly) identified members expressed more conforming views about group issues (e.g., downplaying group problems) when operating at low levels of construal but were more dissenting when operating at high levels of construal. Lay conceptions of what it means to be loyal may also influence decisions to deviate from one's own group (e.g., whistleblowing). Preliminary findings suggest that if loyalty is understood as in-group preference or conformity, it negatively predicts whistleblowing; however, if it is understood as dependability and integrity, loyalty can positively predict whistleblowing to legitimate authorities (Ungson & Packer, Reference Ungson and Packerin progress).
Further evidence for the importance of divergence and for the need to place it in a larger, richer understanding of group dynamics is found in research that is routinely interpreted in terms of conformity. The Asch (Reference Asch1956) dilemma, for example, is cited as an example of astonishing conformity; yet by far the most frequent response for both adults and children is dissent (e.g., Corriveau & Harris Reference Corriveau and Harris2010; Hodges & Geyer Reference Hodges and Geyer2006). Most explanations make no attempt to account for the range and pattern of choices, and the usual explanations offered for agreeing answers (e.g., normative pressure and informational influence) are inadequate. The mean pattern (75% dissent and 25% agreement with wrong answers in Bond & Smith's Reference Bond and Smith1996, meta-analysis) suggests that participants are trying to satisfy multiple values simultaneously – including social solidarity, trust and truth, all of which are markers of interdependence rather than independence (Hodges & Geyer Reference Hodges and Geyer2006). This pattern is not atypical: Across a broad swath of paradigms in social, developmental, and anthropological research (e.g., conversational alignment, synchrony, mimicry, imitation, social influence, social referencing, evolutionary modeling), evidence abounds that divergence and differentiation go hand-in-hand with convergence and matching (Hodges Reference Hodges2014; Reference Hodges, Harkins, Williams and Burgerin press).
Indeed, people differentiate themselves from others even in situations that invite conformity (Efferson et al. Reference Efferson, Lalive, Richerson, McElreath and Lubell2008). In a series of recent studies (Hodges et al. Reference Hodges, Meagher, Norton, McBain and Sroubek2014), participants were placed in a position of ignorance, but heard other participants give what they could assume with high confidence were correct answers to problems. Normative and informational influence should act in concert here, yet participants in this situation chose not to agree with the correct answer about 30% of the time. Results suggested this speaking-from-ignorance effect was a result of people feeling constrained to speak truthfully and cooperatively (e.g., with appropriate warrant) about what they could see. Motivation cannot be reduced to wanting to be agreeable or correct.
Finally, we propose the dynamics of differentiation-integration are not step-wise but continuous and often simultaneous. Integration and differentiation are, in fact, self-reinforcing, forming a virtuous circle in highly functional groups (Heyes Reference Heyes, Sterelny, Joyce, Calcott and Fraser2013). Friends, for example, are more likely than strangers to disagree when they think their peers are wrong (Matsuda Reference Matsuda1985; McKelvey & Kerr Reference McKelvey and Kerr1988; Takano & Sogon Reference Takano and Sogon2008) because it is easier to disagree when trust and social solidarity are already well established (Hodges & Geyer Reference Hodges and Geyer2006). By contrast, social loafing is more common in individualistic cultures (Smith et al. Reference Smith, Bond and Kagitcibasi2006) and groupthink among weakly identified group members (Packer Reference Packer2009). Integration makes differentiation easier; likewise, differentiation often serves integrative purposes. What really matters is cooperation and integrity.
Cultural anthropologists credit the ecological success of humans to their ability to learn from each other and act collectively – cooperating, collaborating, and conforming in ways not apparent in other apes (e.g., Boyd et al. Reference Boyd, Richerson and Henrich2011; Tomasello Reference Tomasello2009; Reference Tomasello2014). By contrast, Baumeister et al. propose that human groups flourish when they encourage differentiation and independence, not simply belongingness. We agree. We also disagree, and that illustrates our point: Humans are continually converging and diverging with respect to each other. Explanations focused on conformity versus differentiation are too simple. Instead, groups function best when they are cooperative and argumentative – indeed, when they are argumentative because they are cooperative, working to achieve goals and realize values that are greater than individual interests or group norms (Hodges Reference Hodges2009; Packer & Miners Reference Packer and Miners2014).
We concur with Baumeister et al. that complementary forces of integration and differentiation are crucial to collective and individual functioning. However, we believe that integration and differentiation are not generally independent or sequential processes. Specifically, we propose that adopting collective identities leads individuals to behave as agentic group members – pursuing collective interests and group goals that are multifaceted. While these goals include cohesion and belonging, they also include change, innovation, improvement, and efficacy motives. Social identification and loyalty can thus drive role differentiation. Ironically, it may be those individuals who are not psychologically “submerged” in the group who are most likely to need and benefit from external mechanisms of individuation (e.g., accountability, incentives). Baumeister et al.'s review properly draws attention to the importance of differentiation; here we offer a sampler of research suggesting that it needs to be scaled up and integrated into a more complex set of dynamics.
In research on conformity and nonconformity, the lion's share of psychologists' attention has been devoted to the former. The assumption has been that if we understand what drives agreement, the inverse explains divergence; for example, if conformity arises from social identification, dissent must result from its absence. Recent approaches to divergence and dissent have challenged this assumption, however. Although identification with groups is often positively associated with conformity to group norms, the relationship is reversed if members perceive a norm as harmful to collective interests (e.g., Packer Reference Packer2008; Reference Packer2009; Packer & Chasteen Reference Packer and Chasteen2010). These findings demonstrate that identified group members are not simply norm followers; rather they are motivated to pursue what they perceive as the larger interests of their groups.
Similarly, group interests are often multifaceted and people vary in how they understand collective goals, which allows them to pursue distinct but nevertheless group-oriented courses of action. For example, drawing on research showing that low-level (concrete) construals tend to orient people toward stability goals – and high-level (abstract) construals toward change and improvement goals – Packer et al. (Reference Packer, Fujita and Chasteen2014) found that different construal levels altered the relationship between collective identification and conformity to group norms. Strongly (vs. weakly) identified members expressed more conforming views about group issues (e.g., downplaying group problems) when operating at low levels of construal but were more dissenting when operating at high levels of construal. Lay conceptions of what it means to be loyal may also influence decisions to deviate from one's own group (e.g., whistleblowing). Preliminary findings suggest that if loyalty is understood as in-group preference or conformity, it negatively predicts whistleblowing; however, if it is understood as dependability and integrity, loyalty can positively predict whistleblowing to legitimate authorities (Ungson & Packer, Reference Ungson and Packerin progress).
Further evidence for the importance of divergence and for the need to place it in a larger, richer understanding of group dynamics is found in research that is routinely interpreted in terms of conformity. The Asch (Reference Asch1956) dilemma, for example, is cited as an example of astonishing conformity; yet by far the most frequent response for both adults and children is dissent (e.g., Corriveau & Harris Reference Corriveau and Harris2010; Hodges & Geyer Reference Hodges and Geyer2006). Most explanations make no attempt to account for the range and pattern of choices, and the usual explanations offered for agreeing answers (e.g., normative pressure and informational influence) are inadequate. The mean pattern (75% dissent and 25% agreement with wrong answers in Bond & Smith's Reference Bond and Smith1996, meta-analysis) suggests that participants are trying to satisfy multiple values simultaneously – including social solidarity, trust and truth, all of which are markers of interdependence rather than independence (Hodges & Geyer Reference Hodges and Geyer2006). This pattern is not atypical: Across a broad swath of paradigms in social, developmental, and anthropological research (e.g., conversational alignment, synchrony, mimicry, imitation, social influence, social referencing, evolutionary modeling), evidence abounds that divergence and differentiation go hand-in-hand with convergence and matching (Hodges Reference Hodges2014; Reference Hodges, Harkins, Williams and Burgerin press).
Indeed, people differentiate themselves from others even in situations that invite conformity (Efferson et al. Reference Efferson, Lalive, Richerson, McElreath and Lubell2008). In a series of recent studies (Hodges et al. Reference Hodges, Meagher, Norton, McBain and Sroubek2014), participants were placed in a position of ignorance, but heard other participants give what they could assume with high confidence were correct answers to problems. Normative and informational influence should act in concert here, yet participants in this situation chose not to agree with the correct answer about 30% of the time. Results suggested this speaking-from-ignorance effect was a result of people feeling constrained to speak truthfully and cooperatively (e.g., with appropriate warrant) about what they could see. Motivation cannot be reduced to wanting to be agreeable or correct.
Finally, we propose the dynamics of differentiation-integration are not step-wise but continuous and often simultaneous. Integration and differentiation are, in fact, self-reinforcing, forming a virtuous circle in highly functional groups (Heyes Reference Heyes, Sterelny, Joyce, Calcott and Fraser2013). Friends, for example, are more likely than strangers to disagree when they think their peers are wrong (Matsuda Reference Matsuda1985; McKelvey & Kerr Reference McKelvey and Kerr1988; Takano & Sogon Reference Takano and Sogon2008) because it is easier to disagree when trust and social solidarity are already well established (Hodges & Geyer Reference Hodges and Geyer2006). By contrast, social loafing is more common in individualistic cultures (Smith et al. Reference Smith, Bond and Kagitcibasi2006) and groupthink among weakly identified group members (Packer Reference Packer2009). Integration makes differentiation easier; likewise, differentiation often serves integrative purposes. What really matters is cooperation and integrity.