Van de Vliert argues that extreme climates have different effects on rich and poor nations, “pushing and pulling” toward freedom in rich groups and toward repression in poor groups. Accordingly, he finds that discrimination, workplace bullying, autocratic leadership, press repression, and reduced freedom of self-expression are (1) most severe where people with low average income face extreme climates, (2) least severe where people with high average income face extreme climates. Our goals in this commentary are to show that this pattern of results is well explained by the individual-level psychology of threat and bargaining and to highlight the importance of inequality as a macroeconomic variable predicting freedom outcomes. In doing so, we hope to encourage synthesis of related theory and findings in different disciplines, leading to improved models.
Van de Vliert emphasizes that humans must cope with climate-related threat by using available resources, including money and the support of one's social group. Poor people facing severe threats they cannot escape have no choice but to form very tight groups to meet shared needs. It is well established that group solidarity is higher when members face a common threat (reviewed by Benard & Doan Reference Benard and Doan2011; Van Vugt et al. Reference Van Vugt, Hogan and Kaiser2008); such effects are even found in nonhumans (Radford Reference Radford2008). Group members have a stake in each other's well-being, so it pays to cooperate in order to address such mutual threats (Lahti & Weinstein Reference Lahti and Weinstein2005; Roberts Reference Roberts2005; West et al. Reference West, Griffin and Gardner2007). As part of this general phenomenon, group threats also cause people to conform to group norms and increase their support for existing leaders (Van Vugt Reference Van Vugt2006; Willer Reference Willer2004); leaders may in turn exaggerate such threats to promote cohesion and suppress attempts to supplant them (Lahti & Weinstein Reference Lahti and Weinstein2005; Willer Reference Willer2004). The greater the threats, the more group members need to unite. (To avoid confusion about terminology, note that where we would say “minor threat,” Van de Vliert says “challenge.”) This research is consilient with Van de Vliert's findings that the people facing the most extreme climate threat with little means of escape (those in poorer countries with extreme climates) enjoy the least individual freedom.
Extreme climates are associated with reduced freedom among poor nations, but greater freedom among rich nations (according to the target article). This interaction may be because rich people confronted with threats have an option besides coping: avoiding the threats altogether. For humans confronted with a threat that is directly and permanently linked to their location (or social group), fleeing from threat will typically require relocating and/or joining a new group. Whether for purposes of coping or fleeing, earning the support of a social group is a bargaining process whereby individuals must make contributions and/or concessions in exchange for access to group benefits that are disproportionately controlled by the most powerful members of the group. When shared conditions are good and group members have many outside options, subordinates have more resources available to challenge dominants and pose a more credible threat to leave; thus, dominants must concede more to subordinates to entice them to stay in their groups. Predictions based on this logic have been supported in behavioral ecology by numerous mathematical models and empirical studies of inequality within nonhuman species, where it is called “reproductive skew theory” (e.g., Johnstone Reference Johnstone2000; Shen & Reeve Reference Shen and Reeve2010). Psychology experiments have shown that when people think emigrating is easy, they are less supportive of the local political system (Kay et al. Reference Kay, Gaucher, Peach, Laurin, Friesen, Zanna and Spencer2009; Laurin et al. Reference Laurin, Shepherd and Kay2010).
We suggest that residents of nations with low average income are less capable of bearing the costs of relocation and bring less bargaining power to efforts to join a new group, and they are thus more likely to choose a coping strategy than a flight strategy in response to threat. Conversely, we suggest that residents of nations with high average income are more capable of relocating and joining a new group, and thus they are more likely to choose a flight strategy. It is therefore possible that leaders of wealthy groups in extreme climates must offer a better bargain, using less violence and monopolizing fewer vital resources (i.e., conceding more freedom) than those in undemanding climates to prevent their subordinates leaving in search of better weather. Because moderate climates are more comfortable, wealthy citizens there cannot threaten to leave as credibly as can wealthy citizens of extreme climates, so leaders can exploit the former more.
Thus far we have explained how the psychology of threat and bargaining may help explain the observed relationship between climate, average income, and several freedom outcomes. We now offer two cautions. First, harsh climates are one of many kinds of survival threats. Models for predicting freedoms as a function of threat may be improved by considering different kinds of survival threats such as pathogens and parasites, predation, individual/coalitional violence, and resource scarcity. Further, threats to “higher” needs than survival, such as the need for status, may also explain freedom-relevant outcomes. For example, the most variable portion of homicide rates across groups is the rate at which young men kill other young men over status disputes (Daly & Wilson Reference Daly and Wilson1988). Models predicting freedom from fear may therefore be improved by including predictors of threats to status.
Our second caution emphasizes the importance of a specific predictor of status threat: income equality. Increasing inequality is a threat to status because it creates a larger gap between current and desired state, which in turn motivates more extreme efforts to make up the difference (Mishra & Lalumière Reference Mishra and Lalumière2010). A large body of evidence has shown that income inequality, above and beyond average income, predicts a wide array of social, health, and well-being outcomes at the aggregate level, including many directly relevant to freedom (e.g., ingroup vs. outgroup comparisons, competition and discrimination, intergroup violence; reviewed in Wilkinson & Pickett Reference Wilkinson and Pickett2009). Furthermore, average income and income inequality are poorly associated at the aggregate level. As a consequence, Van de Vliert's reliance on mean group income to explain outcomes like ethnocentrism and aggression may obscure important effects of within-group income inequality on these outcomes.
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Van de Vliert argues that extreme climates have different effects on rich and poor nations, “pushing and pulling” toward freedom in rich groups and toward repression in poor groups. Accordingly, he finds that discrimination, workplace bullying, autocratic leadership, press repression, and reduced freedom of self-expression are (1) most severe where people with low average income face extreme climates, (2) least severe where people with high average income face extreme climates. Our goals in this commentary are to show that this pattern of results is well explained by the individual-level psychology of threat and bargaining and to highlight the importance of inequality as a macroeconomic variable predicting freedom outcomes. In doing so, we hope to encourage synthesis of related theory and findings in different disciplines, leading to improved models.
Van de Vliert emphasizes that humans must cope with climate-related threat by using available resources, including money and the support of one's social group. Poor people facing severe threats they cannot escape have no choice but to form very tight groups to meet shared needs. It is well established that group solidarity is higher when members face a common threat (reviewed by Benard & Doan Reference Benard and Doan2011; Van Vugt et al. Reference Van Vugt, Hogan and Kaiser2008); such effects are even found in nonhumans (Radford Reference Radford2008). Group members have a stake in each other's well-being, so it pays to cooperate in order to address such mutual threats (Lahti & Weinstein Reference Lahti and Weinstein2005; Roberts Reference Roberts2005; West et al. Reference West, Griffin and Gardner2007). As part of this general phenomenon, group threats also cause people to conform to group norms and increase their support for existing leaders (Van Vugt Reference Van Vugt2006; Willer Reference Willer2004); leaders may in turn exaggerate such threats to promote cohesion and suppress attempts to supplant them (Lahti & Weinstein Reference Lahti and Weinstein2005; Willer Reference Willer2004). The greater the threats, the more group members need to unite. (To avoid confusion about terminology, note that where we would say “minor threat,” Van de Vliert says “challenge.”) This research is consilient with Van de Vliert's findings that the people facing the most extreme climate threat with little means of escape (those in poorer countries with extreme climates) enjoy the least individual freedom.
Extreme climates are associated with reduced freedom among poor nations, but greater freedom among rich nations (according to the target article). This interaction may be because rich people confronted with threats have an option besides coping: avoiding the threats altogether. For humans confronted with a threat that is directly and permanently linked to their location (or social group), fleeing from threat will typically require relocating and/or joining a new group. Whether for purposes of coping or fleeing, earning the support of a social group is a bargaining process whereby individuals must make contributions and/or concessions in exchange for access to group benefits that are disproportionately controlled by the most powerful members of the group. When shared conditions are good and group members have many outside options, subordinates have more resources available to challenge dominants and pose a more credible threat to leave; thus, dominants must concede more to subordinates to entice them to stay in their groups. Predictions based on this logic have been supported in behavioral ecology by numerous mathematical models and empirical studies of inequality within nonhuman species, where it is called “reproductive skew theory” (e.g., Johnstone Reference Johnstone2000; Shen & Reeve Reference Shen and Reeve2010). Psychology experiments have shown that when people think emigrating is easy, they are less supportive of the local political system (Kay et al. Reference Kay, Gaucher, Peach, Laurin, Friesen, Zanna and Spencer2009; Laurin et al. Reference Laurin, Shepherd and Kay2010).
We suggest that residents of nations with low average income are less capable of bearing the costs of relocation and bring less bargaining power to efforts to join a new group, and they are thus more likely to choose a coping strategy than a flight strategy in response to threat. Conversely, we suggest that residents of nations with high average income are more capable of relocating and joining a new group, and thus they are more likely to choose a flight strategy. It is therefore possible that leaders of wealthy groups in extreme climates must offer a better bargain, using less violence and monopolizing fewer vital resources (i.e., conceding more freedom) than those in undemanding climates to prevent their subordinates leaving in search of better weather. Because moderate climates are more comfortable, wealthy citizens there cannot threaten to leave as credibly as can wealthy citizens of extreme climates, so leaders can exploit the former more.
Thus far we have explained how the psychology of threat and bargaining may help explain the observed relationship between climate, average income, and several freedom outcomes. We now offer two cautions. First, harsh climates are one of many kinds of survival threats. Models for predicting freedoms as a function of threat may be improved by considering different kinds of survival threats such as pathogens and parasites, predation, individual/coalitional violence, and resource scarcity. Further, threats to “higher” needs than survival, such as the need for status, may also explain freedom-relevant outcomes. For example, the most variable portion of homicide rates across groups is the rate at which young men kill other young men over status disputes (Daly & Wilson Reference Daly and Wilson1988). Models predicting freedom from fear may therefore be improved by including predictors of threats to status.
Our second caution emphasizes the importance of a specific predictor of status threat: income equality. Increasing inequality is a threat to status because it creates a larger gap between current and desired state, which in turn motivates more extreme efforts to make up the difference (Mishra & Lalumière Reference Mishra and Lalumière2010). A large body of evidence has shown that income inequality, above and beyond average income, predicts a wide array of social, health, and well-being outcomes at the aggregate level, including many directly relevant to freedom (e.g., ingroup vs. outgroup comparisons, competition and discrimination, intergroup violence; reviewed in Wilkinson & Pickett Reference Wilkinson and Pickett2009). Furthermore, average income and income inequality are poorly associated at the aggregate level. As a consequence, Van de Vliert's reliance on mean group income to explain outcomes like ethnocentrism and aggression may obscure important effects of within-group income inequality on these outcomes.