Maestripieri et al. review large literatures on the beauty premium and consider theories that cross disciplinary boundaries, including their preferred perspective of evolutionary psychology. That effort is commendable, and connecting literatures could lead to useful research cross-pollination and new possibilities for policy makers to combat discrimination. We agree that mating motives play a role in decisions that favor attractive individuals. Mating motives alone, however, are neither sufficient to explain the persistence of these biases in key environments like the labor market nor necessary for these biases to occur in the first place. In the former case, Maestripieri et al. ironically fail to consider what hiring strategies are most fit in a competitive environment. In the latter case, they mischaracterize economic approaches to discrimination that can explain the beauty premium in the absence of mating motives (and also explain why humans prefer attractiveness).
1. Mating motives cannot explain discrimination in labor markets
Maestripieri et al. attempt to explain the beauty premium in labor markets by recourse to the behavior of individual decision makers. For example, they note that “when a male employer has the opportunity to hire an attractive female employee … it is likely that the man's mating motivation is activated” (sect. 5.2.1, para. 5). But if attractive females are not more productive workers, as the authors' review suggests, then an arbitrage opportunity is available for any firm that does not have this bias: More productive workers will be available at lower prices. Even if this advantage is small, over time arbitrageurs will win and biased firms will lose, similar to how functional adaptations survive in species, and a small number of unbiased firms can wipe out the beauty premium. Theories of why individuals share resources with attractive people are hence not sufficient to explain the beauty premium in labor markets. Our next and perhaps most crucial point explains why they are not a necessary explanation.
2. (At least) two flavors of discrimination
Maestripieri et al. criticize economic models of discrimination for not explaining why attractiveness is favored. In favor of mating motives, they provide a mechanism behind attractiveness preferences in mating that is putatively non-economic (sect. 2.1.3, para. 2): “In fact, human facial attractiveness is likely to be an indicator of overall quality, including greater genetic quality, lower exposure to stress during early development, greater resistance to diseases and parasites, and greater fertility.” This argument essentially states that because genetic quality cannot be directly observed, people use attractiveness as a proxy for quality, and on average, they are better off than if they ignored this useful information.
The idea that attractiveness is correlated with desirable but unobserved qualities, however, coincides exactly with the economic concept of statistical discrimination (Arrow Reference Arrow, Ashenfelter and Rees1973). Like mating partners, employers also want to identify positive qualities, particularly productivity, that they cannot directly or perfectly observe. Hence, the preference for observables like attractiveness can be explained as identifying groups that have higher average productivity. We are puzzled how it can be fit to judge that attractive people have greater genetic quality and health (according to Maestripieri et al. themselves), yet not fit to judge that they are likely better or more reliable workers. It is not necessary that the hiring individual wants proximity to sexually attractive people for the beauty premium to occur; if attractiveness is a cue to mate quality, it is often a cue to worker quality. Although economists tend to assume that in equilibrium, such discrimination is rational, they need not even be correct in their beliefs that attractive workers are, on average, better for statistical discrimination to operate.
For example, Maestripieri et al. discuss the experiment by Mobius and Rosenblat (Reference Mobius and Rosenblat2006), in which attractive workers were paid more even when they only had phone interviews with their experimental employers. Mobius and Rosenblat interpret this result as reflecting statistical discrimination; more attractive people were more confident, which was used as a proxy to judge their productivity. Attractive workers were not more productive, a fact that Maestripieri et al. note in this and several other experiments, but that does not mean that the statistical rule of favoring attractive or confident people is generally useless. As evolutionary psychologists and others have noted, otherwise adaptive heuristics often fail to apply in one-off experimental settings (e.g., Gigerenzer et al. Reference Gigerenzer, Hoffrage and Kleinbölting1991).
Maestripieri et al. omit the concept of statistical discrimination and treat taste-based discrimination – a premium given to members of a group even if productivity were observable (Becker Reference Becker1957) – as the only economic approach, despite several recent studies that distinguish taste-based from statistical in lab experiments (Mobius & Rosenblat Reference Mobius and Rosenblat2006), field experiments (List Reference List2004), and archival real-world data (Abrams et al. Reference Abrams, Bertrand and Mullainathan2012; Price & Wolfers Reference Price and Wolfers2010). These distinctions are important for understanding the cause of discriminatory outcomes, and neither can explain all instances of discrimination. When hiring a waitress at a Hooters restaurant or an actor for a Hollywood movie, taste-based discrimination on attractiveness may occur. But is it more likely that attractive actors are hired because the producer wants proximity to them for sexual reasons or because audiences who will never be close to them like seeing beautiful people in movies? Even in our examples, the source of taste-based discrimination is plausibly customers, and a profit-minded firm would hire for beauty regardless of the hiring agent's sexual tastes.
3. Integration instead of either-or questions
Mating motives cannot supplant all other explanations of the beauty premium. But instead of asking whether discrimination is better explained by either economic theories or psychological theories, we believe the most progress comes from integrating the two approaches. The taste-based versus statistical distinction could be useful to psychologists who study discrimination or mating preferences. Evolutionary psychology could provide labor economists with a more nuanced and molecular understanding of the origins of statistical beliefs that attractive workers are more productive. Similarly, the idea of mating motives could shed light on the nature of taste-based desires to affiliate with attractive people that ultimately lead to discrimination. The impact on research and policy is greatest when these multiple mechanisms are considered in concert.
Maestripieri et al. review large literatures on the beauty premium and consider theories that cross disciplinary boundaries, including their preferred perspective of evolutionary psychology. That effort is commendable, and connecting literatures could lead to useful research cross-pollination and new possibilities for policy makers to combat discrimination. We agree that mating motives play a role in decisions that favor attractive individuals. Mating motives alone, however, are neither sufficient to explain the persistence of these biases in key environments like the labor market nor necessary for these biases to occur in the first place. In the former case, Maestripieri et al. ironically fail to consider what hiring strategies are most fit in a competitive environment. In the latter case, they mischaracterize economic approaches to discrimination that can explain the beauty premium in the absence of mating motives (and also explain why humans prefer attractiveness).
1. Mating motives cannot explain discrimination in labor markets
Maestripieri et al. attempt to explain the beauty premium in labor markets by recourse to the behavior of individual decision makers. For example, they note that “when a male employer has the opportunity to hire an attractive female employee … it is likely that the man's mating motivation is activated” (sect. 5.2.1, para. 5). But if attractive females are not more productive workers, as the authors' review suggests, then an arbitrage opportunity is available for any firm that does not have this bias: More productive workers will be available at lower prices. Even if this advantage is small, over time arbitrageurs will win and biased firms will lose, similar to how functional adaptations survive in species, and a small number of unbiased firms can wipe out the beauty premium. Theories of why individuals share resources with attractive people are hence not sufficient to explain the beauty premium in labor markets. Our next and perhaps most crucial point explains why they are not a necessary explanation.
2. (At least) two flavors of discrimination
Maestripieri et al. criticize economic models of discrimination for not explaining why attractiveness is favored. In favor of mating motives, they provide a mechanism behind attractiveness preferences in mating that is putatively non-economic (sect. 2.1.3, para. 2): “In fact, human facial attractiveness is likely to be an indicator of overall quality, including greater genetic quality, lower exposure to stress during early development, greater resistance to diseases and parasites, and greater fertility.” This argument essentially states that because genetic quality cannot be directly observed, people use attractiveness as a proxy for quality, and on average, they are better off than if they ignored this useful information.
The idea that attractiveness is correlated with desirable but unobserved qualities, however, coincides exactly with the economic concept of statistical discrimination (Arrow Reference Arrow, Ashenfelter and Rees1973). Like mating partners, employers also want to identify positive qualities, particularly productivity, that they cannot directly or perfectly observe. Hence, the preference for observables like attractiveness can be explained as identifying groups that have higher average productivity. We are puzzled how it can be fit to judge that attractive people have greater genetic quality and health (according to Maestripieri et al. themselves), yet not fit to judge that they are likely better or more reliable workers. It is not necessary that the hiring individual wants proximity to sexually attractive people for the beauty premium to occur; if attractiveness is a cue to mate quality, it is often a cue to worker quality. Although economists tend to assume that in equilibrium, such discrimination is rational, they need not even be correct in their beliefs that attractive workers are, on average, better for statistical discrimination to operate.
For example, Maestripieri et al. discuss the experiment by Mobius and Rosenblat (Reference Mobius and Rosenblat2006), in which attractive workers were paid more even when they only had phone interviews with their experimental employers. Mobius and Rosenblat interpret this result as reflecting statistical discrimination; more attractive people were more confident, which was used as a proxy to judge their productivity. Attractive workers were not more productive, a fact that Maestripieri et al. note in this and several other experiments, but that does not mean that the statistical rule of favoring attractive or confident people is generally useless. As evolutionary psychologists and others have noted, otherwise adaptive heuristics often fail to apply in one-off experimental settings (e.g., Gigerenzer et al. Reference Gigerenzer, Hoffrage and Kleinbölting1991).
Maestripieri et al. omit the concept of statistical discrimination and treat taste-based discrimination – a premium given to members of a group even if productivity were observable (Becker Reference Becker1957) – as the only economic approach, despite several recent studies that distinguish taste-based from statistical in lab experiments (Mobius & Rosenblat Reference Mobius and Rosenblat2006), field experiments (List Reference List2004), and archival real-world data (Abrams et al. Reference Abrams, Bertrand and Mullainathan2012; Price & Wolfers Reference Price and Wolfers2010). These distinctions are important for understanding the cause of discriminatory outcomes, and neither can explain all instances of discrimination. When hiring a waitress at a Hooters restaurant or an actor for a Hollywood movie, taste-based discrimination on attractiveness may occur. But is it more likely that attractive actors are hired because the producer wants proximity to them for sexual reasons or because audiences who will never be close to them like seeing beautiful people in movies? Even in our examples, the source of taste-based discrimination is plausibly customers, and a profit-minded firm would hire for beauty regardless of the hiring agent's sexual tastes.
3. Integration instead of either-or questions
Mating motives cannot supplant all other explanations of the beauty premium. But instead of asking whether discrimination is better explained by either economic theories or psychological theories, we believe the most progress comes from integrating the two approaches. The taste-based versus statistical distinction could be useful to psychologists who study discrimination or mating preferences. Evolutionary psychology could provide labor economists with a more nuanced and molecular understanding of the origins of statistical beliefs that attractive workers are more productive. Similarly, the idea of mating motives could shed light on the nature of taste-based desires to affiliate with attractive people that ultimately lead to discrimination. The impact on research and policy is greatest when these multiple mechanisms are considered in concert.