As noted by Maestripieri et al., social science research has documented the existence of attractiveness bias operating across a variety of domains with very little consideration being given to evolutionary explanations. Although we are in favor of evolutionary explanation in general and often see the value in separating ultimate and proximate causation (but see Laland Reference Laland2015), Maestripieri et al. seem to be putting forth an inconsistent argument in which they become vulnerable to many of the very same criticisms leveled against stereotype theory in the target article. In the light of these inconsistencies, the explanatory utility of their evolutionary account of attractiveness bias comes into question, as does the issue of whether the associated adaptationist perspective offers anything superior to the starting point of stereotype theory in conceptual soundness (Racine Reference Racine2013).
Although the authors allow that additional sociocultural factors are likely to contribute to the observation of such biases, for their evolutionary perspective to make a clear contribution it should provide a degree of explanatory power above and beyond that offered by existing accounts of attractiveness bias. By contrast, Maestripieri et al. attempt the difficult balancing act of fashioning an interdisciplinary approach while advocating for the evolutionary explanation they wish to conceptually situate front and center. It is in this act of situating their particular evolutionary explanation as a solution to, or means to overcome, some of the existing problems and criticisms in explaining attractiveness bias that the article tends to falter and theoretical issues arise surrounding the explanatory power of those evolutionary concepts invoked (Wereha & Racine Reference Wereha and Racine2012).
An essential component of the authors' argument in favor of considering an evolutionary explanation for attractiveness bias over extant stereotype hypotheses is that the latter lack the capacity to make claims about the causal efficacy of said stereotypes in determining preference for attractive individuals. Maestripieri et al. (sect. 4.1, para. 5) claim that “the motivation to behave prosocially toward attractive individuals pre-exists the attribution of positive characteristics to them and is not caused by them, as assumed by stereotype-based theories.” Using the labor market as an example, this is to say that attractive persons are not perceived by the agent as better qualified, but nonetheless are increasingly likely to receive a job offer over an unattractive counterpart. This implies that the construct (i.e., stereotype) pre-existing manifestation of attractiveness bias operates outside of the agent's awareness insofar as subsequent attributions of positive characteristics may be seen as a post hoc rationalization. Given this implication, criticisms of causal inefficacy are ill advised because they may be leveled at the authors' own position if it is considered problematic for a causally implicated construct to pre-exist the motivation it is hypothesized to generate (see also Slaney & Racine Reference Slaney and Racine2013). Similar to a stereotype, the authors write of attractiveness bias as the manifestation of a psychological adaptation, which ancestrally conferred the benefit of surrounding its possessor with an increased number of potential fertile mates. It is highly unlikely that an agent in charge of hiring new employees would acknowledge this influence of mate selection pressures on the decision process. As such, the psychological adaptation hypothesized by Maestripieri et al. must also pre-exist any attribution of positive characteristics relevant to employability and thus be ontologically situated at the same position in the causal chain as a “beautiful is good” stereotype.
When situated in the causal story in this manner, more problems with their account begin to arise. Those portions of the article drawing on outcomes of economic games that demonstrate males offer more resources to an attractive female whom they will never see again, or exhibit more generous behavior in the presence of attractive female bystanders, are intended by the authors to bolster their own evolutionary explanation while simultaneously discounting stereotype theory on the basis that a stereotype is causally inefficacious in such circumstances given the male has no possibility of future interaction with the attractive female participant/bystander. However, if the hypothetical construct of a stereotype pre-exists any attribution of positive characteristics, the potential for future interactions in which said positive characteristics may come to bear need not be considered when implicating stereotypes in instances of attractiveness bias. Conversely, if a psychological adaptation beneficial to mate selection is implicated, the possibility of future interactions with an attractive participant/bystander indeed ought to be a salient variable in manifestations of the bias.
In addition to the previously mentioned theoretical inconsistency arising from reference to economic games, the diversity of methodologies employed in those studies used to support the authors' argument bring further problems with the ad hoc nature of their mismatch hypothesis. By combining evidence from both paradigmatic cases of attractiveness bias (e.g., preference for attractive job candidates being relatively more pronounced in males) with instances of such bias functioning to promote prosocial behavior (e.g., males' increased generosity in the presence of attractive opposite-sex bystanders), Maestripieri et al. create potential conceptual confusion surrounding the adaptive function held responsible for said findings. In the former case, a model of male intrasexual competition for females is implied, whereas the latter relies more heavily on increasing the probability of female mate selection. For their account to be plausible, it must be specified for which mating strategy the psychological adaptation has been selected, because not all of those strategies evidenced by the social psychology findings cited were salient in the ancestral environment in which this adaptation developed.
In summary, both Maestripieri et al. and stereotype theorists hypothesize a psychological construct. As it stands, the benefit of a stereotype is its amenability to social change without ad hoc re-contextualization to capture disparate mate selection models. Although acknowledging the legitimacy of many issues identified with stereotype theory by the authors, and maintaining the usefulness of evolutionary explanation in accounting for certain instances of attractiveness bias, using it as foundational to explaining the phenomenon seems to serve only to conceptually complicate matters. Integrating the claims of Maestripieri et al. into a dual-inheritance model not privileging psychological adaptation over sociocultural considerations may ultimately be more coherent and parsimonious (e.g., Boyd et al. Reference Boyd, Richerson and Henrich2011).
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As noted by Maestripieri et al., social science research has documented the existence of attractiveness bias operating across a variety of domains with very little consideration being given to evolutionary explanations. Although we are in favor of evolutionary explanation in general and often see the value in separating ultimate and proximate causation (but see Laland Reference Laland2015), Maestripieri et al. seem to be putting forth an inconsistent argument in which they become vulnerable to many of the very same criticisms leveled against stereotype theory in the target article. In the light of these inconsistencies, the explanatory utility of their evolutionary account of attractiveness bias comes into question, as does the issue of whether the associated adaptationist perspective offers anything superior to the starting point of stereotype theory in conceptual soundness (Racine Reference Racine2013).
Although the authors allow that additional sociocultural factors are likely to contribute to the observation of such biases, for their evolutionary perspective to make a clear contribution it should provide a degree of explanatory power above and beyond that offered by existing accounts of attractiveness bias. By contrast, Maestripieri et al. attempt the difficult balancing act of fashioning an interdisciplinary approach while advocating for the evolutionary explanation they wish to conceptually situate front and center. It is in this act of situating their particular evolutionary explanation as a solution to, or means to overcome, some of the existing problems and criticisms in explaining attractiveness bias that the article tends to falter and theoretical issues arise surrounding the explanatory power of those evolutionary concepts invoked (Wereha & Racine Reference Wereha and Racine2012).
An essential component of the authors' argument in favor of considering an evolutionary explanation for attractiveness bias over extant stereotype hypotheses is that the latter lack the capacity to make claims about the causal efficacy of said stereotypes in determining preference for attractive individuals. Maestripieri et al. (sect. 4.1, para. 5) claim that “the motivation to behave prosocially toward attractive individuals pre-exists the attribution of positive characteristics to them and is not caused by them, as assumed by stereotype-based theories.” Using the labor market as an example, this is to say that attractive persons are not perceived by the agent as better qualified, but nonetheless are increasingly likely to receive a job offer over an unattractive counterpart. This implies that the construct (i.e., stereotype) pre-existing manifestation of attractiveness bias operates outside of the agent's awareness insofar as subsequent attributions of positive characteristics may be seen as a post hoc rationalization. Given this implication, criticisms of causal inefficacy are ill advised because they may be leveled at the authors' own position if it is considered problematic for a causally implicated construct to pre-exist the motivation it is hypothesized to generate (see also Slaney & Racine Reference Slaney and Racine2013). Similar to a stereotype, the authors write of attractiveness bias as the manifestation of a psychological adaptation, which ancestrally conferred the benefit of surrounding its possessor with an increased number of potential fertile mates. It is highly unlikely that an agent in charge of hiring new employees would acknowledge this influence of mate selection pressures on the decision process. As such, the psychological adaptation hypothesized by Maestripieri et al. must also pre-exist any attribution of positive characteristics relevant to employability and thus be ontologically situated at the same position in the causal chain as a “beautiful is good” stereotype.
When situated in the causal story in this manner, more problems with their account begin to arise. Those portions of the article drawing on outcomes of economic games that demonstrate males offer more resources to an attractive female whom they will never see again, or exhibit more generous behavior in the presence of attractive female bystanders, are intended by the authors to bolster their own evolutionary explanation while simultaneously discounting stereotype theory on the basis that a stereotype is causally inefficacious in such circumstances given the male has no possibility of future interaction with the attractive female participant/bystander. However, if the hypothetical construct of a stereotype pre-exists any attribution of positive characteristics, the potential for future interactions in which said positive characteristics may come to bear need not be considered when implicating stereotypes in instances of attractiveness bias. Conversely, if a psychological adaptation beneficial to mate selection is implicated, the possibility of future interactions with an attractive participant/bystander indeed ought to be a salient variable in manifestations of the bias.
In addition to the previously mentioned theoretical inconsistency arising from reference to economic games, the diversity of methodologies employed in those studies used to support the authors' argument bring further problems with the ad hoc nature of their mismatch hypothesis. By combining evidence from both paradigmatic cases of attractiveness bias (e.g., preference for attractive job candidates being relatively more pronounced in males) with instances of such bias functioning to promote prosocial behavior (e.g., males' increased generosity in the presence of attractive opposite-sex bystanders), Maestripieri et al. create potential conceptual confusion surrounding the adaptive function held responsible for said findings. In the former case, a model of male intrasexual competition for females is implied, whereas the latter relies more heavily on increasing the probability of female mate selection. For their account to be plausible, it must be specified for which mating strategy the psychological adaptation has been selected, because not all of those strategies evidenced by the social psychology findings cited were salient in the ancestral environment in which this adaptation developed.
In summary, both Maestripieri et al. and stereotype theorists hypothesize a psychological construct. As it stands, the benefit of a stereotype is its amenability to social change without ad hoc re-contextualization to capture disparate mate selection models. Although acknowledging the legitimacy of many issues identified with stereotype theory by the authors, and maintaining the usefulness of evolutionary explanation in accounting for certain instances of attractiveness bias, using it as foundational to explaining the phenomenon seems to serve only to conceptually complicate matters. Integrating the claims of Maestripieri et al. into a dual-inheritance model not privileging psychological adaptation over sociocultural considerations may ultimately be more coherent and parsimonious (e.g., Boyd et al. Reference Boyd, Richerson and Henrich2011).