In his article, Van de Vliert applies the appraisal theory (Lazarus & Folkman Reference Lazarus and Folkman1984) in an attempt to explain unevenly distributed fundamental freedoms, thereby suggesting that people's needs, and freedoms of all kinds are caused by climate-economic-based habitats. However, it is doubtful that humans mindlessly adopt every goal imposed by these habitats, because people often have their own guiding preferences and motivations. Human reality is mostly social. Social contexts and motives construct human thoughts and behaviors (Smith & Semin Reference Smith, Semin and Zanna2004). The reality of subjective meanings is anchored in its socially shared nature (Smith & Mackie Reference Smith and Mackie1995). Social verification transforms subjective experiences into objective realities, a process that has costs and benefits. To survive in any social unit, people must possess a mental compass for navigating through role-rule structures in terms of accountability demands, control, and moral backstops (Tetlock Reference Tetlock2002) that make them receptive to social and ecological-economic factors.
However, certain cognitive-motivational mechanisms might lead people to resist external influences. Situational demands involving potential costs/benefits do not always cause people to pursue goals, especially when they are held by others. Rather, people sometimes spontaneously shield themselves from others and even counteract others' implicit motivational influences (Leander & Chartrand Reference Leander, Chartrand, Forgas, Kruglanski and Williams2011). The magnitude of their resistance depends on competing goals, current situational demands, and the available mental-social resources. This flexibility in people's momentary sensitivity to others' influences suggests that they have their own motivational priorities. Sometimes, however, goals become more socially shared when they become associated with a sense of urgency, and this may lead individuals to temporally shift their priorities. For example, perceiving that an ingroup member is seeking to attain an important goal may lead individuals to pursue that goal themselves – as long as it suited their own motivational priorities.
Just as egocentrism is the tendency to judge oneself as superior to others, ethnocentrism is the parallel tendency to judge one's group as superior to other groups. Because these judgment differences include perceived values and goals, shared reality within ingroups increases the likelihood of conflict with outgroups, but also intensifies loyalty to those ingroups. Such egocentric and ethnocentric biases occur in cultural settings, which will determine the full meaning of an event-behavior. For example, in highly interdependent cultures, withdrawal from an interaction might be defined more as expression of anger than it would be in an independent social environment (Mesquita & Markus Reference Mesquita, Markus, Manstead, Frijda and Fischer2004). Similarly, in interdependent cultures, interfering with fights among children is prohibited because fighting is believed to lead to the development of empathy. In independent cultures, on the contrary, a lack of intervention is a sign of neglect. By the same token, although interdependent cultures consider voluntary actions as a response to social roles, in independent cultures they are considered as expressions of individual preferences (Markus Reference Markus2008).
Taken together, a question arises: What are the origins of cross-cultural differences? Because cultural rules are accumulated over generations, this question is historical in nature and it is impossible to find out which factors have played a real part in their development. Much research has focused on the relationship between a variety of ecological and economic factors, in an attempt to explain cross-cultural variation in terms of independence/interdependence or individualism/collectivism (e.g., Fincher et al. Reference Fincher, Thornhill, Murray and Schaller2008; Triandis Reference Triandis1995). However, living conditions, territorial rooting, and so forth, are necessary but insufficient conditions for determining cross-cultural differences. Social distance (population density, social and economic standing) call for abilities to manage the presence/absence of others, and to build connections based on contextual characteristics related to different scales (localization/globalization) and dimensions (territory/network; Moser Reference Moser, Nevarez and Moser2009).
There is therefore no doubt that in the self/ingroup relationship “need-based stress appraisals and choices of goals, means and outcomes are…converging into a pattern of…behavioral choices [that] can be more or less…routine, thus unfree, versus more or less autonomous and adventurous, thus free” (sect. 2.4.1, para. 2). However, as rich and interesting as is the very large research literature reported by Van de Vliert, the question about the India paradox remains open. In 1948, India was struggling for its independence and survival. Through its collective coexistence (different faiths, languages, cultures), India was not expected to survive as a democracy. However, against the logic of human history, India's economy grew and now ranks eleventh in the world for GDP and fifth in purchasing power parity. But according to the Human Development Index, India is 119th out of 169.
Clearly, freedom is a slippery concept, and as such it is difficult to take a stand or even move on, because in addition to being an idyllic state, the meaning of freedom changes according to the perspective taken and the context in which such an idyllic state comes to mind. Considering freedom without looking at its contextual nature could mistakenly lead to the assumption that one is dealing with some kind of “absoluteness.” The absoluteness of such concepts makes their use psychologically meaningless; their contextualized understanding reveals their dynamic nature. Human psychology is about meaning, which emerges from moment-by-moment recursive transactions with the external world (Mischel & Shoda Reference Mischel, Shoda, Mesquita, Barrett and Smith2010). Freedom of all kinds takes on its full significance whenever its relativistic nature, in the short- and long terms, is taken into account. Freedom from certain needs and fears depends on the situational urgency, whereas absoluteness of those freedoms is recklessness. Context-free moral judgments and decisions are often based on universal moral principles. However, the same judgment and decision can be rooted in other considerations, depending on which aspects of the current context are taken into account. Self-indulgence or self-derogation of moral principles may be facilitated by highly demanding physical environments. Demanding climates may provide a solid justification for some kinds of misconduct. Notwithstanding, insofar as it is true that “all living species evolve links between their natural habitats and their natural habits” (sect. 1, para. 1), it is also true that the demanding or undemanding nature of the climate and its changes gradually trigger long-run changes in all living beings, particularly humans, and that situations, cultural, ecological, or/and economical environments exist by virtue of the people who constitute them.
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In his article, Van de Vliert applies the appraisal theory (Lazarus & Folkman Reference Lazarus and Folkman1984) in an attempt to explain unevenly distributed fundamental freedoms, thereby suggesting that people's needs, and freedoms of all kinds are caused by climate-economic-based habitats. However, it is doubtful that humans mindlessly adopt every goal imposed by these habitats, because people often have their own guiding preferences and motivations. Human reality is mostly social. Social contexts and motives construct human thoughts and behaviors (Smith & Semin Reference Smith, Semin and Zanna2004). The reality of subjective meanings is anchored in its socially shared nature (Smith & Mackie Reference Smith and Mackie1995). Social verification transforms subjective experiences into objective realities, a process that has costs and benefits. To survive in any social unit, people must possess a mental compass for navigating through role-rule structures in terms of accountability demands, control, and moral backstops (Tetlock Reference Tetlock2002) that make them receptive to social and ecological-economic factors.
However, certain cognitive-motivational mechanisms might lead people to resist external influences. Situational demands involving potential costs/benefits do not always cause people to pursue goals, especially when they are held by others. Rather, people sometimes spontaneously shield themselves from others and even counteract others' implicit motivational influences (Leander & Chartrand Reference Leander, Chartrand, Forgas, Kruglanski and Williams2011). The magnitude of their resistance depends on competing goals, current situational demands, and the available mental-social resources. This flexibility in people's momentary sensitivity to others' influences suggests that they have their own motivational priorities. Sometimes, however, goals become more socially shared when they become associated with a sense of urgency, and this may lead individuals to temporally shift their priorities. For example, perceiving that an ingroup member is seeking to attain an important goal may lead individuals to pursue that goal themselves – as long as it suited their own motivational priorities.
Just as egocentrism is the tendency to judge oneself as superior to others, ethnocentrism is the parallel tendency to judge one's group as superior to other groups. Because these judgment differences include perceived values and goals, shared reality within ingroups increases the likelihood of conflict with outgroups, but also intensifies loyalty to those ingroups. Such egocentric and ethnocentric biases occur in cultural settings, which will determine the full meaning of an event-behavior. For example, in highly interdependent cultures, withdrawal from an interaction might be defined more as expression of anger than it would be in an independent social environment (Mesquita & Markus Reference Mesquita, Markus, Manstead, Frijda and Fischer2004). Similarly, in interdependent cultures, interfering with fights among children is prohibited because fighting is believed to lead to the development of empathy. In independent cultures, on the contrary, a lack of intervention is a sign of neglect. By the same token, although interdependent cultures consider voluntary actions as a response to social roles, in independent cultures they are considered as expressions of individual preferences (Markus Reference Markus2008).
Taken together, a question arises: What are the origins of cross-cultural differences? Because cultural rules are accumulated over generations, this question is historical in nature and it is impossible to find out which factors have played a real part in their development. Much research has focused on the relationship between a variety of ecological and economic factors, in an attempt to explain cross-cultural variation in terms of independence/interdependence or individualism/collectivism (e.g., Fincher et al. Reference Fincher, Thornhill, Murray and Schaller2008; Triandis Reference Triandis1995). However, living conditions, territorial rooting, and so forth, are necessary but insufficient conditions for determining cross-cultural differences. Social distance (population density, social and economic standing) call for abilities to manage the presence/absence of others, and to build connections based on contextual characteristics related to different scales (localization/globalization) and dimensions (territory/network; Moser Reference Moser, Nevarez and Moser2009).
There is therefore no doubt that in the self/ingroup relationship “need-based stress appraisals and choices of goals, means and outcomes are…converging into a pattern of…behavioral choices [that] can be more or less…routine, thus unfree, versus more or less autonomous and adventurous, thus free” (sect. 2.4.1, para. 2). However, as rich and interesting as is the very large research literature reported by Van de Vliert, the question about the India paradox remains open. In 1948, India was struggling for its independence and survival. Through its collective coexistence (different faiths, languages, cultures), India was not expected to survive as a democracy. However, against the logic of human history, India's economy grew and now ranks eleventh in the world for GDP and fifth in purchasing power parity. But according to the Human Development Index, India is 119th out of 169.
Clearly, freedom is a slippery concept, and as such it is difficult to take a stand or even move on, because in addition to being an idyllic state, the meaning of freedom changes according to the perspective taken and the context in which such an idyllic state comes to mind. Considering freedom without looking at its contextual nature could mistakenly lead to the assumption that one is dealing with some kind of “absoluteness.” The absoluteness of such concepts makes their use psychologically meaningless; their contextualized understanding reveals their dynamic nature. Human psychology is about meaning, which emerges from moment-by-moment recursive transactions with the external world (Mischel & Shoda Reference Mischel, Shoda, Mesquita, Barrett and Smith2010). Freedom of all kinds takes on its full significance whenever its relativistic nature, in the short- and long terms, is taken into account. Freedom from certain needs and fears depends on the situational urgency, whereas absoluteness of those freedoms is recklessness. Context-free moral judgments and decisions are often based on universal moral principles. However, the same judgment and decision can be rooted in other considerations, depending on which aspects of the current context are taken into account. Self-indulgence or self-derogation of moral principles may be facilitated by highly demanding physical environments. Demanding climates may provide a solid justification for some kinds of misconduct. Notwithstanding, insofar as it is true that “all living species evolve links between their natural habitats and their natural habits” (sect. 1, para. 1), it is also true that the demanding or undemanding nature of the climate and its changes gradually trigger long-run changes in all living beings, particularly humans, and that situations, cultural, ecological, or/and economical environments exist by virtue of the people who constitute them.