Baumeister et al.'s timely analysis reminds us of the importance of selves for groups. However, their analysis fails to capture the complexities and dynamics of the self. I argue that their framework – and research on groups more generally – requires a deeper appreciation of which selves matter for group performance, when and why. I also outline ways in which individuated selves can be destructive for groups.
The central assumption of Baumeister et al.'s framework is that effective group performance requires “different selves playing different roles” (sect 1.1, para. 4). According to the authors, such individuation enables members to make distinct contributions to collective performance. Implicit in their arguments is the assumption that selves align with the roles, skills or abilities that drive group performance. However, evidence for the functioning of dual selves in groups calls into question these assumptions.
Healey et al. (Reference Healey, Vuori and Hodgkinson2015) extended dual systems theory to the analysis of work groups to explain coordination failures that occur despite group members sharing (explicit) attitudes, goals, and beliefs. Dual systems theories posit that individuals rely on two distinct information-processing systems (e.g., Epstein Reference Epstein1994; Lieberman Reference Lieberman2007; Stanovich & West Reference Stanovich and West2000). The first is a fast operating and largely nonconscious (i.e., reflexive) system that provides affectively charged responses. The second is a slower and more deliberative (i.e., reflective) system that provides reasoned responses. Because the two systems can provide individuals with conflicting responses to the same object or event, the self is often differentiated within the person (i.e., intrapersonal dissociation; see, e.g., Epstein Reference Epstein1994). Hence, group members often find themselves “caught in two minds.” Their actions are sometimes guided by the reflexive system (the intuitive, impulsive self) and sometimes guided by the reflective system (the reasoned, deliberative self). Which self predominates at a given time depends largely on task and situational factors (e.g., time pressure, cognitive load, degree of group interrelating). These effects are particularly obvious in natural groups, such as work teams operating in naturalistic settings that must collaborate for extended periods (Gersick & Hackman Reference Gersick and Hackman1990). In such circumstances much of the group's work “gets done by individuals or subgroups, acting when the ‘main’ group is not in session” (McGrath Reference McGrath1991, p. 152). Hence, different selves become more or less influential when the group is not in session.
When Baumeister et al. extol the virtues of different selves playing different roles, they overlook the fact that not all selves or even roles are relevant to effective performance of the group's task. From a dual-selves perspective, an individual member's task-focused self (i.e., the person's reflective, reasoned self) may bring unique skills to the task, even while their reflexive, intuitive self pulls them away from elements of the task (see Healey et al. Reference Healey, Vuori and Hodgkinson2015). When some selves run counter to the group's goals or tasks, individuation in the form of emphasizing or facilitating distinct selves can undermine group performance.
In fact, research on groups has long recognized that although task-related roles may be part of the self they do not constitute the whole self. Barnard's (Reference Barnard1938, p. 277) classic treatise on organizations recognized that group members are often subject to competing demands (e.g., professional versus organizational roles) that create “a moral complexity and a moral conflict presumably not soluble.” Bales (Reference Bales1951) observed that group members adopt specialized socio-emotional roles as well as task-related roles, which may conflict with one another. Similarly, Thibaut and Kelley (Reference Thibaut and Kelley1959) distinguished between the roles prescribed by the group and the actual role(s) enacted by individual members. Studies of role conflict show the negative effects of such intrapersonal struggles (Jackson & Schuler Reference Jackson and Schuler1985; Kahn et al. Reference Kahn, Wolfe, Quinn, Snoek and Rosenthal1964; Rizzo et al. Reference Rizzo, House and Lirtzman1970). These range from passive (e.g., withdrawal, decision avoidance, resistance to group rules) to active (e.g., conflict) effects.
Based on the foregoing, it seems that groups performing interdependent tasks need selves that are differentiated in terms of task-relevant expertise but not in terms of self-interest. However, the two types of self can be more difficult to disentangle than Baumeister et al. acknowledge. For instance, members from different professional backgrounds may provide a group with expertise variety; but they may also bring differing attitudes, motives and stereotypes to the group setting, which can hinder coordination and cohesion (see, e.g., Ancona & Caldwell Reference Ancona and Caldwell1992).
Baumeister et al. argue that the solution to the pursuit of self-interest at the group's expense is the first step in their two-step process: establishing a common social identity. They posit that, once established, such shared identity enables a group to subsequently capitalize on the benefits of differentiated roles.
Notwithstanding the fact that, as we have seen, explicitly shared social identity beliefs can be insufficient to prevent coordination failures when group members act based on their implicit self, the idea of a one-shot common identification process as a sustainable means for restraining divergent self-interests over time is somewhat unrealistic. Rather, evidence suggests that groups require ongoing mechanisms for this purpose. Building on his observation that group members adopt specialized socio-emotional roles as well as task-related roles, Bales (Reference Bales1951) process analyses revealed that negative socio-emotional actions often require group members to be “reintegrated” into the group (see also McGrath Reference McGrath1984). Such reintegration tends to occur in the latter periods of a group's task, as others seek to reign-in the socio-emotional actions of a discrepant individual when he or she “defends or asserts self” during the task (Bales Reference Bales1951, p. 193). These findings are consistent with the idea that steps for group cohesion need to reoccur over time, especially in natural groups.
I propose one final limit to the benefits of emphasizing the self in groups. Baumeister et al. highlight the group pathologies caused by the “submersion of individual selves in the group” (sect. 2.2.7), which include social loafing and groupthink. In contrast, they claim that the opposite of submergence, namely emphasizing the individuality and uniqueness of individuals' contributions, necessarily decreases pathologies. However, recent research on narcissism and identification rebuts this latter claim. Specifically, Galvin et al. (Reference Galvin, Lange and Ashforth2015) found considerable evidence that narcissistic individuals subsume the identity of a group within their own identity, adopting the mindset that they and they alone are responsible for the group's success. This form of over-identification leads them to reduce information sharing and engage in dysfunctional behaviors such as excessive risk taking and exploitation of the group for personal ends. Their findings are consistent with the idea that emphasizing the self-as-group can be as dangerous as losing the self within the group.
Baumeister et al.'s framework needs to incorporate a more comprehensive view of the nature and influence of selves in groups. Only then will it provide an accurate account of group functioning.
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Baumeister et al.'s timely analysis reminds us of the importance of selves for groups. However, their analysis fails to capture the complexities and dynamics of the self. I argue that their framework – and research on groups more generally – requires a deeper appreciation of which selves matter for group performance, when and why. I also outline ways in which individuated selves can be destructive for groups.
The central assumption of Baumeister et al.'s framework is that effective group performance requires “different selves playing different roles” (sect 1.1, para. 4). According to the authors, such individuation enables members to make distinct contributions to collective performance. Implicit in their arguments is the assumption that selves align with the roles, skills or abilities that drive group performance. However, evidence for the functioning of dual selves in groups calls into question these assumptions.
Healey et al. (Reference Healey, Vuori and Hodgkinson2015) extended dual systems theory to the analysis of work groups to explain coordination failures that occur despite group members sharing (explicit) attitudes, goals, and beliefs. Dual systems theories posit that individuals rely on two distinct information-processing systems (e.g., Epstein Reference Epstein1994; Lieberman Reference Lieberman2007; Stanovich & West Reference Stanovich and West2000). The first is a fast operating and largely nonconscious (i.e., reflexive) system that provides affectively charged responses. The second is a slower and more deliberative (i.e., reflective) system that provides reasoned responses. Because the two systems can provide individuals with conflicting responses to the same object or event, the self is often differentiated within the person (i.e., intrapersonal dissociation; see, e.g., Epstein Reference Epstein1994). Hence, group members often find themselves “caught in two minds.” Their actions are sometimes guided by the reflexive system (the intuitive, impulsive self) and sometimes guided by the reflective system (the reasoned, deliberative self). Which self predominates at a given time depends largely on task and situational factors (e.g., time pressure, cognitive load, degree of group interrelating). These effects are particularly obvious in natural groups, such as work teams operating in naturalistic settings that must collaborate for extended periods (Gersick & Hackman Reference Gersick and Hackman1990). In such circumstances much of the group's work “gets done by individuals or subgroups, acting when the ‘main’ group is not in session” (McGrath Reference McGrath1991, p. 152). Hence, different selves become more or less influential when the group is not in session.
When Baumeister et al. extol the virtues of different selves playing different roles, they overlook the fact that not all selves or even roles are relevant to effective performance of the group's task. From a dual-selves perspective, an individual member's task-focused self (i.e., the person's reflective, reasoned self) may bring unique skills to the task, even while their reflexive, intuitive self pulls them away from elements of the task (see Healey et al. Reference Healey, Vuori and Hodgkinson2015). When some selves run counter to the group's goals or tasks, individuation in the form of emphasizing or facilitating distinct selves can undermine group performance.
In fact, research on groups has long recognized that although task-related roles may be part of the self they do not constitute the whole self. Barnard's (Reference Barnard1938, p. 277) classic treatise on organizations recognized that group members are often subject to competing demands (e.g., professional versus organizational roles) that create “a moral complexity and a moral conflict presumably not soluble.” Bales (Reference Bales1951) observed that group members adopt specialized socio-emotional roles as well as task-related roles, which may conflict with one another. Similarly, Thibaut and Kelley (Reference Thibaut and Kelley1959) distinguished between the roles prescribed by the group and the actual role(s) enacted by individual members. Studies of role conflict show the negative effects of such intrapersonal struggles (Jackson & Schuler Reference Jackson and Schuler1985; Kahn et al. Reference Kahn, Wolfe, Quinn, Snoek and Rosenthal1964; Rizzo et al. Reference Rizzo, House and Lirtzman1970). These range from passive (e.g., withdrawal, decision avoidance, resistance to group rules) to active (e.g., conflict) effects.
Based on the foregoing, it seems that groups performing interdependent tasks need selves that are differentiated in terms of task-relevant expertise but not in terms of self-interest. However, the two types of self can be more difficult to disentangle than Baumeister et al. acknowledge. For instance, members from different professional backgrounds may provide a group with expertise variety; but they may also bring differing attitudes, motives and stereotypes to the group setting, which can hinder coordination and cohesion (see, e.g., Ancona & Caldwell Reference Ancona and Caldwell1992).
Baumeister et al. argue that the solution to the pursuit of self-interest at the group's expense is the first step in their two-step process: establishing a common social identity. They posit that, once established, such shared identity enables a group to subsequently capitalize on the benefits of differentiated roles.
Notwithstanding the fact that, as we have seen, explicitly shared social identity beliefs can be insufficient to prevent coordination failures when group members act based on their implicit self, the idea of a one-shot common identification process as a sustainable means for restraining divergent self-interests over time is somewhat unrealistic. Rather, evidence suggests that groups require ongoing mechanisms for this purpose. Building on his observation that group members adopt specialized socio-emotional roles as well as task-related roles, Bales (Reference Bales1951) process analyses revealed that negative socio-emotional actions often require group members to be “reintegrated” into the group (see also McGrath Reference McGrath1984). Such reintegration tends to occur in the latter periods of a group's task, as others seek to reign-in the socio-emotional actions of a discrepant individual when he or she “defends or asserts self” during the task (Bales Reference Bales1951, p. 193). These findings are consistent with the idea that steps for group cohesion need to reoccur over time, especially in natural groups.
I propose one final limit to the benefits of emphasizing the self in groups. Baumeister et al. highlight the group pathologies caused by the “submersion of individual selves in the group” (sect. 2.2.7), which include social loafing and groupthink. In contrast, they claim that the opposite of submergence, namely emphasizing the individuality and uniqueness of individuals' contributions, necessarily decreases pathologies. However, recent research on narcissism and identification rebuts this latter claim. Specifically, Galvin et al. (Reference Galvin, Lange and Ashforth2015) found considerable evidence that narcissistic individuals subsume the identity of a group within their own identity, adopting the mindset that they and they alone are responsible for the group's success. This form of over-identification leads them to reduce information sharing and engage in dysfunctional behaviors such as excessive risk taking and exploitation of the group for personal ends. Their findings are consistent with the idea that emphasizing the self-as-group can be as dangerous as losing the self within the group.
Baumeister et al.'s framework needs to incorporate a more comprehensive view of the nature and influence of selves in groups. Only then will it provide an accurate account of group functioning.