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Volume 71 - October 2004

Contents

Page 4 of 6

Other

Book Reviews

Causation and Bayesian Networks

Book Reviews

Causation and Bayesian Networks

  • Causal Inference of Ambiguous Manipulations

  • Peter Spirtes, Richard Scheines
  • Published online by Cambridge University Press:
    01 January 2022, pp. 833-845

  • Over the last two decades, a fundamental outline of a theory of causal inference has emerged. However, this theory does not consider the following problem. Sometimes two or more measured variables are deterministic functions of one another, not deliberately, but because of redundant measurements. In these cases, manipulation of an observed defined variable may actually be an ambiguous description of a manipulation of some underlying variables, although the manipulator does not know that this is the case. In this article we revisit the question of precisely characterizing conditions and assumptions under which reliable inference about the effects of manipulations is possible, even when the possibility of “ambiguous manipulations” is allowed.

  • Manipulation and the Causal Markov Condition

  • Daniel Hausman, James Woodward
  • Published online by Cambridge University Press:
    01 January 2022, pp. 846-856

  • This paper explores the relationship between a manipulability conception of causation and the causal Markov condition (CM). We argue that violations of CM also violate widely shared expectations—implicit in the manipulability conception—having to do with the absence of spontaneous correlations. They also violate expectations concerning the connection between independence or dependence relationships in the presence and absence of interventions.

Book Reviews

Is Methodology Gendered—and Should it be?

  • Robert Boyle and the Masculine Methods of Science

  • Rose-Mary Sargent
  • Published online by Cambridge University Press:
    01 January 2022, pp. 857-867

  • In her recent case study, Elizabeth Potter attempts to show how Boyle's experimental method was biased by gender considerations. Part of her argument focuses on the combination of the “invisibility” of women in Boyle's published work together with his unpublished comments on female chastity, and part concerns Boyle's rejection of the animistic explanation of his air pump experiments by Francis Line. I argue that the historical and biographical elements of the case make Potter's arguments questionable. In addition, I address whether and how such historical cases can shed light on current debates about gender issues and argue that Boyle's methodological writings could be used to better advantage in the feminist cause.

Book Reviews

Is Methodology Gendered—and Should it be?

  • How Might We Put Gender Politics into Science?

  • Noretta Koertge
  • Published online by Cambridge University Press:
    01 January 2022, pp. 868-879

  • Feminist proposals for reforming scientific method often ask that political evaluations be introduced into the context of justification. How might this work in practice? Fausto-Sterling's alternative conceptualization of biological sex is analyzed and criticized. We then use this case study to comment on recent work on the role of social values in science by Longino and Kitcher.

Book Reviews

Is Methodology Gendered—and Should it be?

  • Why Gender Is a Relevant Factor in the Social Epistemology of Scientific Inquiry

  • Kristina Rolin
  • Published online by Cambridge University Press:
    01 January 2022, pp. 880-891

  • In recent years, feminist philosophy of science has been subjected to criticism. The debate has focused on the implications of the underdetermination thesis for accounts of the role of social values in scientific reasoning. My aim here is to offer a different approach. I suggest that feminist philosophers of science contribute to our understanding of science by (1) producing gender-sensitive analyses of the social dimensions of scientific inquiry and (2) examining the relevance of these analyses for normative issues in philosophy of science.

Biological Kinds and Human Kinds

  • Human Kinds and Biological Kinds: Some Similarities and Differences

  • John Dupré
  • Published online by Cambridge University Press:
    01 January 2022, pp. 892-900

  • This paper compares human diversity with biological diversity generally. Drawing on the pluralistic perspective on biological species defended in earlier work (2002, chs. 3 and 4), I argue that there are useful parallels to be drawn between human and animal kinds, as there are between their respective sources in cultural evolution and evolution generally. This view is developed in opposition to the insistence by sociobiologists and their successors on minimizing the significance of culture. The paper concludes with a discussion of the relation between cultural difference and individual difference, and the relation of the latter to conceptions of human freedom.

Book Reviews

Correction

  • Erratum: Can a Constructive Empiricist Adopt the Concept of Observability?

  • F. A. Muller
  • Published online by Cambridge University Press:
    01 January 2022, pp. 635-654
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Biological Kinds and Human Kinds

  • Bridging the Gap between Human Kinds and Biological Kinds

  • Marc Ereshefsky
  • Published online by Cambridge University Press:
    01 January 2022, pp. 912-921

  • Many writers claim that human kinds are significantly different from biological and natural kinds. Some suggest that humans kinds are unique because social structures are essential for the etiology of human kinds. Others argue that human cultural evolution is decidedly different from other forms of evolution. In this paper I suggest that the gulf between humans and our biological relatives is not as wide as some argue. There is a taxonomic difference between human and nonhuman organisms, but such factors as social structure and cultural evolution do not distinguish us from many other organisms.

Wesley C. Salmon 1925-2001: A Symposium Honoring His Contributions to the Philosophy of Science

Page 4 of 6