On December 7, 1975 Indonesian forces invaded the territory of East Timor, a Portuguese colony for some four and a half centuries. Following the 1974 Portuguese revolution, East Timor, like other Portuguese non-self-governing territories had been going through a process of self determination. Portuguese authorities evacuated the territory in August 1975 during civil disorders, condoned if not fomented by the Indonesians. The Frente Revolucianaria de Timor Leste Independente (FRETILIN), a popular group which aimed at independence for the territory after a short transitional period, gained the upper hand. It declared independence on November 28, 1975, hoping this would strengthen its hand in dealing with Indonesian border incursions. A full-scale Indonesian invasion followed.

Over the last decade, the concept targeted killing has received much attention in debates on the customary interpretation of the right to self-defence, particularly in the context of practices such as US armed drone attacks. In these debates, government silence has often been invoked as acquiescence to the jus ad bellum aspects of targeted killing. Focusing on the question of state silence on targeted killing practices by the Israeli and US governments in recent years, this article investigates over 900 UN Security Council and Human Rights Council debates and argues that there has been no tacit consent to targeted killing. The analysis firstly shows that the majority of states have condemned Israeli targeted killing practices and have raised concerns about armed drone attacks, while falling short of directly protesting against US practices. The article, secondly, applies the customary international law requirements for acquiescence and challenges the idea that silence on US armed drone attacks can be understood as a legal stance towards targeted killing. The article, finally, investigates the political context and engages with alternative interpretations of silence. Contextualizing acts of protest and lack of protest within an asymmetrical political context, the article posits that the invocation of silence as acquiescence in the case of targeted killing is problematic and risks complicity of legal knowledge production with the violence of hegemonic actors.

The year 2009 was one of many anniversaries for the state-building project. It marked ten years since the United Nations began its bold experiments of state-building in East Timor and Kosovo, now the independent state of Timor-Leste and the embryonic Republic of Kosovo respectively. It was twenty years since Namibia held elections in the course of becoming independent, heralding a new post-Cold War activism. It was also ninety years since the League of Nations established the mandate system, which – even though it applied only to the colonies of enemy states defeated in the Great War – marked the beginning of the end of colonialism.

Rankings and indicators have been with us for a while now, and have increasingly been objects of attention in international law. Likewise, they have been with the LJIL as a journal for a while now. Our so-called ‘impact factor’ is, to my untrained eye, the most prominent feature on the LJIL webpage hosted by our publisher. So this editorial is something of a rearguard action. The indicators and rankings, however, keep piling up. Proliferation may afford a perverse sort of optimism, about which below but, as will be clear, I do not share it. The increasing number and command of indicators and rankings reflects a consistent trend and a bleak mode of knowledge production. Knowledge production has been a topic in these pages recently, for instance Sara Kendall's excellent editorial on academic production and the politics of inclusion. I mean to continue in that vein, with respect to other aspects of the political economy of the academic production of international law, especially at a nexus of publishing, scholarship and market practices. There is an undeniable element of nostalgia in what will follow, but I do not really mean to celebrate the publishing industry, status quo ante, that has put me in this privileged position to wax nostalgic. The academic publishing business is flawed. What we are preparing the way for is worse. When I say we, I mean to flag my complicity, both as an individual researcher and as an editorial board member. I use the word complicity to convey a personal anxiety, also in my role as editor, so let me be clear: the LJIL board has no policy concerning rankings, and rankings have never influenced review at the journal. Moreover, while I cannot claim to speak for the LJIL as a whole concerning the topic of rankings or any other matter, nor is mine exactly a dissenting voice on the board. The tone of this polemic is mine alone; the concern is not.

Co-operation has proved to be one of the greatest challenges in the first practice of the International Criminal Court (ICC). The Court cannot fulfil its mandate effectively without co-operation from states, international organizations, and other actors. The Prosecutor requires co-operation and assistance at various stages of proceedings (preliminary examination, investigation, judicial proceedings) in order to conduct investigations and prosecutions. The Court depends on the co-operation of states to execute the warrants of arrest and proceed to trial. In the context of its first practice, the Court has operated in situations of ongoing conflict and/or environments where the security situation is volatile. The level and modalities of co-operation were influenced by the factual and political conditions on the ground and the institutional support of other entities (e.g. the United Nations).

In 2017 the Leiden Journal is celebrating its 30th anniversary. Since the inception of the journal in 1988, much has changed. This includes not only the structure, lay out, organization and publisher of the journal, but also the general environment in which the journal is published. This editorial's aim is to briefly sketch the journal's life over the past 30 years and to reflect on it.

The discrimination faced every day by LGBTQIA+ individuals does not disappear during armed conflict. On the contrary, such persons have been, and continue to be, targeted for particularly heinous human rights violations due to their sexual orientation and/or gender identity. And while international human rights law has, in the last two decades, made significant leaps in prohibiting discrimination on these grounds, international criminal law lags behind. The Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court only criminalizes persecution, an extreme form of discrimination, on grounds of gender and other grounds universally recognized in international law rather than on grounds of sexual orientation or gender identity. In the absence of clear textual criminalization of queer persecution, this article argues international law can be queerly reinterpreted to fit sexual orientation and gender identity into the confines of ‘gender’. However, while acknowledging the normative and expressive gains that could come from using international criminal law to pursue queer persecution, this article also notes the costs, including the flattening of queer discrimination into the narrow rubric of gender and suppressing its more radical principles. Therefore, while concluding international criminal law can be queerly reinterpreted, this article expresses doubts as to whether, in fact, it should.

Understanding law as a continuous process with circular and interacting phases of selection, construction, and reception makes it possible to account for the variety of actors and resources implicated in the process of incrementally changing a norm of international law. This process is visualized through an analogy to knitting. One can start the knitting project with one needle, but to actually construct anything, more than one needle is necessary: at least two actors need to collaborate and build upon each other’s work. If those two actors neatly agree upon the pattern to be knitted, the resulting product may be uniform and dense, able to cover all situations it is intended for. However, it is not that easy to knit in exactly the same pace and pattern. The constructed law may not fit perfectly all situations it is intended for, because the different actors may have had different patterns in their head. Also, sometimes, the wool is held too tightly, and the net becomes too dense; sometimes the wool is held too loosely, and the net will have holes. With this visualization in mind, we can think of legal changes as continuously intermingling and building upon each other: international law is generally knitted with different colours of wool, each colour representing a different normative resource. Thus, ‘norm knitting’ provides for an analytical tool that makes it possible to demonstrate the variety in ‘successful’ change of a given norm in international law in response to specific challenges which the actors face.

The article scrutinizes some of the surprising commonalities in the reasonings of two recent decisions by two separate judicial forums: the ITLOS’s judgment in the M/V Norstar case and the award of an ad hoc arbitral tribunal in the Enrica Lexie case. One key connection between the two decisions is their heavy reliance on the Lotus judgment of the PCIJ. Another similarity between the two disputes is that both of them revolve around the concept of exclusive flag state jurisdiction under UNCLOS Article 92(1) and adjacent questions of jurisdiction on the high seas. The article is going to subject both decisions to criticism and argue that some of the more problematic positions adopted by the tribunals in both cases amount to no more than obiter dicta – thus establishing an additional parallel with Lotus, which also received heavy criticism for its controversial obiter dictum. The two tribunals’ new-found interest in Lotus also provides an opportunity to discuss the utility and legal weight of Lotus as a precedent in the face of a century of developments in treaty law and judicial practice. In this sense, this article builds on and attempts to continue the recent trend in scholarship advocating for a renewed appreciation of the Lotus case against the backdrop of decades of criticism against it. Accordingly, the article aims to facilitate a better understanding of all three disputes, the principles they applied, and the dynamics of international adjudication and international law in general.

This article examines the case of Gaza Marine, a small offshore natural gas reservoir in Gaza that has remained undeveloped since its discovery in 2000. Due to the complicated political status of the Gaza Strip over the past two decades, neither the Palestinian Authority, Hamas, nor Israel could claim full rights to Gaza’s maritime zones or develop the Gaza Marine field. However, the devastating 2023 Israel-Hamas war created four possible scenarios of administration over Gaza, each with its own legal implications for the development rights of the field. These scenarios include Palestinian independence, continued Israeli occupation, international transitional administration (ITA) over Gaza, or partial Israeli annexation of Gaza. This article argues that the development of Gaza Marine is a vital part of Gaza’s postwar reconstruction and is possible under these scenarios, the most understudied of which is the ITA model. This article can thus serve as a roadmap for other postwar coastal territories with contested rights over offshore energy deposits.

2004 marks the tenth anniversary of both the start of the genocide in Rwanda and the establishment of the ICTR by the UN Security Council. In the past decade the ICTR has operated slowly but progressively, and it has delivered some insightful case law. Legal issues continue to arise, however, in the practice of the ICTR. This article considers some of these issues, namely the vagueness of the indictment, complicity in genocide, and the nexus requirement for war crimes. The overview shows that in various instances the ICTR has relied on pivotal case law of the ICTY. Moreover, it is demonstrated that, on occasion, the case law of the ICTR has been somewhat inconsistent. Nevertheless, the ICTR's case law is a next step in the building of a sound international criminal law system, and there will certainly be more opportunities for the ICTR to contribute. These contributions will only be worthwhile, however, if the ICTR's output continues to be of high quality.

Judges like to claim that they are impartial decision-makers fully capable of suppressing their personal proclivities, as the rule of law requires. But a century’s worth of studies undermines that view. Going under the name ‘judicial behaviour’, this vast literature shows that many extraneous (non-legal) factors affect the choices judges make. This article focuses on one strand of that literature – the effect of personal characteristics on judging, with emphasis on social identity and social diversity. We show that the literature is bifurcated: studies focusing on the social identity of individual judges (such as their gender, race, and nationality) generate findings consistent with in-group bias, whereas research on the social diversity of judges sitting in panels suggests that benefits can accrue from socially diverse courts. What the two sets of studies have in common, though, is just as important: both could make profound academic and policy contributions but require far more development if they are to realize their potential. We offer proposals for forward movement.

This contribution focuses on the Court of Justice of the European Union (Court or CJEU) reliance on international law in cases involving economic agreements covering occupied territories. In its earlier case law, the Court adopted a formalistic approach by ignoring the broader international legal framework of the dispute in an effort to achieve conformity with international law, while at the same time avoiding being drawn into political storms. The article continues by identifying an even more worrisome trend in the Court’s latest judgments in the Front Polisario and Western Sahara Campaign UK cases. In these two cases the Court showed its willingness to stretch the international rules of treaty interpretation to a breaking point in order to avoid pronouncing on the politically sensitive question of the de facto application of the EU’s agreements with Morocco in the territory of Western Sahara. The article concludes by asserting that the Court’s line of argumentation brings another dimension to the Völkerrechtsfreundlichkeit debate. The classical, binary understanding of the Court’s approach as ‘open/hostile’ to international law only provides us with a partial picture of how international law was actually used in these cases. The Court’s apparent willingness to rely on international law as a heuristic device to reinforce an outcome that radically departs from the logic and structure of international law and international legal argumentation requires a more in-depth engagement with both the content of the international law rules invoked in those judgments and with the Court’s use of such rules.

Understanding international judicial behaviour requires the development of a perspective that considers both individual and collective action. On the one hand, individual judges are influenced and shaped by their background and trajectory prior to their international judicial appointment; on the other hand, when appointed to international courts, they become part of a particular social setting and group dynamic. The article provides an interpretive, structural theory of judicial behaviour which allows for an understanding of international judicial action and the judicial institutional practices resulting from it. The article explains this double structuration of international judicial behaviour by first reconsidering and amending the notion of habitus, originally developed by Pierre Bourdieu, and secondly by applying this idea to the practice of the Caribbean Court of Justice.

The moral and legal debate over the separation of jus in bello from jus ad bellum generally assumes that the law of war supports this separation and the concomitant doctrine of ‘equality between belligerents’, also known as the ‘duality’ or the ‘symmetry’ principle. This article examines the Nuremberg-era precedents and legal scholarship, as well as more recent legal and scholarly material, and argues that the general assumption is wrong and that the arguments supporting the radical legal separation of the two jus's are unconvincing.