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Yoram Dinstein, The International Law of Belligerent Occupation, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2009, 287pp., ISBN-9780521896375, £66.00.

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Yoram Dinstein, The International Law of Belligerent Occupation, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2009, 287pp., ISBN-9780521896375, £66.00.

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  06 May 2011

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Abstract

Type
BOOK REVIEWS
Copyright
Copyright © Foundation of the Leiden Journal of International Law 2011

With the present book, Yoram Dinstein has completed his series on the use of armed force in inter-state relations and its consequences. After War, Aggression and Self-Defence (2005) and The Conduct of Hostilities under the Law of International Armed Conflict (2004), the present work covers a transitory period during which the armed hostilities have ceased but peace is not yet reached, namely the belligerent occupation.

Although other cases of belligerent occupation can be found in recent times, they have been largely overshadowed by the Israeli occupation of the Palestinian territory. This is also reflected in the present book, which, time and again, invites the reader to reconsider the Israeli–Palestinian conflict in light of the abstract rules governing belligerent occupation. Undoubtedly, the greatest merit of Dinstein's newest book is that he has brought light into the factual and normative jungle surrounding this highly complex and, in many regards, unique case. Whether one agrees or not with the one or the other conclusion that the author has drawn, the book represents one of the most thoroughly and well-researched legal analyses on that issue. The book sets a counterpoint to the highly politicized legal discussion surrounding the Palestinian–Israeli conflict. Meanwhile, critics of Israel rely all too often on legally doubtful bases.Footnote 1 All too often, international legal standards are condemned as bias and thus deemed irrelevant in both the Israeli and the Palestinian public discussion.

The book benefits immensely from the author's long-standing experience of and his linguistic access to Israeli law and practice as evidenced by the numerous references to military orders and to judgments of the Israeli Supreme Court, and by insightful explanations of local law (pp. 18, 20–30, 134, 156–8, 162, 163, 202–5).

The author's effort to draw a clear picture of the law of belligerent occupation becomes abundantly clear on page 1. The occurrence of belligerent occupation is neither an anomaly nor an aberration – he counters the most persistent myth. Having explained the general legal framework and the historical outline of the law of occupation in the first chapter, Dinstein directly heads towards the case of the Israeli-occupied territories: the Sinai Peninsula, the Gaza Strip, the West Bank, East Jerusalem, and the Golan Heights. The author leaves no doubt that ‘the unilateral annexation of East Jerusalem by Israel is not valid under international law’ (p. 19), the annexationist interpretation of the Israeli domestic legislation has no impact on the status of the Golan Heights as occupied territory (p. 20), and Israel's withdrawal from the Gaza Strip in 2005 did not end its occupation (pp. 15, 276–80).

As a result of the fragmentary definition in Article 42 of the Hague Regulations, the notion of occupation has never been clear. Recent examples in practice, like the contested status of the occupying powers in Iraq 2003–04, the Israeli policy vis-à-vis the Gaza Strip, the stationing of Ugandan troops beyond the Ituri Region, or the multilateral UN administration of Kosovo, led to further confusion. Thus, it is not surprising that considerable parts of the second chapter on ‘The Legal Nature and Basic Principles of Occupation’ are reserved for the definition of occupation and its differentiation from other phenomena such as invasion and annexation.

The picture of the current law of belligerent occupation would be incomplete if human-rights law was not mentioned. In his third chapter, on ‘Human Rights and Belligerent Occupation’, Dinstein shows again reasonable pragmatism, along with a considerable portion of scepticism. He does not attempt to abstractly define the relationship between human-rights and humanitarian law, often referred to as lex specialis : ‘The screening of human rights by the LOAC [law of armed conflict] – as lex specialis – must be carried out on a right-by-right basis, rather than in a wholesale manner’ (p. 88). And, even if a lex specialis trumps the application of human rights, their built-in limitations accommodate the competing interests of the occupier (pp. 77–8). However, ‘[t]he nostrum’ that the shortcomings of the current law of occupation ‘may be resolved through cross-pollination of precepts grown in the different culture of human rights’ appears to Dinstein ‘to be deluded’ (p. 286). Although he does not succeed in closing the persistent research gap in that area, which is exactly the lack of a comprehensive study based on a rights-by-rights approach, the chapter is well worth reading, as it contains a sound and illustrative summary of the main aspects of the discussion.

In his fourth chapter, on ‘The Maintenance of Law and Order in the Occupied Territories’, the author addresses the central obligations of the occupier. Right at the beginning, he points to a fatal error in the English translation of the authoritative French text of Article 43 of the Hague Regulations. The occupier shall ensure ‘public order and public life’ and not only ‘public order and safety’, as suggested by the English text. It is therefore not enough for the occupying power to protect life and limb. ‘The military government cannot observe with equanimity an economy under occupation in a shambles or social break down causing distress to the civilian population’ (p. 93). Dinstein is clear: ‘[t]he overall objective must be to ensure stability and continuity in the economic and social life of the inhabitants’ (p. 94). It would be interesting to know what this means with regard to the blockade of the Gaza Strip, which the author still considers an occupied territory (p. 15). In any case, the author strongly refuses an individual right to forcibly resist the occupying power (pp. 94–5). Should the occupying power encounter forcible resistance – exceeding mere riots – this would not warrant the continuing occupation, but it would trigger the application of the rules governing armed hostilities (pp. 99–100), with the consequence that civilians taking directly part in hostilities lose their protection from attack (p. 101, but see, for peaceful demonstrations against the occupation, p. 264). It cannot be overlooked that the author had the Israeli–Palestinian conflict with its various incidents in mind. But, especially in relation to this, it would have been interesting to know whether the threshold for the reapplication of the law governing the conduct of armed hostilities and its territorial scope is the same as for the outbreak of an international armed conflict. Arguments in favour of a higher threshold may be found in the comparison with non-international armed conflict or in the purpose of the law of occupation, which is the protection of civilians: to a certain extent, the resurface of armed hostilities in an occupied territory rather resembles the situation of a non-international armed conflict, which requires a higher level of hostilities than the international armed conflict.Footnote 2 From that perspective, a sporadic resurface of small-scale armed hostilities would not justify certain practices such as, inter alia, targeted killings of persons actually engaged in combat, or where less incisive means to render them hors de combat are available.

The fifth chapter addresses the ‘Legislation by the Occupying Power’. Like the previous chapters, it is marked by a careful analysis of the wording of relevant treaty provisions. The author narrows down the anything but easily understandable Article 43 of the Hague Regulations and 64 Geneva Convention IV to the following: ‘there is no legislative tabula rasa in case of belligerent occupation’ (p. 108), but laws might be subject to change in cases of necessity (pp. 109–10). New laws may be necessary to remove ‘any direct threat’ to the occupying power, to repeal legislation inconsistent with Geneva Convention IV, or to ensure the smooth operation of an orderly government (pp. 112–16). The author's affinity with the wording of the treaty provisions does, however, not bar him from departure when state practice suggests otherwise. He admits that ‘the concept of necessity is elastic enough to go beyond all three subdivisions mentioned’ (p. 116). In this context, it is surprising that the author does not mention the interesting case of Iraq 2003–04, in which the occupying forces, albeit with the blessing of the Security Council,Footnote 3 introduced numerous legislative and institutional reforms and thus went far beyond the limits enshrined in Article 64 of Geneva Convention IV.

The sixth chapter, on the ‘Judicial System in the Occupied Territories’, illustrates in a lively way the dualism between local and military courts operating in the occupied territories and the diverse practical legal problems that the Israeli military government has encountered in the occupied Palestinian territory, such as the withdrawal of the local lawyers’ licences by the Jordanian Bar Council or the need to set up new appellate bodies following the separation of the West Bank from Jordanian territory (pp. 133–4).

‘If there is a lodestar guiding the law of belligerent occupation, it is the principle that the civilian population of the occupied territory must benefit from maximal safeguards feasible in the circumstances’ (p. 286). Nonetheless, the law of belligerent occupation is still part of the law of armed conflict, which brings with it diverse restrictions upon civilian rights and liberties. With reprisals, collective punishment, administrative detention, evacuation, assigned residence, deportation, and transfer, Dinstein, in his seventh chapter, headed ‘Protection of the Civilian Population under Belligerent Occupation’, touches again upon some delicate issues. The chapter is supplemented by the eighth chapter, on ‘Special Protection in Occupied Territories’, dealing with certain classes of person that are considered particularly vulnerable, such as refugees, women, and children, as well as with some indispensable services that must be rendered for humanitarian purposes, like medical services, civil defence, and humanitarian relief. Again, he does not hesitate to criticize some Israeli practices where he considers it appropriate, such as the handling of de facto mass deportations as individual deportation by the Israeli Supreme Court (p. 164).

The same goes for the ninth chapter, highlighting the legal limits of ‘Destruction and Pillage of Property in Occupied Territories’, followed by the tenth chapter, dealing with the ‘Seizure and Use of Property in the Occupied Territory’. Again, Dinstein resists any attempts to circumvent international law and withstands some radical theses advanced in defence of house demolitions. ‘[A] house surviving combat is no longer susceptible to deliberate destruction’ (p. 205). In other words, any house demolition that occurs outside a military operation and that serves merely punitive–deterrent purposes has no legal basis in the international law of belligerent occupation (pp. 205–6).

Before turning to ‘The Termination of Belligerent Occupation’, Dinstein addresses ‘Other Major Issues Relating to Belligerent Occupation’. By raising the issue of settlements, the security barrier, and family reunion in his penultimate chapter, the author does not spare the probably most contentious hallmarks of the Israeli occupation of the Palestinian territory. He casts no doubt: the deportation or transfer of parts of the occupier's population into the occupied territory is a war crime (p. 238). But he hesitates to explicitly label some of the Israeli settlements as such (pp. 240–2). Instead, he turns to the reader, asking: ‘Why shouldn't Jews be allowed to live in neighbouring Arab countries?’ ‘Israel has a large Arab minority that enjoys civil rights within it’ (p. 242). This seems to be the stage at which the author's otherwise balanced careful legal analysis is crumbling. Indeed, the author is right when he recalls some blatantly neglected factual moments of the Israeli settlements: there are settlements that were purely private enterprises (p. 240); there are settlements where the settlers purchased the land from the Palestinian owners (p. 241). Moreover, many settlements were and are subsidized by private, foremost religious (not only Jewish) organizations that often reside outside the state of Israel. If this was all, such settlements indeed would not qualify as a breach of Article 49 of the Geneva Convention IV. They do not constitute a transfer initiated by the government. But what if the settlement was built on public land, or even on private land expropriated by the military government, as in some parts of Ma'ale Adumim, one of the largest settlements in the West Bank? What if Palestinians are absolutely prevented from acquiring or reacquiring property in the settlements, opening a store, or even renting apartments due to some city council directives, and the military government tolerates that while disregarding its obligations under Article 2(1)(d) of the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination?Footnote 4 What if some roads, like the famous 443 that connects different West Bank settlements, were for years closed to every single Palestinian for security reasons by the military government? What if settlers build illegally but the State of Israel declines to enforce several Supreme Court judgments on the slippery ground of lacking capacities? And what if, as a result, settlers meanwhile represent more than 10 per cent of the total population in the West Bank? This is precisely the ‘major demographic change in the occupied territory’ (p. 239) that Article 49 of the Geneva Convention IV is intended to avoid. The fact that a settlement was build by private initiative alone does not rule out the application of this provision. It can be regarded as one of the best-established rules of international law that a state is internationally also responsible if it supports, controls, or approves acts of private individuals that, if committed by the state, would amount to a violation of international law.Footnote 5 As Dinstein rightly observes in his final statement, ‘it is crucial that the law is not outstepped by the march of events’ (p. 287). The same must apply to the Israeli settlements.

Like its predecessors, the book impresses by its rich and plentiful case references, a sharp sophisticated argumentation, and an easily traceable structure combined with a crystal-clear and picturesque writing style enjoyable for both academics and practitioners alike. The biggest plus, however, is that the book is, with 287 pages, rather short and this is not to the disadvantage of its content. In sum, it is a pleasure to read it.

References

1 See the various reports of the expert committees of the Human Rights Council UN Doc. A/HRC/12/48, A/HRC/15/21, A/HRC/15/50, which all show smaller or bigger shortcomings when it comes to determining the legal standard.

2 For the different thresholds of the non-international armed conflict under common Art. 3 of the Geneva Conventions, 75 UNTS 35, 81, 135, 287, and Art. 1(2) Additional Protocol II to the Geneva Conventions, 1125 UNTS 609, see Opinion Paper ‘How is the term “Armed Conflict” Defined in International Humanitarian Law’, International Committee of the Red Cross, March 2008, at 3–5.

3 UN Doc. SC/RES/1483 (2003), SC/RES/1546 (2004).

4 660 UNTS 195.

5 United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran (United States of America v. Iran), Judgment of 24 May 1980, [1980] ICJ Rep. 3, at 34, paras. 69–71; Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. United States of America), Merits, Judgment of 27 June 1986, [1986] ICJ Rep. 14, at 54, para. 115.