Even though Article 23 of the 1982 Convention on the Law of the Sea explicitly acknowledges the right of innocent passage through the territorial sea to nuclear vessels, many coastal states have recently forbidden or submitted to authorization the passage of ships carrying radioactive materials: this reveals a trend towards a more restrictive concept of “innocent passage.” As to straits used for international navigation and archipelagic sea lanes, the ius communicationis is still prominent and every measure that might prejudice the navigational rights of nuclear ships would not be consistent with the Montego Bay Convention.

This contribution investigates restrictivist reasoning on the origin of armed attacks, and concentrates on the interpretation of Article 51 of the UN Charter and the use of state practice. One particular aspect is examined: the linkage of the armed activities of non-state actors to a state required for an exercise of the right of self-defence to be justified in relation to that state. Many authors have moved away from a restrictive interpretation of Article 51 of the Charter and customary international law, and have proposed various legal constructs –complicity, aiding and abetting, harbour and support, unwillingness or inability to act– to allow for the invocation of self-defence even when armed activities of non-state actors cannot be attributed to a state and its substantial involvement is doubtful. Noticeable among authors generally, with certain exceptions, is a certain lack of concern to account for whatever method of interpretation or analysis they employ.

Human rights violations by corporations are widespread and have a broad spectrum: damage to people’s health through pollution, environmental accidents and health and safety failures, forced labour or child labour, underpaid workers, displaced communities, contaminated water sources, use of excessive force, and discrimination, for example by race, gender or sexuality. Corporate violence, resulting from a long history of corporate power and colonialism continues today as corporations have grown into powerful global conglomerates. Through complex and opaque multinational groups and supply chains, use of corporate law concepts such as the corporate veil, as well as other actions such as tax avoidance and lobbying of national and international political institutions, corporate actors remain free to pursue their goals. Despite efforts to combat corporate harm through the development of a business and human rights movement success has been limited and significant gaps remain in the global governance required to ensure protection. This article argues that, similar to a cat and mouse game, corporations find new ways to defend themselves against those seeking to dismantle their power or to prevent human rights infringements. The problem is rooted in structural and systemic inequalities within the international legal framework and in company laws that maintain corporate structures that obstruct the human rights movement’s progress. The current drive towards a more sustainable business agenda requires a just transition, including transformation of global and corporate structures to tackle human rights violations and the inequalities of power and wealth that facilitate such violations.

The Hague Peace Conference of 1899 was attended by 27 states, the Conference of 1907 by 43, the overwhelming majority being from Europe and America. Among the participants were four from Asia: China, Japan, Persia and Siam. Their delegates, trained in the best European legal and diplomatic traditions, were assisted by European experts in explaining their positions on ‘projects’ (or drafts) of European or American origin.

When an international criminal tribunal establishes its headquarters in a state, its legal relationship with that state must be carved out. This legal relationship has the potential to exclude the applicability of human rights protection by curtailing the host state's jurisdiction in parts of its territory. Despite this, there is little clarity as to when when such curtailment should arise. This problem is illustrated by the situation regarding witnesses at the International Criminal Court, which has recently been the subject of decisions of the Hague District Court and of the European Court of Human Rights. These two courts disagree on the threshold at which the human rights issues engaged by the situation are brought under the jurisdiction of the Netherlands. This article submits that the European Court in Djokaba Lambi Longa v. The Netherlands set the threshold for jurisdiction under the Convention too high. In applying easily distinguishable previous case law, and failing to take into account all relevant facts, the Court's finding of inadmissibility is unconvincing. The Dutch Court, on the other hand, took a broader approach from which the European Court of Human Rights could learn. Ultimately the two decisions give contrasting interpretations of the relationship between the ICC and its host state, which could have wider ramifications.

In this article, the author gives an overview of the main international legal norms that are relevant to imputiny for human rights violations, and their actual implementation, in order to answer the question whether imputiny is indeed in violation of present day general international law. In this context, attention will also be given to the development towards the establishment of an international criminal tribunal.

Despite repeated attempts to eliminate statelessness and to provide for the protection of stateless persons, international law has not been able to provide an adequate response to these problems. In the Middle East the problem has continued to grow as social and political change pushes people into becoming stateless and fails to provide those who are stateless with adequate protection. The treaties that have attempted to prevent this practice have failed. At the same time the lex specialis aimed at protecting people from the consequences of statelessness have also failed. The result has been a lacuna in the protection of stateless persons. This article suggests that a step towards filling this gap might be made by applying general international human rights law to protect stateless persons.

In a small note which Peter Kooijmans wrote to me in answer to a letter in which I congratulated him with his election as Judge in the International Court of Justice – the first Netherlands Judge in the Court after World War II apart from Professor Riphagen who only served as a Judge ad hoc in the Barcelona Traction, Light and Power Company Ltd. case – he stated that he considered himself to be a privileged man. Privileged, because the new position would allow him to continue to remain active in the field of international law considerably beyond the retirement age of 65 which applies to professors of international law and most other people in The Netherlands. Privileged, I would like to add, also in another respect. Very rarely it will be given to one person in his lifetime to fulfil so many different honourable positions in the field of international law and international relations at such a high level of responsibility as has been the case with Peter Kooijmans: Professor of public international law, United Nations Special Rapporteur on Torture, State Secretary (Staatssecretaris) for Foreign Affairs, in particular disarmament matters (1973–1977), Minister for Foreign Affairs and, finally, Judge in the International Court of Justice.

Many of the conflicts that have led to the creation of hybrid tribunals were identity-based conflicts – people who identified as members of one tribe, race, ethnicity, or religion used these distinctions as grounds to attack and persecute another group who often responded in kind. This reality means that the criminal justice processes that take place in the wake of such conflicts must take issues of identity seriously to be effective. This article uses the notion of framing contests to examine different identity-based responses to international justice. Defenders of the tribunals seek to portray them as impartial observers while critics paint them as illegitimate outsiders. Because hybrid tribunals have identity considerations as features built into them, they are better suited to promote their own legitimacy in these framing contests. These features include the personnel they use, the witnesses they call, the strategies their prosecutors deploy, and their local outreach programmes. Each of these tools can be used to frame the tribunal as a legitimate means to promote criminal justice and thereby advance the values of transitional justice.

Judge Buergenthal argues that the increased acceptance by states of international human rights obligations proclaimed in UN and regional treaties, reinforced by the jurisprudence of international and regional tribunals, accounts for the substantial progress that has been made in the protection of human rights throughout the world. The resultant political significance of international human rights law and the international community's growing expectation of compliance with that law explain why states engaging in large-scale human rights violations increasingly risk serious political and economic consequences for such practices. A state's continuing non-compliance with its international human rights obligations tends also to lead to the gradual loss by its government of the national and international legitimacy it needs in order to govern, which may in time contribute to its fall.

The International Court of Justice rendered its judgement on the merits in the case concerning Oil Platforms (Islamic Republic of Iran v. United States of America) on 6 November 2003. This article reviews the judgement, focusing on the Court's substantive legal determinations on the scope of ‘armed attack’ under the right of self-defence. The review further considers the implications of the judgement as regards the role of the Court in the judicial settlement of disputes. It concludes by considering the impact of the judgement on the legal framework for international peace and security as applied in the maritime context.

Situating itself in current debates over the international legal archive, this article delves into the material and conceptual implications of architecture for international law. To do so I trace the architectural developments of international law’s organizational and administrative spaces during the early to mid twentieth century. These architectural endeavours unfolded in three main stages: the years 1922–1926, during which the International Labour Organization (ILO) building, the first building exclusively designed for an international organization was constructed; the years 1927–1937 which saw the great polemic between modernist and classical architects over the building of the Palace of Nations; and the years 1947–1952, with the triumph of modernism, represented by the UN Headquarters in New York. These events provide an illuminating allegorical insight into the physical manifestation, modes of self-expression, and transformation of international law during this era, particularly the relationship between international law and the function and role of international organizations.

Environmental harm is of increasing concern to peoples and states all over the world, whether in relation to ensuring access to healthy air, water, food, and sustainable livelihoods, or coping with the diversity of challenges posed by changing climates and ecologies. While international lawyers have focused on crafting solutions to environmental problems, less attention is paid to the disciplinary role in fostering harmful and unsustainable behavioural patterns. Environmental issues are usually relegated to the specialized field of international environmental law. This project explores instead the role of nature in the general discipline, arguing that the natural environment is a determinative factor in shaping international law, and that assumptions about nature lie at the heart of disciplinary concepts such as sovereignty, development, economy, property, and human rights.

Increasingly the UN is ‘subcontracting’ peacekeeping and peace enforcement operations. The ECOMOG intervention in Sierra Leone is an example. Some members of ECOMOG have been accused of violating international humanitarian law. These accusations have not been adequately addressed by ECOMOG nor by the UN. The limited attention paid to this problem by the UN in ‘subcontracted’ operations contrasts with increased concern with respect for international humanitarian law by forces under UN command and control. It is argued that the UN should ensure that ‘subcontracting’ does not lead to lowering standards of international humanitarian law.

This article focuses on two key aspects of the Keraterm case before the ICTY. The first is Duško Sikirica's acquittal of the crime of genocide. The Trial Chamber's construction of the phrase “destruction in part of a group” is critically examined and compared to the reasoning of a differently constituted Trial Chamber in the Krstić case. The second key aspect of the Keraterm case is the decision by all three defendants to enter into plea agreements with the Prosecutor at a relatively late stage in the trial. This article discusses the rules governing plea agreements, general sentencing factors and the extent to which guilty pleas have resulted in a pattern of lighter sentences in the jurisprudence of the Tribunals.

The dynamic of the secondary market for sovereign debt has been affected by the presence of a peculiar category of holders: vulture funds. These funds, specializing in purchasing the debt of sovereign states in distress at a discounted market price, stay aloof from restructuring processes and then enforce their claims in courts to secure the face value. For low revenue debtor countries, paying the claims may involve reducing the resources available for basic services to the population. For very poor countries this also involves a significant regression in terms of development. Against this background, the purpose of this work is to inquire whether and to what extent there exists a rule permitting the suspending and rescheduling of payments so as to pay dues without impairing services. In order to find such a rule, inquiry is to be made into general norms: necessity and public policy. It is under the umbrella of the truly international public policy that the duty of a state to provide certain basic services to its population can be subsumed and the corollary of the suspension and rescheduling of these payments consistently with this duty can be applied.

This article highlights the challenges to the operation of domestic courts as agents of development of the laws of armed conflict and particularly of the law on the conduct of hostilities. The first part of the article concerns the spillover from various branches of the laws of armed conflict to the law regarding the conduct of hostilities. The second part of the article addresses the structural constraints on domestic courts in deciding issues relating to the laws of armed conflict, focusing on the conflict between their role as guardians of national interests and their judicial commitment to protecting the individual. The cumulative effect of these characteristics of domestic litigation suggests that the laws of armed conflict, and particularly the law on the conduct of hostilities, are not necessarily well served by development through domestic jurisprudence.

The object of this study is, as suggested by its title: “The Role of the International Law Commission in the Decade of International Law”. In this exercise, the title role will be played by the International Law Commission in the context of the ‘Decade of International Law’ recently proclaimed by the General Assembly of the United Nations. The contribution to be expected of the Commission will be viewed from the perspective of the prospect of enhancing the practice of states in the adoption of available means of their choice for the peaceful settlement of international disputes.

The purpose of the present study is to briefly introduce the final (1994) Draft Articles of the International Law Commission (hereinafter ILC) on The Law of Non-Navigational Uses of International Watercourses (hereinafter Draft Articles or 1994 Draft) and to analyse some of the more important and interesting provisions. It is not the intention to discuss basic theories relating to the management of international watercourses, on which numerous studies are already available. Nevertheless, the Draft Articles incorporate two fundamental principles of the law relating to watercourses, viz. the principle of equitable utilization and the no-harm rule, which will be treated at rather greater length because of their importance as well as certain ambiguities in the Draft Articles relating to them.

The Treaty of Asunción in 1991 gave rise to the Common Market of the Southern Cone (MERCOSUR) as a promising economic integration process. Over the past 20 years, as the legal personality of MERCOSUR was reinforced, there were also important changes in its legal system. International law and international economic law played a fundamental role in the development of MERCOSUR law. The main aim of this article is to provide some insights into the current stage of MERCOSUR law, taking into account the evolution of the legal system, the dispute settlement mechanism, and the relationship with international law. In order to do so, the author examines various turning points in the case law of the arbitration tribunals constituted so far and the Permanent Review Tribunal established by the Olivos Protocol.