Any legal system, including the international legal system, consists of rules that serve multiple purposes and functions that the legal system in question needs to perform in order to survive as a viable organism. Jurisprudence of national and international courts relating to areas such as responsibility, immunity, and dispute settlement has involved intensive discussions as to the nature and implications of the various categories of rules. Approaching this broad area, with its multiple components, requires careful differentiation of the nature of those various categories of rules, for the fact that the relevant classification of rules works in one area does not inherently make it workable in other areas, which is confirmed in practice. The most problematic issue remains the judicial application of jus cogens in relation to state immunities and the ensuing distinction between substantive and procedural rules. It is shown in this contribution that this artificial distinction does not reflect the functions international law actually accords to its various rules, and is instead a product of political and ideological preference to keep particular classes of plaintiffs out of certain jurisdictions.

The judgment of the International Court of Justice (ICJ) of 11 November 2013, interpreting its 1962 judgment in the case concerning the Temple of Preah Vihear, inspires a reconsideration of the role of interpretation proceedings pursuant to Article 60 of the Statute of the Court. In particular, it invites us to take a closer look at the role and scope of the principle of res judicata in public international law in general and as considered in the case law of the Court in particular. This contribution reveals the competing concepts of the principle in interpretation and consecutive original contentious proceedings, and promotes instead a uniform concept that avoids the conflict inherent in current approaches.

Section 1 introduces Article 60 of the ICJ Statute (section 1.1.) and thereinafter views interpretation proceedings before the Court in light of the Court's case law, in particular its 2013 interpretation judgment in the Temple case (section 1.2.). Section 2 constitutes the heart of the analysis and discusses what will be identified as the competing concepts of res judicata. Section 2.1. presents the functions, concepts, and case law of res judicata in public international law in general, whereas section 2.2. focuses specifically on the case law of the ICJ and the Permanent Court of International Justice (PCIJ) in this regard. Finally, section 2.3. concludes this study by setting out the approach that the author regards as appropriate to reconcile the competing concepts of res judicata.

According to Article 62 of the ICJ Statute, a third state can be granted permission to intervene before the Court provided ‘that it has an interest of a legal nature which may be affected by the decision in the case’. The interest of a legal nature is a crucial requirement under Article 62 and the scope of intervention largely depends on the definition of such a requirement. In light of the recent case law of the Court, the author explores the different types of legal interest that could justify permitting a third state to intervene before the ICJ.

The European Court of Human Rights found no violation of the Convention in its judgement in the complaints of the former East German political and military leaders Streletz, Kessler, and Krenz. All three were convicted and sentenced to terms in prison by German courts in relation to the deaths of East Germans who were killed in attempts at fleeing across the fortified border between East and West Germany. Nonetheless, the Court's decision constitutes a clear rejection of the Radbruch Formula, which served as a central line of reasoning in the decisions of the German courts in the cases. The author addresses the Court's rejection of the Radbruch Formula, focusing especially on the distinct historical and political circumstances that existed after World War II and in 1989.

The Kosovo Advisory Opinion gave rise to responses that suggest that the Court went too far, or not far enough, depending on one's perspective. In this article, the authors argue that the Court should either have done nothing or gone all the way. By accepting an inadequately drafted question, the Court was necessarily going to give an inadequate answer. This article adopts a strict approach to the legal nature of the question and considers that the ICJ should have declined its competence, not as an exercise of its discretion, but as a preservation of its core judicial function, which does not include primarily the conduct of non-state entities. Going further, the authors suggest that the Court could have rephrased the question and sought to establish the international responsibility of the United Nations, and, ultimately, of Kosovo, which, it is argued, is in fact implicitly recognized by the Court, both politically and legally.

The Supreme Court of the Netherlands construed the state’s positive human rights obligations as requiring a 25 per cent reduction of its greenhouse gas emissions by 2020 compared with 1990 levels. This article explores how judges can decide the level of state effort required to mitigate climate change. To date, judges have predominantly approached this issue by seeking to identify an elusive benchmark, either by deduction from global objectives or induction from state conduct. This article shows that the judicial assessment of a state’s requisite efforts inevitably relies on equity infra legem. Acknowledging this, judges could learn from the international courts’ experience with establishing clarity in the midst of vague legal rules.

The doctrine and case law on expropriation in international investment law is an unsettled area due to a variety of factors such as the diversity of interests between capital importing and exporting states, the divergence in legal, economic, and cultural concepts of property rights, and, more importantly, the regulatory role of the state in cross-border investment activities. Although China has been an active ‘treaty-maker’ in the universe of international investment arbitration, evidenced by its nearly 130 bilateral investment treaties (BITs), the notion of expropriation in these BITs is in a state of flux. This article scrutinizes the expropriation clauses in China's BITs, in particular, the Peru–China BIT and the Peru–China free trade agreement, by reference to the final award of Tza Yap Shum v. The Republic of Peru, the first Chinese BIT arbitration case. This article attempts, in a comparative context, to understand the underlying rationale for China's evolving stance on expropriation.

The overall aim of this article is to analyse the principal purpose test as an emerging rule of customary international tax law. By means of the principal purpose test, the tax administration can deny the tax treaty benefit if one of the principal purposes of the action undertaken by the taxpayer was to obtain a benefit. This principal purpose test has been developed by the OECD with the political support of the G20 as one of the actions to tackle Base Erosion and Profit Shifting by multinationals (BEPS Project). At the time of writing, 137 jurisdictions including non-OECD, non-G-20 countries have committed to the implementation of the principal purpose test in their current and future tax treaties. Based on the analysis of the objective element (state practice) and subjective element (accepted as law), there are indications that this principal purpose test can emerge as a principle of customary international law. In the past, international tax law scholars addressed the customary international law regarding the OECD/UN tax treaty Models, the OECD Harmful Tax Practices, and the arm’s length principle. However, current international tax developments, including the BEPS Project, call for an analysis of the main elements of customary international law in respect of the principal purpose test, a general anti-avoidance rule that by its own nature, is often general, vague, and imprecise. Therefore, the findings of this article can be useful for generating new areas of research by international public law, international law, and international tax law experts.

This article examines the precedential value of Russia’s ‘special military operation’ against Ukraine in February 2022 for the purpose of interpreting the rules of jus contra bellum. Following the methodology set down by the ICJ in its Nicaragua judgment, self-defence is identified as the legal basis explicitly invoked by Russia in order to justify its operation in Ukraine. The authors then examine closely the reactions by third states with respect to the legality of Russia’s military operation and establish that the legal arguments put forth by Russia – including, more specifically, an innovative reading of the right to self-defence of entities unilaterally recognized as states – have been overwhelmingly rejected by third states. On that basis, the authors conclude that this precedent does not challenge the established understanding of the prohibition to use force in international relations and of its exceptions.

It can be shown that – as with the tie between crimes against humanity and the perpetration of other international crimes in the Charter of the International Military Tribunal in Nuremberg – the context element of the crimes against humanity as set out in the Rome Statute is based on the international law principle of non-interference in the affairs of a foreign country, and only serves to justify ‘international’ jurisdiction in respect of crimes which are typically already punishable pursuant to the lex loci commissii. As a consequence, the feature of a ‘widespread or systematic attack directed against any civilian population’ is not an aggravating circumstance in respect of the material facts of the case that define the wrong of the act (Unrecht) or the offender's blameworthiness (Schuld), but a jurisdictional element which is a mere precondition for prosecution only.

This article analyses the growing resistance to judgments of the International Court of Justice arising out of domestic law in Latin America, through a study of challenges to the authority of the Court’s judgments regarding territorial and maritime delimitation in the region. These challenges are based upon the ‘territory clauses’ found in many Latin American constitutions, which were used to set national boundaries following colonial independence. Territory clauses that once developed international law doctrines such as uti possidetis iuris are now being used against prevailing international law rules, in a process described in this article as ‘constitutional resistance’.

This article explains the nature of ‘territory clauses’ in Latin America, i.e., clauses that constitutionally define the national territory in reference to international law. It then describes the process of ‘constitutional resistance’, by which local authorities have used these clauses to oppose ICJ judgments, leading to various results, such as non-appearance in further proceedings, constitutionalizing exclusively favourable judgments, deferring the implementation of a judgment to the Constitutional Court or implementing only certain ICJ judgments, while creating legal barriers to the implementation of judgments that, in the State’s view, negatively affect their territory.

These challenges based on territory clauses are studied through prominent ICJ cases involving Nicaragua, Honduras, El Salvador, and Colombia. The article also explores how the lack of a strong territory clause eased the implementation of the Peru v. Chile judgment, and how the recent non-appearance of Venezuela in its current ICJ proceedings with Guyana, is partly based on constitutional justifications.

‘Climate change inundation’ – the process whereby climate change-related impacts like rising sea levels, higher storm surges, and changing rainfall patterns interact with and exacerbate existing vulnerabilities like poverty, isolation, resource scarcity, and inadequate infrastructure – presents a unique challenge to the territorial, legal, and political infrastructure of low-lying coral atoll island states. This article uses the example of climate change inundation to illustrate some of the shortcomings of the mainstream ‘minimum threshold’ account of statehood. It then proposes an alternative account of the criteria of statehood as a set of overlapping similarities or relationships between state-like entities, drawing on Wittgenstein's concept of ‘family resemblances’. Although problematic in some respects, this family resemblance account provides a broader conceptual space for assessing the merits of alternative forms of statehood.

This article argues that the South West Africa Cases were brought to an ignominious end because the cases were about self-determination as much as they were about apartheid. For liberals like Judge Sir Percy Spender, the President of the Court, political systems based on majority rule looked suspiciously like authoritarian regimes modelled on the Soviet Union during the Cold War. It is submitted that, given the controversy surrounding self-determination in international law, Sir Percy wanted to avoid addressing the merits of the cases. Self-determination was the proverbial ‘elephant in the court room’ that Sir Percy wanted to avoid at all costs. This article builds upon earlier archival research on the South West Africa Cases by taking a closer look at Sir Percy's role in the cases and his views on self-determination. It is argued that what ‘killed’ the cases was Sir Percy's belief that Ethiopia and Liberia were seeking to ‘legalize’ self-determination with a view to further uniting the Afro-Asian bloc at the United Nations with the Soviet Union against the West.

In this article I draw on John Dugard's criticism of apartheid judges to initiate a discussion of the role and functioning of judges in the post-apartheid era. Using John's critique of the limits of judicial interpretation in an illegitimate order, I extend the analysis to review the record of the Constitutional Court in adjudicating socioeconomic rights cases post-1994. In doing so I propose a radical interpretation of the Court's role in society and an activist functioning of judges in South Africa's constitutional democracy. I conclude that, notwithstanding the momentous changes in the South African legal order since 1994, John's critique of the judiciary retains much value and applicability today.

The inspiration for this article came from a call for amicus curiae briefs issued in April 2016 by the Office of the Co-Investigating Judges in the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia (ECCC). The call sought guidance on: whether, under customary international law applicable between 1975 and 1979, an attack by a state or organization against members of its own armed forces may amount to an attack directed against a civilian population for the purpose of constituting a crime against humanity under Article 5 of the ECCC Law. We argue that customary international law justifies a finding that an attack on members of the armed forces can constitute crimes against humanity. In particular, the article focuses on the importance placed on the persecution element of crimes against humanity in the post-Second World War jurisprudence, and the broad interpretation of the term ‘civilian’. The article also examines the jurisprudence of contemporary international courts, finding that in some cases the courts have interpreted the term ‘civilian’ as incorporating hors de combat. However, the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) and International Criminal Court (ICC) have moved towards a more restrictive interpretation of the term ‘civilian’, potentially excluding members of the armed forces. We argue that this move is regressive, and against the spirit in which the offence of crimes against humanity was created. The ECCC has an opportunity to counter this restrictive approach, thereby narrowing the protection gap which crimes against humanity were initially created to close.

Since 2006, the Leiden Journal of International Law (LJIL) has been dedicating a series of special issues of its Articles section to the theme ‘International Law and the Periphery’. This issue marks the fourth in this series.

Human rights constitute a challenge that Peter Kooijmans never refused or will refuse, both in his academic and government activities. For a long time he has been in the forefront of those who have struggled for the promotion and protection on human rights for everyone, everywhere in the world. As he said himself: “I myself would not have devoted so much of my time to the cause of human rights […] if I had not believed it to be a just cause and worthy task.“ The issue of human rights first became a major concern for him when he was State Secretary for Foreign Affairs (1973–1977), when he had the Dutch foreign policy within the United Nations (including human rights questions) in his portfolio. It was during that period that the United Nations was gradually changing its course, by shifting the emphasis from standard setting in the field of human rights to supervision over the implementation of international human rights norms. He was then working in the shadow of Max van der Stoel, Minister for Foreign Affairs, who was himself an outspoken protagonist of international human rights. It was Max van der Stoel who, after he had again become Minister for Foreign Affairs during the shortlived Van Agt II cabinet (1981–1982), requested Peter Kooijmans to succeed him as Chairman of the Netherlands' delegation to the United Nations Commission on Human Rights, the main political organ of the United Nations in the field of human rights. With his usual sense for realism, Kooijmans once described this Commission as “a crooked stick to make straight stroke”.

The variety of notions of responsibility and liability, used by many publicists, continues to be a source of confusion. It would, therefore, be very clarifying to introduce one meaning for one concept and, thus, use the notions as the ILC defines them. The survey of the several 1LC reports on responsibility and liability shows that the concepts have become more and more interrelated. A different approach might be needed on the subject of international liability in order not to diminish the usefulness these rules can have within the environmental fiel.

Goldstone's recent retraction can leave the reader of the report that bears his name somewhat perplexed. Indeed, if the deliberate intent to target civilians could be discussed in some specific attacks listed, such a report nevertheless describes a pattern of behaviour that cannot be swept aside without disregarding the order of priorities set by the Israeli legal system itself. Through analysis of the new Israeli military code of ethics as well as the Israeli Supreme Court case law, this paper examines how civilians in Gaza were deliberately put at risk by a specific interpretation breaking down the flat rule of civilian immunity into a more complex construction opposing the Israeli soldiers’ right to life to the rights of an ‘enemy population’.

The adoption of the Convention in hand is regarded as a significant step in the law-making process in the field, irrespective of its entry into force. In order to assess the extent of such significance, the text under consideration is interpreted in the light of the most advanced relevant international instruments, including the International Law Association private codification process. The provisions on the general principles of equitable utilisation and no-harm are read in conjunction with Part IV on ‘protection, preservation and management’, on account of a systematic interpretative approach, and on the assumption of the interdependence between water quantity and quality issues. The general character of the wording in which the substantive principles are spelled out, will prompt their further specification, rather than change, through subsequent diplomatic, treaty, and judicial practice.