The Award of the Arbitral Tribunal in the Second Phase (Maritime Delimitation) of the Eritrea-Yemen Arbitration follows the trend towards producing a single all-purpose delimitation line constructed on the basis of equidistance, the course of which is chiefly dictated by mainland coastal geography. Islands are accorded little impact upon the course of the final line, save to the extent necessary to permit them a full territorial sea. The potential relevance of other factors, including fishing and navigational interests is acknowledged but, given the methodology adopted, they did not influence the construction of the line. As in other cases, proportionality is demonstrated by comparison of areas with the relevant coastal lengths, although the usefulness of this is dubious. Although entirely separate exercises, it may be that the methodology pursued owes something to the outcomes of the first phase of the Arbitration, concerning sovereignty over the islands, and this may have a bearing upon the impact of the Award for maritime boundary delimitation more generally.

This article illustrates the power of discourse in free trade agreement (FTA) negotiation, elucidating the concept from the perspective of a country’s abilities of rule control, rule assimilation and rule contestation. To enhance rule control, the G2 (the US and EU) have chosen their FTA partners, designed the FTA rules, and offered offensive-defensive exchange strategically. They have approached weak or trade-dependent parties first in FTA negotiation, innovated new rules to accelerate FTA negotiation, skillfully constructed intentional ambiguity and exemptions to remove rule discrepancies and made offensive-defensive exchange with their negotiating parties. Some of these strategies have been copied by China although in a different way. Further, a template approach for negotiating an FTA and exporting domestic laws and normative values to others contributes to the G2’s rule assimilation. A de facto FTA template has also been established by China recently, but its legal culture and political stance have led it to sign incomplete contracts and tolerate rule differences with its negotiating parties instead of transposition of domestic law. In facing the rival rules adopted by their competitors, the G2 have incorporated counteractive rules in their FTAs with their competitors’ close trading nations. China has also contested rules treating China as a non-market economy in its FTAs, but its stance toward state-owned enterprises (SOE) disciplines and rules forbidding forced technology transfer is milder due to its lack of experience in dealing with unfavourable rules.

This article maps out the landscape holding and connecting three interrelated phenomena: art, international criminal justice, and reconciliation. We argue that reconciliation, viewed as a restoration process, is one of the goals of international criminal justice. Yet, its attainment through law is challenging because international criminal justice, strictly construed, is outcome oriented. Art can serve as a ‘bridge’ linking normative legal standards with their reconciliatory aspirations. The key argument is therefore that art has the clear ability to mediate and amplify the law’s restorative potential through three key features. Firstly, art reflects the complexity of the human condition and reserves a place for emotional processing. Secondly, it is a useful relational tool in opening the space for dialogue, the latter being essential for reconciliation. Lastly, art has the capacity to translate legalistic findings into a language accessible to a wider audience.

This article analyses the decision-making process of the UN Security Council when it adopts outcome documents, such as resolutions, Presidential statements and press statements. It is commonly assumed that because of their veto power and permanency China, France, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States have greater influence than their elected counterparts in shaping those outcomes. In recent years, that control has been strengthened by the penholdership system. Under this practice, one or more members, usually France, the United States or the United Kingdom (P3), take leadership over a situation on the agenda of the Council. When ‘holding the pen’ a member often decides what action the Council should take, then drafts an outcome document that it negotiates with other permanent members before sharing the text with elected members. This article explores the development of this practice and its impact on the respect for the rule of law in the Security Council’s decision-making process. It argues that, while concentrating power in the hands of the P3, hence diminishing transparency and the opportunity for all members to participate in the decision-making of the Council, at the same time the penholdership system also provides an avenue to strengthen elected members’ influence in ways that promote respect for the international rule of law.

The Dispute Settlement Understanding in the WTO Agreement represents a significant shift from a diplomatic model of dispute settlement to a rule-based model. The substitution of legal legitimacy for political legitimacy in the dispute settlement process makes the success or failure of the system largely dependent on the credibility of the jurisprudence produced by the panels and Appellate Body. One way which international tribunals have established credible jurisprudence, is by following their previous decisions unless there is good reason for deciding otherwise. This paper examines the precedential effect of previously adopted panel and Appellate Body reports, and policy reasons for and against a stronger form of precedent in WTO jurisprudence.

This article argues that the principle of judicial economy belongs to the fundamental canons of international procedure – that is, those canons which are inherent in the judicial function and whose application should generally be ensured by the judge concerned, regardless of what the written procedural law establishes. This is particularly evident if one considers how often international courts and tribunals, precisely for reasons of judicial economy and departing from the duty to decide all points put forward by the parties (non ultra petita), enter into those issues alone which are necessary for the purpose of resolving the dispute and/or establishing the true state of the world (the so-called criterion of judicial limitation of the scope of the decision or absorption). Even though no provision requires it, each judge is in fact expected to operate in conformity with this criterion and to use it in a proper way; its misapplication may lead to reforming the decision or precluding its enforcement. The frequent use of the criterion at issue, on the other hand, supports this article's final contention, according to which judicial economy is an expression of judicial activism.

Within international institutions such as the International Criminal Court (ICC), lawyers increasingly encounter managerial practices which are designed to improve organizational efficiency and cost-effectiveness. Charting this trend, scholars have analyzed these practices with a view to make them more legitimate. However, this scholarly focus overlooks the role of managerial practices in legitimizing and thus sustaining the institutions in which they are embedded. In this article, I ask how managerial practices operate to boost the ICC’s reputation among its global audience. I find the answer in the Court’s use of the juxtaposed images of bureaucracy and management, with all their negative and positive associations. The Court uses these images to narrate a story of its own internal evolution from inefficient bureaucracy to efficient and well-managed organization. This hidden narrative of institutional progress functions rhetorically to frame, focus and distract the attention of the Court’s global constituencies.

In the summer of 2017, the International Law Commission adopted a draft article on exceptions to immunity. The Draft Article adopted provides that immunity ratione materiae does not apply with respect to certain international crimes, namely crimes against humanity, the crime of genocide, war crimes, the crime of apartheid, torture, and enforced disappearances. These exceptions do not apply to immunity ratione personae. The Draft Article was adopted after a vote and was severely criticized by some members of the Commission. It has also received mixed reaction from states, with some supporting its content while others have opposed it. In the aftermath of the adoption of the Draft Article, there has also been academic commentary, some of which has been critical. The (main) criticism levelled against the Draft Article is that it does not represent existing law and has no basis in the practice of states. This article seeks to evaluate the criticism by considering whether there is any state practice in support of the Draft Article proposed by the Commission.

In the absence of police powers, the International Criminal Court, like the Tribunals for the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda, will depend on the co-operation of states in order to fulfil its mandate. Discussing the jurisprudence of the ad hoc Tribunals and the travaux préparatoires of the Rome treaty, the author compares the mandatory powers conferred on the respective institutions to this end. He concludes that the Security Council endowed the Tribunals with unequivocally binding powers, while under the Rome treaty regime, which resembles traditional inter-state co-operation in criminal matters, the ICC's powers are more limited and state obligations less stringent.

The term ‘ambition’ appears to have infiltrated international legal discourses: it is used to, for instance, lament the lack of state action to tackle major global challenges, praise progress towards difficult goals, or evaluate the outcomes of international law-making processes. Often mobilized, the concept of ambition in international law remains, however, poorly understood. And yet, each narrative offers a specific analytical frame that influences our understanding of the world and sets distinct policy prescriptions. What argumentative functions do ambition narratives play and what implications do they carry for international law, in both its practice and study? To respond to this question, the article explores the occurrence of the term in a field where the rationale of ambition has recently taken centre stage – international climate law – and uses the crisis narrative as a means of comparison to highlight the specificity of ambition discourses. The argumentative implications of ambition are identified in terms of vision, means and temporality: this article suggests that an ambition discourse fulfils objectives that a crisis narrative is unable to accommodate by calling for structural transformations, motivating states to commit to far-reaching objectives and adopting a long-term perspective focused on incremental change. The shortcomings of an ambition narrative are also highlighted, in relation to its determination and evaluation. The study contributes to shedding light on a new international law discourse to offer a different analytical frame for the discipline.

This article begins with a study of the political economy of welfare capitalism to demonstrate how the private quest for profit was never going to be undermined by the advance of socio-economic rights. Contrary to the conventional view among human rights lawyers, capital draws power from its rights or welfarism. It is in recognizing the role that socio-economic rights play in serving capitalism that the field of international law concerned with structurally transformative human rights can begin to explore how socio-economic rights inhibit alternative forms of social organization. This work then turns to recovering property rights through a study of recent evictions and housing rights case law of the UN Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights that problematizes structural inequities and calls the financialized capitalist system into question. Next this work investigates radical legal positivism in international indigenous rights jurisprudence for how it transcends the private ownership of indigenous lands and control over the means of production. The social function of property rights is then revisited and extended, drawing to a close an article that unearths how socio-economic rights might yet emancipate people from capitalist property relations, alter the underlying structure of the economy, and, in time, sever its concordance with the capitalist welfare state.

As international law is widening in regulatory scope and intensity, it arguably suffers from a legitimacy deficit. This article conceives of this deficit as a deficit in possibilities to politicize, criticize, and contest international law-making proposals in the way a loyal opposition does in a domestic constitutional context: through the representation of relevant societal interests, the voicing of critique, and the safeguarding of alternative proposals for the future. The author of this article tries to bring together the current debate in political theory on the value of legitimate disagreement and dissent in political institutions and the ongoing discussion on the legitimacy of international law. Therefore, a concept of an institutionalized opposition for international law-making processes is developed, referencing authors such as Hannah Arendt and Claude Lefort. Next, the author analyses whether one can already find instances of an institutionalized opposition in international law – in parliamentary assemblies and in international agreements which are designed to present a legal–political counterweight to specific legal concepts and institutions.

This article proposes a different theoretical account of the role of domestic courts when engaged in judicial review of decision-making by international institutions. Many domestic courts in democratic societies operate in accordance with a ‘public-law model’ when adjudicating questions related to international decision-making, underwritten by respect for doctrines such as the rule of law and separation of powers. Drawing on a case study of domestic-court decisions in the Security Council sanctions context, this article seeks to demonstrate how the public law model's focus on concepts of ‘bindingness’ and hierarchy between judicial and political organs can lead to distorted outcomes when applied to decision-making by international institutions. As an alternative, the author proposes a different theoretical account of the judicial role, described as the ‘dialogue model’, of courts when engaging in the review of Security Council decision-making. The idea is that domestic courts should confine themselves to tools of ‘interpretation’ and ‘declaration’ in their approach to international decision-making, so as to position their judgments in a more theoretically supportable way in the broader legal context.

Moiwana Village is the second case to be decided by the Inter-American Court on Human Rights against Suriname in which the victims are members of an ethnic community that descends from ‘Bush Negroes’ or ‘Maroons’, namely escaped former slaves who established new autonomous communities in the eastern part of Suriname. In contrast to its prior judgment, in Moiwana the Court shows a striking evolution in its case law regarding the treatment of ethnic or group rights. This approach, which may be traced back to previous case law on the rights of indigenous communities, affords an enhanced protection to members of an ethnic community in the light of their disadvantaged position as a vulnerable group and taking into account the ancestral traditions followed by the community. After the Moiwana case, the Court decided Yakye Axa and Yatama, two cases regarding indigenous and ethnic communities in which this tribunal consolidated its approach towards the protection of these vulnerable groups.

No international lawyer bats more than the proverbial eyelid nowadays at states intervening militarily in states which host non-state armed groups. Neither drone strikes nor what used to be called ‘invasion’ quicken the pulse of the jus ad bellum lawyer; this is now a matter for humanitarians; the ‘how’ matters much more than the ‘whether’. We have become inured to relatively small-scale military interventions. Those who remember that 20 years ago international lawyers were more likely to find such actions illegal than justified should (but do not) collectively raise an eyebrow at this rapid change.

In Nuhanović and Mustafić (5 July 2011), the Court of Appeal of The Hague held the Netherlands liable under Bosnian torts law in relation to acts of Dutchbat in the days following the fall of Srebrenica. The claims were brought by relatives of victims killed by Mladić's troops after being evicted from the Dutchbat premises, where they had sought refuge. When resorting to international law to attribute the conduct to the Netherlands, the Court shed light on the concrete meaning of ‘effective control’ when a wrongful conduct does not result from direct orders, thereby clarifying some of the questions surrounding the determination of responsibility for conducts in the framework of international organizations.

An unlimited right of non-self-incrimination of witnesses before international criminal tribunals exists only during the pre-trial investigation (Article 55 ICC Statute); during trial the right is not unlimited, as the witness can be compelled to answer any question, either on the basis of an ex ante assurance of non-use of the evidence against him/her coupled with an assurance of confidentiality (ICC Rule 74(3)(c)) or on the basis of a guarantee of non-use without an explicit assurance to that effect (ICTY/ICTR Rules 90(F)). It is doubtful whether these rules are compatible with the principle nemo tenetur se ipsum accusare since this principle protects not only the accused but also the witness from a criminal prosecution which is based on her own statements.

To date, analyses of gender justice at the International Criminal Court (ICC) have focused primarily on critiques of, and shifts within, the Office of the Prosecutor. This article takes a different approach by focusing on the ICC’s judiciary. We being by arguing that state parties can and should do more than electing a balance of male and female judges – they can also ensure gender-sensitivity on the Bench by supporting candidates with expertise in gender analysis, and by backing judges who bring a feminist approach to their work once elected. Next, we explain the concept of the ‘feminist judgment-writing’ and suggest that this method offers a useful framework for embedding gender-sensitive judging at the ICC. To illustrate this argument, we highlight opportunities for ICC judges to engage in gender-sensitive judging in relation to interpreting the law, making findings of fact, and deciding procedural questions. The final section of the article discusses how best to institutionalize the practice of gender-sensitive judging at the ICC.

On 19 November 2012, the International Court of Justice gave its judgment concerning the Territorial and Maritime Dispute between Nicaragua and Colombia. This judgment includes several important issues which need serious consideration, such the as legal status of maritime features, the interpretation and application of Article 121 of the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea, the methodology of maritime delimitations, the role of proportionality in maritime delimitations, and the impact of the judgment upon third states and effect of Article 59 of the ICJ Statute. Focusing on these issues, this contribution aims to analyse the judgment of 2012 from a viewpoint of the international law of the sea, in particular, the law of maritime delimitation.

In the Brđanin and Krajišnik judgments, the ICTY Appeals Chamber found that the accused may incur criminal liability for crimes carried out by low-level non-joint criminal enterprise (JCE) physical perpetrators who are used as tools or are otherwise instrumentalized by JCE members other than the accused to carry out the crimes of the common plan. Similarly, the Appeals Chamber held that the accused may also incur liability for crimes of excess committed by non-JCE perpetrators. However, as for the precise nature of liability in such cases, no clarification was provided. From this ambiguity the author detects an inclination on the part of the Appeals Chamber to construe JCE not only as an expression of commission but also of complicity. The author then identifies and elaborates the theoretical difficulties that this construction would instil in the traditional doctrine of JCE as formulated by the Tadić Appeals Chamber and the international law of individual criminal responsibility. He suggests that awareness of these very problems of theory is the reason behind the conspicuous ambiguity in Brđanin and Krajišnik as to the nature of JCE liability.