On 5 December 2000 the International Court of Justice adopted amended texts of Articles 79 and 80 of the Rules of Court, dealing respectively with preliminary objections and with counter-claims. The present paper introduces the new articles in the light of the 1978 version of the texts.

Carl Schmitt's Der Nomos der Erde allows us to rethink his interlinked proposals for the organization of the Weimar Republic, namely his theory of ‘democratic dictatorship’ and the ‘concept of the political’. Connecting the domestic homogeneity of an empowered people with the pluralism of the Westphalian state system, Schmitt seeks to humanize war; he objects to the renaissance of the ‘just war’ tradition, which is premised on a discriminating concept of war. Schmitt's objections are valid today, yet their Eurocentric foundations are also partially outdated. We are thus to argue with Schmitt against Schmitt to reflect on possibilities for the humanization of war.

Martti Koskenniemi's From Apology to Utopia is (rightly) considered a classic in international legal theory. The study tracks the oscillation of international legal argument over hundreds of years to reconcile seeming incongruencies: legal reasoning does not provide determinacy, but it brings weighted direction to political conflict; legal categories are amorphous, yet also an autonomous field of study. Though not commonly engaged, the methodological and theoretical posture of the book is significantly informed by a theory of history. This article focuses on this historical element within the text as a means to analyze some of its central claims and situate it within a broader sociology of knowledge production particular to late twentieth century legal academia.

Comparative advantage which motors free trade crucially depends on national differences in respect of endowment with resources – e.g. natural,human, technological – and with factors and standards of production, including standards on production processes. Yet, is it open to any GATT contracting party to unilaterally force its own standards upon others?Moreover, is it permissible for a contracting party to enforce such standards by means of ‘trade sanctions’ in the form of import prohibitions against another whose environmental standards regarding certain production processes it has judged inferior to its own? The answer is a resounding ‘yes’ from some exponents of the environmental constituency, arguing that values pertaining to global environmental welfare should prevail. Similarly, some members of the GATT constituency, particularly developing countries, emphatically reject what it they term ‘eco-imperialism’.Generally, their argument is that, in order to safeguard the welfare of world trade against disguised protectionist aberrations, governmental environmental measures must be justified under the general exceptions of GATT.

In the process of selection of articles for the International Court of Justice section at the Editorial Board of the Leiden Journal of International Law (LJIL), we tend to be seduced by those manuscripts which are effective in making use of the jurisprudence of the Court as an instrument to engage in an in-depth examination of substantive legal issues of a general nature. This reflects our conviction – hardly an original one, since it appears to be shared by our entire legal community – that the Court has a fundamental role to play in the advancement of international law as a legal system. It also echoes an idea that is present in the mission statement of our journal, which is conceived as ‘a forum for two vital areas, namely international legal theory and international dispute settlement’, thus establishing an intrinsic link between them. But how is the Court's contribution to the development of international law to be assessed? And what do we expect from a scholarly piece examining its case law in this respect?

It is always a pleasure and privilege to address a body of students as they commence their graduate studies. You have climbed the foothills successfully and have reached the first plateau. But there are many peaks ahead, and as you commence your ascent of one of them today, I wish you the very best of luck in reaching the sunlit plateau that lies ahead. When you arrive there, you will no doubt see other peaks which you may wish to climb, because any branch of study reveals ever higher and higher peaks. The higher you go, the more you see. These summits are sometimes even hidden in the clouds. You keep discovering them, and even if their existence is known, they are often unexplored territory. Pathways have to be found through them. That is part of the intellectual excitement you will commence today as you leave the well-trodden paths and begin to carve out pathways for yourselves. I congratulate you and wish you God speed on your journey.

In seeking to define torture in international humanitarian law, the ICTY and ICTR have turned to the definition of torture contained in the UN Convention against Torture for guidance. The Convention definition contains a requirement that the actor be a public official or other person acting in an official capacity. The ad hoc tribunals have put forward various views as to whether this is an element of the definition of torture in international humanitarian law. This article examines these views. Potentially more significant are the pronouncements of the tribunals on the actor element of the definition of torture in international human rights law. This article also explores these pronouncements. It compares them with the drafting history of the Convention against Torture and with the jurisprudence of the Committee against Torture, the European Court of Human Rights and the UN Human Rights Committee. It questions whether the approach of the ad hoc tribunals is part of a trend towards a wider reading of ‘the actor’ in international human rights law.

The European Court of Human Rights has consistently reiterated that positive obligations under the European Convention on Human Rights arise when state authorities know or ought to have known about the risk of harm. This article attempts to describe and assess the role of state knowledge in the framework of positive obligations, and to situate the Court’s approach to knowledge about risk within an intelligible framework of analysis. The main argument is that the assessment of state knowledge is imbued with normative considerations. The assessment of whether the state ‘ought to have known’ is intertwined with, first, concerns that positive obligations should not impose unreasonable burden on the state and, second, the establishment of causal links between state omissions and harm.

The interplay between the International Criminal Court (ICC) and domestic jurisdictions under the complementarity regime has unveiled statutory and policy limitations. These loopholes became vivid when the ICC faced new complex situations that were not initially envisaged by the drafters of the Rome Statute. On the practical side, the Libyan situation revealed setbacks and shortages in the policy(ies) adopted by the ICC. The first of these setbacks is the apparent lack of a coherent strategy on positive complementarity as invoked by (some) organs of the Court. The second aspect is the Court's adoption of a restrictive interpretation of the constituencies of the complementarity regime, making it extremely difficult even for some willing and able states to exercise their primary duty to prosecute core international crimes.

The unfortunate loose interpretation of ‘unavailability’ that the ICC has developed has led to inaccurate interpretations of the complementarity mechanism in certain situations, such as Libya. Furthermore, the fair trial standards within the admissibility regime should not be exaggerated, but rather invoked to determine whether the state has a bona fide intention to investigate and prosecute these crimes. Contrary to some writers’ interpretation, this is an objective test of intention, not one of relativity or specific result.

The ICC practice has shown a patchy approach that lacks a consistent and clear vision of its relation with domestic jurisdictions. While the ICC has not missed every opportunity to hail its commitment to positive complementarity, the reality is that the Court seems keen on understanding its success through conducting more international prosecutions.

Accession to the World Trade Organization (WTO) is viewed as a major step in the development of a state, and the commitments made by acceding states are often interpreted as a symbolic commitment to international economic and political community. However, as a subject of scholarship, WTO accession is under-theorized – there has been no sustained academic attempt to build a theory that accounts for the complexity of the accession process. Traditional, positivist approaches can point to increasingly onerous terms of accession, but fail to probe past Article XII's one-dimensional concept of ‘the acceding state’ negotiating with ‘the WTO’. This perspective dislocates the accession process from the broader political, economic, and legal reforms that involve both state and non-state actors. This article examines the role of these actors as epistemic communities, and argues that these epistemic communities engage in a series of dialogues about the nature of law and the legal system in the acceding state.

The article critically examines the use of the doctrine of command responsibility by the UN International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda in two of its judgements, Kayishema & Ruzindana and Musema. It argues that in assessing superior-subordinate relationships the ICTR applied the wrong standard in both cases. While there is no doubt that civilian superiors are liable to prosecution for command responsibility, the doctrine will be properly operative only in cases where the superior's control of subordinates strongly resembles that enjoyed by military commanders. The article builds upon the arguments of the ICTY's Čelebići judgement on this point, and emphasises the difficulty in holding lower-ranking Rwandan civilians responsible as superiors for genocide committed by supposed subordinates.

This keynote address delivered to a Conference on Evidence in International Criminal Tribunals at University College Dublin in November 2011 considers how differently evidentiary issues are dealt with by international criminal tribunals from domestic tribunals. It is argued that, although there are jurisdictional differences affecting what international prosecutors have to prove before international criminal tribunals, many of the problems and difficulties that beset international tribunals are also to be found in domestic tribunals and both types of tribunal have similar duties and issues to grapple with.

The trials at Indonesia's Ad Hoc Court for Human Rights in East Timor have been widely condemned. ‘Sham’ and ‘show trial’ are the terms frequently used to describe the process, yet to date there has been little substantive assessment that adequately explains or documents the process. This article offers a detailed assessment of the first three trials at the court, namely that of a former governor of East Timor (Abilio Soares), a former police chief of East Timor (Timbul Silaen), and five members of the military, police, and civil administration accused of responsibility for the Suai church massacre. In 2000, the international community gave a shamed nation the opportunity to redeem its honour and reputation by bringing to justice those of its nationals responsible for the destruction of East Timor in a process that met international standards. But the inescapable conclusion for the author is that the cases of Abilio Soares, Timbul Silaen, and the Suai church massacre were not conducted in a way that was consistent with an intent to bring to justice persons responsible for gross violations of human rights in East Timor.

Under the UN sanctions regime of Resolution 1267, UN member states are obliged to freeze the assets of persons and entities which are associated with Usama bin Laden, and which therefore reason have been listed by the UN. Within the European Union this ‘UN sanctions list’ is implemented by means of a Community regulation, having direct effect in all EU member states. The regulation was challenged by several individuals and an organization, which were added to the UN sanctions list on the basis of their association with al Qaeda. The regulation was challenged on two grounds. First, the applicants claimed that the Community did not have the competence to adopt the contested regulation. In the second place, the applicants claimed that the Community regulation infringed their human rights (right to property, right of access to court). Thus the CFI was asked to determine to what extent it is competent indirectly to review measures adopted under the UN Charter. This delicate legal question is answered in a lengthy judgment, the legal reasoning of which is not always convincing.

Access to and distribution of natural resources have been since immemorable time at the root of violent conflict. Over the last few decades, international institutions, legal scholars and civil society started to pay attention to the dangerous liaison between resource commodities and wars. Current debates emphasize how, through sanctions, global regulatory initiatives, and legal accountability, the governance of natural resources in conflict and post-conflict countries has improved, although international law should play a greater role to support the transition to a durable peace. The aim of this article is to illuminate the biases and limitations of dominant accounts by exploring the influence of the resource curse thesis, and its hidden propositions, upon legal developments. Using the Sierra Leonean and Liberian Truth Commissions as a case study, it shows how legal practices and discourses have contributed to a narrow understanding of resource-driven wars as started by voracious rebel groups or caused by weak/authoritarian/corrupt governments. What is obscured by the current focus on greed and ineffective resource governance? What responsibilities and forms of violence are displaced? Engaging with these questions allows us to see the dynamics through which structural injustices and distributive concerns are marginalized in existing responses to these conflicts, how the status quo is perpetuated, and the more subtle ways in which external interventions in the political economy of the Global South take place.

As a result of the extension of the jurisdiction of the Court of Justice of the European Union over the former third pillar (Police and Judicial Cooperation in Criminal Matters), several cases were referred to the Court for interpretation, inter alia, of the dispositions of the Schengen Convention dealing with criminal matters, especially the ne bis in idem principle. This principle was also addressed in the case law of the European Court of Human Rights, the Inter-American Court of Human Rights, and the Supreme Court of the United States. While addressing the problem at international level, this article focuses principally on the case law of the Court of Justice of the European Union and the European Court of Human Rights in the field of the ne bis in idem principle, concisely presenting the legal framework, findings of the Courts, and some conclusions on the interpretation of the principle. The study also analyses the absence of uniformity in interpretation and the use of different criteria in addressing identical situations by different courts, or even by the same court, concluding on a (seemingly) fortunate approximation in interpretation at European level.

The articles in this issue of the Leiden Journal of International Law (LJIL), on the life and work of Alejandro Álvarez, comprise the first in a series of occasional special issues planned for the LJIL, each of which will focus on the work of a leading international legal scholar from the ‘periphery’. In launching the Periphery Series, the editorial board of the LJIL had in mind the goal of focusing attention on the role played by centre–periphery dynamics in international law. The centre–periphery formulation of international affairs owes its provenance to political economy, in which context it is primarily associated with dependency theory, Immanuel Wallerstein's world systems theory, and more recently, Paul Krugman's model of the geography of trade economics. In part, the Periphery Series invites scholars to confront questions of resource allocation, dependency, and geography highlighted by those bodies of work. In addition, however, this series seeks to foster wider engagement with the discursive function of centre–periphery oppositions in international law, in their many and various iterations.

On 9 April 2018, the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court filed a request seeking the composition of a Pre-Trial Chamber, in order to decide whether the Court has territorial jurisdiction over the Rohingya deportation from Myanmar to Bangladesh as a crime against humanity. This filing is a first for the Court on at least two fronts; it is the first time the Prosecutor has asked the Court to interpret Article 12(2)(a) and apply qualified territoriality; it is also the first time the Prosecutor has asked for a ruling on jurisdiction under Article 19(3).

This study explores certain procedural questions emerging from this request, such as the Court’s authority to decide while its jurisdiction is ‘dormant’; the function of Article 19(3) within the Rome Statute’s overall system concerning jurisdictional determinations; issuing a decision on jurisdiction, while avoiding prejudice to subsequent proceedings and without rendering meaningless the right to challenge jurisdiction under Article 19(2) of the Statute. The article accepts that the request is a step in the right direction, as it signals the Prosecutor’s determination to investigate the Rohingya crisis. However, the manner and timing of its presentation give rise to plausible claims of incompatibility with the Court’s procedural framework. Arguably, the Court may well instruct the Prosecutor to assume the risk of wasting precious resources and proceed with further investigations, pending the final determination of the jurisdictional question at a later stage.