Despite a near unanimous agreement that human trafficking is a morally reprehensible practice, there is confusion around what qualifies as human trafficking in the United States. Adopting a mixed-method strategy, we examine how human trafficking is defined by the public; how contemporary (mis)understanding of human trafficking developed; and the public opinion consequence of this (mis)understanding. The definition of human trafficking has evolved over time to become nearly synonymous with slavery; however, we demonstrate that media and anti-trafficking organisations have been focussing their attention on the sexual exploitation of foreign women. We show that general public opinion reflects this skewed attention; the average citizen equates human trafficking with the smuggling of women for sexual slavery. Using a survey experiment, we find that shining light on other facets of human trafficking – the fact that human trafficking is a security problem and a domestic issue – can increase public response to the issue.

Using Atkinson and Coleman's typology of policy networks, this article shows how many of the differences in policy outcomes can be traced to the structure of the policy environment in each nation. French and Germany policy makers adopted a strategy of investing in high speed passenger transport to revitalize their declining railway sectors. The French TGV was developed in a state-directed policy network which insisted on cost containment and commercial viability. In Germany a corporatist style of policymaking in the rail sector led to delays and higher costs for the ICE train. A separate clientele pluralist network led by the Research Ministry developed the Transrapid maglev option, but in order to finance and deploy an operational system, the Chancellor and cabinet had to create a concertation network. The policy network approach provides a useful framework for conducting comparative analysis. In addition, these detailed cases suggest that it is useful to add a dynamic, cross-temporal dimension to the static typology.

From a traditional rationalist principal-agent framework, the development of the European Community’s competition policy could appear as a straightforward story of agency loss. However, the recent overhaul of competition policy, which the Community presented in terms of decentralisation, appears to have changed the story. We are confronted with the uncommon event of an agent (the European Commission) returning some of its powers to the principals (the member states). This paper resolves the puzzle by highlighting the role of the Commission and of European courts. It has become part of the Commission’s strategy to pursue its objectives through legally non-binding instruments such as notices or guidelines or co-operation in networks. These instruments do not need the approval of the Council of Ministers or the European Parliament. With the Commission’s promotion of new modes of governance, the link between sectoral governance (in terms of regulation specific to competition policy) and the governmental shadow of hierarchy shifted to an increasing extent to judicial review by European courts. Alongside this shift, the character of judicial review has changed in the direction of judicial control, as European courts no longer restrict themselves to review of the legality of Commission actions, but also engage in assessing the facts themselves.

The article examines the variables which preclude or facilitate shifts or change in patterns of budgeting within governments. Emphasis is placed upon the connection between systems of budgeting and underlying structures of ideas and values which constitute organisational ‘myths’. Drawing upon the literatures of political science and organisational analysis the paper identifies a combination of factors which facilitate the erosion of the legitimacy of prevailing myths and lead to their displacement. This thesis is empirically examined using data from twenty English local authorities.

This paper examines the relationship between states’ migration control policies and human trafficking in origin, transit and destination states. Using cross-sectional data on states’ visa policies for 192 states and indicators for human trafficking from the Global Patterns report by the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, the paper analyses feedback mechanisms between policies and trafficking. The empirical evidence suggests that, contrary to the pessimistic predictions of policy scholarship, the feedback is characterised by a virtuous mechanism. Firstly, the results show that, in line with expectations of security studies, states tighten visa policies in response to trafficking threats. Origin and transit states face a greater number of restrictions on travel. Similarly, destination states of trafficking impose tighter controls. Secondly, visa restrictions against origin and transit countries mitigate trafficking from and through these states. Finally, the paper demonstrates that the vicious effect whereby stricter policies exacerbate trafficking pertains mostly to destination states’ visa policies and to visas imposed at borders.

Irrespective of views about equity, social insurance has a major efficiency role. Because of technical problems in private markets, neither unemployment nor inflation are risks against which private markets can supply actuarial insurance, and medical insurance cannot cover all risks for all types of individual. The existence of social insurance is therefore supported on the grounds that it does things which private, actuarial insurance would either not do at all or would do inefficiently.

This paper examines recent European policy changes designed to support small and medium size enterprises (SMEs). These changes have resulted in both the development of specific support programs for SMEs and more general deregulatory measures to improve the economic environment for business. The rationale often provided is that SMEs contribute to a dynamic and innovative environment and generate high quality employment. An analysis of OECD material and a review of the literature on SMEs reveals that their role in innovation, employment growth and the adoption of new forms of work organisation is often over-emphasised. The vast majority of SMEs do not carry out research and development and are associated with low quality and insecure employment. Policies in support of SMEs need to be formulated with an awareness of the diversity of SMEs. There are only a very limited number of SMEs which make an important contribution to employment and innovation. Efforts to facilitate the establishment and growth of these high quality SMEs need to be based on targeted programs rather than general measures such as tax reduction or labour market deregulation. Targeted policies include R&D support, the improvement of SMEs' intangible investments and regional access to capital and technology. General measures are more likely to create an environment in which low quality, low wage employment is generated in SMEs with little future.

It is widely acknowledged that poor government policy performance undermines public trust in government. However, there has been insufficient study of how citizens attribute responsibility to different levels of government within an authoritarian unitary context. Inquiry is needed to assess the ways government performance in various policy domains affects central–local political trust. This study uses the case of China to addresses these questions. Results show that, in particular, local governments risk losing public trust for corruption. Nevertheless, the central government loses public trust due to unsatisfying economies. Both local and central governments lose public trust for poor performance regarding environmental protection, food safety problems, public health, and primary/middle school education. The central government cannot always avoid blame, depending on different policy issues. The results indicate that the perceived administrative responsibility of different levels of government affects citizens’ evaluations of the performance of the central and local governments as well as their political trust.

What are the effects of fiscal imbalances, and austerity, on regional-level spending? To answer this question, we examine an original dataset of yearly spending decisions of regional governments in Italy and Spain between 2003 and 2015. We find that the rise in regional deficits has an important negative effect on regional governments’ spending. The strength of this effect is, however, mitigated by the presence of a left-wing party in regional office. In addition, we uncover an important variation in the extent of cutbacks across policy sectors: regional governments tend to protect the health sector and focus their retrenchment efforts on social assistance and running of public institutions. Partisanship matters here too, as left-wing parties tend to protect healthcare more than their right-wing rivals. These findings bear relevance for understanding the role of partisanship and policy sector in the process of public retrenchment in multi-level states.

Despite a pervasive trend towards state retrenchment in Latin America since the 1980s, there remains significant variation in the levels of privatization across the region. However, very few cross-national studies of the determinants of privatization have been conducted and we still do not truly know why states privatize. This paper examines the determinants of privatization for 14 Latin American states over the period 1975 to 2003. I contend that privatization is best conceptualized as a two-stage process involving an initial decision to privatize, followed by a subsequent decision concerning the extent and intensity of privatization. In addition, privatization cannot be simply explained by either international or domestic level-variables. Rather, endogenous and exogenous variables will have different impacts at different stages of this process. The results of the statistical tests yield two important insights. Firstly, the initial decision to privatize is primarily shaped by international factors, in particular, international diffusion, while variation in the level of state divestiture across the region can primarily be explained by domestic economic and political conditions.

In the most global of industries, such as telecommunications and finance, international competition remains governed primarily by national regulations. When multiple national regulators govern international markets, the regulators themselves compete. But do they compete in laxity, trying to reduce regulation as much as possible, or do they compete in regulatory subsidy, trying to rig regulations to favor domestic firms? These questions are examined in Britain and Japan. In telecommunications and finance there has been no single global trend toward regulatory laxity or regulatory subsidy; national regulations still set the terms for international competition; the game of regulatory competition is so complex that it is difficult to find any single strategy for winning; and national authorities will continue to have difficulty in shifting regulation to the international level.

This paper tries to integrate and generalise research results from selected comparative policy studies in the fields of economic, social, educational, environmental and health and safety policies. The countries included are Britain, Sweden and the United States. The concepts of institutional and organisational structure, culture orientation and policy style are applied in order to develop descriptive taxonomies to suggest how these factors might influence ultimate policy outputs.

The integration of immigrants is an intractable policy controversy in Dutch politics: the Blok Committee was established by Parliament to offer a resolution. However, its evaluation study ‘Building Bridges’, itself became controversial. This paper asks: Why did the policy evaluation of the Blok Committee become so fiercely contested? We argue that the debate on immigrant integration can be characterized by frame-conflict: there were fundamental differences in how immigrant integration was defined and normatively interpreted by actors. The resolution of such ill-structured problems requires the critical articulation of multiple and conflicting frames. In situations of intractable policy controversies, policy evaluation should reach beyond mere technical and contextual levels to include systemic and ideological discourse. Policy evaluation can thereby focus more on utilization and contribute to the resolution of intractable policy controversies by building bridges among conflicting frames.

The quality of health care services has recently become a prominent political issue in both Britain and America. Everyone is in favour of quality. Yet closer inspection reveals that the term is being used with several different meanings, and that its fashionability seems intimately connected with the collision, in both countries, between rising health care costs and a desire on the part of the purchasers or paymasters of health services to restrict their expenditures. The different approaches to assessing quality are not neutral, technical matters. Each carries implications for the future relationships among health care providers, and between providers, payers and patients. Furthermore, changes in these institutional relationships may well lead the debate back to the larger, traditional and more obviously ‘political’ issues of resource allocation, equity and the role of the state.

Using an original demographically representative survey, we estimate the determinants of public support for a set of supportive and punitive policies to combat the opioid epidemic among a sample of 2,131 Americans. Our findings indicate that individuals who attribute blame for the epidemic to the personal choices of individuals, conservatives and those high in racial resentment are consistently more likely to support punitive policies to combat the opioid epidemic and less likely to favour policies to support individuals with substance use disorders. Individuals who have a personal connection to someone struggling with opioid use disorder favour policies to support such individuals but have nuanced attitudes towards punitive policies. Importantly, we find overwhelming support for all supportive policies except supervised injection sites, while roughly 50% of our sample supported the set of punitive policy choices. Our research represents a significant step forward toward understanding public opinion about the opioid epidemic and policies to combat it.

Whether corporatism matters or not is one of the most difficult and intriguing questions confronting policy analysts. One approach to the problem not previously adopted is to use systems analysis as a means of teasing out the implications of general structural differences between corporatist and pluralist polities. By using a framework derived from the systems analysis of Easton but incorporating elements of political competition and accountability, it is shown that corporatist and pluralist states differ significantly in the ways in which they process information and generate support. The combination of centralisation and consensus proves to be the key to the apparently greater learning capacity of corporatist systems. The analysis suggests that policymaking may itself be better understood as a learning mechanism rather than as an allocative process.

Starting without any a priori assumption that government is necessarily a force for good or ill, this article examines what negative consequences are likely to arise from big government – or government growing bigger still. Three generic effects are postulated: a loss of effectiveness, because of the use of weaker means-ends programme technologies for new programmes; an increase in contradictions between existing, growing and new programmes; and a possible reduction of consent, insofar as growth increases the ‘impropriety’ of government actions. The growth of government is shown to be ‘unbalanced’, that is, to occur in incommensurable ways and at varying rates for major resources (government revenue, personnel, and laws); government organizations; and programme outputs. The different character of growth in each element is examined, and particular consequences hypothesized for resource elements singly, for internal characteristics of organizations, and for their combination in programmes. The analysis suggests that while much growth involves no intrinsic problems of size (as long as economic resources are available to meet the costs), there is likely to be disproportionate loss of effectiveness, and increasing contradictions between programmes if big government grows bigger still.

Intelligence sharing among countries with different technical capabilities and local knowledge is particularly valuable for countering terrorism, transnational organized crime, and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. States participating in intelligence-sharing arrangements must balance the benefits of more and better intelligence against the possibility that their partners will withhold or distort the information they share or will pass along to others the information they receive. Participants can balance these benefits and risks by introducing elements of hierarchy into their sharing agreements. Hierarchical arrangements allow a state to monitor more effectively for defection and to reassure others of its own commitments to the terms of their sharing arrangement. I evaluate this argument by analyzing intelligence sharing between the United States and Britain and West Germany during the early cold war, and conclude with some insights the approach sheds on contemporary sharing arrangements and problems.

Security is generally considered a core public good provided by the state. Since outsourcing military and security tasks erodes the state's monopoly of force, we would expect regulation in this area to be stronger than in areas that do not have potentially lethal consequences. But neither caution nor careful regulation is evident in state responses to the emergence of private military and security companies; instead, the industry's rapid growth has outpaced government efforts to control their activities. This article assesses whether two industry associations, the US-based International Peace Operations Association (IPOA) and the British Association of Private Security Companies (BAPSC), have adopted mechanisms necessary for effective self-regulation, and it evaluates different national approaches to self-regulation. Neither the IPOA nor the BAPSC has established self-regulatory mechanisms able to monitor or sanction member companies' behavior. The IPOA's activities correspond to American patterns of self-regulation, while the BAPSC's efforts suggest weaker linkages with the British government than seen in other self-regulatory mechanisms.