The pressures of economic crisis and reform that have gripped African societies have been accompanied by a proliferation of new religious movements. Amid concerns about the political impact of religious revivalism, little attention has been devoted to their economic implications. Focusing on the remarkable coincidence between the withdrawal of the state, the rise of religious movements, and the dramatic expansion of the informal economy, this paper examines the role of religious revivalism in processes of informal economic governance and class formation in contemporary Africa. Against the background of the historical role of religion in the development of market institutions across the continent, it traces the dynamics of religious revivalism and informal economic regulation in two regions of Nigeria. Rather than representing a return to occultist or patrimonial impulses, new religious movements reveal distinctly Weberian tendencies. However, modernising tendencies fostered within the informal economy by popular religious revivalism are being stunted by the relentless pressures of liberalisation, globalisation and pseudo-democratisation. Progressive religious tendencies among the poor are being instrumentalised by religious entrepreneurs and political elites, undermining fragile processes of entrepreneurial class formation taking place within the informal economy.

In many West African countries there are large numbers of foreigners who have settled down to live and work or who come periodically to help harvest the crops. These aliens may be seen, from one point of view, as a useful and willing labour force, and a politically passive group requiring little in the way of services, or, from another viewpoint, as an insupportable drain on an economy which is not able to supply jobs for local people, and a source of political conflict because they have no allegiance to the ruling government. The growth in the economic power of Lebanese businessmen and local reactions to this competition have been ably discussed;1 this article will be concerned with African aliens, who are present in far greater numbers than the Lebanese and whose position has become increasingly insecure in recent years.

This article analyses contemporary Eritrea's acute crisis within the framework of the theory of anomie. It is based on the hypothesis that militarisation, forced labour, mass exodus and family disintegration can be interpreted as the consequences of two incompatible norm and value systems: the collectivist, nationalistic and militaristic worldview of the former liberation front and ruling party People's Front for Democracy and Justice (PFDJ), and the traditional cultural system of Eritrea's society. In 2002 the regime introduced an unlimited ‘development campaign’, thereby forcing large parts of the society to live as conscripts and perform unpaid labour. This has caused a mass exodus of young people and a rapid process of family disintegration. The article is based on empirical fieldwork and evaluates the ongoing developments which have led to rapid economic decline and the destabilisation of the entire fabric of society.

In the early hours of Easter Sunday, 14 April 1974, the army, led by Lieutenant Colonel Seyni Kountché, overthrew the Government which had held power in Niger since independence. President Hamani Diori's régime became the twenty-fifth in Africa to fall to a coup d'état in eleven years, and Niger the eighth republic of former French Africa to come under the control of the military.

The failure of structural adjustment programmes to promote industrialisation in Africa may be at least partly explained by the fragmentation of African business systems. In Africa, the parastatal, foreign-dominated formal and indigenous informal sectors are poorly integrated, largely as a result of the institutional environment in which they have developed. The lack of supportive financial, state and social institutions inhibits trust and accountability, and impedes the access to capital, labour market flexibility, and sub-contracting, which are needed for modern industrial development. More research is needed, both detailed studies of business systems in individual African countries, and cross-country comparisons of the linkages between the economy and the wider social and institutional environment.

One of the most striking voting patterns in many African elections is the marked difference between urban and rural voters in their willingness to support the incumbent. In many countries, incumbents receive their worst electoral scores in the cities, whereas the countryside votes overwhelmingly for them. This pattern is puzzling because there is no evidence that rural areas benefit more from government policies. On the contrary, most governments in Africa exhibit a pro-urban policy bias. Why then do rural voters support incumbents at higher rates? Using evidence from original interviews with politicians in Senegal, coupled with media coverage from several elections, I contend that incumbents enjoy higher success in rural vis-à-vis urban areas because rural voters are more susceptible to clientelism. Tight social structure, cohesion and the prominent role of local patrons facilitate the acquisition of entire blocs of rural voters for the incumbent. These findings are independent of ethnic, religious or party identity.

To date, most of the literature on trade networks in West Africa has considered networks in a metaphorical way. The aim of this paper is to go one step further by showing how social network analysis may be applied to the study of regional trade in West Africa. After a brief review of the literature, this exploratory paper investigates two main issues related to regional trade. We start by discussing how recent developments in regional trade in West Africa have contributed to challenging the social structure of traders. We then discuss the changes that have affected the spatiality of regional trade by looking at the influence of spatial location and geographic scale on traders' abilities to trade. In both cases, we argue that the value of social network analysis in exploring how traders have progressively adapted to social and spatial changes in economic activities has been greatly underestimated. Our discussion is illustrated with the case of two trade networks located between Niger, Benin and Nigeria.

The end of the Cold War has had contradictory effects on African security. Southern Africa and Ethiopia clearly benefitted from the end of superpower rivalry, whereas central and western Africa have seen an upswing of violence during the 1990s. The withdrawal of foreign patronage, the post-Somalia reluctance of the West and the UN to intervene militarily, heightened external demands for economic and political reform, and the changing nature of African insurgencies, have placed additional pressure on already weak governments. Many African states have only weak militaries to defend their security, the collapse of Mobutu Sese Seko's Armed Forces of Zaïre providing the most recent example.

As recently as 1990, the idea of African states relying upon mercenaries from the former South African Defence Force (SADF) would have seemed both preposterous and insulting. Yet since 1993, Executive Outcomes (EO), the world's largest and best known ‘mercenary’ group, has marketed itself as a defender of African state security in this post-Cold War era. A private army with access to some 2,000 ex-South African Defence Force (SADF) combat veterans, EO has helped to defeat discredited insurgencies in Angola and Sierra Leone. Large sections of Africa need effective militaries and EO, which claims to fight only for sovereign governments, presents itself as a stabilising force for African development. To some observers, EO is ‘with the possible exception of the South African army, the most deadly and efficient army operating in sub-Saharan Africa today’.

This article examines the controversial Executive Outcomes military as a security option for African governments. It sketches EO's history, its military effectiveness, and its political loyalty, to assess whether EO threatens or assists African state stability. The article concludes by looking at EO's possible future, and the lessons which it offers about African security.

This article examines the new norms in bilateral, regional and international relations that evolved in the wake of the emergence of the Eritrean state which had successfully challenged the hegemonic claims of both the imperial and Afro-Marxist Ethiopian state. The analysis proceeds from a retelling of the events in 1998 which precipitated the break between the Ethiopian and Eritrean partners of the old alliance against the Mengistu regime, then examines the structural anomalies in the alliance and their consequences. The evidence examined here suggests that two inter-related phenomena help to shed light on the structural, historical and philosophical underpinnings of the 1998–2000 Ethio–Eritrean conflict: (1) the asymmetry of vision between diasporic and hegemonic states, leading to a clash of interests; (2) the failure of both post-war regimes to formalise their ‘understandings’ into formal treaties based on international law.

As the two countries pursued different systems of economic and political governance, the cluster of informal understandings unravelled amidst conflicting interpretations of issues relating to sovereignty: territorial jurisdiction and citizenship. What emerges is a picture – seen from below rather than from above – of the norms and rules that govern the conduct of interstate relations between Africa's most recent and oldest sovereign states.

This paper examines the cultural repertoires of the youthful, ‘militant’ faction of the Oodua People's Congress (OPC) in Nigeria, pointing to ways in which violence and ritual can be interpreted both as an instrumentally rational strategy of power struggle and as a form of symbolic action with cultural meanings. The OPC case strongly challenges the bifurcation of tradition and modernity, given the way the group appropriate culture in negotiating Yoruba identity, while also retaining democratic rhetoric. It argues that the activities of the OPC constitute not stable, bounded manifestations of culture, but rather fluid, ambivalent and paradoxical ethnic-power relations and formations.

In February 2011, Ugandan President Yoweri Museveni resoundingly won re-election. In the aftermath of the vote, which many had predicted would be competitive, analysts and opposition supporters ascribed Museveni's victory to massive pre-election spending on public goods, creation of new administrative districts, and vote buying. While the opposition could not compete with Museveni and his National Resistance Movement in access to resources, our analyses of survey data, from two pre-election surveys conducted by Afrobarometer in November/December 2010 and January 2011, and a pre- and post-election panel study, find little evidence that Museveni benefited significantly from public goods outlays, district creation, and vote buying. Additionally, we find little evidence that fear and intimidation were responsible for the results. Instead, the data suggest that Museveni's re-election was driven by an uninspiring opposition slate, widespread satisfaction with macro-economic growth, and an improved security situation, particularly in the Northern Region.

Civil society has been an active mobilisational and agitational force in the resource conflicts of the Niger Delta region in Nigeria. The paper examines the gender segment of civil society and its character, forms and roles in these conflicts. The central argument is that marginality can be a basis of gendered movements and their engagement in struggles for justice, accommodation and fair access to benefits. Utilising secondary data and primary data elicited from oral interviews, the study identifies and categorises women groupings and identifies their roles and engagements in the oil economy. It finds that community women organisations (CWOs), with the support of numerous grass-roots women organisations, are the most active and frequently engaged in the local oil economies, where they have constructed and appropriated traditional women protests as an instrument of engagement. The paper notes the implications of women protest engagements and particularly their exasperation with previous engagements, the depth of their commitments, and the extension of the struggle beyond the threshold of normal social behaviour.

Little exists to document the widespread repression of opposition in Africa since independence. Current studies of the rise of capitalism and the post-colonial state largely ignore institutionalised authoritarianism, which characterises the political side of this process. This article discusses the restraints placed on opposition in Kenya up to 1969. Its salience continues with the creation of a de jure one-party state since the abortive coup of 1982.

Ghana's pursuit of socio-economic growth has necessitated joining the information communication technology (ICT) revolution, thus increasing the consumption and obsolescence rate of electrical and electronic equipment (EEE) and the creation of what is popularly called e-waste. The absence of legislation governing its importation and disposal, combined with the dynamics of Accra's urban economy, including neo-liberal policies and lack of formal job opportunities, has triggered people's ingenuity to engage in novel occupations such as e-waste recycling. Though a lucrative strategy, it comes with a price for those involved: environmental health risks, a fact well articulated by a burgeoning literature. Nevertheless, little empirical evidence exists relating to this perceived relationship. Using questionnaires, FGDs and in-depth interviews, this study fills the lacuna. The findings reveal that the mean daily income of an e-waste worker is GH¢30, far above the daily minimum wage of GH¢4·48. Despite the positives, the findings also show that the environment and health can be compromised.

This article analyses a longstanding ethno-political conflict between Kusasis and Mamprusis in Bawku in north-east Ghana. A double argument is pursued. First, while communal conflict and violence challenge the state and expose its incapacity, the conflicts (played out over chieftaincy, party politics, land, markets, names of places etc.) at the same time invoke a powerful idea of the state as the most significant institution to qualify claims as rights or discard them as illegitimate. Second, the broad variety of social conflicts has effectively been cut to fit an ethnic distinction. Thus, the various conflictual issues have ‘confirmed’ and structured each other. The antagonisms have been crystallised and a pattern entrenching conflict between the two groups has been perpetuated. The article draws historical lines from the 1930s to the present, linking national policy to local politics and political culture with a particular focus on the political manifestations vis-à-vis the state and the use of ‘history’ to justify claims.

Political corruption is widespread in contemporary societies, and is regarded by some analysts of the Third World as the single most important obstacle to economic development and political integration. Certainly the frequent régime changes which have occurred in Africa in the last several decades have been accompanied by charges of gross administrative malfeasance and promises to introduce honest government. Perhaps no country in the continent has devoted more attention and energy to continuing allegations of corruption than Nigeria. Indeed, from the late colonial period up until the present, critics of those in power have lamented the level of venality, and numerous published reports have catalogued a wide range of iniquities and called for reform.

It is now generally acknowledged that Tanzania's policy of rural collectivisation has been abandoned as a failure. By most accounts, systematic efforts to bring about collective production ceased altogether during 1975 and may have halted, informally, as early as the end of 1974. According to the Villages and Ujamaa Villages Act of 1975, one or another form of block farming is considered sufficient for a village to become officially identified as an ujamaa village. Thus, ujamaa as a concept once intended to convey a social ideal of collective ownership, labour, and sharing is reduced to describing a state of affairs in which individual farming is intermittently supplemented by occasional cooperation in such tasks as planting and harvesting. Villagisation without socialism is, in effect, the current policy.

The recent involvement of China in sub-Saharan Africa is challenging and changing the world geostrategic scene. In the article, we analyse the agreements between the Congolese government and a group of Chinese state-owned enterprises. A number of public infrastructure works will be financed with Chinese loans. To guarantee reimbursement, a Congolese/Chinese joint venture will be created to extract and sell copper, cobalt and gold. These are the biggest trade/investment agreements that China has so far signed in Africa. This article seeks to contribute to the discussion regarding the agreement's impact on internal development in Congo. Does it create a ‘win-win’ situation for all, or is it an unequal exchange? We outline the internal and international debates and analyse several noteworthy characteristics of the agreements. In conclusion, we present a balanced view on the likely impact on Congo's short-term and long-term development.

The World Bank and IMF launched the Poverty Reduction Strategy Initiative in the context of longstanding criticisms of their structural adjustment programmes. This article examines the process of formulating Ghana's Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP) from two perspectives. From the perspective of reforming the Bretton Woods institutions, it assesses the extent to which the PRSP approach alters the lending practices of these institutions in Ghana. From the perspective of understanding policymaking in highly indebted, aid-dependent African countries, it reveals the multiple interfaces of politics in such countries produced by relations among and within donors/creditors, the government and non-governmental actors. Its conclusions echo the growing body of literature critiquing PRSPs, and emphasise the constraints which the foreign aid regime places on democratic governance.

This article explores men in arms’ conceptions of armed violence in a country which has been prone to a violent cycle of rebellion and repression. Based on ethnographic research in Chad, it analyses combatants’ life trajectories in an unstable political environment and a militarised economy. It moves beyond rebellion towards an analysis of the most mundane patterns of the activities conducted by men in arms, to understand what is at stake beyond times and spaces of war. It argues that armed violence is an ordinary way of expressing contestation, as well as a practical occupation or métier, a French word that indicates a non-institutionalised profession.