The hallmark of accountability in a democracy centres on the way the elected parliament holds the executive to account. If the parliament does not perform its oversight role effectively, lower authorities would have fewer incentives to do the same vis-à-vis local executives. In this article we therefore ask whether or not different meanings of accountability can be discerned amongst Tanzanian Members of Parliament (MPs). In our Q-method research we found four clearly identifiable discourses on accountability amongst Tanzanian MPs: Partycrats; My Electorate's Advocates; Frustrated Account Holders; and Pragmatic Account Holders. We understand MPs discourses within the broader context of political clientelism and we argue that this combination of discourses, or accountability culture, enables the executive to rule in semi-autocratic ways. Even if opposition parties would obtain a parliamentary majority, this accountability culture stands in the way of achieving greater democratic responsiveness.

The preliminary results of on-going research in Burkina Faso, undertaken in collaboration with the University of Ouagadougou, suggest that the lack of titled land and land markets does not necessarily imply serious economic disadvantages, such as little investment or low productivity, and that the transaction costs of moving from a traditional to a modern system of land tenure would be far higher than if old arrangements continued to operate.

People of quite diverse social position and perspective have turned to economic growth as a source of political change in South Africa. Contained within the concept of growth, they maintain, are processes — capital accumulation and class formation, business enterprise and markets, changing skill and capital requirements – that, at the very least, allow some blacks a more secure and higher living standard, that may bring greater equality between the races, or more profoundly, confound traditional racial lines and privileges of quite diverse social position and perspective have turned to economic growth as a source of political change in South Africa. Contained within the concept of growth, they maintain, are processes — capital accumulation and class formation, business enterprise and markets, changing skill and capital requirements – that, at the very least, allow some blacks a more secure and higher living standard, that may bring greater equality between the races, or more profoundly, confound traditional racial lines and privileges. Indeed, some argue that growth undermines the foundations of the racial state. Many of those who posit a relationship between economics and politics, take the next logical step: supporting actions, including foreign investment, that foster economic growth and, presumably, political change in South Africa.

What is ‘essence’ and what is ‘appearance’ in African politics? Does class or interest-group analysis describe and explain the various realities? These questions are unanswerable without an examination of the methods by which claims to correct understanding are made. All claims to knowledge are arbitrary until the methods of enquiry and the justification for their validity are made explicit.

Mali has one of the highest migration rates in Africa, but we still know very little about the processes and drivers of migration – particularly in the context of the current political crisis. This article draws on 27 focus groups with 220 returnees and male youth respondents conducted in the summer of 2018. Respondents cite underemployment and the inability to provide for relatives as well as a feeling of hopelessness about a future life in Mali as drivers of migration. Returnees report that the voyage was more difficult than anticipated. However, even with knowledge of the significant risks they face, most (68%) returnees express a desire to try to migrate again: this is particularly true for returned migrants who failed in an attempt to reach Europe (89%). The research illustrates very different experiences for migrants attempting to reach Europe and those with goals of intra-African migration.

Even those who do not see the struggle between capital and labour as necessarily antagonistic in a capitalist economy, recognise that it represents one of the most critical areas of potential conflict. This must be analysed by those who wish to study industrial relations and to understand class struggle. Furthermore, the complexity of issues involved is such that people with the most divergent perspectives have often found themselves emphasising the same facts to achieve very different objectives.

Smallholders in developing countries can potentially benefit from access to local, regional, national and international markets as they intermediate between rural and urban demand for agricultural products and smallholder supply. This study investigates how smallholders in Meru, Tanzania make use of the various marketing channels that are available to them, and argues that the variety of potential marketing channels and easily accessible market information enables smallholders to weigh advantages and disadvantages with varying market opportunities and form rational decisions. It presents a case where producers, consumers and traders are the principal agents in building market institutions through what should be characterised as endogenous processes. As these market institutions correspond to smallholders' needs, they may be able to play an important role in the overall process of agricultural development in the area.

When Dag Hammarskjöld flew to Ndola in Northern Rhodesia (now Zambia) on 17 September 1961 it was to meet Moïse Tshombe, the self-styled President of secessionist Katanga, in order to bring about a ceasefire to the fighting that was going on between his soldiers and those of the United Nations, especially in Elisabethville (now Lubumbashi). One of the more spectacular components of diese hostilities was a French-built Fouga Magister, which had strafed some unprotected U.N. positions from the air, and journalists quickly located the Belgian pilot as a ‘Major’ Delin, depicted as a kind of modern ‘Lone Ranger’ defying the world community. The importance of ‘the little Fouga’ soon got blown out of all proportions, and when Hammarskjöld's DC-6B, nicknamed ‘Albertina’, took off from Léopoldville (now Kinshasa) it was decided to take a roundabout route in order to avoid being attacked by the Fouga. After the Secretary-General's plane had crashed, the press jumped to the conclusion that it had been shot down by the Fouga, and U.N. spokesmen confirmed that Ndola was within its range.

There was a considerable increase in the number of African countries compiling national accounts during the 1950's; ‘what was once the happy hunting ground of the independent research worker has become the routine preoccupation of official statisticians and international Civil Servants.’1 A comparison of the methods of calculation in use was speeded up when the U.N. Economic Commission for Africa was established, and the International Association for Research in Income and Wealth (made up of national accounts workers in different countries) sponsored a regional conference for Africa in January 1961. Official statisticians at that conference proceeded immediately to a U.N.E.C.A. meeting and considered the role national accounts calculations could play in Africa, and how far a standardised system was possible. This article reviews the published papers considered at the I.A.R.I.W. conference, and other relevant publications recently becoming available.2

Previous literature on women's representation in the Ugandan Parliament painted a grim picture of women exploited by political leaders, and brought into Parliament and other political spaces by a benevolent dictator who allowed their entry to extend and deepen his political networks. These women were expected to accept a subordinate and inferior place, and to defer to male authority. Female members cooperated dutifully by ‘knowing their place’ and by actively supporting the ‘hand that fed them’. Studies noted that women lacked gender consciousness and even the analytical power to understand the implications of the policies they helped pass. There was a general consensus that patriarchal attitudes in Parliament diminished women's influence and undermined their political efficacy. This paper analyses gender relations, and examines the status of female members through their words, actions and behaviours in the Ugandan Parliament. The three primary sources of data for this study were surveys, semi-structured interviews of male and female members of Parliament, and the proceedings of parliamentary debates in 2014. Analysis of parliamentary debates and personal accounts of gender relations in the 9th Parliament reveal a changing landscape. Women are moving from marginal roles to more central roles in Parliament, and are becoming active participants in shaping parliamentary discourse and policy outcomes. There is a newfound sense of empowerment among respondents. Women articulated a new sense of being respected in Parliament, a sense of self- and collective efficacy that they can advance policy priorities. There is a change in women's performance on the Chamber's floor. Parliamentary proceedings offer evidence of an ability to successfully engage in vigorous debates, effectively advance their policy agendas, and utilise sophisticated political strategising and manoeuvring. While there are still elements of continuity, a new gender schema is emerging – a schema that challenges traditional values and attempts to reconcile these values with requirements for running a modern government.

During the first decade of independence for the tropical African states, economic planning has moved through several stages. Before and at the time of independence the development literature still featured debates as to whether or not to plan, and what the role of the government should be in economic development. In Africa these debates were won, hands down, by the planners and by ‘African socialists’ of various types. Within a few years there appeared a host of plan documents responding to the perceived requirements, leading one analyst even to characterise Africa as ‘the continent of economic plans’1 articles on ‘comprehensive economic planning’ and simple econometric models were at that time in fashion. These plans were typically prepared by foreigners with relatively little experience of the countries concerned, and were based upon the scrappiest of data and analysis. While not as elaborate in their technique, or as far removed from reality, as many of their counterparts of the period in Asia and Latin America, these plans tended to be just as lacking in real content, political support, or potential for implementation. Their authors usually departed for home shortly afterwards, leaving the hardpressed decision-makers on the scene (many of whom were themselves expatriates newly arrived in the country) little the wiser.

In examining the question of the unification of laws in East Africa, we must bear in mind that we are faced with two distinct problems: on the one hand, territorial unification of the different types of law prevailing within each territory; and on the other, inter-territorial unification as between the systems of law in Kenya, Uganda, and Tanganyika.

Shortly after assuming office as Head of State in August 1985, President Ibrahim Babangida inaugurated a 17-member Political Bureau, headed by Professor Sylvanus Cookey, whose terms of reference included ‘The review of Nigeria's political history, identifying the basic problems which led to failure in the past and suggesting ways of resolving and coping with these problems’.1 One of the most controversial of the Bureau's proposals was that the number of political parties should be limited to two in order to ensure that Nigeria's future politics would be based on principles and not ethnicity.2 The Government accepted this recommendation as part of the programme for a return to civilian rule in 1992, and has decided that two parties will be registered in 1989.3

This article is based on the assumption that there are worldwide trends towards the more humane treatment of prisoners which have as their principal objective the reform of criminals. These trends are determined by the societies that have evolved them; they trends are not therefore characterised by African aims and they do not express themselves in African forms. So the possibilites of purely African innovation are limited.

The investigation of African economies has been dominated by two perspectives. On the one hand, the neo-classical or diffusionist position views third-world nations as essentially repeating the same development path as occurred during the historical experience of the now-industrialised nations. This paradigm indicates that the barriers to the advance of these undeveloped economic systems are essentially internal, and that they include issues such as shortages of labour, limitations in infrastructure, and lack of capital savings. On the other hand, while recognising the constraining influences posed by such factors, the dependency or neo-Marxian perspective argues that the constraints posed by the peripheral position of these economies in a world system is of pre-eminent importance. Such contrasts, although greatly simplified, dominate the explanations of the economic difficulties facing African nations.

Local and district councils as institutions of democratic representative government have enjoyed a brief and fragile life in Commonwealth Africa. Furthermore, throughout the period of their existence they have never been a priority concern for either colonial rulers, African leaders, or social scientists, and their very existence has been recently challenged. In a number of countries, particularly those which have experienced military take-overs, the councils have been abolished; where they remain in existence they have been transformed with few exceptions into bodies with even more limited powers and autonomy. Nevertheless, their activities, even if greatly curtailed, still offer a focal point for the study of certain questions of representation and administration in the context of political change in independent black Africa.

Changes in the nature of federal financial relations were among the most striking features of the nearly 14 years of military rule in Nigeria. At the time of the January 1966 coup there was a great imbalance in the size of the four Regions, with a consequential built-in tendency for political instability. At the resumption of civilian rule in October there were 19 States of relatively balanced size, with an important rôle for the Federal Government as a mediator between them as well as an initiator of change.

The term ‘New International Economic Order’ – often referred to as N.I.E.O. – suggests two immediate thoughts: the first is related to ‘New’ and the second emphasises ‘Order’.

The New Versus The Old International Economic Order

If there is to be a new order, then presumably it must be contrasted with an old order, an O.I.E.O., namely the Bretton Woods system which was established at the end of World War II as a result of Anglo-American negotiations, with an absorbing interplay between the intellect of Keynes, subtly representing British interests, coming up against the hard facts of U.S. power and economic supremacy.

The idea of a railway from the Zambian Copperbelt to the Indian Ocean via Tanzania had long been considered. But although the first serious report was published in 1952 by a consultant from the British Colonial Office, it was not until 1964, the year of independence, that further studies were commissioned, all of which eventually found such a railway uneconomic. The World Bank mission erred in tying the cost estimates to the trans-shipment of goods (due to gauge differences), and ignoring the option (actually taken) of constructing a direct line to Dar es Salaam. The U.N. team argued that the reasons for the project were too speculative, that the existing railways had spare capacity, and that the likely development benefits were invalid, unless an iron and steel complex emerged. In 1965 the authors of the Brookings Institution study felt that the project was an unnecessary duplication of existing facilities, and that transport matters in the region should be depoliticised, an idealistic proposal since there are external benefits and costs involved in the operation of railways.

The correct starting point in the analysis of any economic unit is to pose the following three questions: What are the needs of the people? What resources are available? How adequately are these resources being mobilised for these needs ?1

These questions are applicable to a continent or a country (or for that matter a county, a city, or a village); they can also be applied to the world as a whole. If they are, a picture emerges which, if it does not appal us, because it is so familiar and so easily taken for granted, would certainly astonish a visitor from another planet. The basic human needs for nourishment and for protection from the weather are not great, and the resources known to be available could, with current levels of technique, easily permit a comfortable living standard for everyone. Yet these resources are very largely unexploited or wasted, and miserable poverty is the typical human condition.