INTRODUCTION
Between 2005 and 2015, the international stock of Malian migrants increased by over 34% (UN DESA 2017). Since 2012, Mali has struggled with an insurgency, that ultimately resulted in a coup d’état. An elected government has since been reinstated and thousands of UN and French troops have been sent to Mali to establish peace and security, but intercommunal violence and the presence of rebel groups, including self-proclaimed jihadist groups, has increased. However, it is clear that many Malian youths were engaged in migration long before the ‘political crisis’. The last decade has also been characterized by increased connectivity between migrants and their families and friends back home facilitated by the proliferation of cell phones and access to the internet. These technologies enable significant flows of information about opportunities abroad, but also tragedies such as migrant abuses in Libya as well as Malian lives lost in the ocean in an attempt to reach Europe.
Mali has an extremely high rate of out-migration, yet it remains under-studied, particularly in the context of the current political crisis. It is a poor country that relies heavily on remittances. Much of the literature in political science is trying to understand the way that violence, conflict and poverty influence decisions to migrate abroad, but it often relies on large-n survey data to understand the ‘push and pull factors’. This article uses focus group data to better understand the drivers of migration, information flows between migrants and friends and family back home, the divergence of migrants’ expectations and realities, and aspirations for future migration. In the current context, how do Malian youth understand opportunities and risks associated with migration? How do returnees think about these same opportunities and risks now that they have already been abroad? What information do they have when they make their decision? What do those that leave learn along the way? For those who have returned, how does their experience abroad shape attitudes about other attempts at migration?
This article draws on 27 original focus groups in order to ask Malian youthFootnote 1 these questions directly. The focus groups were conducted with two distinct populations of interest in summer 2018: returnees who have already attempted to migrate abroadFootnote 2 as well as male youth members of grinw Footnote 3 – tea-drinking social clubs. Returnees are an under-studied group (Mainwaring & Brigden Reference Mainwaring and Brigden2016) and offer important, realistic perspectives on migration since they have already experienced the realities of migration and living abroad. Many respondents in our sample had been deported or voluntarily relocated back to Mali from North Africa after an unsuccessful attempt to reach Europe; others had returned to Mali after working in other countries in West and Central Africa. We complement returnee perspectives with focus groups of male youth. These participants have not yet been abroad, but are within the demographic (young males) most likely to migrate. We can compare statements from those who have personal experience of migration and those who rely on information from family, friends and the media.
Malians migrate to a variety of locations; migrants travel to Europe, but more often to other locations in Africa. This article also explores the ways that migrant trajectories are shaped by resources at the destinations as well as their communities of origin. We select two sites: one in the capital city of Bamako – ostensibly where youth have the most access to monetary capital needed to migrate – as well as one near the ongoing political conflict – Sevare. Consistent with our expectations, we find that respondents from the two cities exemplify different migration experiences. Most returnees in Bamako had attempted to go to Europe, but ended up in North Africa, while most migrants from Sevare had lived in West and Central Africa. We held focus groups in these two locations in order to assess whether there are differences in migration patterns or information flows in the capital and an area closer to rural livelihoods and the current conflict.
BACKGROUND
Drivers of youth migration
A growing literature within political science tries to understand how the political and economic context shapes individuals’ incentives to migrate. It identifies ‘push and pull factors’ that affect migrant motivations including exposure to natural disasters, migrant networks effects, wage gains between host and destination countries, population pressure and slow economic growth and inequality (Hatton & Williamson Reference Hatton and Williamson2003; Mayda Reference Mayda2010; Docquier et al. Reference Docquier, Peri and Ruyssen2014; Beine & Parsons Reference Beine and Parsons2015; Hendricks & Schoellman Reference Hendricks and Schoellman2018). Investigations explore whether violent conflict affects out-migration (Alvarado & Massey Reference Alvarado and Massey2010; Naude Reference Naude2010) as well as the search for information about migration opportunities (Holland & Peters Reference Holland and Peters2016). Domestic and international factors are often at play. For instance, studies from the Americas stress the interconnectivity of US foreign policy, regime destabilization and extractive capitalism (Gonzalez Reference Gonzalez2000; Bedolla Reference Bedolla2015).
Qualitative interviews with migrants reveal that individual ‘push and pull factors’ are complicated by social context. They suggest that analysis of the drivers of migration necessitates an examination of not only individuals’ calculations, but ‘collective family strategies’ to diversify income and increase opportunities, which often requires substantial investment by family or kin networks (Juárez et al. Reference Juárez, LeGrand, Lloyd, Singh and Hertrich2013; Tanon & Sow Reference Tanon and Sow2013). For instance, Hertrich & Lesclingand's (Reference Hertrich and Lesclingand2013) study of internal migration in Mali reveals that boys use migration to strengthen their status within the family; their families encourage their migration.
Further, youth migration is also linked to a broader social transformation to adulthood. As ‘successful migrants’, youth can earn ‘social prestige’ and fulfil obligations to elders ‘to live out their lives in the best conditions’ (Mondain et al. Reference Mondain, Diagne and Randall2013: 14). For instance, lack of economic opportunity at home does not solely account for international migration aspirations in West Africa; a dearth of employment opportunities at home is compounded by youth yearning to experience travel abroad (Conrad Suso Reference Conrad Suso2019; Whitehouse Reference Whitehouse, Kane and Leedy2013). Examining the Mauritanian context, Tanon & Sow find that youth migrate in order to ‘enhance their social prestige’ since the ‘migrant embodies a new emblematic figure of success whose social visibility is undeniable’ (Reference Tanon and Sow2013: 200). Bøås's study of youth aspirations from Liberia, Sierra Leone and Mali suggests the importance of youth agency and dreams, which ‘goes beyond frequently told tale of constrained livelihoods’ (Bøås Reference Bøås2013: 613).
The current context of an increasingly globalized world means that young people have higher levels of access to images of the world beyond their own borders. In many cases, this increased flow of information is concurrent with increasing restrictions on migration and the limited ability of their countries’ economies to absorb labour and to provide meaningful employment (Juárez et al. Reference Juárez, LeGrand, Lloyd, Singh and Hertrich2013: 8). West Africans considering a journey to Europe are also exposed to information about the tragedy of migrant deaths at sea as well as migrant abuses in Libya. However, studies in a variety of contexts show that knowledge of the risk of death or harsh policing is not a significant deterrent for would-be migrants (Mbaye Reference Mbaye2014; Rodriguez Reference Rodriguez2017; Bah & Batista Reference Bah and Batista2018; Hiskey et al. Reference Hiskey, Cordova, Malone and Orces2018). Migrant narratives, instead, often characterize the decision to leave as being the only choice, which some scholars attribute as their pursuit of self-realization (Saul Reference Saul2017). Further, migration routes demonstrate great adaptability; this flexibility suggests that migrants are willing to absorb significantly higher costs in their journey (Gathmann Reference Gathmann2008).
Migration in Mali: pre and post crisis
Estimates of Malians abroad vary widely, but all point to sizeable numbers of migrants. One IOM report estimated about 1,213,042 Malians, approximately 10% of the population, were living abroad in 2012 (De Haas Reference De Haas2008).Footnote 4 Among migrants to Europe, Malians composed 9.1% of Mediterranean Sea and land arrivals in 2018 (UNHCR Operational Portal: Refugee Situations). However, Malians in Europe are a minority of all Malians abroad. Since 1990, 90% of Malian migrants could be found in sub-Saharan Africa with about 10% in Europe (mainly France); an estimated half of all Malian migrants can be found in Nigeria and Cote d'Ivoire (IOM 2013; UN DESA 2017). Mali has a strong history of migration dating back centuries (Manchuelle Reference Manchuelle1989). For some ethnic communities, migration is a typical part of the male transition to adulthood (Dougnon Reference Dougnon, Berriane and de Haas2012). Even before the recent conflict and insecurity, many of Mali's borders were extremely porous (Trauner & Deimel Reference Trauner and Deimel2013: 23), which facilitated movement across countries.
Many Malian families continue to rely on income provided through remittances. Economists estimate that Malian remittances reduce overall poverty rates by between 5–11%.Footnote 5 Recent Afrobarometer polls from Mali reveal that a third of respondents had someone from their household (including themselves) living abroad in the last three years. The survey asks about whether respondents have considered migrating. It reveals that some respondents consider migrating to other countries in West Africa (27%) or elsewhere in Africa (20%), while others name Europe (37%).Footnote 6
Many Malians also fail to reach their ultimate destination. Thousands of Malians are deported back to Bamako each year with minimal resources for economic or social reintegration (Dünnwald Reference Dünnwald2011). Migrant activism within civil society has been traced back to 1996, when deported migrants formed the Malian Association of Deportees (AME) to support peers and to critique domestic and international migration policy (Sylla & Schulz Reference Sylla and Schulz2020: 7). Migrant activist groups are credited with pressuring the Malian government from signing readmission agreements twice in the last decade (Sylla & Schulz Reference Sylla and Schulz2020: 7).
In 2012, Mali endured a rebellion in the north followed by a coup d’état, which removed the president a month before scheduled elections. During the conflict, nearly 450,000 Malians were displaced (Bleck et al. Reference Bleck, Dembele and Guindo2013). While most remained in Mali, approximately 135,000 Malian refugees sought asylum in the neighbouring countries of Mauritania, Niger, and Burkina Faso (UNHCR Population Statistics). Since 2013, thousands of UN and French troops have come to Mali. However, the country continues to face security challenges including the extension of insurgent groups into the centre of the country and increased intercommunal violence.
The country's economy remains paralysed with limited opportunities for youth due to school and marketplace closings due to to insecurity throughout the country's territory. The period is also characterised by continued disruptions to the education sector including school closings by jihadist groups, but also teacher strikes. In this context, youth are unable to see paths to adulthood or to imagine futures for themselves.
It is important to note that the Malian crisis is concurrent with increasing access to information facilitated by unprecedented internet penetration as well as the proliferation of smartphones. During this period in Mali, there has been significant discussion and debate about migration policy as well as an awareness of the tragedies claiming Malian lives as they attempt to cross over to Europe (Sylla & Schulz Reference Sylla and Schulz2020).Footnote 7
Malian migration appears to be increasing over time, as do attempts to reach Europe. Recently, irregular migration routes to Europe by Malians appear to have shifted from central Mediterranean routes (Libya to Italy) to western Mediterranean routes (Morocco or Algeria to Spain). Cooperation among EU member states, Libya and Algeria has likely contributed to the shift as migrants are increasingly intercepted by the Libyan Coast Guard and deported from Algeria (Brenner et al. Reference Brenner, Forin and Frouws2018). However, widespread human smuggling networks across Niger continue to facilitate illegal migration despite European efforts (Raineri Reference Raineri2018). We stress that this article cannot isolate the role of crisis in shaping migration trends, but rather offers this description by way of background.
There is limited literature on the drivers of Malian migration – particularly in the context of the current political crisis. Existing studies stress migration as part of a youth coming of age repertoire. Kleinman's study of migrants in France describes youth as undergoing the ‘cultural repertoire’ of migration in which it is ‘conceived as an “adventure,” a coming of age ritual for men who must enter the “wilderness” of foreign lands before returning home as marriageable adults’ (Kleinman Reference Kleinman2014: 191). In his study of migrants in Gao, Bøås describes migration as a strategy to:
achieve some minimum degree of control over their lives; to empower some sort of escape from the condition of social death, that is the inability to lead a worthy life … People are willing to gamble with life, even their own lives, as anything is better than being lost in the void of being forever betwixt and between, in a social limbo where you are nothing and end up as nothing. (Bøås Reference Bøås2013: 612)
Whitehouse's study of West Africans living in Congo-Brazzaville shows the strategic considerations behind migration. He demonstrates how migrants use physical distance to limit the constant financial demands of their kin networks in order to save capital and start businesses (Reference Whitehouse, Kane and Leedy2013: 23–4). He also shows how being in a foreign country allows migrants the opportunity to take on jobs that might be deemed too low status, and mocked by their community, in their country of origin (Whitehouse Reference Whitehouse, Kane and Leedy2013: 27). He stresses the need to view economic considerations for migration in a broader social context.
The emphasis on migration aspiration as more complex than a calculation weighing risks and benefits suggests the need to talk to migrants themselves. We employ an open-ended, qualitative format to understand the ways that youth use and disseminate information, how this information informs the choices that they make, the alignment of perceptions and realities, and youth aspirations. We interview returnees, who have direct experience with migration, as well as male youth to better understand drivers of migration as relevant to the contemporary Malian context: characterised by armed conflict, limited economic opportunity, heightened exposure to information, and an ongoing history of migration as outlined in the section below.
RESEARCH DESIGN AND METHODOLOGY: FOCUS GROUPS WITH RETURNEES AND YOUTH
In order to understand the drivers of migration, it is critical to speak to those young people who are directly implicated. Due to the highly politicised and sensitive nature of migration, it is difficult to get quality information about ‘push and pull factors’. This paper adopts a focus group approach in order to talk directly with former migrants and those that may aspire to go abroad. Focus groups have some methodological weaknesses including propensity toward group think, lack of anonymity and unequal rates of participation among respondents (Morgan Reference Morgan1996; Cyr Reference Cyr2016). However, the authors ultimately found the strengths of focus groups to outweigh the disadvantages in the context of youth and returnee discussions about migration. These strengths include their ability to encourage participation on sensitive topics, to solicit information from marginalised populations, and to encourage dialogue and debate among respondents with different experiences (Morgan Reference Morgan1996; Cyr Reference Cyr2016).
Further, the authors adopted a series of steps to maximise the quality of the data. First, the study employs an innovative approach of using ‘organic focus’ groups – building on networks of people that know each other and regularly engage in discussion. Due to the sensitive nature of the discussion topics (aspirations, experiences abroad and remittances), we privileged familiarity among respondents. Most of the groups of returned migrants included participants who had all migrated to the same destination.Footnote 8 In some groups, a number of the participants had travelled together or worked together at their destination, though it is unclear if this was the case in all groups. In all instances, group members knew each other well.
To gather perspectives of youth who have not yet migrated, we conducted focus groups with members of social clubs, locally referred to as grinw. These are neighbourhood social groups, that meet frequently to drink tea and discuss news, gossip and each others’ lives. Group members are predominantly male youth. We limit our samples to groups with members aged 18–45. One advantage of conducting focus groups with these clubs is the ease and comfort of communication between members who are used to communicating as a group; this increases the validity of the data as respondents tend to be more forthcoming and honest around people who they know and trust. In contrast to discussing sensitive themes such as migration with strangers, participants in these environments would typically have had previous experience discussing issues such as migration. Participation takes place in a comfortable venue similar to where other discussions take place.
We use this group as a proxy for Malian male youth, but recognize that youth is a complex and multi-dimensional concept that transcends a simple age categorisation (Abbink Reference Abbink, Abbink and van Kessel2005). By using an age criterion (18–45) in recruitment to our sample, we recognise that we exclude non-adult youth (those under 18) and may also include some men who do not consider themselves to be youth. Similarly, by targeting networks of returned migrants in this age strata, we exclude older returnees who might have spent more time abroad and been more successful at their destinations.
Second, since the role of a focus group mediator is crucial in facilitating data quality (Morgan Reference Morgan1996), we were careful to choose ‘peer enumerators’ who were roughly the same age as the participants to generate an open environment for discussion. In Bamako, one of the two enumerators was a former migrant. In Sevare, we used a male and female team.Footnote 9 Each enumerator was from a different ethnic group, but all spoke Bamana as a primary lingua franca. Each team had a lead RA who had participated in extensive training on focus group moderation during a previous research exercise with one of the authors, which included administering over 30 focus groups in grinw in one of the two cities. By using peer enumerators, which stressed the research purpose of the focus group and were distanced from any type of international organization, we believe we were able to generate more neutral data.
Third, our research assistants recorded focus group discussions in Bamana, and then translated and transcribed them to French. This enables us to capture the details of discussions including areas where there was consensus or debate.
Fourth, participants responded to open questions with very limited moderator intervention so they would not feel pressured to respond to any question and to provide them agency to discuss the topics that interested them.Footnote 10 Due to sensitivity of topics, we told the focus group leaders to adopt a non-interventionist approach and respondents were able to skip any questions they were uncomfortable with (Cyr Reference Cyr2016).
There are a couple of important notes as we interpret the data. First, we note that since we interviewed friend-groups, there is often less repetition of themes as you might see in a group of strangers as participants feel more comfortable with a friend ‘speaking on their behalf’. We note the difference between participants and active participants (those who spoke in the focus group). Based on observation of the dynamics of these groups, we typically read this type of non-engagement as agreement with ideas that were already cited. For example, when we see 10 voices in favour of an idea, no dissenters, and five non-respondents, we tend toward interpreting the five respondents as agreeing with the affirmative voices. As stated earlier, these focus groups replicate a grin-like setting where there are norms of open, uncensored participation, egalitarian exchange and lively, but collegial disagreement and debate.
Second, in interpreting the data, we remind readers that these data were collected in an audience of close peers and are thus subject to social desirability bias created by that audience. Each response was performative in the sense that it is not anonymous and is spoken in front of an audience of peers. However, this performance is also subject to vetting from inside the focus group – where we observe active disagreement and questioning of other peers’ statements. As anticipated, respondents frequently corrected each other and appeared very willing to acknowledge differences in their experiences.
Third, our approach to analysing the data utilised the following strategies: to identify common themes within focus group dialogue surrounding the open questions, we inductively identified themes and repetitive language on drivers of migration, types of hardships faced, the content of information sent and received by migrants, and aspirations for future migration. For particular questions that generated a high number of individual responses within all groups, we computed percentages of responses that aligned with certain common themes. However, in cases of questions that often generated singular responses per group, we instead refer to counts or percentages of groups falling into certain response categories.
SAMPLE
We focus on two populations of interest: returned migrants and youth who have not yet migrated. The sample includes 10 focus groups with 68 returned migrants (returnees). We were particularly interested in the experience of returnees as they are a relatively under-studied population and since they have experienced the realities of being abroad. Groups of returnees were recruited through snowball sampling: this generated a biased sample so that most of the returnees from Bamako had been living in North Africa (and most of them had returned home earlier than expected – through deportation or lack of resources), while those from Sevare had primarily spent time in West or Central Africa, including Cote d'Ivoire, Gabon and Equatorial Guinea. None of the respondents in the sample had been to Europe or North America. We sacrifice a representative sample for two reasons: the difficulty of locating a sampling frame that would capture all ‘returned migrants’ and the desire to maximise data quality by using focus group members who knew each other already and have previously discussed topics such as migration, thus making them more willing to have a truthful conversation about drivers in the presence of a peer enumerator.
In order to identify returnees, research assistants located recent returnees and members of migrant associations; they asked them to bring a group of friends (who were also returnees) for a group interview. As discussed above, the returnees are not a ‘representative sample’ of all Malians who have lived abroad and returned home. They do, however, constitute a group that has suffered considerable challenges, particularly those who were in Algeria. This exploration of returnees is particularly interesting in that we know very little of migrants’ plight in North Africa, and studies of migrants in Europe have disproportionate representation of those who reached their destination – despite the fact that we know many fail along the way.Footnote 11 Ultimately, we interviewed 10 groups of returned migrants (five in Bamako and five in Sevare), which were composed of 68 participants.
Our second population of interest includes youth from grinw. This allows us to draw on complementary perspectives of those who may aspire to go abroad, but have not yet personally experienced migration. We targeted men aged 18–45, who, according to the Afrobarometer survey, have a higher probability of harbouring migration aspirations than the rest of the population (Afrobarometer 2018).Footnote 12 However, we remind readers that these respondents were not selected because of their aspirations to leave their country of origin. This sample includes those with aspirations, but limited ‘capabilities’ to go abroad (Flahaux & de Haas Reference Flahaux and de Haas2016), as well as those who have no interest in migrating.
Malian research assistants identified seven groups in Bamako and 10 groups in Sevare with an eye toward maximising ethnic and socio-economic variation in group composition.Footnote 13 We held 17 focus groups with 152 youth.
We held focus groups in the capital city of Bamako and in Sevare – in the conflict-affected Central region. Afrobarometer data reveal different migration strategies and aspirations in urban and rural areas. Malian respondents in rural areas were more likely to imagine a migration destination on the continent, while those in the capital were more likely to think about travelling to Europe.Footnote 14 We included the capital as well as a conflict-affected area to capture different political dynamics that might be driving migration, but also to vary access to resources as well as the unique geographic relationship with migration. Those respondents in Sevare are currently in the centre of the Malian political crisis, while those in Bamako are much farther removed from violence and insecurity.
DESCRIPTIVE DATA
Returned migrants
We interviewed 10 focus groups (five in each city) comprising 68 returned migrants or ‘returnees’, who had previously been abroad, but had returned home. Thirty-eight youth participated in Sevare (34 of whom were active respondents) and 30 youth participated in Bamako (19 of whom actively responded). Among the groups of returned migrants, the destinations to which they had migrated differed between the Bamako and Sevare locations. Nearly all of those from Sevare (90%) were successful in reaching their intended destination in either West/Central or North Africa. Of the 34 participants from the groups held in Sevare, 24 shared their intended destinations and 21 shared the destination to which they actually arrived. Seventy-six per cent of the returnees from Sevare had arrived in Cote d'Ivoire, Gabon, Republic of Congo and Equatorial Guinea, while 24% had arrived in North Africa. There is some evidence of fluidity of movement between locations among respondents in Sevare. In at least one group, some participants had returned to Mali in order to get married, but planned to return to their original destinations abroad to continue working. Alternatively, most (87%) of the returned migrant groups in Bamako had intended to reach Europe, but failed to reach it by way of Algeria or Libya. Of the 17 Bamako participants who shared their intended destination, 76% had aimed to reach Europe and 24% had aimed to reach West or Central Africa. Those who targeted West and Central Africa were more likely to reach their destination. Table I summarises intended and actual destinations among returnees.
Table I Destinations
* Not all participants shared their intended or actual destinations.
** Among intended destinations in Europe, some participants mentioned Spain and France, but most did not specify a particular country.
It is also clear that cost constraints factor into choice of location. At least one respondent who went to West/Central Africa claimed to choose that location based on what they were able to afford (S13 R6). Another respondent in Bamako said they decided to migrate after accumulating 300,000 CFA (roughly $600) (B9 R1). Some migrants said they intended to work along the route because they did not have sufficient resources for the trip.
Respondents also cited existing networks of Malians living abroad as affecting choices about a destination. In looking exclusively at the population of returned migrants, 35% said they chose to migrate to a destination based on having a friend or family member there.Footnote 15 This included 41% of returnees from West/Central Africa who claimed they had contacts there and 33% with contacts in Europe (who attempted to migrate through North Africa). Returned migrants who had failed to reach Europe explained how these networks influenced their migration choices, ‘My objective was Spain because I have a brother there who would have to help me enter once in Libya’ (B8 R3). Another shared, ‘I have a cousin of one of my friends who is in France. When he came here on vacation, I had spoken with him so that he could help me enter France after leaving Libya. I was going to work to reimburse him for the costs he would have spent on my travel and he agreed’ (B9 R3). However, all such migrants intending to reach Europe failed to successfully pass through North Africa. It is important to note that no returned migrants reported having friends or family in North Africa.
Table I shows the intended and actual destinations of returnees. Note that most migrants from Sevare ended up in West or Central Africa, while most in Bamako ended up in North Africa. As we will highlight below, we observed that those in sub-Saharan Africa and those in North Africa have very different trajectories and experiences. As the chart reveals, those in North Africa had mostly intended to reach Europe with the exception of Focus Group 11 from Sevare. Thus, the narrative of most returned migrants from North Africa reveals some systematic differences from those in Central and West Africa, who were much more likely to reach their destination.Footnote 16 The unintended nature of an extended stay in North Africa meant that these groups were less likely to be able to draw on family or regional networks or existing information in North Africa. They were also subject to an increasingly hostile political environment with increased pressure on the policing of migrant populations.
In contrast, those who migrated to sub-Saharan Africa were far more likely to reach their intended destination and anecdotally appear to have had more success in finding employment abroad. Despite the ability of many of these migrants to work along the route and successfully reach their target country, however, many still faced horrific abuse and hardship along the route and after their arrival. Just two (S15 and B12) of the five focus groups of migrants to sub-Saharan Africa reported overall positive experiences with their decision to migrate.Footnote 17
Youth focus groups in grinw
Seventeen focus groups with 152 participants comprised Malian youth in grinw who had not yet migrated. In Sevare, 76 youth participated in these groups – 48 of whom were active respondents. In Bamako, focus groups consisted of 76 participants with 41 youth who actively responded to questions.Footnote 18 Youth were asked whether they had any friends or family who had migrated in the past 10 years. Approximately half (42/89) of the active participants in the focus groups in grinw shared that they knew friends or relatives who had migrated.Footnote 19 No respondent stated that they did not know any past or current migrants.
Respondents in Sevare were much more likely to know someone who was currently abroad – representative of longer historical patterns of out-migration from this region. Twenty-eight respondents in Sevare claimed to know people abroad personally (in nine of the 10 focus groups). Of the 28 respondents in Sevare with contacts abroad, 57% had a friend or family member who had migrated to West and Central Africa (most commonly Equatorial Guinea, Cote d'Ivoire or Gabon), 21% had contacts in Europe (Spain, Italy and France), and 14% had contacts in North Africa (Libya and Algeria). In Bamako, 14 respondents (in all seven groups) reported knowing friends or relatives who had migrated. Half of these respondents knew somebody who had migrated to Europe, and 21% knew somebody who had migrated to West and Central Africa. While these data are not representative of the entire populations of returnees in Bamako and Sevare, it does suggest different migration trajectories from the two cities.
WHY DO MALIAN YOUTH MIGRATE?
First, we asked both groups, members of grinw as well as returnees, why they or their peers choose to migrate from Mali. Respondents cited four major reasons: unemployment and under-employment, family/social pressure, inadequate policy or governance environment to generate opportunities for youth and migrants, and the inability to see a future in Mali, as motivating decisions to leave. Unsatisfactory employment was the most widely cited reason for migration – every focus group (27/27) and roughly half of all focus group participants (57/112) cited unemployment or low wages as a reason for migration.Footnote 20 This is consistent with 2017 Afrobarometer data collected in Mali; respondents considering migration cited economic hardship (46%), wanting to find work (26%) and poverty (11%) as top reasons for Malians considering migration (Afrobarometer 2018).
The qualitative data collected in the focus groups help to contextualise these responses. Economic hardship encompasses more than unemployment or underemployment. It also relates to youth dissatisfaction with inadequately remunerated ‘careers’. They were frustrated with jobs that could not sufficiently cover their financial responsibilities to extended family. A grin member from Bamako reflected:
if there were a lot of jobs, we would not think of leaving … Here, we lack everything and we do not even know which way to turn. Here, us young people, we try to survive because to live a beautiful life is what we can only dream of, but not live. Our jobs do not pay us enough because what we make doesn't allow us hardly to live, so we have no choice but to leave. (B5 R2)
In this quote, the respondent stresses that the current economic situation allows young people to survive, but not to live, because many of the available jobs do not provide enough remuneration. Unfulfilling or shameful employment also emerged as related factors. Rather than merely the dilemma of needing to find a job, respondents stressed that available jobs are not fulfilling their needs.
This economic pressure needs to be contextualised in line with family obligations. The second most common reason for migration was ‘social pressure’. Responses typically included references to family poverty or even direct pressure from family members to go abroad. Nine of 17 focus groups in grinw and five of 10 returnee focus groups referenced family pressure. Family pressure encompassed both a sense of duty in response to seeing one's family in poverty and direct requests to cover expenses for a group of dependents. Family poverty was a particularly powerful reason for migration for those who are the oldest child and are under pressure to provide for their families. Often described as an ‘obligation’, one respondent stated:
My family is large and I am the oldest. My father was too old to cover the costs of the family, and what I earned was not enough to meet the needs of the family … so I decided to migrate with the hope of arriving in Europe because I think that only Europe can allow me to earn what I need to meet the needs of my family. (B9 R2)
Many Malian youth face the need to cover costs for their nuclear family, but also for their parents and other relatives, but they face an environment of scarcity where there is a limited supply of ‘good jobs’ in the face of rising youth demographic growth. As described in Conrad Suso's study of Gambian migration, the inability to cope with rising costs and lack of perceived opportunities make youth feel trapped and desperate for economic alternatives (Conrad Suso Reference Conrad Suso2019: 119–20).
In other cases, it is ‘the family who decides to send a family member abroad by paying for his transport to arrive at a destination so that he can help the family out of poverty’ (S4 R1). This finding resonates with literature that underscores the importance of understanding family strategies (in addition to individuals’ strategies) for migration. This financial backing can create additional pressure for those abroad who feel the need to repay these investments in their trip.
Related to family pressure was a desire for honour and status. In Mali, as in much of West Africa, transitions to adulthood for men are contingent on marriage and on one's economic ability to provide for their family. Three focus groups explicitly mentioned migration as facilitating the ability to marry by generating resources for the bride price and the ability to set up one's own household. Approximately 6% of all respondents mentioned not wanting to be dependent on their family at their age due to honour or shame.Footnote 21 One respondent from Bamako described his frustration, ‘look at yourself, you are 30 years old and you live on the hook of your father, but this is unacceptable for any conscientious person … life cannot be this way. Our parents will have done their best to support us financially and materially, but this cannot be eternal’ (B6 R1). This respondent explains how the transition to adulthood requires resources so that respondents can take over the responsibility of providing for others in the family. Migration is a strategy for young Malians to achieve the resources they need to provide for their parents and extended family and categorically move from the role of dependent to ‘provider’.
Relatedly, 13% of respondents referenced ‘jealousy’ or seeing the success of other migrants. A grin member from Sevare explained how ‘rivalry is gaining ground and pushing young people to migrate in order to have money and to be respected by their peers’ (S4 R1). Participants from eight of 17 focus groups in grinw and three of 10 groups of returnees cited these factors relating to jealousy.
There were no explicit mentions of the political conflict, but respondents instead spoke of structural governance issues such as corruption or lack of sufficient government policy. For instance, one grin member from Bamako stated, ‘Because of corruption, the government has forgotten that we are fighting simply to survive and that we cannot get three meals a day, so if you have the opportunity, you must leave’ (B3 R12). Interestingly, this reason was more commonly cited in Bamako (all focus groups in grinw) than in Sevare (only three of 10 groups in grinw), which has been much more directly affected by the conflict. Corruption can be read as contributing to a broader environment that is hostile to youth aspirations and success.
Many respondents described government indifference or even hostility toward youth success. One respondent from Balabaougou gave examples of different youth entrepreneurs he knew who had been blocked by government authorities such as a local juice producer who had his operation shut down by Malian police. This respondent went on to talk about the case of Mamoudou Gassama, the young Malian who scaled a four-story building to rescue a baby from falling from a balcony in Paris, and who was subsequently recognised by the French government with citizenship and an internship at the local fire station. He said that ‘there are many Mamoudou Gassamas in Mali’, implying that many Malian youth commit similar heroic feats without any recognition or compensation from the government (B7 R4). Respondents also felt as though the government neither adequately protected migrants’ rights abroad, nor supported returnees when they returned to Mali. Another respondent added that Malian migrants contribute to society without government acknowledgement or support (B7 R3). One respondent from Bamako condemned government figures for inducing the mental strain of living without dignity in Mali that pushes many youth into a dangerous quest for a more dignified life: ‘Our leaders do not think of their people; they only steal the advantage of the poor which kills them mentally and makes many young people prefer to take the roads of immigration and die in the sea than live in dishonour in their own country’ (B1 R2).
Migrant youth defy the government in their noble pursuit of remittances in the face of potential prosecution, violence by host country government, and even death. The description of a successful youth migrant – forging his own future and supporting his family without any outside support – is respected and seen as fulfilling a duty to his family and society.
Eighteen per cent of migrants, evenly spread among youth and returnees, referenced a lack of future in Mali and ‘having no choice’ in the context of hopelessness and despair stemming from economic hardships and social pressures. They often characterised migration as a ‘necessary evil’. However, all of these responses came from respondents in Bamako. One respondent described, ‘In our country, despair pushes many people to leave. If not, imagine how somebody can decide to go risk his life at sea in search of pseudo happiness? So, you must understand that it is despair that is the basis of migration in our country’ (B7 R4). Returned migrants also reflected on the hopelessness that prompted their departures, one stating how he left after he ‘no longer had faith in anything in Mali because of the way that [he] saw things evolving in Mali’ (B11 R4).
INFORMATION FLOWS
The focus group asked grin members about news that family and friends living abroad shared with them directly. This question specifically focuses on first-hand information from friends and family abroad, in contrast to more general secondhand news that they might get through radio, television or social media.Footnote 22 Relatedly, we asked returned migrants what type of news related to their journey or experiences abroad they shared with family and friends. Most Malians living abroad communicated with those back home by phone or social media.
Migrants’ narratives of their lives abroad are often very sobering. Grin members reported receiving more negative news from current migrants than positive news. Sixteen of 36 (44%) grinw members reported receiving negative information about the experience of friends or family living abroad. Of these responses, six specified hearing news of the difficulties in finding work, making money, securing papers, and facing racial discrimination from current migrants.Footnote 23 One respondent from Sevare described, ‘[My relatives] told us how they were attacked by bandits who robbed them of their property. I have a friend who one time was a victim of assault. He was stripped of his money’ (S4 R3).
However, seven of 36 (19%) grin members stated that they received positive information from friends or family about the general quality of life abroad. A respondent from Sevare noted, ‘Someone who is in Cote d'Ivoire gives news that the situation is better … and soon his wife will join him there’ (S3 R4). This may reflect true positive experiences of those friends and family or suggest that they were censoring the difficulties they faced.
However, Malian youth also observe infrastructure built with remittances – particularly in Kayes, which is home to the Soninke ethnic group, which has high rates of migration. One focus group respondent originally from Kayes explained that the remittance infrastructure sent by migrants’ associations dwarfs government public goods. He claimed that the visibility of diaspora-funded projects fuels young people's desire to leave. This yearning to achieve similar success blinds them from being discouraged – despite the fact that many of them have relatives who went to Libya or France who they have not heard from in years (B2 R4).
In speaking to those who had already been abroad, returnees reported censoring the types of information they shared back home.Footnote 24 Half of respondents said that they did not share the challenges they faced abroad in order not to worry their families. Instead, these respondents often provide reassurance for family members at home. Among those who did share struggles with their family, three said that they shared that they had difficulty finding work or making money, three shared information about broader difficulties of being abroad (e.g. war in Libya), and one shared information about the challenge of reaching his final destination.
We asked returnees whether they would counsel prospective migrants to stay in Mali or if they would encourage migration. They gave mixed responses. Twelve of 32 respondents said they would advise prospective migrants to stay in Mali. Eight respondents said they would either encourage migration or say that they could not tell anyone to stay in Mali due to the ‘hopeless situation’. Four said they would only advise migrating legally to avoid the dangers of the irregular migration routes. Acknowledging both the situation in Mali and the dangers of migrating, one returned migrant from Bamako reflected:
Well the problem is that we cannot tell young people not to leave given that nothing is happening in our country, but I will simply say to young people who want to leave to try to go the legal way because the land routes are not safe. There is too much loss of human life on these roads. (B10 R2)
Again, the refrain of ‘nothing is happening’ indicates the respondents’ sense that there are inadequate opportunities in Mali.
Thirty-four per cent of respondents – regardless of whether they encouraged or discouraged migration – said that they would warn migrants of the suffering that comes with the experience of migration. One returned migrant shared, ‘I will also tell young people that if they decide to leave that they must know that the route is more than difficult, that only the lucky and determined reach their destination’ (B8 R3). Another warned, ‘there is only suffering in migration’ (S3 R2).
EXPECTATIONS VERSUS REALITY
To capture the expectations that Malians have prior to migrating, we asked grin members about the information they have received directly from friends or family members who have migrated recently. Similarly, we asked returned migrants what information they had about the migration process prior to leaving and how they chose their intended destination. Then, we asked them whether their experiences and actual destinations were what they expected.
Within the grin focus groups, four respondents referenced having information from family and friends abroad about the dangers of migration routes.Footnote 25 Among returned migrants, three people indicated that they had chosen their destination based on information they had about the safest migration routes. However, ultimately, returned migrants in nine out of the 10 focus groups told stories of the dangers and problems they faced along the migration route.Footnote 26
Eighty-eight per cent of respondents described challenges on the migration route, which included horrific tales such as lack of food and water, police harassment, being stranded in the Mediterranean Sea and imprisonment in North Africa. One returnee recalled, ‘We walked for days and days to cross the Sahara desert, facing much thirst. Many wanted to return but it was already too late because if you return you will get lost and die in the desert’ (S14 R6). Twenty-eight per cent of the respondents who were in North Africa described being imprisoned there. Only three returnee responses stated that they had faced no problems along the migration route; all of these respondents had legally migrated to West/Central Africa by plane.
While few returned migrants had expectations about racial discrimination before their journey, three respondents shared experiences of racial discrimination either along the route or at the destination. Of these, two pertained to the experience of returned migrants from Algeria and the third was in Equatorial Guinea. One respondent described a scenario in Algeria where, ‘The [Algerian] authorities started a “hunt for blacks” with arbitrary imprisonment and unconditional deportation of black people without a penny nor baggage’ (B10 R4).Footnote 27
Finally, migrating illegally puts these youths in precarious positions. As one returnee recalled, ‘We were chased by bandits carrying machetes who wanted to skin us. We were on foot because we couldn't enter [Gabon] the legal way since we did not have papers’ (S12 R3). No returnees referenced any expectations about their ability to secure papers at their destination, although a small number of grin members (2/36) reported hearing of challenges to do so. However, two returnees (of 12 respondents) indicated that the difficulty of getting work papers was one of the reasons motivating them to return home.
Grin members had mixed responses about how easy they heard it was to earn money abroad – some stressed that they knew of difficulties, while others said they heard about the ease of making money directly from those friends and family abroad. However, only one grin respondent said that he has a family member abroad who regularly sends money. Returnees were asked to reflect on their expectations about earning prior to migrating, and the majority expressed positive expectations about the ease of finding work abroad. For instance, half of returned migrants from Sevare reported positive expectations prior to migrating concerning the ability to make money. However, once abroad, half of Sevare returned migrants indicated that it was far more difficult to make money than they anticipated.Footnote 28 A returnee from Equatorial Guinea described, ‘It was not what we heard. It was the opposite because we thought that there would be money. We met Malians there who wanted to return but they did not even have enough for the transport to return home’ (S12 R3). In focus groups of returnees, there was not one respondent who responded that it was easy to make money while abroad.Footnote 29
Questions about sending money were relatively sensitive and only seven returned migrants chose to share information about the frequency with which they sent money home. However, the small sample reveals the difficulty of sending money back home. Of these seven, three were able to send money home within six months, two reported sending money within a year, and one waited two years before sending money home.Footnote 30 The other respondent was never able to send money. Some returnees said people returned home from Algeria due to the difficulties of sending money from there.
WHAT MOTIVATED DECISIONS TO RETURN?
We asked all returnees why they were back in Mali. Eighty per cent of migrants from Sevare – mostly from West/Central Africa – returned due to reasons such as desire to reunite with their families, getting married or having made enough money to return home.Footnote 31 Thirty-three per cent noted that they had made enough money to return, one returnee noting that his ‘goal was not to stay [abroad]’ (S14 R6). This indicates that they viewed this migration as temporary.
In contrast, 89% of migrants from Bamako that returned to Mali were forced to return due to insecurity or economic problems at their destination, mostly in North Africa. Roughly two-thirds of these returnees from Bamako were repatriated voluntarily – primarily through the International Organization of Migration.Footnote 32 In many instances, this was due to security issues in North Africa. For instance, 17% of returned migrants referenced being imprisoned or concerned about their security while in North Africa as prompting them to return. One migrant from Bamako described his troubles in Algeria, ‘We had problems there with an Arab man who wanted to scam us, and we found ourselves in prison. When we got out, the man who had kept my money had fled, so I had no option but to return. So I volunteered to return with the IOM who brought us to Bamako’ (B9 R1).
ASPIRATIONS FOR MIGRATION/MOBILITY
We asked those who had never been abroad whether they would migrate if given the chance. Half of grin members said they would migrate, while 33% of respondents said that they would never go.Footnote 33 While some reported definite future plans to migrate, many described migration as a possibility ‘if conditions [in Mali] do not improve’. Responses of this nature disclosed, ‘the idea of leaving is never far from us’, often even acknowledging the dangers: ‘We know that people are abused in migration, but we do not have a choice’ (B1 R1; S7 R7). In our sample, respondents from Bamako were more likely to want to migrate (64%) than those from Sevare (44%).Footnote 34
Strikingly, among returned migrants, 68% stated that they would like to migrate again and only 24% stated they would never do so. This response was more prevalent among returned migrants in Bamako (89%) – the population who had suffered the most during their previous voyage – compared with those in Sevare (56%). One returnee from Algeria explained, ‘I too am prepared to leave again. From our repatriation until now, the Malian government has done nothing to encourage us to stay’ (B8 R1). Another respondent, who had twice failed to reach Europe from Algeria, remained determined to go again – ‘If I find the means, I will leave tomorrow’ (B10 R1). Part of youth dissatisfaction with government attempts to provide support to migrants stems from the government’s visible campaigns touting reintegration and development programmes for youth; they do not observe tangible efforts on the ground. As our Malian RA explained to us, these types of campaign advertisements are disseminated everywhere. One focus group member captured youth scepticism about these efforts – suggesting that they were ineffective, ‘In the news we hear about programmes and campaigns (of projects) that the government is doing for migrants, but people still leave’ (B6 R4). This sentiment feeds into youth disillusionment with the government treatment of and policy toward migrants.
The prevalence of aspirations to migrate again among Bamako returnees may reflect the fact that returnees never reached their intended destination (Europe) during their last attempt. The failure to reach their desired locations is compounded by continued pressure from families. Previous studies have highlighted the intense shame, guilt and rejection that returnees face from their families if they come home empty-handed (Dünnwald Reference Dünnwald2011).
When asked if they would return to the same destination, respondents from Sevare had mixed opinions. However, returned migrants in Bamako all responded that they would avoid the destination they ended up in before (typically Algeria); those that initially intended to reach Europe (and failed previously) would still try again to reach Europe but would use a different route than going through Algeria.
CONCLUSION
This paper has drawn on original data from 27 focus groups with 220 Malian youth, including 152 youth grin members who have not yet been abroad, as well as 68 returned youth migrants (returnees) in Mali's capital Bamako and Sevare – situated near the current conflict. It makes four contributions to the literature on migration.
First, we find that knowledge of risk, or even the experience of violence and adverse treatment, do not appear to be significant deterrents. We are able to draw on our unique sample of returnees and find that the vast majority of them are eager to migrate again. Sixty-five per cent of all returnees, and 89% of those returning from North Africa, many of whom suffered abuses including imprisonment, theft and racial discrimination, claim that they would migrate again if given the chance. While this finding may reflect the fact that many in our sample returned without accomplishing their goal of reaching Europe, the results emphasise that those who suffered tremendously still want to return abroad. The percentage of returnees who want to migrate again surpasses the percentage of grin members who stated they would make the journey abroad (about 50%).
These aspirations to return and finish what they started are consistent with studies from other parts of the region and world; life is characterized by a pervasive feeling of ‘destinylessness’, continued desperation and failure (Khosravi Reference Khosravi2018; Conrad Suso Reference Conrad Suso2019). For instance, research on deported migrants from Afghanistan underscores that the existence of outstanding debt, the shame of failure, attempts to balance transnational and local ties, and associations with criminality all increase the difficulty of adjustment and integration (Schuster & Majidi Reference Schuster and Majidi2013). This yearning to capitalise on the opportunities that they know exist, despite tremendous risks, poses tremendous challenges to reintegration and efforts to stem future migrant flows.
Further, there is no evidence that youth who have not been abroad are insulated from information about the difficulties of migration. While many returnees admit censoring the information they share with friends and relatives back home, we find that many youth have heard cautionary tales about the difficulties abroad. Consistent with research from other parts of the world, young Malians are choosing to emigrate or re-attempt the perilous journey abroad with significant understanding of the challenges and risks that face them (Mbaye Reference Mbaye2014; Rodriquez Reference Rodriguez2017; Bah & Batista Reference Bah and Batista2018; Hiskey et al. Reference Hiskey, Cordova, Malone and Orces2018). Primary drivers for migration are underemployment or unemployment linked to significant family pressure for redistribution, but also a feeling of hopelessness and the inability to envision a satisfactory future based on opportunities in Mali.
Second, consistent with other studies on youth migration, we find a social yearning to migrate. Migration aspirations must be understood in the context of ongoing family obligations. Respondents stress familial responsibilities and underemployment rather than pointing directly to the political crisis in Mali. These are factors that precede the political context, but have been worsened by the poor economic climate of the current context and rising disillusionment; all of these factors contribute to youths’ inability to see a future for themselves. Respondents’ discussions of decisions to migrate cited these longer-term grievances rather than the specific moment of crisis.
Rather than calculating their potential success at home versus their opportunities abroad, many of these respondents could not visualise a career in Mali. This ‘hopelessness’ pushes them to migrate – if given the chance. Mali's current economy cannot absorb the number of young people graduating with a diploma and most youth do not know where to turn to find quality employment that could provide enough money for them and their families. This mirrors findings from some other countries, where respondents report difficulty imagining a future in their country of origin and yearn to migrate in order to cope with constant pressure to provide for their families (Nyanzi et al. Reference Nyanzi, Rosenberg-Jallow, Bah and Nyanzi2005; Conrad Suso Reference Conrad Suso2019).
Without money, it is difficult for male youth to make a transition to adulthood anchored in expectations of marriage or investment. The complexity of these drivers means that fostering short-term or low-paid employment opportunities will be insufficient to thwart attempts to go abroad. As Conrad Suso (Reference Conrad Suso2019) writes, ‘Forcing undesired “opportunities” (i.e. fishing and farming) on the youth of the country will not make them want to stay’ (131). Hourly or temporary employment does not enable youth to earn sufficient money to make the transition from the role of a dependent to an adult provider. Instead, respondents yearn for access to income that can help them to provide for others, which earns them respect and status within society. Research assistants conducting the focus groups described a feeling of total hopelessness about life in Mali among returnees. This yearning to go abroad seems to indicate the pinnacle of aspirations and dreams – rather than a risk calculation.
Finally, the study inadvertently captured two different patterns of migration – from the capital to North Africa in search of opportunities in Europe and those in Sevare who migrate to other countries in sub-Saharan Africa. The findings reveal different migration experiences depending on these two different locations and the pre-existing networks of migrants on the ground. Respondents hailing from Sevare were more likely to have migrated to other sub-Saharan African countries where they knew people who were already living abroad. They reported more productive, successful and positive experiences than those who tried to reach Europe but were stranded in North Africa. Those in North Africa did not plan to spend time there and, thus, did not have the information or networks to prosper.Footnote 35 Because they had not planned to migrate to these destinations, but use them as a launch pad to Europe, returnees from North Africa were not prepared to manage life there. They do so without existing family connections or other networks that play a central role in West and Central Africa. This may also reflect the selection bias of those who we interviewed – the vast majority of whom returned before they had completed their mission. These findings resonate with recent work showing that migrants will forgo economic or welfare opportunities in order to locate to where there are family or regional networks. This points to the importance of engaging with migrants from a diversity of geographic contexts to achieve a fuller picture of their motivations, aspirations and experiences.
Appendices
Focus Groups Descriptive Data
Table A.I. Sevare
Table A.II. Bamako
Table A.III. Sevare Descriptive Statistics
Focus Group Questionnaires
Grinw
1. More and more, young Malians are choosing to migrate to other countries despite the enormous difficulties and risks. How do you think young people make the decision to leave?
2. Do you have friends or family members who have migrated within the last 10 years? If yes, to where? If these family members or friends who migrated have returned, the question is asked in the past.
3. Do you have news from them? If yes, which kinds of information do they share?
4. Do you think that migration changes them in one manner or another?
5. Could you consider migrating? Which factors would you weigh in your decision to migrate or not?
Returned migrants
1. Why did you choose to migrate?
2. How did you choose your destination?
3. What type of information did you have about the migration process? The place you planned to go?
4. Can you explain how you made the choice, the day when you decided to leave, the stops along the way?
5. Did you go to the place that you had initially anticipated? Why or why not?
6. Was the experience/location what you expected? Why or why not?
7. Did you communicate with your family or friends at home? If yes, how regularly?
8. Which types of news did you share with them? Challenges, successes? At what moment did you start sending money home?
9. Do you think that the experience of migration changed your attitudes or ideas? For example, has it changed your understanding of success, of religion, of governance, of citizenship, or responsibility?
10. Why did you return?
11. What do you tell young people who plan to migrate?
12. Do you plan to migrate again? Why or why not?
13. If yes, would you go to the same place where you had been?
