In this paper I lay out what 1 take to be the crucial insights in Susan Bordo's “Feminist Skepticism and the ‘Maleness’ of Philosophy” and point out some additional difficulties with the skeptical position. I call attention to an ambiguity in the nature or content of the “maleness” of philosophy that Bordo identifies. Finally, I point out that, unlike some feminist skeptics, Bordo never loses sight in her work of women's lived experiences.

Hobbes's justification for original maternal dominion is often evaluated in connection to the ambiguous status of women in his political thought. Many feminist interpreters explain this ambiguity as a contradiction: following Carole Pateman, they see maternal dominion as one term of the “paradox of parental power.” The first aim of this article is to elaborate a second, alternative approach within some critical responses to Pateman's reading. Rather than as one part of a contradiction, in these interpretations maternal dominion emerges as a self-standing form of authority that is very different from patriarchal domination. By offering a new synthesis of some of these interpretations, I aim to show this second view as more comprehensive and compelling than that offered by Pateman. Then, building upon this view, I give a new reading of the concept of preservation that establishes the mother's dominion as an intersubjective practice that reflects an awareness about the interdependent conditions for human well-being and, hence, challenges the standard approach to Hobbesian individualism and sovereign power. Finally, drawing from my interpretation of preservation, I offer a new way to understand Hobbes's argument that “parental authority is derived from the child's consent.”

Answers to the question of immigrant admissions (what policies governing the admission and exclusion of nonrefugee foreigners may states justly adopt?) have been debated extensively by political philosophers since the 1980s. A wide variety of normative approaches to the question have been taken, but very nearly zero have been expressly feminist. Generalizing from Alison Jaggar's articulation of a feminist methodological approach to the political morality of abortion, this article proposes a feminist methodological approach to immigrant admissions. This article does not defend a substantive view on what policies states ought to adopt, but it does describe several features of our social world that are salient for a feminist methodological approach to the assessment of the justice of states’ immigrant admissions policies.

In “Rescuing Conservatism: A Defense of Existing Value,” G. A. Cohen offers an anticapitalist philosophy of valuing that takes as given the existence itself of particular valuable and valued things, and commitment through time to cherishing relationships to them. In this article, I argue that “being placed,” in precolonial senses, and decolonial “being in” and “seeking place,” are the givens of being valuing, living creatures among valuing, living creatures. Valuing as placed and valuing being placed are intrinsic to decolonial feminist resistance to the gendered, racialized, and denatured ideological warfare on the terms of life. Place is not one among other values; place and placed temporality must be accepted as given. In place, the past is living in the present. Placed decolonial valuing is the only resistance to solipsistic destruction of all that has value, to a coloniality that would fragment the past to destroy the life force of the capacity to value present existing and living. Thus I bring Cohen's rescuing valuable things, and the capacity to value them, to intergenerational, interspecies, temporally located placedness shared across diverse peoples prior to fifteenth- and sixteenth-century conquests and nineteenth-century imperialism, and in perpetual resistance to contemporary settler societies and coloniality.

This article explores the prospects for a eudaimonist moral theory that is both feminist and Aristotelian. Making the moral philosophy developed by Aristotle compatible with a feminist moral perspective presents a number of philosophical challenges. Lisa Tessman offers one of the most sustained feminist engagements with Aristotelian eudaimonism (Tessman 2005). However, in arguing for the account of flourishing that her eudaimonist theory invokes, Tessman avoids taking a stand either for or against the role Aristotle assigned to human nature. She draws her account of flourishing instead from the beliefs about flourishing implicit in the feminist and black freedom movements. I examine the implicit conception of flourishing in the writings of two prominent leaders of the black freedom movement—Martin Luther King, Jr. and Malcolm X—and argue that Tessman's attempt to avoid the “sticky issue” of human nature is not successful. Tessman's defense of the burdened virtues depends on a particular reading of human nature as does a eudaimonist account of the virtues more generally.

In this essay, I examine the arguments against physician-assisted suicide (PAS) Susan Wolf offers in her essay, “Gender, Feminism, and Death: Physician-Assisted Suicide and Euthanasia.” I argue that Wolf's analysis of PAS, while timely and instructive in many ways, does not require that feminists reject policy approaches that might permit PAS. The essay concludes with reflections on the relationship between feminism and questions of agency, especially women's agency.

This essay focuses on how we embody the language we speak: how an audience “reads” the body of a speaker as it both constructs the positionality of that speaking subject and construes that subject's discursive authority. Buildingon the work of Linda Brodkey and Michelle Fine, 1 explore what is at stake when university students harass a faculty member by accusing that teacher of not embodying authority in the proper form (body).

A comment on Susan Wendell's paper “Oppression and Victimization; Choice and Responsibility” that appeared in Hypatia 5(3).

This essay considers the important role attributed to education in the writings of nineteenth-century feminist Harriet Taylor Mill. Taylor Mill connected ignorance to inequality between the sexes. She called up the specter of regression into lowness and ignorance when she associated feminism with progress. As she stressed the importance of education, she constructed an‘other’ to feminism, variously associated with lowness, poverty, and the primitive. She made a case for the advantages of civilization (education, enfranchisement, equality) to be opened up to women. Yet Taylor Mill's position that the ignorant poor, like all humans, should be in a position of so-called “perfect equality” drifted intermittently into the view that the elevation of women to perfect equality would refine and elevate the lower classes.

This autonomous-feminist statement is a collective work born from a gathering at the Autonomous Feminist Encounter [Encuentro Feminista Autónomo] in Mexico City in 2009. This piece gives a historical review of so-called autonomous feminism in Latin America and poses a definition and vision of its praxis, taking into account the socio-political-economic context in Latin America in the early 2000s. This article also recognizes feminist groups that started the critique of hegemonic feminist praxis in the region.

While Sarah Hoagland's conception of a lesbian ethic offers a promising route toward articulating an ethics of resistance, her notion of self in community does not provide a conception of “subject” capable of both embracing political action as fundamental to personal life and explicitly recognizing cultural, ethnic, and sexual multiplicity as central to ethical decision-making. Such a notion can be found, however, in the remarks of later Wittgenstein concerning the “language games” of describing.

This article examines the “backlash thesis” as a way of interpreting hostility and resistance to reproductive rights in the United States. The dominant interpretation of resistance to abortion rights or of advocacy for population control is that they are a backlash against feminism and civil rights. Granting that the backlash thesis has intuitive appeal, the article argues that it is not adequate to a contemporary analysis of these issues. It then claims that what is needed is an account of the contradictory and dynamic way in which capitalism generates anxiety about fertility and family life. The article then uses socialist feminist social reproduction theory to develop an alternative explanatory framework for why market forces form the precondition and basis for context-specific appeals to tradition rather than being antithetical to them. The latter includes both pronatalist ideas and neo-Malthusian ones about population control. The article concludes by suggesting ways in which the analysis can be useful in other contexts.

This article looks at the implications of medical colonialism in Canada for the feminist concept of care. Because medical colonialism is an ongoing material relation where “good” settler care cannot be separated from Indigenous dispossession, I defend the view that care and violence can be coextensive and suggest that a decolonial care ethic needs to disrupt the directionality of care as flowing from agential carers toward colonized care-receivers. I argue that contemporary medical colonialism should indeed be understood as a form of care if structural harm is to be addressed in practice, and trouble the notion of inclusion at work in some contemporary theories of care. By finding demands for assimilationist “participatory inclusion” in examples of government-run, Indigenous-serving care services, I caution against the implicit settler-colonial assumptions in notions of “caring democracies” and “caring societies” on the welfare-state model. If care is political and can participate in the normative pressures of civic assimilation, then to “decolonize” it through refraction, disruption, infiltration, disconnection, re-appropriation, and resistance also means to “decolonize” citizenship and civic life in the interests of Indigenous self-determination, rather than presumed inclusion in settler-state processes.

Through a combined ecofeminist, and critical disability philosophical analysis of the commodification of female farmed animal reproduction, the paper conceptualizes ability as a socio-capitalist construct that can carry the potential for harm. Patriarchal farmed animal capitalism relies upon the idea of naturalized ability of farmed females to be hyper-reproductive/hyper-ovulatory/hyper-lactative. This paper frames the introduced condition of hyper-ovulation in “egg” hens, or the amplification of their ability to lay through selective breeding, as reproductive impairment, and an act of violent patriarchal commodification and capitalization of female reproduction. Impairment, then, functions not just as disability, but also as ability. Focusing on our rescued chickens, the paper argues that such intentionally bred hyper-fertility manifests for individual hens in its least harmful form as chronic illness with the likelihood of everyday pain and inflammation, anxiety, and metabolic hunger; and in its most harmful form as a life-threatening condition. It then examines the subversive ecofeminist politics of using contraception for chickens in a fraught attempt to restore a closer pace of avian ovulation cycles that existed prior to their selective breeding. In allowing infertility to be restored to hen bodies, chicken contraception highlights the disappearance of intentionally introduced reproductive impairment to materialize the patriarchal-capitalist ableist construct of hens who naturally ovulate daily. Ideas of normal and natural can also thus operate in the service of ability. Ultimately, the paper positions the infertile hen as central to a fuller feminist resistance to the governance and control of the female reproductive body.

This article examines gender imbalance in philosophy using statistical analysis of philosophy professionals and students in Spain. It is the only study on an international scope that provides complete, real data of an entire national system. This analysis shows that among teaching and research personnel, women make up 25% of the total, among full professors they represent 12%, and the glass-ceiling index in the field is the same as that in engineering. For the study, I resorted to a normalization of indicators to allow for international comparisons, which I have done using the reports and analyses available in other countries. In the second part of the article, I use the Spanish data to test some recent hypotheses on gender imbalance in philosophy. The data does not confirm the theory of Neven Sesardic and Rafael de Clercq, which attributes the imbalance to differences in cognitive abilities (Sesardic and Clercq 2014). However, the data does partially confirm the study by Molly Paxton, Carrie Figdor, and Valerie Tiberius regarding the dissuasive effect of introductory courses in philosophy (Paxton, Figdor, and Tiberius 2012), as well as that by Sarah Leslie and her colleagues on the field-specific abilities belief hypothesis (Leslie et al. 2015).