Iran’s pursuit of nuclear technology continues to place a major strain on US–Iranian relations, with many US decision makers still sceptical of Iran’s claims that its uranium-enrichment program is aimed only at providing fuel for civilian purposes, not at developing nuclear weapons capability. In spite of the diplomatic progress made to date, the conclusion of a comprehensive agreement resolving the issue remains elusive, with powerful elements in both states resistant to any compromise, and the United States’ key regional allies, Israel and Saudi Arabia, strongly opposed to the Obama administration’s decision to negotiate with the government of Hassan Rouhani. Consequently, a US attack on Iran in order to (at least) severely delay Iran’s nuclear program remains a distinct possibility. After outlining the causes of the current situation, and noting the extent to which both Iran and the United States have disregarded their obligations under the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, this article considers the lawfulness of a potential US military strike against Iran, examining in detail relevant international legal rules governing the use of force. The conclusion reached is that such a preventive use of force would be — and should remain — illegal and that adherence to their respective legal obligations still offers the best way forward for both countries.

I Persons against whom the jurisdiction cannot be enforced

The first part of this note deals with the persons who claim immunity from the compulsory jurisdiction of Canadian courts.

(1) The Foreign State, Sovereign or Head of Foreign State as a Defendant

The law relating to the immunity of foreign states and sovereigns or heads of foreign states from Canadian jurisdiction is to be found in the common law and has been stated and re-stated in leading cases such as The Parlement Belge, The Porto Alexandre, The Cristina, Dessaulles v. The Republic of Poland and Mehr v. The Republic of China et al. Lord Atkin reduced this law to two propositions:

The first is that the courts of a country will not implead a foreign sovereign, that is, they will not by their process make him against his will a party to legal proceedings whether the proceedings involve process against his person or seek to recover from him specific property or damages.

The second is that they will not by their process, whether the sovereign is a party to the proceedings or not, seize or detain property which is his or of which he is in possession or control.

One of humanity’s most important challenges for thenext century will be to ensure the rationalmanagement of common natural resources and, mostimportantly, of environmental resources. Theconcepts of common heritage and of sustainabledevelopment offer interesting perspectives for thecreation of mechanisms that will provide for thesafe management of common resources and theequitable sharing of the benefits of exploitation.This study aims to present a model for themanagement of these resources that incorporates thepractice of the international community into themanagement of the atmosphere and of biologicaldiversity.

The Statute of the International Court of Justice specifies that the nominations of candidates for election to the Court shall be made by “national groups” constituted either by the national groups in the Permanent Court of Arbitration (PGA), or by national groups appointed for this purpose “under the same conditions” as those prescribed for members of the PCA under the Hague Convention of 1907. As of May 1987, about half the member states of the United Nations — seventy-six out of one hundred and fifty-eight — were members of the PCA, but among these only sixty-two had functioning national groups. Official United Nations documents show that a great many national groups from other states, perhaps created on an ad hoc basis for the regular elections to the Court, submit nominations as provided under Article 4(2) of the Statute. Once a candidate has been nominated by one or more national groups, the state of which he is a national is free to decide whether formally to sponsor his candidacy and to seek the support of other states in the elections to be held in the General Assembly and the Security Council.

John Erskine Read, Q.C., D.C.L., LL.D., was born in Halifax, Nova Scotia, on July 5, 1888, and died on December 3, 1973, in the words of his friend Max Wershof “full of mental vigour to the last.” After graduating in Dalhousie Law School in 1909, he completed a year’s post-graduate study in Columbia University, New York. As a Rhodes scholar he then went to University College, Oxford, where he took a “double first” in winning his B.A. and B.C.L. In 1913 he was called to the Nova Scotia bar, joining the firm of Harris, Henry, Rogers and Harris. After distinguished service with the Canadian Field Artillery in World War I, in which he was wounded and invalided out with the acting rank of Major, he returned to that firm as a partner in 1918. In 1920 he joined the Faculty of Law of Dalhousie University, and was Dean between 1924 and 1929. In 1929 he was appointed Legal Adviser of the Department of External Affairs and held that position until he was elected a member of the International Court of Justice on February 6, 1946.

Comparison is a very common tool for international lawyers. In fact, international law is built around, and draws upon, constructions necessitating an exercise of comparison. In recent years, however, calls have been made to turn the familiar tool of comparison into a central way to engage with international law. This is the idea of those spearheading the rise of a new field called comparative international law. This article critically examines the promotion of comparison as a central mode of engagement with international law and scrutinizes some of the main features of the comparativist project. It particularly shows that the comparativist project, far from laying bare the plurality of international legal thought and practice, enables a thought-colonizing enterprise. The article ends with some reflective observations on the possibility of limiting colonizing thinking in international legal studies. In doing so, it argues that it must remain possible for international lawyers to engage with alterity in a way that does not unilaterally manufacture the “other,” silence it, and speak on its behalf. This approach is called counter-comparability.

For anyone who is interested in the methodology of choice of law, no field is more rewarding than that of contracts. As domestic laws of contracts develop a progressively more intricate relationship between the principles of social regulation and private autonomy, private international law is led to develop choice of law techniques that will keep an appropriate balance between these principles in interjurisdictional cases. Choice of law rules that underemphasize the interests of the parties, and rely instead on the regulatory concerns of states that are affected by the transaction, may place too many obstacles in the way of persons who should be left to arrange their transaction in the way they think best. At the same time, choice of law rules that give too much weight to the parties’ wishes may interfere unduly with a state’s ability to regulate a transtaction with which it has a legitimate concern. In this respect, balance is more difficult to achieve in contracts than it is elsewhere.

After US President Joe Biden took office, some believed he would take a different path from that of his predecessor and that the Trump years were over. However, one of President Biden’s first moves was to strengthen American protectionism by heightening the United States’s “Buy America” and “Buy American” requirements. With this, the American government procurement market started to close off even more, and Canadian suppliers, in turn, grew worried. Given the United States’s international procurement commitments and the specificity of the Buy American Act and the Buy America Policy, this article explores the pathways to favourable treatment of Canadian suppliers in keeping with applicable international trade rules.

Lors de sa dernière réunion, qui cut lieu en septembre 1970, le Comité des utilisations pacifiques de l’espace extra-atmosphérique a noté que “le Groupe de travail (des satellites de radiodiffusion directe) avait estimé qu’au moins dans un avenir prévisible, la coopération internationale dans ce domaine devrait s’exercer à un niveau régional, trouvant son expression dans la participation à la creation et à l’exploitation de systèmes régionaux de radiodiffusion par satellites et/ou à la préparation et à la production de programmes pour ces systèmes et que les Etats membres et les organisations régionales et internationales devraient en conséquence favoriser la coopération régionale, tant au niveau gouvernemental que non gouvernemental, en particulier parmi les organismes de radiodiffusion et leurs associations.”

Le conflit Iran-Irak a été une guerre d'une extrême violence qui n'a respecté aucune des règles du droit international. L'auteur analyse en particulier trois aspects de ce conflit: l'usage illégal de la force, l'usage des armes chimiques ainsi que les attaques contre les'navires neutres. A la lumière de toutes ces violations du droit international, la communauté internationale, dont le Canada, n'a pas su réagir avec succès. Quelle leçon peut-on en retenir pour les autres conflits régionaux? L'intervention active de tierces parties à un conflit est donc plutôt l'exception que la règle. Afin de bénéficier d'une telle intervention de la communauté internationale, il faudrait une initiative américaine ou celle d'un autre membre permanent du Conseil de Sécurité des Nations Unies.

The integration of sustainable development goals in the international sales contracts of biofuels highlights a new role for international contract law. This article examines how the substantive rules of the UN Convention on International Sale of Goods (CISG) may contribute to the implementation of sustainable development and the applicability of the “sustainability clauses.” The contracting parties, including the final buyers of a global supply chain have the right to demand enforcement of these contractual clauses. However, the CISG is limited as to the legal effects international contracts have for third-parties that benefit or are interested in the sustainable development of biofuels. In this context, the contractual tool used in the international trade of sustainable products becomes not only useful but also indispensable.

The United Nations Fourth World Conference on Women provided animportant occasion for the international community to assess and todevelop its political commitment to the protection of the humanrights of women. The author discusses the Beijing Declaration andPlatform for Action that resulted from the conference and considerswhether international machineries for the enforcement of rights willbe adequate to deal with rights that traditionally have beenmarginalized. Recognizing the past and current limitations ofinternational mechanisms, the author argues that working withinmainstream institutions as well as developing independent specialprocedures are necessary measures to ensure that the internationalsystem reflects the needs of women.