How can we better understand the complex interaction effects that are triggered when businesses and international government agencies become partners in social development? To answer, this article presents field experiences of Heineken in the Democratic Republic of Congo, ethnic cleansing in Myanmar, and the United Nations Global Compact in Dubai, to show the impact of key multi-stakeholder business-development policies as experienced by millions of people. These cases help us understand business and sustainable development interactions by exploring existing research gaps regarding issues of discourse, guidance, and legitimacy. This article has four aims: (1) to show that business-development interactions are much more complex than most case studies are able to encapsulate; (2) to explore how unintended ripple effects of even the most promising “win-win” business-development policies can carry catastrophic consequences; (3) to illustrate the potential benefits of a novel methodology for future research on business, global governance, and sustainable development; and (4) to show how business and development concerns interconnect across and through the macro- and meso-levels of analysis down to local livelihood interactions and impacts. I contextualize these experiences to emerging scholarship, opening avenues for building theory and improving policy on business, development, and peace.

The rentier-state literature pays little attention to the initial political conditions that shape the way an oil-rich country develops its resources. One of the key causal mechanisms linking oil wealth and regime type is the relationship between foreign investors and host governments. Especially in the developing countries that depend on international financing and expertise, the role of foreign capital in fashioning the balance of power in the political system and thereby the distribution of oil wealth becomes ever more important. As the experiences of Azerbaijan and Russia in the 1990s demonstrate, among oil-rich states in the developing world, those with authoritarian regimes tend to fare better in terms of attracting FDI in the oil sector than states with democratizing (or hybrid regimes). The durability of some authoritarian regimes in the developing world is partly a function of this external legitimation from foreign investors.

Globalization is often said to lead to convergence among firm strategies. Significant differences existed in the organization of the production networks of Japanese and US firms in electronics in East Asia at the beginning of the 1990s. The sources of these differences lie in part in the relative newness of the export-orientation of Japanese companies, in weaknesses in Japanese corporate governance, in the geographical proximity of East Asian plants to Japan, and in the product mix of Japanese firms. An opening of Japanese production networks occurred in the first half of the 1990s in part in response to pressures associated with various forces of globalization, including the diffusion of capabilities, changes in technology, and the internationalization of the Japanese economy. This opening of Japanese networks caused them to converge towards their American counterparts. Partial convergence, however, coexisted with persistent diversity relative to the behavior of US networks. While nationality continued to matter, other factors affecting firms have to be incorporated into the analysis to explain the persistent diversity of firm behaviors.

The rise of public policies in the field of Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) suggests a reassertion of state power over a phenomenon initially designed to weaken public authorities. But depending on policy objectives and underlying state-business relationships, CSR public policies seem to oscillate between the steering of corporate conduct towards political goals and the provision of political support to business interests. The present paper offers new perspectives on this ambiguity. Using social systems theory to guide a comparative study of two major Indian CSR policies, the analysis distinguishes two levels. At a functional level, the introduction of CSR in Indian regulatory politics produced more or less constraining expectations that open up opportunities for companies to participate in the performance of political functions. At an operational level, however, even a “mandatory” policy designed primarily according to political calculations let companies decide how they perform these functions. This persistence of voluntarism, which is supported by the semantic properties of “CSR,” consolidates the role of profit-driven calculations in the regulation of corporate conduct and, in the Indian case, in the redistribution of resources for social welfare. Research perspectives on the implications of CSR public policies for democracy are outlined in concluding remarks.

Apart from being one of the hardest hit sectors during the 2008 financial crisis, the auto sector is also a prominent sector where emerging auto markets such as China have fared relatively well compared to their competitors in North America and Europe. This paper examines various ways that nations have shifted their policy gears to revive and restructure the automotive industry by using the case studies of the USA, France, and China. New sets of policy initiatives are contingent on particular industrial and institutional contexts, but both developed and developing countries have employed wide range of “murky” protectionist measures. This makes it unlikely for the WTO member countries to take a naming and shaming approach and file a case at the WTO level, which poses challenges to the WTO rules and trade liberalization.

The intellectual engagement with multinational enterprises in International Relations has found a new home within the narratives of global governance and corporate social responsibility. Both narratives seem to agree that the role of business has changed as state capacities to provide governance assumingly have diminished and, based on broader social and political responsibilities, enterprises began to participate more actively in the provision of collective goods. Increased participation alone, however, does not reveal how corporate actors define and make sense of their responsibilities and their roles within global governance. In fact, focusing on corporate responsibilities and corporate governance contributions does not consider enterprises as actors in their own right who actively interpret and respond to changes in their normative environments. To fill this gap, the article proposes a framework that conceptualizes corporate agency as inherently social and creative. This framework, which can be applied to different contexts, is illustrated by reconstructing interpretative frames and self-understandings advanced by Shell in response to its crisis in Nigeria during the 1990s. Based on this reconstruction, Shell failed to develop and communicate a clear understanding of its social responsibilities, and its overall integration into global governance is likely to remain an ambiguous process in which uncertainty and indeterminacy prevail.

Based on three in-depth case studies, the study analyzes how and why Chinese enterprises partner with governments in cooperative ventures which aim to simultaneously achieve poverty alleviation objectives and establish profitable business ventures in rural areas. The analysis draws out specific characteristics of three government-business partnerships in China, which vary in terms of governance structure, resource complementarity and incentives. The findings show that in this state capitalist system, outcomes of government-business partnerships depend on firms having unique resources and capabilities that serve particular policy objectives of the government. By the same token, in order to make partnerships attractive to firms, national and local governments must hold the keys to unique resources needed by enterprises looking to do business in low-income markets. The cases further illustrate that, in order to build and maintain successful government-business partnerships over time, the alignment of incentives plays an important role. In sum, complementary resources and well-aligned interests between firms and governments help to explain why some government-enterprise partnerships are more successful than others.

This article constructs a measure of geopolitical and economic tensions in US–China relations based on the sentiment expressed in major US news media and utilizes it to analyze the impact of bilateral tensions on US imports from China between 2002 and 2019. Our results suggest that bilateral tensions have had a negative effect on US imports. Additional analyses of the impact of bilateral tensions for industries with varying levels of supply chain linkages to China suggest that, contrary to expectations, they have more disproportionately affected industries highly integrated with the Chinese market. This pattern continues to hold during the trade war period. Not only were bilateral tensions associated with higher tariffs for industries with high levels of global value chain linkages to China, but the tariff hikes have also had a more sustained impact on such industries. Overall, our findings indicate that potential “sunk costs” considerations may not have been strong enough to forestall the downward trend in bilateral trade relations under both routine diplomacy and trade war conditions.

Formal institutions such as business chambers have been assumed to be a key indicator of the health of state-business relations (SBR). Yet in Africa these organizations have seldom risen to the level of access and influence enjoyed by some of their counterparts elsewhere in the developing world. A number of recent studies of SBR in Africa continue to overstate the importance of business associations (BAs). Yet despite the widespread marginality of BAs in Africa, the receptiveness of African states to leading firms and business interests has increased markedly. While this poses certain risks of increased corruption, collusion and monopoly, the institutional and political environment for doing business has also improved, thereby fostering new opportunities for further business-related growth and business sector development among bona fide firms. Drawing on evidence from Zambia and elsewhere, this paper finds that the benefits provided to individual firms who enjoy state access can, paradoxically, contribute to an improved environment for other private sector actors whose interests are directly represented only in moribund formal associations. Even without strong BAs, when aided by the state, individual firms, and/or international actors, Africa's improved business environment has a salutary impact on growth.

This paper broadens the scope and depth of business alliance research by way of interdisciplinary enrichment. The paper draws on the political science literature on nation-state alliances to generate insights into the establishment, operations and performance of inter-firm alliances. Shared theory bases of game theory and transaction cost economics, as well as theories, variables and research findings indigenous to political science are posited as a platform from which propositions regarding inter-firm alliances are derived.

Despite much commentary in the media and the popular assumption that the banking industry exerts undue influence on government policy-making, the academic literature on the role of the banks since the 2008 financial crisis remains theoretically and empirically under-specified. In particular, we argue that different forms of financial power are often conflated, while favorable policy outcomes are too-readily assumed to be evidence of regulatory capture. In short, we still know relatively little about how bank influence varies over time and in different national contexts, the extent to which banking interests are unified or divided, and the conditions under which banks are capable of producing meaningful variation in policy outcomes. This article has three objectives: 1) to explain why the debate on bank influence matters; 2) to examine the evidence of bank influence since the international financial crisis; and 3) to set out a range of conceptual tools for thinking about bank power.

This paper identifies recurrent patterns in the political activity of American corporations that support trade. These firms have made public coalitions a central element of their pro-trade activities, and their collective efforts vastly outstrip those of trade's corporate opponents. This superiority in organization is paired with dramatically greater volumes of lobbying and campaign contributions. I explain these striking divergences by integrating collective action theory into a firm-centred model of trade politics: the heavy concentration of gains from trade among a small number of firms makes both individual and collective political action easier for pro-trade firms than for producers opposed to trade. This explanation is supported in panel analysis of firms’ participation in pro-trade coalitions, which shows that size, multinationality, and heterogeneity in global networks of production and sales drive participation in pro-trade groups. Globally engaged firms have supported trade by matching pro-trade preferences with highly organized political action.

This paper analyzes how the structure of the legislature affects interest groups' incentives to lobby. Lobbying is modelled as the strategic provision of information by an interest group to a multi-member legislature, and the effectiveness of lobbying lies in the ability of information to change the winning policy coalitions. We show that with a long enough time horizon for policymakers, the distinguishing feature between the U.S. Congress and European parliamentary systems—the vote of confidence procedure—reduces an agenda setter's willingness to change policy coalitions, and thus significantly lowers the incentives for interest group lobbying.

The economic and political outcomes of market globalization continue to be complex. As international corporations engage developing markets, they increasingly find consumers who lack market sophistication, meaningful purchasing options and economic leverage. Such conditions are ripe for the exploitation of these market segments but also can be mitigated by enlightened managers willing to thoughtfully consider their ethical and professional obligations to vulnerable consumers. This paper builds on a normative ethical framework, labeled the integrative justice model (IJM) for impoverished markets that was introduced in the marketing and public policy literature. Specifically, the paper will extend the normative ethics of the IJM by proposing logically reasoned decision principles for managers, particularly in MNC subsidiaries, that might better shape ethical business strategy when targeting impoverished segments. Additionally, numerous case examples are given to illustrate how a number of these decision principles are already being applied by companies around the world. Such an approach can serve as a counterweight to the difficulty of crafting global regulations for market development.

Do neoliberal economic policies help or hinder human development? Many have argued that such policies promote economic stability and growth, which may have indirect positive effects on human welfare. Others claim that neoliberal policies retard human development. We argue that neoliberal economic policies may improve the human welfare in ways that are independent of their effects on economic performance. Specifically, this paper hypothesizes that open international trade policies, low-inflation macroeconomic environments, and market-oriented property rights regimes promote human development across the world. We test this argument by examining the impact of several measures of neoliberal policies on infant mortality rates across the world between 1960 and 1999. Results suggest that openness to imports, long-term membership in the GATT and WTO, low rates of inflation, and effective contract enforcement are each associated with lower rates of infant mortality across the world, even when controlling for countries' economic performance.

Following the financial crisis, the United Kingdom introduced major structural reforms to address concern about Too-Big-To-Fail (TBTF) banks, while France and Germany adopted much weaker reforms. This is puzzling given the presence of large universal banks engaged in market making activities in all three countries, which suffered significant losses during the international financial crisis, and given the commitments to reform made by political leaders in all three countries. The paper explains this policy divergence by analysing how dynamics of agenda setting contributed to the emergence of policy windows on structural reform. We explain the United Kingdom's decision to delegate the process to an independent commission as an example of venue shifting which helped to insulate the process from industry framing, and resulted in “conflict expansion” by mobilizing a wider coalition of actors in support of bank ringfencing. By contrast, in France and Germany the agenda was tightly managed through existing institutional venues, enabling industry to resist the framing of the issue around TBTF and limiting the role of non-business groups—a process we label as “conflict contraction.” We argue that analysis of agenda setting dynamics provides new insights into the cross-national variability of business power.

Compensation hypothesis, which has established a link between trade openness of countries and levels of government spending, has been widely accepted in the literature on trade policy and international globalization. However, the nature of the distribution effects produced by trade is likely to determine the existence of more or less redistribution demands from the median voter, and therefore government growth. In this paper I hypothesize that the effects of trade openness on redistribution demands are not homogeneous between countries, and I argue that they depend both on the type-of-factor endowment of the economy and the size of the sectors more likely to be affected by trade. I test this hypothesis with ISSP data for 23 countries, both with a country level and an individual level analysis. The results show that redistribution demands issued from trade openness of the median voter of a country are largely conditional on GDP per capita and size of potential loser sectors such as manufacturing: while trade has a negative effect on pro-redistribution preferences in “poor” and/or in “low manufacturing” countries; it positively affects pro-redistribution preferences in “rich” and/or in “high manufacturing” countries. Additionally, I empirically observe that the size of the loser sector plays a more important mediating role than the type-of-factor endowment of the economy.

Over the past decade, multinationals (MNCs) have followed three main objectives while entering Latin America: efficiency seeking, growth seeking, and resource seeking. Efficiency seeking MNCs aim to reduce costs in their global production process through access to cheaper labor, and proximity to destination markets such as the United States. Growth seeking firms enter Latin American markets to grow and/or acquire new markets. They are by nature more dependent on the macroeconomic conditions in local markets for their success. Resource seeking firms enter Latin America in the search of minerals, metals, and hydrocarbons. This paper introduces the concept of “natural markets” to explain the relative successes of MNCs from different regions – Europe (mainly Iberian), USA, and Asia. ‘Natural markets’ for a MNC are defined as those markets sharing a common history or language or having a high level of physical proximity with the country of origin of the MNC. This paper proposes that a firm focusing on natural markets has a comparative advantage, and thus increases the probability of its success. The paper also draws upon the experiences of successful MNCs in Latin America to infer some lessons for East Asian MNCs wishing to operate in the region.

Do countries with high corporate social responsibility (CSR) performance support more stringent supranational regulation? Following this logic, existing scholarship claims that Nordic countries push for tougher regulations to sharpen their competitive advantage. On the basis of an examination of the negotiations over the EU Directive 2014/95/EU, a corporate transparency law that requires firms to report on their social, environmental, and human rights impacts, this paper argues that strong CSR performance does not necessarily entail strong support for regulation. Nordic companies perform well when it comes to sustainability, but except for Denmark, Nordic governments’ support for the Directive was lukewarm. To explain why, I examine the dynamics between CSR leaders, business associations, and party politics. I find that business associations are key for explaining this outcome. While some Nordic CSR leaders provided support, business associations, in which SMEs with lower CSR performance comprise the bulk of the members, were forceful opponents of regulation, unless domestic regulations are in place, in which case these associations support supranational regulations to level the playing field. I also stress the importance of partisan politics and extend the analysis to mandatory human rights due diligence. In sum, Nordic countries are much more heterogeneous than what the literature often suggests.

Between 1982 and 1994 all fifty states enacted new car warranty legislation commonly known as ‘lemon laws’. These statutes provide that a consumer who buys a lemon (defined as ‘a chronically defective new car that cannot be repaired with a reasonable effort’) is entitled to receive a replacement car or full refund from the car's manufacturer. We ask why these laws were enacted, exploring both economic and political rationales. The analysis demonstrates that reasonable economic arguments can be advanced for the legislation, both pro and con, and concludes that the legislation resulted most directly from an alliance of consumer advocates and automobile dealers at the expense of manufacturers. This case study illustrates the interplay of legal, political, and economic factors that shape consumer legislation generally.