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Individual identity and freedom of choice in the context of environmental and economic conditions

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  29 August 2013

Roy F. Baumeister
Affiliation:
Department of Psychology, Florida State University, Tallahassee, FL 32306-4301. baumeister@psy.fsu.eduhttp://www.psy.fsu.edu/~baumeistertice/index.htmlpark@psy.fsu.eduhttp://www.psy.fsu.edu/~ehrlingerlab/Park/Park.htmlainsworth@psy.fsu.eduhttp://www.psy.fsu.edu/~baumeistertice/ainsworth.html
Jina Park
Affiliation:
Department of Psychology, Florida State University, Tallahassee, FL 32306-4301. baumeister@psy.fsu.eduhttp://www.psy.fsu.edu/~baumeistertice/index.htmlpark@psy.fsu.eduhttp://www.psy.fsu.edu/~ehrlingerlab/Park/Park.htmlainsworth@psy.fsu.eduhttp://www.psy.fsu.edu/~baumeistertice/ainsworth.html
Sarah E. Ainsworth
Affiliation:
Department of Psychology, Florida State University, Tallahassee, FL 32306-4301. baumeister@psy.fsu.eduhttp://www.psy.fsu.edu/~baumeistertice/index.htmlpark@psy.fsu.eduhttp://www.psy.fsu.edu/~ehrlingerlab/Park/Park.htmlainsworth@psy.fsu.eduhttp://www.psy.fsu.edu/~baumeistertice/ainsworth.html

Abstract

Van de Vliert's findings fit nicely with our recent arguments implying that (1) differentiated selfhood is partly motivated by requirements of cultural groups, and (2) free will mainly exists within culture. Some cultural groups promote individual freedom, whereas others constrict it so as to maintain elites' power and privilege. Thus, freedom is, to a great extent, a creation of culture.

Type
Open Peer Commentary
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2013 

All over the world, human beings live in cultural groups, that is, in groups that share information, work together with differentiated, complementary roles, engage in some form of trade or exchange, and pass on their social structures and knowledge to subsequent generations. Some groups allow their members considerable freedom, whereas others severely constrain individual freedom. In the target article, Van de Vliert has identified one significant pattern, which is that freedom depends on a combination of climate and economic success – such that freedom is highest in relatively rich places with harsh climates.

We connect Van de Vliert's findings to the emergence of the individualistic form of selfhood that promotes inner exploration of the single person and allows people to choose and define who they are. This may be a historically and culturally relative form of selfhood. It emerged first in Europe around the time of the Renaissance (thus rich societies with some harsh climates) but gradually is now spreading to other parts of the globe (see Baumeister Reference Baumeister1986; Reference Baumeister1987 for overview). It replaces a previously more universal form of selfhood in which identity was largely assigned to individuals by fixed circumstances of social position, exploration of inner selfhood was minimal or trivial, fulfillment was defined by society (usually in religious framework), and self-definition was a moral matter of performing one's assigned roles.

Participation in culture raises fundamental choices between group collective control (what Van de Vliert calls “ingroup agency”) and individual freedom. Van de Vliert proposes that the resulting latitude of individual freedom depends on interaction between material wealth and climate stresses. Harsher climates are threatening to materially poor cultures, and threats cause these groups to curtail freedom so as to enforce conformity. In contrast, harsh climates are challenging (as opposed to threatening) to rich cultures, and so they let individuals cope and adapt as they wish. In part, the harsh climate motivates people to improve their comfort by working hard and pursuing individual goals, in effect enabling the individual to obtain a large share of the available wealth by dint of individual effort and thereby to improve life for his or her family substantially. When the climate is benign and pleasant, everyone lives reasonably well with minimal effort, so there is not much motivation for individuals to work hard and try new things.

Human selfhood is vastly more complex than what is seen in other species. This is not limited to the overgrown, complex, individualistic modern self but is true even of the simplest selves in simple, early societies. One partial explanation for special nature of human selfhood is that cultural groups benefit from differentiation of selves. Baumeister et al. (Reference Baumeister, Ainsworth and Vohs2012, submitted) reviewed the research literature on group functioning in light of the seeming contradiction that many studies have found groups to be more than the sum of their parts – whereas many other studies have found them to be considerably less. The difference depended heavily on the degree of differentiation versus submerging of the self in the group. The pathologies of groups (e.g., social loafing, groupthink, diffusion of responsibility, mob violence) mainly arise when selves are submerged in the group and individuals conform to others. In contrast, the best results of group action (e.g., social facilitation of individual performance, wisdom of crowds, improvements in efficiency and productivity through division of labor) are achieved by differentiating individual selves. The latter includes encouraging independent thought and judgment, making people feel their unique contributions are indispensable to group success, and holding people morally accountable for their actions.

The highly internal, individualistic form of selfhood that emerged in Western Europe after the Renaissance took greater advantage of differentiation of selfhood than previous societies. Although the earlier ones certainly differentiated roles, the operation of individual agency in performance and information-gathering was greatly enhanced in early modern Europe. The freedom of individuals to pursue their own competing goals, in flexible partnerships rather than rigidly defined positions in immobile social hierarchies, almost certainly contributed to making those societies rich by promoting trade and innovation. Whereas Van de Vliert emphasizes that wealth (under harsh climate) promotes freedom, we think that freedom increases wealth also. In any case, the bottom line is that greater freedom (to act as an autonomous agent within the system) is an important part of the historically new, more advanced form of human selfhood.

Elsewhere one of us has argued that free will mainly exists within the context of culture (Baumeister, in press). The possibility of exerting freedom, including rational choice based on meaningful understanding and the exertion of self-control to adapt one's behavior to standards, is greatly increased by living in culture with language and rules. Van de Vliert's work contributes to this view and thus to the free will debate by suggesting that the very motivation to exert free, autonomous choice varies according to cultural context, including climate demands and economic prosperity that reward autonomous effort. Rich cultures offer greater freedom of choice and greater opportunity for self-definition than poor cultures, and harsh climates may motivate people to exert themselves to find ways of making life better. Freedom is hence to a substantial degree a creation of culture.

Again, though, some cultures promote freedom, whereas others restrain it. In poor cultures in harsh climates, elites may use the idea of free will simply to hold people responsible for doing what they are expected to do. Actual freedom is thus restrained, because free action by the majority would jeopardize the privileges of the elite. In contrast, rich cultures with harsh climates can permit greater freedom, and free will becomes a matter of the individual acting as an autonomous economic, political, and social agent.

References

Baumeister, R. F. (1986) Identity: Cultural change and the struggle for self. Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
Baumeister, R. F. (1987) How the self became a problem: A psychological review of historical research. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 52:163–76. DOI: 10.1037/0022-3514.52.1.163.Google Scholar
Baumeister, R. F. (in press) Constructing a scientific theory of free will. In: Moral psychology. Free will and responsibility, vol. 4, ed. Sinnott-Armstrong, W.. MIT Press.Google Scholar
Baumeister, R. F., Ainsworth, S. E. & Vohs, K. D. (2012, submitted) Are groups more or less than the sum of their members? Google Scholar