As an antidote to the ever-increasing Balkanization of the behavioral sciences, the authors' broad integrative effort is welcome indeed. The literatures on personal versus group identities are especially ripe for such a creative integration. That said, the authors sometimes outdid themselves in the creativity department, as when they defined and then redefined some of their key constructs. Especially troubling, they defined differentiated identities in at least two contradictory ways, with one emphasizing personal regulation of behavior and the other emphasizing social regulation of behavior. As we explain below, the two definitions refer to fundamentally distinct processes that cannot be treated as interchangeable or even complementary. But first, we consider some themes that we resonated with.
The role of differentiated identities in groups was particularly interesting to us because this is also a major theme in our work on identity fusion theory. Identity fusion occurs when people develop a powerful sense of oneness with the group, a sense so strong that fused individuals become willing to make extreme sacrifices on behalf of the group (Swann et al. Reference Swann, Gómez, Seyle, Morales and Huici2009). In contrast to classic social identity theory (but not the social identity perspective, which discarded some core principles of the classic theory), fused individuals retain salient personal identities when they become deeply aligned with the group. In fact, a strong sense of personal agency mediates the extreme behaviors of fused individuals (Gómez et al. Reference Gómez, Brooks, Buhrmester, Vázquez, Jeen and Swann2011). Moreover, strongly fused persons recognize each individual group member as separate and unique. Just as family members each are indispensable parts of the whole, for fused individuals other group members are not mere interchangeable exemplars of the group prototype. The authors' point of view also resembles fusion theory in highlighting instances in which individual contributions to the group come at a cost to the individual.
But if parallels between the authors' theory and fusion theory apply when one defines differentiated self in terms of personal regulation (“individually identified and responsible,” target article, para 5), they lose force when one defines a differentiated self in terms of social regulation (“members performing different roles,” para. 6). Not only do those two definitions refer to two different constructs, but also, personal regulation of behavior likely contributes to the progroup actions that the authors have in mind, and social regulation does not. For example, most great armies (in fact, most great organizations) have clear division of labor (high social regulation). Yet armies vary in the degree to which they treat their foot soldiers as if they are unique individuals versus indistinguishable pawns in a game of chess. In fact, military historians have noted that battles are won when soldiers recognize themselves and each other as unique individuals and develop family-like ties to their brothers-in-arms (Swann et al. Reference Swann, Buhrmester, Gómez, Jetten, Bastian, Vázquez, Ariyanto, Besta, Christ, Cui, Finchilescu, González, Goto, Hornsey, Sharma, Susianto and Zhang2014). For example, in our study of fighters in the 2011 Libyan revolution, those who volunteered for frontline combat were distinguished by the fact that they reported being as strongly bonded to their battalion as they were to their own families (Whitehouse et al. Reference Whitehouse, McQuinn, Buhrmester and Swann2014). Such personal ties are generally impossible without individually identifying and valuing each group member.
Depending on which conceptualization of differentiated identity one is interested in, one may also focus on different group outcomes. For example, if specialization of labor is of interest (the authors' second definition of differentiated identity), one may note that organizations whose members specialize financially outperform organizations without specialization (section 2.1.2, para. 6) This finding has historical precedent: the Industrial Revolution ushered in specialization of labor – and wealth creation – on a massive scale. But this specialization also involved workers becoming increasingly replaceable and deindividuated (the opposite of a “differentiated identity” using the first definition). If one's definition of differentiated self turns on recognition of the idiosyncratic identities of group members, one may note that the deindividuation of workers led to organizations' mass exploitation of employees, including women and children, which then necessitated the creation of unions and labor protection laws.
We agree that division of labor can be important and beneficial in bolstering the efficiency of groups. Nevertheless, division of labor is no panacea; it fails to solve the problem that the authors identify as being common to all groups: that “group systems require individuals to set aside some self-interest, but members are tempted to pursue self-interest at group expense” (sect. 1, para. 1). In contrast, freedom to regulate the self and valuing fellow group members promote accountability and thereby diminish self-interested behavior. The authors provide several examples of this phenomenon. In their discussion of transactive memory, for example, performance was improved when group members kept track of who knew what, and the outcomes in the Indian call center improved not because employees were assigned different roles but because training emphasized “individuality and unique potential contribution” (sect. 2.1.3, para. 6). Thus, in such scenarios the positive group outcomes the authors discuss were not a result of division of labor but rather of individuals feeling personally identified and responsible. In other scenarios, role specialization may occur to such an extreme as to make group members truly irreplaceable and thus valued as individuals. But such instances are exceptions to the rule that role specialization is not a categorical good. Indeed, it is hard to imagine that the Enron scandal could have been avoided if only its employees had been more specialized or that a mob would be less violent if only they had agreed who would be responsible for looting the stores and who would be responsible for setting cars on fire. Here and elsewhere, when it comes to assessing the virtues of the differentiated self, the devil is in the details.
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As an antidote to the ever-increasing Balkanization of the behavioral sciences, the authors' broad integrative effort is welcome indeed. The literatures on personal versus group identities are especially ripe for such a creative integration. That said, the authors sometimes outdid themselves in the creativity department, as when they defined and then redefined some of their key constructs. Especially troubling, they defined differentiated identities in at least two contradictory ways, with one emphasizing personal regulation of behavior and the other emphasizing social regulation of behavior. As we explain below, the two definitions refer to fundamentally distinct processes that cannot be treated as interchangeable or even complementary. But first, we consider some themes that we resonated with.
The role of differentiated identities in groups was particularly interesting to us because this is also a major theme in our work on identity fusion theory. Identity fusion occurs when people develop a powerful sense of oneness with the group, a sense so strong that fused individuals become willing to make extreme sacrifices on behalf of the group (Swann et al. Reference Swann, Gómez, Seyle, Morales and Huici2009). In contrast to classic social identity theory (but not the social identity perspective, which discarded some core principles of the classic theory), fused individuals retain salient personal identities when they become deeply aligned with the group. In fact, a strong sense of personal agency mediates the extreme behaviors of fused individuals (Gómez et al. Reference Gómez, Brooks, Buhrmester, Vázquez, Jeen and Swann2011). Moreover, strongly fused persons recognize each individual group member as separate and unique. Just as family members each are indispensable parts of the whole, for fused individuals other group members are not mere interchangeable exemplars of the group prototype. The authors' point of view also resembles fusion theory in highlighting instances in which individual contributions to the group come at a cost to the individual.
But if parallels between the authors' theory and fusion theory apply when one defines differentiated self in terms of personal regulation (“individually identified and responsible,” target article, para 5), they lose force when one defines a differentiated self in terms of social regulation (“members performing different roles,” para. 6). Not only do those two definitions refer to two different constructs, but also, personal regulation of behavior likely contributes to the progroup actions that the authors have in mind, and social regulation does not. For example, most great armies (in fact, most great organizations) have clear division of labor (high social regulation). Yet armies vary in the degree to which they treat their foot soldiers as if they are unique individuals versus indistinguishable pawns in a game of chess. In fact, military historians have noted that battles are won when soldiers recognize themselves and each other as unique individuals and develop family-like ties to their brothers-in-arms (Swann et al. Reference Swann, Buhrmester, Gómez, Jetten, Bastian, Vázquez, Ariyanto, Besta, Christ, Cui, Finchilescu, González, Goto, Hornsey, Sharma, Susianto and Zhang2014). For example, in our study of fighters in the 2011 Libyan revolution, those who volunteered for frontline combat were distinguished by the fact that they reported being as strongly bonded to their battalion as they were to their own families (Whitehouse et al. Reference Whitehouse, McQuinn, Buhrmester and Swann2014). Such personal ties are generally impossible without individually identifying and valuing each group member.
Depending on which conceptualization of differentiated identity one is interested in, one may also focus on different group outcomes. For example, if specialization of labor is of interest (the authors' second definition of differentiated identity), one may note that organizations whose members specialize financially outperform organizations without specialization (section 2.1.2, para. 6) This finding has historical precedent: the Industrial Revolution ushered in specialization of labor – and wealth creation – on a massive scale. But this specialization also involved workers becoming increasingly replaceable and deindividuated (the opposite of a “differentiated identity” using the first definition). If one's definition of differentiated self turns on recognition of the idiosyncratic identities of group members, one may note that the deindividuation of workers led to organizations' mass exploitation of employees, including women and children, which then necessitated the creation of unions and labor protection laws.
We agree that division of labor can be important and beneficial in bolstering the efficiency of groups. Nevertheless, division of labor is no panacea; it fails to solve the problem that the authors identify as being common to all groups: that “group systems require individuals to set aside some self-interest, but members are tempted to pursue self-interest at group expense” (sect. 1, para. 1). In contrast, freedom to regulate the self and valuing fellow group members promote accountability and thereby diminish self-interested behavior. The authors provide several examples of this phenomenon. In their discussion of transactive memory, for example, performance was improved when group members kept track of who knew what, and the outcomes in the Indian call center improved not because employees were assigned different roles but because training emphasized “individuality and unique potential contribution” (sect. 2.1.3, para. 6). Thus, in such scenarios the positive group outcomes the authors discuss were not a result of division of labor but rather of individuals feeling personally identified and responsible. In other scenarios, role specialization may occur to such an extreme as to make group members truly irreplaceable and thus valued as individuals. But such instances are exceptions to the rule that role specialization is not a categorical good. Indeed, it is hard to imagine that the Enron scandal could have been avoided if only its employees had been more specialized or that a mob would be less violent if only they had agreed who would be responsible for looting the stores and who would be responsible for setting cars on fire. Here and elsewhere, when it comes to assessing the virtues of the differentiated self, the devil is in the details.