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Although a growing stream of research investigates the role of government in corporate social responsibility (CSR), little is known about how governmental CSR interventions interact in financial markets. This article addresses this gap through a longitudinal study of the socially responsible investment (SRI) market in France. Building on the “CSR and government” and “regulative capitalism” literatures, we identify three modes of governmental CSR intervention—regulatory steering, delegated rowing, and microsteering—and show how they interact through the two mechanisms of layering (the accumulation of interventions) and catalyzing (the alignment of interventions). Our findings: 1) challenge the notion that, in the neoliberal order, governments are confined to steering market actors—leading and guiding their behavior—while private actors are in charge of rowing—providing products and services; 2) show how governmental CSR interventions interact and are orchestrated; and 3) provide evidence that governments can mobilize financial markets to promote CSR.
Climate–sincere citizens are frustrated with three decades of global and national failures to reduce greenhouse gas emissions, so they are receptive to arguments that they can make a difference by changing their own behavior – consuming less, flying less, driving less, becoming vegetarian. However, if our economy is dominated by fossil fuels, individual behavioral change has to be radical to reduce emissions, and few people are willing to do that. But if we change our behavior as citizens to increase the chance of electing climate–sincere politicians and supporting their policies – through civil actions – we actually create the conditions where our consumer behavior can also contribute. If our politicians forced coal plants to close, then our use of an electric vehicle and of an electric home heat pump for heating and cooling will reduce emissions and provide a model for others.
Climate–sincere citizens are frustrated with three decades of global and national failures to reduce greenhouse gas emissions, so they are receptive to arguments that they can make a difference by various means, one of which is to make an offset payment to someone else to reduce emissions while they continue to cause emissions when, for example, flying in an airplane. Unfortunately, research shows that a significant percentage of so–called offsets do not reduce emissions from what they otherwise would have been. Instead, offset payments are made to someone for doing something they would have done without the payment. Climate-concerned citizens would have greater impact if they instead made their offset payments to help elect climate–sincere politicians and to make sure that these politicians implement policies that require ezveryone to reduce greenhouse gas emissions, not just the people who buy offsets.
There is evidence that the risk of stranded assets in the oil and gas sector is underpriced in financial markets. Publicly traded Western oil and gas companies are starting to write down assets, opening up the possibility that more rationalisation of value is likely to come. To the extent that large oil companies diversify portfolios to include cleaner energy and carbon sequestration technologies, it could reduce the risk of a sudden cascading change in the stock valuation of these firms and related bond and credit markets. Instead, the vast majority of oil and gas assets that will be stranded are in the control of sovereign states whose national budgets are highly dependent on oil and gas revenues. Thus, the problem of stranded asset risk for the oil and gas sector may be most relevant in markets for sovereign credit as well as risks that go beyond financial losses.
Globally, semi-arid lands (SALs) are home to approximately one billion people, including some of the poorest and least food secure. These regions will be among the hardest hit by the impacts of climate change. This article urges governments and their development partners to put SAL inhabitants and their activities at the heart of efforts to support adaptation and climate resilient development, identifying opportunities to capitalize on the knowledge, institutions, resources and practices of SAL populations in adaptation action.
Climate change is one of the biggest challenges facing the world. Scientific research points out that it is predominately driven by human activity. There are three different types of risks that arise from this change. These have been broadly grouped into physical, transition and liability risks. These risks can impact general insurers to different degrees, depending on their business areas and investment strategies. These may pose different strategic, investment, market, operational and reputational risks. This paper provides General Insurance Practitioners with an overview of different aspects of insurance operations that may be affected by climate change. It highlights the impact of these risks on pricing and underwriting, reserving, reinsurance, catastrophe modelling, investment, risk management and capital management processes.
Over the past few years, the number of climate cases being filed against corporations and public authorities around the world has been on the rise. Aware of the central role of finance in economic development, the financial sector has remained vigilant. Traditionally, climate litigation in financial markets had been rare, but that seems to be changing: in 2018 there were more cases filed than in any previous year. The development of existing and forthcoming private and public sector initiatives with the aim of promoting sustainable finance may usher in even greater numbers in the next few years. This article provides the first systematic overview of climate cases in financial markets and introduces a typology to classify this type of climate case. This classification reveals common issues across different financial systems and raises questions for further enquiry that define a new research area within the emerging literature on climate litigation.
This book covers the fundamental principles of environmental law; how they can be reframed from a rational actor perspective. The tools of law and economics can be brought to bear on policy questions within environmental law. The approach taken in this book is to build on the existing consensus in international environmental law and to provide it with new analytical tools to improve the design of legal rules and to enable prospective modelling of the effects of rules in pre-implementation stages of evaluation and deliberation. The Pigouvian idea of environmental injuries as economic externalities. The core idea of Pigou’s model is that manufacturing costs that are excluded from the decision-making process will inherently not be reflected in the decision making of producers, and thus, manufacturing costs will be incorrectly perceived as lower than they actually are. The key is to ensure better decision making and to prevent environmental injuries by ‘internalising’ the cost externalities. Rational actors, forced to bear the costs of the injuries resulting from their production activities, will set optimal levels of production inclusive of minimising the costs of pollution injuries via reducing the incidence of those pollution injuries
Chapter 5 examined empirical evidence regarding the main factors behind land use change in developing countries, noting that many economic analyses of tropical deforestation and land conversion have emphasized the important role of institutional factors. However, such analyses are often unable to examine the influence of open access conditions and ill-defined property rights, as to date an adequate cross-country data set on property rights and land ownership conditions does not exist for developing economies.
Since 2008, a global ‘land rush’ has been unfolding and so have efforts by international, national and regional actors to position themselves as the principal authorities in the determination of appropriate usages of land. This article examines three of the most influential ‘soft law’ instruments: the Principles for Responsible Agricultural Investment; the Principles for Responsible Investment in Agriculture and Food Systems and; the Voluntary Guidelines on the Responsible Governance of Tenure. Despite their substantive differences, all three documents share a specific form of state-centrism. They imagine the host state of such large-scale investments as internally unitary and externally independent and entrust it with the bulk of responsibilities regarding the management of land investments. However, I argue that this particular form of state-centrism obscures the legal and administrative realities of the post-colonial state that is often legally bifurcated and subject to pervasive forms of international authority. Rather, an appreciation of the multitude of actors who claim jurisdiction over the lands of the South enables a better understanding of the legal mechanics of land-grabbing. Sierra Leone, which has been positioned as a ‘poster child’ for the implementation of such ‘soft law’ instruments, serves as the focal point of this jurisdictional approach to land-grabbing. In this context, the promise of ‘soft law’ instruments to make the post-colonial state the guarantor of universally beneficial large-scale land acquisitions is shown to be a false one.
A structural model for green bonds is developed to explain the formation and dynamics of green bond prices and to address the issue of the so-called ‘greenium’, that is, the difference between the yields on a conventional bond and a green bond with the same characteristics. We provide answers to the following questions: What are the determinants of the green bond value? Do green bonds enhance the credit quality of the issuer? Are green bonds a relatively cheap tool to fund sustainable investments? We also study the effect of investors' environmental concern on portfolio allocation. Our results have direct policy implications and suggest that an improvement in credit quality could ultimately lead to a lower cost of capital for green bond issuers and that governmental tax-based incentives and an increase in investors' green awareness play a significant role in scaling up the green bonds market.
This article reflects on the implications of the Trump presidency for global anthropogenic climate change and efforts to address it. Existing commentary, predicated on liberal institutionalist reasoning, has argued that neither Trump’s promised rollback of domestic climate-related funding and regulations, nor withdrawal from the Paris framework, will be as impactful as often feared. While broadly concurring, I nonetheless also in this article take a wider view, to argue that the Trump administration is likely to exacerbate several existing patterns and trends. I discuss four in particular: the general inadequacy of global greenhouse gas emissions reduction targets and implementation efforts; the inadequacy of contemporary climate financing; the embrace between populist conservatism and opposition to action on climate change; and not least, the current global oil and gas boom which, crucially, is being led by the US. I submit that these patterns and trends, and the Trump administration’s likely contributions to them, do not augur well for climate change mitigation, let alone for an orderly transition to a low-carbon global economy. Given current directions of travel, I suggest, this coming transition is likely to be deeply conflict-laden – probably violently so – and to have consequences that will reverberate right across mid-twentieth-century international order.
Global fossil fuel subsidies are substantial and contribute to climate change. They also undermine the ambitions of the Paris Agreement. However, under the WTO, the international community's foremost economic institution, it is renewable energy subsidies, not fossil fuel subsidies, that have been subjected to litigation. To date, no fossil fuel subsidy has ever been brought before the WTO's Dispute Settlement Body (DSB). This paper makes a unique contribution to the literature on energy subsidies by applying the WTO covered Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures (1994) (SCM Agreement) to a specific government measure designed to support the coal export industry in Australia: namely, the proposed concessional loan for the construction of a rail line between the Carmichael coal mine and Abbot Point coal port by the Northern Australia Infrastructure Facility (NAIF). In finding that this measure is in breach of the SCM Agreement, this paper foreshadows future litigation and provides guidance to non-government organizations (NGOs) seeking to identify other unlawful fossil fuel subsidies.
Acknowledgements: We are grateful to Wade McCartney (California Air Resource Board) and David Edwards (California Air Resource Board) for their answers to our questions.
Context
Electricity in carbon pricing mechanisms
Most cap-and-trade schemes developed or in development in the world at least regulate CO2 emissions from the electricity sector. Several specifications may facilitate the inclusion of this power sector under this kind of regulation:
• the electricity sector is usually responsible for a large share of CO2 energy emissions – 12 billion tons or 40 percent CO2 energy emissions globally;
• some low-cost CO2 emission reductions opportunities exist within the sector such as fuel-switching (Ellerman et al., 2010; IEA, 2012);
• the electricity sector is usually not at risk of carbon leakage, as international electricity trades are greatly limited by grid connections, and operators can therefore pass on the costs of carbon allowances to consumers in the price of electricity.
In terms of monitoring, reporting and verification of its CO2 emissions, the power sector offers some inherent advantages: large point sources, relatively few flows to monitor, fuel inputs traded and therefore measured, some data and reporting structures available from pre-existing regulation and a limited number of companies involved.
In most developed or developing cap-and-trade schemes, the electricity sector is covered at the production level – electricity producers rather than consumers are capped – and the regulation only applies to power plants located within the regulator's jurisdiction. However, the cap-and-trade scheme in California presents a specificity for the power sector: the regulation also covers the electricity imported from neighboring States. Another example of covering Greenhouse Gas (GHG) emissions from electricity consuming emissions and entities located outside the regulator's jurisdiction is the Shenzhen Emission Trading Scheme (ETS) pilot, see Chapter 8. From this angle, the Californian law is – to our knowledge – the first instance of a border carbon adjustment and, as such, a very interesting testing ground.