Our concluding chapter examines race, civil society, and social movements. What do political actors do when the chain of democratic accountability and responsiveness is broken? How do we understand the origins of protest movements and more radical forms of political participation? How do ordinary citizens in a diverse democracy contest and claim power for the people and effect change?

This chapter turns from the legal to the sociolegal to offer a different lens through which to consider the phenomenon of climate change litigation. By drawing on theoretical approaches in the study of legal mobilization, this chapter sheds light on some of the social and political dynamics of climate change litigation. I suggest that situating climate change litigation in its social and political context is useful in gaining a more holistic understanding of what is at stake when individuals and groups turn to the courts as part of their efforts to address the climate crisis. Drawing on the contributions to this volume, this chapter (1) shows how legal mobilization theory can be helpful to practitioners and scholars interested in understanding, explaining, and assessing climate change litigation in practice, and (2) highlights some of the ways in which studying climate change litigation can shape our conceptual and empirical understandings of processes of legal mobilization more generally.

For large irrigation systems there is usually an organizational structure that is tasked with managing water, structures and equipment, and people. It engages in decision-making, resource mobilization, communication, and conflict resolution. This chapter provides a snapshot of elements of irrigation management.

Chapter 6 traces the evolution and corporatization of Euro-lawyering. The repertoire of court-driven change developed by the first Euro-lawyers only took root where a broader array of practitioners came to perceive it as professionally advantageous. Since the 1980s, a rising network of "Euro-firms" took charge of Euro-lawyering to tend to a corporate, transnational clientele in global cities. Conversely, in more resource-scarce client markets where lawyers are balkanized into generalists, practitioners perceive mobilizing European law as impractical - something one does elsewhere. Since the only national courts routinely solicited to apply EU law and solicit the ECJ are in cities where Euro-firms cluster, the judicial construction of Europe has evolved as patch-worked ecology hollowed by black holes. The chapter leverages geospatial analysis and comparative fieldwork across five cities where Euro-lawyering corporatized– Rome, Milan, Paris, Hamburg and Munich – and four cities where it never took root – Palermo, Naples, Bari, and Marseille. Readers curious about how lawyers rework economic and spatial inequities into place-based identities, how these identities refract access to courts and the promise of judicial policymaking, and how repertoires of legal mobilization are co-opted and corporatized will find this chapter of interest.

After four decades of learning by trial and error, the CCP has achieved total control over every aspect of society, including all resources, firms, and the population. This, along with its objective of “treating the entire nation as a chessboard” has propelled the CCP to run the country as a giant corporation. Living, working, and doing business in China is not a right, but a privilege granted by the party. To a great degree, state-owned firms are business units, state-related firms are subsidiaries, private firms are joint ventures, and foreign firms are franchisees of the party-state, with the party leader being the CEO of China, Inc. China, Inc. enjoys the agility of a business firm and the vast resources and capabilities of a state. The interplay between China and other countries is essentially a rivalry between a huge corporation and other countries. And the competition between a Chinese firm and a foreign firm can become a match between the Chinese state and the latter. This new perspective will help the international community reexamine global competition. It will also aid researchers to further explore this new phenomenon.

Unlike the industrial policies of other countries, which are mostly guidelines, China’s industrial policy is more like a corporate strategy that approves/disapproves projects and mobilizes the country’s resources to help its firms achieve dominance. Due to its size, the effects of China’s industrial policy have a powerful global impact. The general pattern of its industrial policy is that the state identifies certain industries and determines them to be high priorities. Once an industry is designated as strategically important, the state will mobilize all necessary resources from across the country to develop this industry. The state will pick some domestic firms as national champions, and erects barriers to foreign firms entering the industry. With a large, protected domestic market, the designated firms will be able to quickly realize the necessary scale and to lower unit production costs. Once the designated domestic firm becomes efficient, the state will support it as it goes out and dominates the world market. The cases of electronic vehicle batteries, solar panels, and high-speed rail are used to show how China’s industrial policy helps its firms to gain global dominance.