Introduction
In the run-up to the presidential elections of 2012 in Senegal, widespread protests took place against then president Abdoulaye Wade’s attempts to change electoral rules in his favor. As several African leaders had done before him (see, e.g., Posner & Young Reference Posner and Young2007), the incumbent president tried to secure a third term in office when nearing the end of his presidency. He introduced a new legislative proposal to adjust the required majority to win the election in the first round and put forward a new interpretation of the constitution to allow for his third term. The first strategy was thwarted by large-scale protests before the National Assembly on June 23, 2011, the day of the legislative vote. Despite further protests, Wade did participate in the presidential elections of February 2012. After Wade’s victory in the first round of the election, the opposition rallied behind runner-up Macky Sall, who eventually won the elections in March. Unlike some African leaders, Wade accepted his defeat and left office peacefully.
It is quite common in the literature to explain mass mobilization by referring to individual or group motivations, such as political and economic grievances (e.g., Gurr Reference Gurr1974). In the case of the Senegalese electoral protests, the grievance explanation has been given most attention. Several researchers have, for example, already referred to rising civic consciousness among the Senegalese population (e.g., Gellar Reference Gellar and Diop2013), as well as economic hardship and (youth) unemployment (e.g., Resnick Reference Resnick2013). The latter cause has also been prominently featured by Western news media, which quickly link youth unemployment to violent rioting (e.g., BBC 2012; Nossiter Reference Nossiter2012). Movement activists themselves also tend to refer to the “will of the people” when explaining their success in mobilizing the masses, often framing protests as spontaneous outbursts (Polletta Reference Polletta2006).
This paper will emphasize additional conditions for successful mobilization, in particular the practical feasibility of mobilization. The theoretical frame is based on social movement studies, in which a motivational or grievance-based approach constitutes only one major dimension to explain movement success (for an overview, see McAdam, McCarthy & Zald Reference McAdam, McCarthy, Zald and Smelser1988). Two other major dimensions in social movement studies focus on resource mobilization and political opportunity structures. Influenced by the work of Olson (Reference Olson1971) on collective action challenges, the resource mobilization perspective was advanced by McCarthy and Zald (Reference McCarthy and Zald1977) to raise attention to the importance of access to resources and minimal forms of organization for engagement in social conflict. McCarthy and Zald simply define resources as “money and labor” (1977:1216). Freeman (Reference Freeman, Zald and McCarthy1979) gives a more detailed description. She distinguishes between tangible assets such as money, facilities, and means of communication, and intangible assets such as organizing and legal skills and the labor of supporters. Linked to the resource mobilization approach is a focus on the existence of prior formal and informal networks as a resource conducive to mobilization (Diani & McAdam Reference Diani and McAdam2003; McAdam, McCarthy & Zald Reference McAdam, McCarthy, Zald and Smelser1988). Political opportunity structures (POS) can be regarded as resources external to a group (Tarrow Reference Tarrow2002:77–85). Several factors have been advanced as determining opportunities: access to the system, divided elites, state strength (weak/strong), and repression.
Although the presence of political opportunity structures will be addressed here, the major focus of this study is inspired by the resource mobilization approach. The core contribution of this approach is that it reveals the key actors supporting and financing a social movement. In the Senegalese case, these actors are primarily political parties and their leaders, who supported continuous campaigning against the incumbent president largely to further personal goals. This argument is developed through a chronological account of the rise and fall of Mouvement 23, the social movement created to campaign against Wade’s candidacy for presidency. Whereas the M23 was first seen as the best instrument for mobilizing against Wade and therefore massively supported, support dwindled when movement actions started to interfere with electoral campaigns and particularly once elections were won by Macky Sall. Consequently, the account challenges the view that the 2011–12 electoral protests constitute an active “citizens’ revolution” (révolution citoyenne), and argues that the objectives of key actors raise questions about the ability of the protests to bring about deeper democratic change.
The empirical analysis relies on field visits undertaken in Dakar in February–March and November–December 2014. Semi-structured interviews were conducted with leaders and organizers of the Mouvement 23 as well as key observers of the movement (e.g., civil society members who did not take part in the M23). Respondents were first approached by contacting the offices of involved political parties and civil society organizations. Respondents later provided me with new contacts, and I used membership lists to establish further contacts. In total, thirty-two interviews were conducted. Three other interviews were conducted with high-ranking members of the Parti Démocratique Sénégalaise (PDS). During my visits it was also possible to acquire internal movement documents, which are used in the analysis. An additional source of information is formed by thirty-five informal interviews with local residents, politicians, and youth movements in the neighborhoods around one of the central protesting squares, the Place de l’Obélisque. I also make use of news reports, blog posts, and television images, which were mainly acquired from the independent news channel Walf TV. Footnote 1
In the following section I first give a more detailed overview of events in the run-up to the presidential elections of 2012. The subsequent section examines factors that have been raised by other authors to explain successful protest mobilization, in particular, economic and political grievances at the population level. I then turn to my chronological analysis of the electoral protests, which emphasizes movement capacities and underlying social networks, also contextualized within the Senegalese political field.
Electoral Protests in Senegal: An Overview of Events
On June 16, 2011, President Wade’s Council of Ministers adopted a law proposal that would change prevailing rules regarding the presidential elections to be held in February 2012. Footnote 2 The most important changes were the direct election of the president together with a vice president and the introduction of a 25 percent voting majority (instead of the previous 50 percent) to win the elections in the first round. The election of a vice president with the president seemed to be put in place to benefit Wade’s son Karim and raised accusations of a dévolution monarchique, while the 25 percent rule would clearly benefit the incumbent president (see the first round voting results below).
The day before the vote in the National Assembly, June 22, 2011, several protests took place in Dakar, some of them running together with vandalism and tire burning. The largest, yet authorized, protests took place on the day of the vote, the 23rd of June, in Dakar and elsewhere in the country. Demonstrations were led by political opposition parties and civil society organizations, such as the Y’en a Marre movement and the Rencontre Africaine de Défense des Droits de l’Homme (RADDHO). Some protests were accompanied by low-intensity violence, such as rock throwing. Police forces used teargas and made several arrests. The law proposal was subsequently withdrawn. The events of the 23rd led to the creation of the Mouvement 23, a coalition of opposition parties and civil society groups. The movement organized demonstrations against Wade’s plan to run for a third term in office and tried to build support for this goal by, among other things, meeting with religious leaders.
Things started to heat up again on January 27, 2012, when the Constitutional Court ruled that Wade’s candidacy for presidency was legal. Numerous protests demanding Wade’s withdrawal, organized by the M23, took place between this date and the first round of the presidential elections on February 26, 2012. Several protests turned violent, with four to nine deaths, according to various sources. Footnote 3 Protests raised domestic concern, with several prominent religious and intellectual leaders calling for peace while international actors such as the U.S., France, the European Union, and the African Union called for stability. The first round of voting took place in relative calm. Abdoulaye Wade (34.82 percent) and Macky Sall (26.57 percent) went through to the second round of voting on March 25. The month of March passed without major disturbances. The second round of elections was won by Macky Sall with 65.8 percent of the vote.
In the next section, I focus on the possible motivations for protest that have already been raised in the literature. Foremost among these are the grievances that accumulated against the presidency of Abdoulaye Wade after he came to power in 2000.
The Waning Popularity of the Wade Regime
When Abdoulaye Wade, the unrelenting opposition leader and presidential candidate of the PDS, defeated Abdou Diouf of the long-reigning Parti Socialiste (PS) in the second round of the elections in 2000, this turnover, or Alternance, was widely heralded as a victory for democracy in Senegal. It did not take long, however, before critical voices started to point out increasing authoritarian and clientelistic tendencies in Wade’s rule (Dahou & Foucher Reference Dahou and Foucher2004; Galvan Reference Galvan2001:56; Mbow Reference Mbow2008). Notable issues raised were press censorship, ousting of former coalition parties, a weak justice system, regular changes of the prime minister, and a strengthening of the position of the president. For example, although the constitutional referendum of 2001 reduced the presidential term from seven to five years, the seven-year term was reinstated in 2008. These evolutions were also reflected by the change in Senegal’s Freedom House score from “Free” to “Partly Free” in 2009 (Freedom House 2014) and the lowering of the Polity IV regime type score from 8 to 7 in 2008 (Polity IV 2014). Footnote 4
Although cracks in the regime were visible, the Wade government could still rely on the public’s goodwill because of the favorable economic situation (Dahou & Foucher Reference Dahou and Foucher2004). Indeed, in the presidential elections of 2007, Wade was reelected with an absolute majority of the votes (55.9 percent) in the first round. Notwithstanding accusations of hasty elections (Mbow Reference Mbow2008:165) and electoral fraud, Osei (Reference Osei2011:185–6) argues that Wade’s reelection can for the most part be attributed to his popularity. For example, data from the Afrobarometer Round Three, conducted in 2005, show that the presidency was the most trusted political institution, with 59.2 percent of respondents stating they trusted the presidency “a lot” and only 10.9 percent stating “not at all” (Osei Reference Osei2011:206–7). Footnote 5
Notably, in the Afrobarometer Round Four, conducted in May–June 2008, the percentage of respondents who said they trusted the president a lot had dropped to 30.27 and the percentage that trusted the president not at all had risen to 33.70. Footnote 6 During his second term, the Wade regime did run into considerable difficulties. The economic situation deteriorated, which was highlighted by urban (youth) unemployment and clandestine migration, compounded by rising food and petrol prices following the global food price spike of 2007–8 (Resnick Reference Resnick2013). Moreover, the population was confronted with numerous electricity cuts, and, particularly in Dakar, recurrent flooding of the suburbs (banlieues).
According to the International Monetary Fund (IMF 2012), growth decelerated from an average of 4.5 percent in the period 1995–2005 to 3.3 percent in the period 2006–11. As a result, poverty indices barely decreased in the latter period and stayed at about 47 percent. The IMF also points to recurrent electricity cuts as an impediment to growth and the ad hoc and ineffective measures taken by the government amid the food and fuel crises. Inflation in 2007 and 2008 reached 5 to 6 percent, compared to an average of 2 percent in earlier years. Yet the price of imported rice, a major commodity in Senegal, rose by 112 percent between August 2007 and August 2008 (FAO 2009:21–22). While the population faced these challenges, Wade also made the controversial decision to build the Monument de la Renaissance Africaine in Dakar, at an approximate cost of $28 million US (Resnick Reference Resnick2013).
Several of these issues had already led to mobilization for protests. For example, rising food prices led to protests in March and April 2008 (Antil Reference Antil2010), and the inauguration of the Renaissance monument led to protest in 2010 (Al Jazeera 2010). Furthermore, electricity cuts led to rioting and vandalism against offices of the state-owned electricity company Senelec in Dakar and other areas in October 2008 (Antil Reference Antil2010) and on June 27, 2011 (Le Soleil, June 28, 2011). These latter protests are also commonly seen as connected to the June 23rd protests against Wade’s law proposal.
Meanwhile, resistance in the political sphere developed further. When Wade ousted his prime minister, Idrissa Seck, in 2004, the latter—after a period in detention due to accusations of corruption—started his own party, Rewmi, in 2006 (Mbow Reference Mbow2008:164; Resnick Reference Resnick2013:631). The next prime minister, Macky Sall, left the PDS due to a clash with Wade in 2008 and formed the Alliance pour la République (APR) (Kelly Reference Kelly2012:125; Resnick Reference Resnick2013:631). After Wade’s victory in the 2007 presidential elections, a coalition of opposition parties, including the PS, the Alliance des Forces de Progrès (AFP), and former left-wing partners of Wade, boycotted the legislative elections several months later. This group, the Front Siggil Senegaal (Front to Save Senegal), also joined the Assises Nationales, a national conference to discuss the country’s pressing societal challenges, in 2008. Although invited, the PDS did not take part in the conference. Front Siggil Senegaal developed further into Bennoo Siggil Senegaal (United to Boost Senegal; BSS) with the addition of new partners (Kelly Reference Kelly2012:126–7; Resnick Reference Resnick2013:631–2). This coalition defeated the PDS in most major urban areas in the local elections of 2009.
Gellar (Reference Gellar and Diop2013) also notes a spectacular rise in citizen movements under the Wade regime and argues that these have been crucial for democratic consolidation in Senegal. These movements generally advocate stronger citizenship values (citoyenneté) in Senegal, including political and economic reform. Some new formations included the Mouvement Citoyen (led by Penda Mbow), Bes Du Ñak/Mouvement citoyen pour la Refondation Nationale (founded by Mansour Sy Djamil), Fekke Ma Ci Boole, (formed by Youssou Ndour), and Yamalé (led by Bara Tall). Several movement founders also went into politics and made bids for the presidency in 2012. The more grassroots initiatives of the Collectif des Imams et Résidents de Guédiawaye and Y’en a Marre, formed by rappers in Dakar and particularly popular among urban youth, are also well known.
According to Gellar, these movements are proof of a growing internalization of democratic culture in Senegal, which was crucial for the protests against Wade. This viewpoint can be supported with research by Bratton (Reference Bratton, Cheeseman, Anderson and Scheibler2013), who finds that between the 2002 and 2008 Afrobarometer rounds, the percentage of Senegalese preferring democracy over other kinds of government increased, whereas the percentage of Senegalese who were satisfied with the extent of democracy in their country declined.
There was ample evidence of the waning popularity of the Wade regime, especially during his second term. Participation in the electoral protests can therefore be broadly explained by the economic as well as political grievances that accumulated among the population of Senegal during that time. Clearly, poor governance and Senegal’s slow growth were key issues in the presidential elections themselves, with electoral promises focusing on youth employment, food prices, electricity provision, and so on (see, e.g., Le Soleil, March 23, 2012). Moreover, Mouvement 23 based its campaigns primarily on democratic values and citizenship. The following section will highlight the organizational and financial resources necessary to stage protests and the key actors who were involved.
Organizing a Revolution: Strategy, Blueprints, and Performances
In this section, I begin by analyzing the start of the movement and events on June 23, 2011. I then look at movement activities from June 23 until the validation of Wade’s candidacy and the start of the election campaign. Then I analyze the election period itself, followed by the aftermath, including the M23 today.
“Touche pas à ma Constitution” and June 23, 2011
The law proposal introduced by Wade was controversial from its conception. According to PDS interviewees, many of Wade’s own ministers and members of Parliament struggled with the proposal and thought the idea a strategic error, as it would communicate that the ruling party itself was no longer sure of a victory in 2012. Just before the closing of Parliament, the law proposal was sent to the Assembly to be considered under emergency procedures. The ECOWAS (Economic Community of West African States) Protocol on Good Governance prohibits substantive changes to electoral rules six months before an election, and the reopening of Parliament was planned for October.
When word broke out about the law proposal via Senegal’s largely independent press, Alioune Tine, the head of RADDHO, gathered prominent civil society members to oppose the proposal. This led to the initiative Touche pas à ma Constitution, brought together a week before the vote in the National Assembly. The participants started attacking the proposal, mainly via press releases. Each member also made contact with other civil society networks—business associations, labor unions, youth and women’s movements, and so on—to meet up and discuss further actions. The steering committee also met with leaders of the opposition coalition BSS to put forward a joint initiative. This group was not represented in the National Assembly because of the legislative boycott in 2007. Cooperation with opposition parties was not unusual, as connections had already been formed through the experience of the Assises Nationales. Many interviewees estimated that about 90 percent of the members of the Assises later also took part in the M23.
Opposition parties also set up actions of their own to decry the president’s electoral proposal. Political youth movements chose to do so by instigating riots in the city. On June 20, for example, political youth created a disturbance by blocking roads at the busy Sandaga market of Dakar: “At whatever cost, it was necessary to obtain our goal, and the goal was not to oppose the police, that did not interest us, the goal was to get arrested, to create a scandal so the entire world would know that Abdoulaye Wade was doing things in Senegal which were not democratic” (political youth, Dakar, March 13, 2014). Footnote 7
A generational clash is visible in these actions. On June 22, a meeting between civil society actors and politicians took place near the Place de l’Indépendance in Dakar. Whereas most prominent figures saw the meeting as an assembly to make arrangements for the following day, many youths, from political parties as well as civil society (notably the Y’en a Marre movement), chose instead to take protesting to the streets:
There was a strong mobilization of youths, we told those youths that those leaders, what they wanted to do here, what they did in Danshoko’s living room [coalition gatherings often took place in the house of BSS leader Amath Dansokho]; that it would be necessary for us to stop the Assembly, to force them to go into the streets . . . there was a strong presence of the press and it was like that that the people of Senegal were informed. (civil society/political youth, Dakar, December 12, 2014) Footnote 8
These sorts of “violent performances” continued to play a part in the actions of the M23, and will be further discussed below.
The demonstration on the 23rd was a great success, and many would refer to it as a historic mobilization of the Senegalese people. Le Monde (2011) recounts estimates ranging from one thousand to several thousand protesters at the Place Soweto. The M23 would later cite—probably exaggerating—hundreds of thousands of protesters across the whole of Senegal (internal document meant as press release, June 28, 2011). The opposition demonstration as well as a less successful PDS demonstration took place at the Place Soweto directly in front of the National Assembly, which was an unusual, and perhaps daring, choice by PDS officials. Protests indeed degenerated into violence, notably characterized by rock throwing. Escalation might have been planned, as the Place Soweto lacks rocks to throw and some young protesters arrived on the scene carrying stones. Police responded with teargas and clashes went on in the city until the afternoon. Footnote 9
As early as the 23rd, preparations and coordinating efforts were undertaken to steer the demonstration in the right direction. Some protested at Place Soweto, while some stayed at the headquarters of RADDHO, and other groups traveled between the two to transport food, water, and wounded. When violence broke out, the group at RADDHO took on a coordinating and information-sharing role, indicating where police forces were present, where tires had to be burned to block roads, and so forth. Meanwhile, party youths as well as members of Y’en a Marre undertook various actions elsewhere in Dakar. One political representative noted rather proudly that his militants had vandalized PDS members’ houses during the protests to give a clear sign to Wade (see also Le Soleil, June 24, 2011).
In the end, it can be said that pressure from the street led President Wade to withdraw the law proposal, although, according to PDS representatives, the president had already abandoned both of the main elements of the proposal on the advice of his MPs. Therefore, the situation could have been similar to that of Nigerian president Obasanjo, whose extension of term limits was denied by his senate (Posner & Young Reference Posner and Young2007).
The M23: Buildup of a Protest Movement
After the success of the 23rd, most protest organizers decided to continue the campaign as the Mouvement 23, now a campaign against Wade’s possible candidacy. Footnote 10 As I will demonstrate, during this phase, the movement relied to a large extent on political party blueprints for organizing demonstrations, as well as political financial and human resources. At this point, several civil society organizations also opted out of the movement out of fear of “politicization.” A notable example is Forum Civil, the Senegalese branch of Transparency International, which lost some members to the M23 because of this decision.
Whereas preparations for the 23rd were conducted rather hastily, the M23 now formed a permanent structure with a general assembly, coordination committee, secretariat, and various commissions (finance, organization and mobilization, diaspora). Particularly important was the creation of departmental cells throughout the national territory: “so that gave the impression that—but it is in the entire country that we have seen this” (party member 1, Dakar, March 3, 2014). Footnote 11 “If it was Dakar only, the regime . . . would be able to say, ‘well it’s not that serious’ . . . but if there is something at Dakar, Thiès etc., the pressure is much greater” (party member 2, Dakar, March 6, 2014). Footnote 12 Finding local contacts in all regions of Senegal was no easy task, however, and not always successful, as can be deduced from the constant calls to establish and “revive” committees in internal documents. To establish departmental committees it seems that the movement relied to a large extent on membership contacts provided by the opposition parties. One meeting summary states: “If possible, work with membership lists of departmental committees established by Bennoo Siggil Senegaal” (internal document, January 16, 2011). Footnote 13 Lists of departmental activists also include a large majority of political party representatives (internal document, December 21, 2011). Local cells were also supported financially: “Yes, and now concerning the money . . . to local structures, who were frankly in the position to organize a demonstration. This was to avoid throwing money away” (party member 1, Dakar, March 3, 2014). Footnote 14
To acquire the necessary financial resources, the M23 relied on monthly contributions. Repeated calls for contributions (evident in internal documents) indicate that this was not the most stable source of income. Indeed, many admit that political leaders covered the large majority of expenses for the organization of protests, especially the “big four”: Macky Sall (APR), Moustapha Niasse (AFP), Ousmane Tanor Dieng (PS), and Idrissa Seck (Rewmi). One important expense is broadcasting a demonstration on television, with costs ranging from $4000 to $17,000: “All that, it’s a strategy put in place to inform public opinion and the Senegalese so that they would join our struggle” (civil society member 1, Dakar, March 12, 2014). Footnote 15 Other expenses can be found in the proposal for a protest march in Dakar shown in table 1.
Table 1. Internal Budget Proposal of the M23 Organization Commission
Source: Internal document (October 31, 2011). Author’s translation, amounts in CFA were transferred to US dollars; numbers were rounded to multipliers of 500. Numbers do not add up in original.
This budget proposal reveals that M23 demonstrations were largely based on political party blueprints for how to organize a successful demonstration. For parties this is an important instrument to compare relative strength, which is crucial in coalition formation. For example, although some civil society members defend the idea that all protesters gathered spontaneously and by their own means, it is clear that a lot of logistical effort had to be undertaken to organize transportation. As with political meetings, this is done by hiring cars rapides (minibuses) to carry militants and sympathizers from the banlieues (Guédiawaye, Pikine, Rufisque) and elsewhere to the meeting grounds (Dakar center). This necessitates a strong organizational presence in local neighborhoods and budgetary decentralization. Footnote 16
The form of the demonstrations also reveals common political practice. It is always deemed necessary to hire entertainment (such as musicians and rappers) to make participation more attractive to the general public. Sound equipment and podiums have to be provided, usually by the larger political parties. Speeches by political leaders also always take place (although speech times led to some internal struggles within the M23).
Typical techniques used to support mobilization in Senegal also include the provision of food, water, T-shirts, hats, and other party paraphernalia. These inducements were also widely used by the M23. In the beginning, the M23 prohibited signs of party affiliation, but this was not always implemented successfully, and many party colors as well as banners could be seen at M23 demonstrations (see also Cissé Reference Cissé2012; Maro Reference Maro2012). Ultimately, it seems that civil society members of the M23 had to give up on the idea of party neutrality to safeguard the success of demonstrations: “Parties and coalitions may allow their militants to wear T-shirts with their colors” (internal document, February 15, 2012). Footnote 17
The practicalities of protest organizing are usually left in the hands of political youth movements. Footnote 18 They set up podiums, sound equipment, and fences, and organize security for their leaders. Moreover, they are also seen as “protest specialists” who take the lead in marches and prepare and synchronize slogans. Another task left for youths is to engage in low-intensity violent actions to attract media attention and keep the idea of a political battle alive.
No, that [peaceful demonstrations only] would not have had any effect. . . . The government would say, “Oh, let them demonstrate, so what?” But when . . . people started to see day and night demonstrations with burning tires and television channels all over the world started to show these images and the international community started to pay attention to the troubles in Senegal (civil society member 2, Dakar, December 18, 2014). Footnote 19
Therefore, burning tires at strategic traffic locations in Dakar, throwing rocks at police forces when they arrive—according to their own standard operating procedures, the police use teargas to disperse protesters—and other clashes with police are not to be seen as spontaneous outbursts of violence. On the contrary, actors are quite aware of the effect of these actions on Western media and plan their actions carefully: “It was a strategy put in place by the youths in each district, each group took a district, sometimes they needed some money to buy fuel to burn tires, we would give them that” (civil society member 2, Dakar, December 18, 2014). Footnote 20 Overall, violence remained quite limited, weapons were rarely used by rioters, and they mostly burned old tires and wooden tables they had collected. These actions seem to correspond more to “performances” meant to create the image of widespread violence.
A generational clash was visible within the M23, with youths advocating more “revolutionary” actions than adults. An often repeated example is that of youths shouting “On va au palais” (“To the palace”) during demonstrations, while political and civil society leaders dismissed such actions as irresponsible. Youths from both political parties and civil society organizations also took the initiative to organize an M23 youth group to set up more autonomous actions. Footnote 21
The M23 and the 2012 Electoral Campaigns
As the elections drew closer, the fragile coalition of civil society organizations and numerous political parties started to unravel. Opposition parties themselves were far from united at this point, with nine presidential candidates in the M23 and a split within the BSS between Moustapha Niasse and Ousmane Tanor Dieng. The major goal of the movement was thwarted by the Constitutional Court’s ruling validating Wade’s candidacy, which led to serious internal divisions over the next course of action. At first the plan was to keep protesting until his candidacy was withdrawn: “The intention we had was to occupy the Place de l’Obélisque as the Egyptians had occupied the Place Tahrir” (civil society member 3, Dakar, March 4, 2014). Footnote 22 Yet protests would gradually diminish and the comparison with the Arab Spring would soon be found flawed (see also Châtelot Reference Châtelot2012). One reason was surely the continuous repression that took place after demonstrations were prohibited and authorization was no longer sought. For example, the day of the validation of Wade’s candidacy, a young student (and, what is often left unmentioned, a PS militant), Mamadou Diop, was killed when he was hit by a police truck. He was soon heralded as a martyr of the revolution by the opposition—an interesting framing exercise in a case which is clouded by much uncertainty. The death of a police officer during this period, beaten to death by protesters or violent infiltrators, is commonly ignored. Footnote 23 Besides repression, another reason for the declining mobilization for M23 demonstrations was the interference of opposition candidates’ election campaigns
Initially, it seemed that the majority of the M23 had rallied behind the idea to boycott the elections if Wade’s candidacy was not withdrawn (see, e.g., Le Soleil, February 6, 2012). Several opposition leaders, notably Macky Sall, were not entirely convinced, however. Since his departure from the PDS, he had traveled throughout Senegal to prepare for the elections and felt confident of the results. A few days after the validation of candidacies, Sall left Dakar to campaign in the rest of Senegal. Moustapha Niasse, Ousmane Tanor Dieng, and—to a lesser extent—Idrissa Seck soon followed suit. Smaller political parties, with no real chance of winning the presidency, stayed put and continued protesting. The consequences for the M23 were strongly felt. Demonstrations became less successful: “Finally, we realized that demonstrations only took place in Dakar, maybe Mbour a bit, Thiès a bit, but it was Dakar” Footnote 24 (party member 3, Dakar, March 7, 2013). The movement’s institutional structures quickly became devoid of political party members:
The secretariat was empty . . . just before the validation of candidacies, before the electoral campaign. At that time, political party representatives had practically disappeared. And certain civil society members as well had disappeared. So in the secretariat there were only two people left, from civil society (civil society member 4, Dakar, March 4, 2014). Footnote 25
When Macky Sall emerged as the runner-up in the first round of the elections, all other opposition candidates rallied behind him for the second round. A grand electoral coalition under the name Benno Bokk Yakaar (BBY) was formed, uniting the opposition against Wade. At this time the locus of action shifted from the M23 headquarters to BBY:
We were with the political parties, we were fighting for the same ideal, that’s to say, the departure of Wade. But the political parties, afterwards they gathered amongst themselves . . . they started to discuss the BBY coalition without even consulting civil society. It was when they had agreed among themselves, that they informed us” (civil society member 5, Dakar, March 11, 2014). Footnote 26
This rendered civil society members vulnerable to others’ accusations that they had been playing the politicians’ game all along. Their efforts had not been rendered entirely obsolete, however. To increase his support, Sall promised to reduce his presidential term from seven to five years after being elected. This had been a demand of many members of the Assises Nationales, in which Sall never played a prominent role. The month of March passed without major protest actions and most efforts were invested in Sall’s campaign.
Aftermath
After Macky Sall won the elections and Wade peacefully left office, government and administrative positions were quickly filled by members of the grand BBY coalition. Not only were Sall’s political colleagues within the M23 given positions; many former civil society members were co-opted within state institutions as well. Notable examples are Abdoulatif Coulibaly (a reporter critical of the former Wade regime), Abdoul Aziz Tall (Yamalé), Alioune Tine (RADDHO), and Penda Mbow (Mouvement Citoyen). These realignments continue to stir debate within Senegalese society. Concerns center on why formerly prominent civil society members are no longer heard in the policy domain and why they strictly refrain from criticizing the current regime (L’Observateur 2014). This also rekindles an old debate on the motives of civil society actors (see, e.g., AfriMAP/OSIWA 2012:75): are NGOs simply a means of getting closer to power, and are they, in the end, no different from politicians?
After months of silence following the elections, the majority of the members of the M23 decided to continue the movement as an association. Some members did not join the association, arguing that the M23 corresponds more to a general sentiment and does not need to be bureaucratized. Still others formed factions of their own and split off from the main M23. The M23 decided that a renewal of membership was not necessary, therefore everyone who previously belonged to the organization is technically still a member. This leads to the schizophrenic situation in which many members of government are also members of the M23, which plays primarily a watchdog role. Political actors have largely abandoned the M23, though. This could be seen in the celebration of one year of revolution on June 23, 2012, which was quite sober. A second problem is that the M23 has accepted some $18,000 from Macky Sall for its headquarters, which raises serious doubts concerning its neutrality. Finally, some argue that the M23 has now become just one of many NGOs focusing on corruption, economic development, and similar issues.
Who Mobilizes? Political Parties and Mobilization Capacities
Narratives often play a major part in recounting and remembering social movement actions, in particular, cycles of resistance (Polletta Reference Polletta2006). This is clearly visible in the Senegalese case. Interviewees commonly refer to the spontaneity of resistance, as when they say that “people came by their own means” (civil society member 5, Dakar, March 11, 2014) Footnote 27 or refer to the “emerging civic consciousness” (civil society member 6, Dakar, March 15, 2014), Footnote 28 or consistently speak of “the citizens’ revolution” (civil society/political youth, Dakar, December 12, 2014). Footnote 29 In narrating this episode, some contradictions can occur, though. For example, the latter interviewee also stated:
But the Senegalese who were there the 23rd of June, they did not have this constitutional culture. They were there because of growing unemployment, others were there because of the electricity cuts, others were there because they understood the law proposal, and others were there as well because they did not like the policies of Abdoulaye Wade’s government. Footnote 30
Indeed, for many protesters, it is likely that the deteriorating economic situation played a stronger role than constitutional concerns for protest participation.
The celebration of Mamadou Diop as a martyr of the revolution also plays a major part in narrative-making. Referring to people’s network connections—as in the case of Diop’s political militancy—is almost taboo. Unprovoked, interviewees often make statements such as, “I’ve seen colleagues who have never been involved in politics, but who were mobilized” (party member 2, Dakar, March 6, 2014) Footnote 31 or “[some] who have never been active in a civil society organization or political party . . . came spontaneously” (civil society member 7, Dakar, March 19, 2014). Footnote 32 These statements are likely to be correct, but they do ignore the networks and organizations taking the initiative to stage and plan protest actions in the first place. Indeed, further probing reveals numerous strategic decisions, for example, to seek media attention, or the elaborate planning behind demonstrations. Political parties played a major role in this.
Civil society in Senegal is not known to have strong organizational capacities and seems mainly visible via charismatic leaders (AfriMAP/OSIWA 2012:74–5). They generally do not stage demonstrations, but rely on declarations: “That [civil society declarations], that’s ok for us, we have no problems with that” (PDS representative, Dakar, November 27, 2014). Footnote 33 They usually work from offices in the capital with limited staffs and without strong connections in the rest of the country. When participating in demonstrations, the practical functions are usually taken up by experienced party representatives. In the case of the M23, many respondents make statements such as “they have people behind them” (civil society member 8, Dakar, March 20, 2014), Footnote 34 “political parties, that’s the masses” (party member 1, Dakar, March 3, 2014), Footnote 35 and “civil society organizations are too weak and . . . human resources are needed, financial resources are needed, you need a mobilization capacity” (civil society member 1, Dakar, March 12, 2014). Footnote 36
The comparative advantage of parties is by far their financial means and experience, as well as their presence on the ground in local political structures. To gather protesters in an underdeveloped context, transport, food, and water are crucial to compensate participants for forgoing the chance to gain a daily income: “If you try to call a gathering, the majority will ask for their bus ticket” (party member 2, Dakar, March 6, 2014). Footnote 37 The role of new social media in uniting previously unconnected activists in Africa has been widely discussed, especially in the context of the Arab Spring (e.g., Allagui & Kuebler Reference Allagui and Kuebler2011). Yet although calls were actively made via Facebook, Twitter, and online forums, evidence suggests that protest mobilization in Senegal mainly relied on established membership lists, known contacts, and telephone communications. Local contacts are then responsible for gathering protest support, for example by appealing to youth movements. This has also been found crucial in order to stage “nationwide” protests in Senegal. It is revealing that the Y’en a Marre movement, which accomplished arguably the most successful civilian mobilization, relied strongly on political mobilization strategies, primarily the building of local organizations (esprits) in the capital and elsewhere in the country.
These findings do not imply that protesters were only party militants. For example, political parties see their own role more as forming a solid base for successful protests: “if for example there are fifteen thousand people at the Place de l’Obélisque, half of them are political party militants . . . this also allows for others to join us” (political youth, Dakar, March 13, 2014). Footnote 38 Civil society organizations were also not obsolete in the protests. Both political parties and civil society members stress that the participation of civil society gave the opposition needed credibility and legitimacy. For example, cooperation with civil society reinforces the image of a “citizens’ revolution,” whereas the participation of political parties alone would create the image of a purely political conflict, making it more difficult for outsiders to take a position on the movement.
Successful party mobilization can be related to the ongoing “passive revolution” in Senegalese politics, which can also be seen, in this context, as an opening up of the political opportunity structure. Fatton’s (Reference Fatton1987) concept of passive revolution refers to the gradual liberalization that took place under Senghor and Diouf without strong pressure from the street, and which transformed Senegal from a de facto one-party state to a multiparty democracy. The main goal of this democratization was to reinforce the hegemonic position of the PS by dividing the opposition. This pattern of gradual liberalization without consolidation has been maintained under Diouf (see, e.g., Beck Reference Beck1997; Villalón Reference Villalón1994).
Several researchers have noted the flip side of this liberalization for the ruling party. In the long run, it encourages internal splits, with defectors taking their own chances in the multiparty system, and it encourages opposition cooperation through a learning process (e.g., “repeated games”; Vengroff & Magala Reference Vengroff and Magala2001). For example, Galvan (Reference Galvan2001:54) sees the defections of Djibo Ka and Moustapha Niasse from the PS as crucial determinants of the political turnover of 2000. With Diouf remaining in power, these prominent PS figures saw their chances of winning the presidency reduced and left the PS, taking their supporting factions with them.
A parallel can be drawn with the departures from the PDS of Idrissa Seck (Rewmi) and Macky Sall (APR) (Kelly Reference Kelly2012:125; Resnick Reference Resnick2013:5). When they exit, these prominent figures take their supporters with them, draining the ruling party of many of its members. Moreover, aided by their former positions in power (and resources they have obtained in these positions), they can become quite formidable political opponents. As opposed to the idea that political parties in sub-Saharan Africa, especially opposition parties, are generally weak and unstructured (see, e.g., Bogaards Reference Bogaards, Cheeseman, Anderson and Scheibler2013), the gradual breaking up of factions from the ruling parties has led to more effective political pluralism in Senegal.
By engaging in protests, political actors follow their own objectives, however: “The political parties, what interested them were transparent elections, fair competition to allow them to win the elections” (party member 4, Dakar, March 21, 2014). Footnote 39 With Wade finishing his second term and his popularity declining, party leaders wanted to strongly resist a third term, and often spent money outside the M23 for this purpose, unbeknownst to civil society. When elections with Wade became inevitable, resources were quickly shifted to electoral campaigns. Smaller parties that made the decision to stay in Dakar to protest and raise awareness were later rewarded with positions within BBY. The M23 today is left aside, an unnecessary vehicle for attaining power.
Many other actors in the networks behind the demonstrations seem to pursue personal goals rather than being motivated by broader political and economic grievances. The position shifts of NGO actors have already been noted, but leaders of citizen movements as well quickly reveal political ambitions, and citizen movements transform into new parties: “When we are approaching elections, . . . many [new] movements are created. . . . And many of those movements spring up like that, because there was the horizon of 2012, [when] we were moving toward elections” (political journalist, Dakar, December 15, 2014). Footnote 40 Political youths also often wish to be rewarded with administrative positions, or use their “demonstration fame” to climb party ranks.
Conclusion
Although academic discussions on social movements in Africa certainly take place (e.g., Footnote de Waal & Ibreck 2013), the literature remains to an important extent deprived of in-depth analyses of how movements in Africa are formed, how they structure themselves, what actions they undertake, and, ultimately, how they fall apart. Coalitions of opposition parties and civil society actors are regularly formed in Africa. This type of mobilization also took place in Guinea (2009), Niger (2009–10), and, more recently, Burkina Faso (2014). It is striking that these movements have scarcely been discussed in African studies. This study therefore attempts to clear the path toward a deeper and more detailed analysis of protest organization in Africa, and an increased understanding of African social movements.
The resource mobilization perspective on the M23 in Senegal brought to light the practicalities of protesting—organizing transport, attracting media interest, and so forth—which reveal to what extent the movement had to rely on financial and human resources. This also demonstrates the intentionality behind the cycle of resistance in Senegal in the run-up to the elections. Indeed, nationwide protests are actively staged (and financed). Local protests therefore do not solely depend on the level of grievances, but also organizational strength on the ground. Furthermore, violence—usually of a low intensity—is used to attract media attention, both national and international. With regard to the latter, actors seem to pick up quite ingeniously on Western assumptions about political instability and violence in Africa, whereas in reality the scale of conflict and violence in (Sub-Saharan) African countries varies widely.
The motivational dimension remains important to explain mobilization success. Democratic and economic grievances among the populace were also what rendered old and new opposition parties more popular. Political opportunity structures could also be identified as internal divisions and defections within the ruling party that strengthened opposition forces as well as their means for protesting. Grievances and opportunity structures alone do not, however, account for mobilization, although they are connected in important ways to the resource mobilization argument. Mobilization also required that key actors and prior networks ultimately decide to undertake organizational efforts and devote sufficient means to the movement goal. The core contribution of the resource mobilization approach is that it reveals the actors fulfilling these tasks. In Senegal, major efforts were undertaken by opposition parties while following their own objectives to reach power. When the utility of the neutral and “citizen-oriented” M23 for reaching these goals dwindled, efforts were redirected to electoral campaigns. The same opposition actors also made up the new regime after the presidential elections. These features of the mobilization of 2011–12 cast doubt on the ability of the protests to fundamentally change prevailing political and economic relations, as is entailed in the meaning of a revolution.
Acknowledgments
I would like to thank my research assistant, Abdou Salam Niang, for his valuable help as translator for interviews conducted in Wolof. I also want to thank my supervisor, Arnim Langer, my colleagues at CRPD, and three anonymous reviewers for valuable suggestions for this paper. Finally, I want to thank my interviewees for their enthusiastic responses and graciously donated time.
