We experimentally investigate to what extent people trust and honor trust when they are playing with other people’s money (OPM). We adopt the well-known trust game by Berg et al. (in Games Econ. Behav. 10:122–142, 1995), with the difference that the trustor (sender) who sends money to the trustee (receiver) does this on behalf of a third party. We find that senders who make decisions on behalf of others do not behave significantly different from senders in our baseline trust game who manage their own money. But receivers return significantly less money when senders send a third party’s money. As a result, trust is only profitable in the baseline trust game, but not in the OPM treatment. The treatment effect among the receivers is gender specific. Women return significantly less money in OPM than in baseline, while there is no such treatment effect among men. Moreover, women return significantly less than men in the OPM treatment.

We use a human-subjects experiment to investigate how bargaining outcomes are affected by changes in bargainers’ disagreement payoffs. Subjects bargain against changing opponents, with randomly drawn asymmetric disagreement outcomes that vary over plays of the game, and with complete information about disagreement payoffs and the cake size. We find that subjects only respond about half as much as theoretically predicted to changes in their own disagreement payoff and to changes in their opponent’s disagreement payoff. This effect is observed in a standard Nash demand game and a related unstructured bargaining game, in both early and late rounds, and is robust to moderate changes in stake sizes. We show theoretically that standard models of expected utility maximisation are unable to account for this under-responsiveness, even when generalised to allow for risk aversion. We also show that quantal-response equilibrium has, at best, mixed success in characterising our results. However, a simple model of other-regarding preferences can explain our main results.

Altruistic punishment is often thought to be a major enforcement mechanism of social norms. I present experimental results from a modified version of the dictator game with third-party punishment, in which third parties can remain ignorant about the choice of the dictator. I find that a substantial fraction of subjects choose not to reveal the dictator’s choice and not to punish the dictator. I show that this behavior is in line with the social norms that prevail in a situation of initial ignorance. Remaining ignorant and choosing not to punish is not inappropriate. As a result, altruistic punishment is significantly lower when the dictator’s choice is initially hidden. The decrease in altruistic punishment leads to more selfish dictator behavior only if dictators are explicitly informed about the effect of willful ignorance on punishment rates. Hence, in scenarios in which third parties can ignore information and dictators know what this implies, third-party punishment may only ineffectively enforce social norms.

This study compares Chinese people’s trust and trustworthiness, risk attitude, and time preference before and after the onset of the COVID-19 pandemic in China. We compare the preferences of subjects in two online experiments with samples drawn from 31 provinces across mainland China before and after the onset of the pandemic. We test two competing hypotheses regarding trust and trustworthiness. On the one hand, the outbreak as a collective threat could enhance in-group cohesion and cooperation and thus increase trust and trustworthiness. On the other hand, to the extent that people expect their future income to decline, they may become more self-protective and self-controlled, and thus less trusting and trustworthy and more risk averse and patient. Comparing before and after the onset, we found that the subjects increased in trustworthiness. After the onset, trust and trustworthiness (and risk aversion and present bias too) were positively correlated with the COVID-19 prevalence rate in the provinces. Subjects with more pessimistic expectations about income change showed more risk aversion and lower discount rates, supporting the speculation concerning self-control.

This study examines the association between psychosocial adjustment and future expectations in early adolescence. This research tries to fill some gaps in the literature on how current adjustment might be an antecedent of early adolescents’ future expectations. Participants were 781 students (mean age = 12.37 years). Data were collected in 11 schools. The results revealed statistically significant correlations between self-esteem, life satisfaction, self-efficacy, emotional and behavioural problems, educational and social adjustment, and future expectations. The structural equation model confirmed a positive relation between psychosocial adjustment and these adolescents’ future expectations. The main contribution of this research is to further our comprehension of the development of adolescents’ future expectations and the way in which psychosocial adjustment has an impact on such development. Future expectations are an important protective factor for healthy development in adolescence, as thinking about the future motivates everyday behaviour and influences choices, decisions and future activities.

This study examined the relationship between executive functions (EFs) and school performance in primary and secondary school students aged 8 to 13 years (N = 146, M = 10.4, 45.8% girls). EFs were evaluated using the Trail Making Test (TMT), Verbal Fluency (VF), and the Stroop Test. Students’ GPAs and teachers’ assessment of academic skills were used to measure school performance. To evaluate the students’ social behavior, participants were asked to rate all their classmates’ prosocial behavior and nominate three students with whom they preferred to do school activities; teachers also provided evaluations of students’ social skills. EF measures explained 41% (p = .003, f2 = .694) of variability in school performance and 29% (p = .005, f2 = .401) of variance in social behavior in primary school students. The predictive power of EFs was found to be lower for secondary school students, although the TMT showed significant prediction and explained 13% (p = .004, f2 = .149) of variance in school performance and 15% (p = .008, f2 = .176) in peer ratings of prosocial behavior. This paper discusses the relevance of EFs in the school environment and their different predictive power in primary and secondary school students.