The highly popular belief that rent-control leads to an increase in the amount of affordable housing is in contradiction with ample empirical evidence and congruent theoretical explanations. It can therefore be qualified as a misconception. We present the results of a preregistered on-line experiment in which we study how to dispel this misconception using a refutational approach in two different formats, a video and a text. We find that the refutational video has a significantly higher positive impact on revising the misconception than a refutational text. This effect is driven by individuals who initially agreed with it and depart from it after the treatment. The refutational text, in turn, does not have a significant impact relative to a non-refutational text. Higher cognitive reflective ability is positively associated with revising beliefs in all interventions. Our research shows that visual communication effectively reduces the gap between scientific economic knowledge and the views of citizens.

Plato's Republic VII suggests that if we ask someone to philosophize when they are too young, they can become corrupted (537e–539d). Republic VII also suggests that to avoid this corruption, we must not expose youth to argument (539a–b). This is not a reasonable option outside of Kallipolis, so a question arises: does Plato describe how to correct corruption if we do not manage to prevent it? This paper shows that a parallel between this passage from Republic VII and a passage from Laws X suggests that he does. Laws X describes an impious man who is corrupted in the same way as the youth exposed to philosophy prematurely in Republic VII. While we leave the youth to his corruption in Republic, the impious man is helped to overcome his corruption in Laws with a refutation followed by a myth (also called a charm). This paper analyses these steps in terms of Plato's psychology, showing that both corruption and correction require a destabilization of the soul, which in these passages is brought about through refutation. This destabilization allows for a reconfiguration, which, with something that can restabilize the soul (for example with myth), can be a reconfiguration for the better.

In this paper, we analyze Boolean formulas in conjunctive normal form (CNF) from the perspective of read-once resolution (ROR) refutation schemes. A read-once (resolution) refutation is one in which each clause is used at most once. Derived clauses can be used as many times as they are deduced. However, clauses in the original formula can only be used as part of one derivation. It is well known that ROR is not complete; that is, there exist unsatisfiable formulas for which no ROR exists. Likewise, the problem of checking if a 3CNF formula has a read-once refutation is NP-complete. This paper is concerned with a variant of satisfiability called not-all-equal satisfiability (NAE-satisfiability). A CNF formula is NAE-satisfiable if it has a satisfying assignment in which at least one literal in each clause is set to false. It is well known that the problem of checking NAE-satisfiability is NP-complete. Clearly, the class of CNF formulas which are NAE-satisfiable is a proper subset of satisfiable CNF formulas. It follows that traditional resolution cannot always find a proof of NAE-unsatisfiability. Thus, traditional resolution is not a sound procedure for checking NAE-satisfiability. In this paper, we introduce a variant of resolution called NAE-resolution which is a sound and complete procedure for checking NAE-satisfiability in CNF formulas. The focus of this paper is on a variant of NAE-resolution called read-once NAE-resolution in which each clause (input or derived) can be part of at most one NAE-resolution step. Our principal result is that read-once NAE-resolution is a sound and complete procedure for 2CNF formulas. Furthermore, we provide an algorithm to determine the smallest such NAE-resolution in polynomial time. This is in stark contrast to the corresponding problem concerning 2CNF formulas and ROR refutations. We also show that the problem of checking whether a 3CNF formula has a read-once NAE-resolution is NP-complete.

Kendler argues for the reality of psychiatric diagnostic classes in terms of two realist theories of truth, coherence and correspondence. I would advocate an alternative interpretation of the truth status of diagnostic classifications that leads to different conclusions. This is based firstly on Karl Popper's ideas on the growth of knowledge, whereby hypotheses developed from theoretical conjectures are deliberately subjected to attempts at refutation (we refine our always provisional views of what is true by increasing our knowledge of what is false). My second source of argument is John Wing's view that diseases are theoretical constructs on which disease theories may be based and tested. Such theories relate variously to aetiology, pathology, treatment, course and outcome. Rejecting a disease theory does not force rejection of the disease construct it seeks to qualify. We adhere to disease constructs more strongly than to the disease theories based on them. However, if it becomes apparent that the information obtained by testing disease theories is incoherent, we may eventually jettison particular disease constructs, as has happened regularly in the history of medicine. The disease constructs used in psychiatry may be approaching this point.