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Public health emergencies sometimes require the restriction of civil liberties through social distancing: lockdowns, quarantines, the closure of public spaces and institutions, and so on. Social distancing measures can decrease mortality and morbidity, but they also cause social and economic harm. Policymakers have to make trade-offs between “lives and livelihoods,” while introducing only minimally necessary restrictions on civil liberties. Traditionally, cost-benefit analysis has played a central role in formulating these trade-offs. Recently, however, some philosophers have argued that the trade-offs should instead be made on the basis of contractualist moral theory. In this essay, I argue against the use of contractualism for this purpose.
Contextualizing the regulation of human mobility in a new security framework, this book offers an original perspective on the dominant mode of politics and evolving norms shaping the immigration policies of contemporary liberal states. In doing so, the authors challenge existing paradigms that privilege economic and cultural factors over new security ones in explaining the critical institutional and normative changes in migration management, from the early post-WWII through the post-Cold War era. Drawing on evidence from multiple sources, including media and elite discourse, policy tracking, party manifesto data and public opinion across Europe and the US, the book exposes the restrictive nature of immigration politics and policies when immigration is framed as a security threat, and considers its implications for civil liberties. Informed by a rich breadth of scholarly sub-disciplines, the findings contribute both empirically and theoretically to the literatures on international migration, security and public opinion.
When establishing constitutional rules that regulate political parties, liberal democracies struggle between civil liberties—thus tolerating anti-democratic parties—and potential threats of democratic breakdown, which can be reduced by prosecuting and prohibiting anti-democratic parties. We suggest that liberal democracies must balance false positives and false negatives by combining ex ante and ex post regulatory mechanisms. By making use of a unique dataset of thirty-seven liberal democracies collected by the authors, we find empirical results consistent with our positive theory. An extensive review of the normative debate and case law provides additional qualitative support.
Wartime pressures to protect national military and security interests inevitably create threats to civil liberties. This essay reviews the abuses of the period, carried on by public officials as well as citizens who saw themselves as acting on their behalf. There was a remarkable range of targets—with few spies to find, broadly defined disloyalty sufficed. The attempt to create a unified, loyal culture extended to wide areas of the culture, such as the teaching of history, aided by volunteers. The public and private efforts brought ruined reputations, imprisonments, public shaming, murders, and awful behavior on the part of courts and citizens. These were bad times for civil liberties. This essay reviews the history and explores the legacies.
This chapter is dedicated to the role of the potential opposition in autocracies. It deals with the various forms of repressing dissent and how autocratic incumbents keep the opposition at bay. Like the previous and the subsequent chapters, it condenses in a first step our current knowledge about the topic, carving out the lessons learned for the conceptualization of the over-politicizing and de-politicizing logics. It introduces the broad distinction between soft and hard forms of repression. While the former violates civil liberties and political rights, the latter infringes upon the person’s integrity rights. It is argued that over-politicizing autocracies seek to justify even the usage of hard repression by inflating a friend-foe distinction and declaring an internal foe. In contrast, de-politicizing regimes avoid using this type of repression, as it risks breaking the silent autocratic contract between the passivated people and the regime that is supposed to materially deliver.
The analysis examines the effort to incorporate labor rights into the American conception of civil liberties and the opposition to that endeavor. It focuses on three Senators—Robert Wagner, Robert La Follette, Jr., and Elbert Thomas—and New Deal officials who conceived of the National Labor Relations Act as a cornerstone of the effort to achieve “economic justice” and defended the law against its critics. It examines the opponents, including the National Association of Manufacturers and an anticommunist alliance between southern Democrats and Republicans. An ideological counteroffensive recast the supporters of social rights as un-American opponents of free enterprise and defined civil liberties as protecting the individual from an expansionist state and labor bosses. The analysis demonstrates the multiple causes for the disappearance of ideological space for conceiving that protection from oppressive employers constituted a civil liberty and the displacement of labor rights by the “right to work.”
This chapter introduces those rights and freedoms that are considered core to the democratic process. Those freedoms (often labelled ‘civil liberties’) ensure that individuals are able to circulate and obtain information freely, are able to participate in the election of representatives (and governments) and are able to peacefully – and collectively – make public demonstrations of political viewpoints without incurring criminal sanctions. In turn this chapter will therefore consider freedom of expression, freedom of assembly, the liberty and security of the person, and the right to vote.
In this Chapter, I use American mass incarceration and the War on Drugs to draw conclusions about the increasing use of the criminal justice system to combat the abuse of non-human animals. I conclude that expanding criminal sanctions will result not just in increased incarceration, but in net-widening and deprivation of civil liberties. Furthermore, such negative effects are likely to be unequally distributed, falling most heavily on communities of color.
Since the 1970s, the campaigns of animal protection advocates have been met with increasingly draconian government response, reflected in the Federal Bureau of Investigation’s post-9/11 classification of animal rights activists as the “number one domestic terrorism threat.” Animal advocates—who have never harmed a human being—have been targeted by expanded federal and state anti-terrorism legislation, disproportionate prison sentences, sweeping new surveillance powers, and experimental prison units, among other attacks. This article explores how, and why, the civil rights and civil liberties community have largely ignored—and in some cases even embraced— the carceral logic of criminalizing animal rights activists as “terrorists.”
Research from the United States has shown that the 9/11 terrorist attacks activated individuals’ ethnocentric predispositions to structure public opinion toward several political and social issues. Beyond this overall finding, several aspects of the activation hypothesis remain unexplored, including its geographical and substantive scope. Using the quasi-random timing of terrorist attacks during the collection of the 2016 GGSS, we demonstrate the terrorism-induced activation of ethnocentrism in Germany. Specifically, a cascade of terrorist attacks involving immigrants in the summer of 2016 activated ethnocentrism among native Germans to predict (lower) support for civil liberties relative to security concerns after its influence had been absent just a month before. Further, we show that the activation of ethnocentrism holds up in a series of robustness checks and is not explained by alternative factors, including other predispositions.
In this chapter we present our recommendations for how the policy landscape in the U.S. and other liberal democracies should respond to the opportunities and challenges brought on by quantum information science. These recommendations are informed by the four scenarios of quantum futures combined with the understanding of technology capabilities we discussed in Part I. We begin this chapter by putting our cards on the table and presenting our policy goals. We then explore how to achieve these goals using traditional policy levers: direct investments, education, and law. We conclude with a discussion of national security issues.
Quantum sensing, computing, and communication offer some significant improvements on classical technologies, in some cases create fundamentally new capabilities. Quantum technologies are quickly arriving. Even if the most hyped promises in quantum computing are not realized in the next decade, in the near term quantum sensing could shift relationships irrevocably. This book has painted the landscape of quantum's implications---from nation-state concerns of strategic conflict, intelligence gathering, and law enforcement activities; to the concerns of companies that may be subject to industrial policy priorities and restrictions; to the level of the individual who may face institutions with great asymmetries in sensing and sense-making power. This chapter concludes with a forecast of quantum technology scenarios, with forecasts for each quantum technology analyzed in this book, and with a summary of the most important policy issues to pursue.
In chapter 5, I describe how participants in the 1916 debates used the law of nations as it existed at the time, and the dominion and constitutional law of the British Empire to deliberate the justifications for war and for conscription. The languages of these debates included, for example, arguments about the preservation of White Australia, about the need to protect Australians’ civil liberties, and about the unequal claims made on the different classes of Australian society as a result of the First World War. The persuasiveness of uses of international legal language in 1916 depended on speakers’ abilities to navigate the complications of Australia’s colonial nationalism. Speakers made sophisticated arguments about the duties of the Dominion of Australia to the British Empire on the one hand, and to its own emerging nationhood on the other.
This chapter provides an account of the protection of civil liberties and human rights in English law. This includes an account of the Human Rights Act 1998 and its relationship to decisions of the European Court of Human Rights. It also explains the interaction between the Human Rights Act 1998 and common law protections of fundamental rights. It then provides an evaluation of the laws on terrorism, freedom of expression and the right to protest.
This chapter explores the 4,000 conscientious objectors (COs) who refused to kill during World War I. It examines the Selective Service Act of 1917 and the religious and secular principles that led men to become COs. By refusing military combat service and resisting the military rules in army camps and military prisons that violated their conscience, COs demonstrated courage, sacrifice, and commitment to principle. Although most COs accepted noncombatant military service or alternative civilian service, 450 absolutists, who refused to cooperate with military authorities and rejected all service under military control, were court-martialed and imprisoned. In camps and prisons, COs defied military rules, regulations, and policies. Their resistance included refusal to obey orders, work strikes, hunger strikes, general strikes, noncooperation, and nonviolent revolts. Furthermore, COs were often severely abused, which led to a wartime civil liberties movement that defended (and which included) COs and that evolved into the postwar American Civil Liberties Union. Finally, this chapter shows how COs contributed to peace and freedom by advancing civil liberties, inspiring future COs, liberalizing World War II conscription legislation, secularizing the peace movement, and pioneering the nonviolent direct action that infused post-1945 peace and justice movements.
To meet the challenge of mobilizing the nation for war in Europe, the Wilson administration took steps to silence dissent on the home front. In addition to a massive propaganda campaign to rouse public enthusiasm for the war, the government used the Espionage Act (1917) to silence anti-war publications and to arrest pacifists, political radicals, and others accused of making disloyal statements. The government’s campaign against dissenters was upheld in landmark decisions by the Supreme Court, supporting the imprisonment of hundreds of anti-war speakers, most notably the socialist leader Eugene V. Debs. While federal government repression encouraged similar laws at the state level as well as a wave of vigilante violence against pacifists and anti-war radicals, the arrests also led some free speech advocates to form the American Civil Liberties Union, one part of a wider campaign that sought amnesty for imprisoned dissenters.
The article sheds light on tutelary regimes, which have so far been left out in the discussion of contemporary authoritarian regimes. It uses a configurative approach to conceptualize tutelary regimes according to the three dimensions of tutelary interference, electoral competitiveness and civil liberties. Tutelary interference is conceived of as a spectrum of possible and not mutually exclusive roles which tutelary powers perform – depending on their position in the political system. Empirically, the article uses a case study of Myanmar's tutelary regime to illustrate how the armed forces’ institutionalized powers and prerogatives have helped the country evade substantial democracy. The results show a high degree of regime heterogeneity, with a functioning electoral regime in place but substantial weaknesses in civil liberties. Both are (partly) rooted in the tutelary interference of the military, which is pervasive. The military's position straitjackets the government; the military vetoes certain policies and structural reforms and guards the political system and its prerogatives from a position of strength. Politicians have so far not come up with successful strategies to bring the military under civil control.
This introductory chapter sketches the main argument of the book and the various areas of interest it touches upon: sovereignty, international law and laws of war, the dilemma security versus freedom, the attempt at humanizing the war conduct, the transformation of notions and practices of citizenship, rights, individual and human in particular, humanitarianism, national belonging, war and society. The introduction focuses in particular on whether there were consolidated customary practices and codified rules to deal with aliens of enemy nationality at the moment of the outbreak of the First World War, and if and how that conflict represented a watershed. It then presents the structure of the book.
This chapter opens the second part of the book and is the first of six entirely devoted to the First World War. It concentrates on the early months of the war and examines first of all the spread of the state of emergency throughout Europe and the British Empire. It then, while calculating the number of enemy aliens in the belligerent countries, describes the first measures against enemy aliens adopted by Britain, France, the Russian Empire and Japan on the one hand, and those taken by Germany, Austria-Hungary and the Ottoman Empire on the other. It also spells out the diplomatic attempts at protecting enemy aliens, the reactions of the victims of the earliest provisions and the attitudes of the nationalistic public opinion, the spy fever, the spread of fake news and the popular responses to them. By the end of December 1914, each of the early participants in the war had set in motion the mechanism for dealing with enemy aliens. By the same date, the war against them had also become global, ranging from Europe to North America, from Oceania to India or Iran.
What did it mean to be an alien, and in particular an enemy alien, in the interstate conflicts that occurred over the nineteenth century and that climaxed in the First World War? In this ambitious and broad-ranging study, Daniela L. Caglioti highlights the many ways in which belligerent countries throughout the world mobilized populations along the member/non-member divide, redefined inclusion and exclusion, and refashioned notions and practices of citizenship. She examines what it meant to be an alien in wartime, how the treatment of aliens in wartime interfered with sovereignty and the rule of law, and how that treatment affected population policies, individual and human rights, and conceptions of belonging. Concentrating on the gulf between citizens and foreigners and on the dilemma of balancing rights and security in wartime, Caglioti highlights how each country, regardless of its political system, chose national security even if this meant reducing freedom, discriminating among citizens and non-citizens, and violating international law.