Norenzayan et al. should be praised for their ambitious attempt to tackle some Big Questions. The connection between religious beliefs and social structures is certainly a Very Big Question. Behind the debate about the adaptive value of religion there hides an often pragmatist question of how religious beliefs could lead to prosocial acts.
The authors insist on avoiding a definition of religion. This is puzzling. How and why do you study religion if you are not sure what it is? (Beit-Hallahmi Reference Beit-Hallahmi2015) Although stating that defining religion is impossible, they actually deal with a well-circumscribed set of concrete phenomena, and refer to “supernatural agents,” “supernatural punishment,” and so forth scores of times, so they obviously have a clear notion of the phenomena they wish to explore.
Setting their conceptual framework, Norenzayan et al. choose to glide over serious theoretical disagreements. Reading their article, one would never guess that the concepts of group selection and social instincts, which they rely on, are not universally accepted. Bracketing this issue, there are some other difficulties.
It is clear that cooperation (as well as competition) characterized human interactions long before the appearance of so-called prosocial religions. Humans have always negotiated (with varying degrees of success) interactions with peers and superiors. Neighbours and kin will act as enforcers without divine authority, and most humans will handle that productively. Beyond face-to-face interactions, humans had commitments to family, clan, and tribe before young religions were created over the last 12 millennia. As societies grew, loyalties expanded. The authors note the use of fictive kinship terms in large groups, which supports the notion of loyalties expanding symbolically and practically as groups get larger. Religion sometimes inspires cooperation among genetically unrelated individuals by invoking a new identity that is above that of family or clan, but secular nationalism has been doing the same thing, using other fictions.
The evidence presented in the article moves back and forth between ancient times and the latest in priming experiments. There is nothing wrong with that, as long as all pieces of the puzzle are handled with critical caution.
The authors provide insightful evidence about religion and political systems in Mesoamerica, China, India, Mesopotamia, Greece, and Rome. As to the evolution of Abrahamic religions, they offer one source: “Wright (Reference Wright2009) provides a summary of textual evidence that reveals the gradual evolution of the Abrahamic god from a rather limited, whimsical, tribal war god – a subordinate in the Canaanite Pantheon – to the unitary, supreme, moralizing deity of two of the world's largest religious communities. We see the same dynamics at work in other major literate societies” (sect. 3.2.2, para. 1). Wright is a journalist, not a scholar, who writes charmingly and promotes recycled mythology. One of the main heroes of his narrative is named Josiah, and the problem is that there is no evidence that he, just like other Biblical heroes, ever existed. The search for the historical Jesus, Paul, or Muhammad has not been any more successful than the search for the historical Krishna, Osiris, or Zeus (Berg & Rollens Reference Berg and Rollens2008; White Reference White1896/1993). Nevertheless, mythology should be of major interest to students of religion in its own right, as a reflection of universal (and local) human experiences and fantasies (Beit-Hallahmi Reference Beit-Hallahmi2010).
Bringing up Abrahamic religions goes right to the heart of the theoretical question of the relation between religion and political structures. The examples of religion and political systems in Mesoamerica, China, India, and so forth, provided by the authors, are totally different from the cases of Abrahamic religions. Christianity, for example, was founded by a small group of committed believers and scribes who produced authoritative scriptures. It was not formed in the womb of a state or empire. Both the Hebrew Bible and the New Testament were canonized under imperial Rome around 200 CE, but in this case the empire was the hated enemy. In the case of Islam, it might be claimed that the religion created an empire, but the actual founders probably had little political power. As suggested above, we need to admit that we know very little about the early days of the Abrahamic religions, or most religions. We are on a surer footing when looking at younger religions, such as Mormonism, Baha'ism, or Anthroposophy, where real historical documents are available.
In relation to “Karmic religions,” the authors state that the “precise psychological mechanisms are not as well understood as for the Abrahamic religions” (sect. 3.2.2, para. 6). Nowhere do we get an explanation for this claim. What psychological mechanisms are well understood for Abrahamic religions? Should we seek explanations which apply to specific religions? Is this a goal of evolutionary–cognitive theories?
The authors’ comprehensive literature survey has missed some critiques of evidence used to buttress their theoretical approach. Claims about the higher survival rates of religious communes (Sosis Reference Sosis2000; Sosis & Alcorta Reference Sosis and Alcorta2003; Sosis & Bressler Reference Sosis and Bressler2003) ignore Bader et al. (Reference Bader, Mencken and Parker2006), who, after examining 454 modern American communes, challenged the generalization and stated that religiosity had no effect on survival. Similarly, they present findings on trust through ritual participation (Ruffle & Sosis Reference Ruffle and Sosis2006; Sosis & Ruffle Reference Sosis and Ruffle2003) but neglect to mention Hoffmann (Reference Hoffmann2013), who pointed out that the effects were less than robust.
The interpretation of religious priming effects, presented here, could be broadened. The impact of religious concepts was found to be identical to that of secular law-enforcement concepts (“jury” or “police”). Moreover, Ma-Kellams and Blascovich (Reference Ma-Kellams and Blascovich2013) found that using “science” terms, such as laboratory, hypothesis, or theory had the same effect, because “science” is apparently imagined by many people as a positive authority. Harrell (Reference Harrell2012) found that reward-related primes, whether religious (heaven) or secular (appreciation) also elicited generosity. It is possible that priming with religious, or secular, authority images or with reward symbols will induce benevolence, cooperation, or submission in humans and that this wide effect is not limited to WEIRD populations but has deep evolutionary roots.
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Norenzayan et al. should be praised for their ambitious attempt to tackle some Big Questions. The connection between religious beliefs and social structures is certainly a Very Big Question. Behind the debate about the adaptive value of religion there hides an often pragmatist question of how religious beliefs could lead to prosocial acts.
The authors insist on avoiding a definition of religion. This is puzzling. How and why do you study religion if you are not sure what it is? (Beit-Hallahmi Reference Beit-Hallahmi2015) Although stating that defining religion is impossible, they actually deal with a well-circumscribed set of concrete phenomena, and refer to “supernatural agents,” “supernatural punishment,” and so forth scores of times, so they obviously have a clear notion of the phenomena they wish to explore.
Setting their conceptual framework, Norenzayan et al. choose to glide over serious theoretical disagreements. Reading their article, one would never guess that the concepts of group selection and social instincts, which they rely on, are not universally accepted. Bracketing this issue, there are some other difficulties.
It is clear that cooperation (as well as competition) characterized human interactions long before the appearance of so-called prosocial religions. Humans have always negotiated (with varying degrees of success) interactions with peers and superiors. Neighbours and kin will act as enforcers without divine authority, and most humans will handle that productively. Beyond face-to-face interactions, humans had commitments to family, clan, and tribe before young religions were created over the last 12 millennia. As societies grew, loyalties expanded. The authors note the use of fictive kinship terms in large groups, which supports the notion of loyalties expanding symbolically and practically as groups get larger. Religion sometimes inspires cooperation among genetically unrelated individuals by invoking a new identity that is above that of family or clan, but secular nationalism has been doing the same thing, using other fictions.
The evidence presented in the article moves back and forth between ancient times and the latest in priming experiments. There is nothing wrong with that, as long as all pieces of the puzzle are handled with critical caution.
The authors provide insightful evidence about religion and political systems in Mesoamerica, China, India, Mesopotamia, Greece, and Rome. As to the evolution of Abrahamic religions, they offer one source: “Wright (Reference Wright2009) provides a summary of textual evidence that reveals the gradual evolution of the Abrahamic god from a rather limited, whimsical, tribal war god – a subordinate in the Canaanite Pantheon – to the unitary, supreme, moralizing deity of two of the world's largest religious communities. We see the same dynamics at work in other major literate societies” (sect. 3.2.2, para. 1). Wright is a journalist, not a scholar, who writes charmingly and promotes recycled mythology. One of the main heroes of his narrative is named Josiah, and the problem is that there is no evidence that he, just like other Biblical heroes, ever existed. The search for the historical Jesus, Paul, or Muhammad has not been any more successful than the search for the historical Krishna, Osiris, or Zeus (Berg & Rollens Reference Berg and Rollens2008; White Reference White1896/1993). Nevertheless, mythology should be of major interest to students of religion in its own right, as a reflection of universal (and local) human experiences and fantasies (Beit-Hallahmi Reference Beit-Hallahmi2010).
Bringing up Abrahamic religions goes right to the heart of the theoretical question of the relation between religion and political structures. The examples of religion and political systems in Mesoamerica, China, India, and so forth, provided by the authors, are totally different from the cases of Abrahamic religions. Christianity, for example, was founded by a small group of committed believers and scribes who produced authoritative scriptures. It was not formed in the womb of a state or empire. Both the Hebrew Bible and the New Testament were canonized under imperial Rome around 200 CE, but in this case the empire was the hated enemy. In the case of Islam, it might be claimed that the religion created an empire, but the actual founders probably had little political power. As suggested above, we need to admit that we know very little about the early days of the Abrahamic religions, or most religions. We are on a surer footing when looking at younger religions, such as Mormonism, Baha'ism, or Anthroposophy, where real historical documents are available.
In relation to “Karmic religions,” the authors state that the “precise psychological mechanisms are not as well understood as for the Abrahamic religions” (sect. 3.2.2, para. 6). Nowhere do we get an explanation for this claim. What psychological mechanisms are well understood for Abrahamic religions? Should we seek explanations which apply to specific religions? Is this a goal of evolutionary–cognitive theories?
The authors’ comprehensive literature survey has missed some critiques of evidence used to buttress their theoretical approach. Claims about the higher survival rates of religious communes (Sosis Reference Sosis2000; Sosis & Alcorta Reference Sosis and Alcorta2003; Sosis & Bressler Reference Sosis and Bressler2003) ignore Bader et al. (Reference Bader, Mencken and Parker2006), who, after examining 454 modern American communes, challenged the generalization and stated that religiosity had no effect on survival. Similarly, they present findings on trust through ritual participation (Ruffle & Sosis Reference Ruffle and Sosis2006; Sosis & Ruffle Reference Sosis and Ruffle2003) but neglect to mention Hoffmann (Reference Hoffmann2013), who pointed out that the effects were less than robust.
The interpretation of religious priming effects, presented here, could be broadened. The impact of religious concepts was found to be identical to that of secular law-enforcement concepts (“jury” or “police”). Moreover, Ma-Kellams and Blascovich (Reference Ma-Kellams and Blascovich2013) found that using “science” terms, such as laboratory, hypothesis, or theory had the same effect, because “science” is apparently imagined by many people as a positive authority. Harrell (Reference Harrell2012) found that reward-related primes, whether religious (heaven) or secular (appreciation) also elicited generosity. It is possible that priming with religious, or secular, authority images or with reward symbols will induce benevolence, cooperation, or submission in humans and that this wide effect is not limited to WEIRD populations but has deep evolutionary roots.