The mechanisms underlying the capacities for revenge and forgiveness have evaded evolutionary analysis despite the direct and indirect fitness consequences these forms of social interaction have. McCullough et al. provide an adaptational account for the evolution of complementary cognitive systems for revenge (deterring future harm) and forgiveness (mitigating possible relationship damage and avoiding the costs associated with such a loss). We argue, however, that the conceptualization of such systems is problematic, and the social exchange research reviewed sheds very little light on the evolution of these purported cognitive systems. The authors base their model on a fundamentally non-developmental evolutionary paradigm that misconstrues the nature of development, its role in evolution, and mischaracterizes the psychological capacities they wish to explain. In the following, we outline how an evolutionary systems approach problematizes the plausibility of such systems and their putative selection and specification. An evolutionary systems perspective requires examining developmental processes, and in this case would require reviewing the social cognitive development research that demonstrates the complex and variable ontogenetic processes that give rise to the highly developed perspectival understanding required in the social exchange scenarios they describe.
Despite giving “equal footing” to proximate factors in their adaptationist account (e.g., appealing to Tinbergen's four questions; target article, sect. 2.1) developmental processes are a priori ignored or mischaracterized by the non-developmental evolutionary metatheory involved. McCullough et al. claim that a cost is only revenge if it is “caused by a mechanism designed to deter cost-impositions or benefit-withholdings in the future” (sect. 2.2.4, their emphasis). From this evolutionary psychological (EP) perspective, decisions to act are “computations.” They are evolutionary-derived algorithms (instantiated as cognitive mechanisms) that were selected because they conferred fitness advantages upon ancestral humans. These algorithms do some heavy lifting in this model, in that they are able to compute courses of action for seemingly countless situations and factors involved.
The question is: To what extent is it useful to consider the decisions humans make in a social exchange game as the product of evolved cognitive mechanisms? Aside from the platitude that we are products of natural selection, can we gain any insight into the specifications of such a system through reverse-engineering our decisions to seek revenge or forgive our transgressors? From the non-developmental population genetic perspective of the authors, this is possible. That is, genes that give rise to particular, adaptive phenotypes were selected for in the past. Because the genotype is taken to be the source of developmental information, it follows that genes represent the entirety of the phenotypic outcomes that were once adaptive and selected to solve recurrent social problems. Environmental factors, at most, become a trigger for the initiation of a developmental program, and are thus deemed “equally important.”
The neo-Darwinian paradigm has been increasingly criticized for its neglect and mischaracterization of developmental processes (see e.g., Pigliucci & Müller Reference Pigliucci and Müller2010). Failing to use an evolutionary systems perspective that fully incorporates developmental processes into evolutionary theory leads McCullough et al. to mischaracterize the nature and source of developmental information. For example, McCullough et al. do not seriously consider that the evolutionarily relevant problems they outline not only occurred in our evolutionary past, but they are still occurring. The implication is that these problems are re-occurring developmental problems, that are, in part, created anew each generation, and with which each generation must contend. A specific genotype does not equate to a specific phenotype (Charney Reference Charney2012). Simply stated, genes do not contain the developmental information in the way needed to make McCullough et al.'s model tenable.
From an evolutionary systems perspective, examining a “revenge system” would include tracing the development of the capacities underlying such a system. The complexity of the “system” would constantly change (i.e., develop) over time, with various factors changing it in sometimes non-obvious ways. In the particulate, additive, non-developmental stance popular in EP, the “system” with all its potentialities are developmentally predetermined, a perspective that is contrary to the probabilistic nature of development (Gottlieb Reference Gottlieb2007). Further, selection only selects products of developmental processes. A selectionist perspective can at best only describe why some abilities persist, not how they appeared, which has little relevance for understanding the choices people make in a social exchange situation.
For McCullough et al., “evolved cognitive mechanisms” underlie decision-making processes. Decisions, however, are made by people with life histories. Decisions are influenced by knowledge and emotional and motivational states; they are a function, in part, of one's experience interacting with others within particular social and cultural norms of conduct based upon forms of interaction characteristic of biological humans. A developmental perspective is required to examine the many foundational psychological capacities that lead to the high level of social understanding of adult humans. This understanding has a long and complex ontogeny beginning in the first year of life with the capacity for joint attention, the ability to coordinate attention and activity with oneself and another. Young children develop a “theory of mind” around age 4 when they are able to understand false belief (Carpendale & Lewis Reference Carpendale and Lewis2006). Although the consistent age of false belief understanding has led many to assume that it is specified by genetic or biological factors (i.e., Baron-Cohen Reference Baron-Cohen1995; Gopnik Reference Gopnik, Carruthers and Smith1996; Leslie Reference Leslie1987), Boesch (Reference Boesch2007) demonstrates the extreme variability in false belief understanding across cultures, including those that do not pass a standard false belief test at age 14. Such findings reiterate the fact that consistent development takes place in the context of consistently recurring developmental factors. Little can be said about “evolutionary mechanisms” when the development of these capacities is not examined.
A fundamentally non-developmental evolutionary metatheory is not conducive to understanding the evolution of psychological capacities. From an evolutionary systems perspective, understanding developmental changes over generations is to understand the evolution of a trait or a cognitive system. A selectionist perspective and its inherently developmentally uncontexualized mechanisms does little to provide this understanding. The existence of revenge across cultures does not mean it is universal in the sense that it is based on genetic selection, but results from the common developmental conditions of our species.
The mechanisms underlying the capacities for revenge and forgiveness have evaded evolutionary analysis despite the direct and indirect fitness consequences these forms of social interaction have. McCullough et al. provide an adaptational account for the evolution of complementary cognitive systems for revenge (deterring future harm) and forgiveness (mitigating possible relationship damage and avoiding the costs associated with such a loss). We argue, however, that the conceptualization of such systems is problematic, and the social exchange research reviewed sheds very little light on the evolution of these purported cognitive systems. The authors base their model on a fundamentally non-developmental evolutionary paradigm that misconstrues the nature of development, its role in evolution, and mischaracterizes the psychological capacities they wish to explain. In the following, we outline how an evolutionary systems approach problematizes the plausibility of such systems and their putative selection and specification. An evolutionary systems perspective requires examining developmental processes, and in this case would require reviewing the social cognitive development research that demonstrates the complex and variable ontogenetic processes that give rise to the highly developed perspectival understanding required in the social exchange scenarios they describe.
Despite giving “equal footing” to proximate factors in their adaptationist account (e.g., appealing to Tinbergen's four questions; target article, sect. 2.1) developmental processes are a priori ignored or mischaracterized by the non-developmental evolutionary metatheory involved. McCullough et al. claim that a cost is only revenge if it is “caused by a mechanism designed to deter cost-impositions or benefit-withholdings in the future” (sect. 2.2.4, their emphasis). From this evolutionary psychological (EP) perspective, decisions to act are “computations.” They are evolutionary-derived algorithms (instantiated as cognitive mechanisms) that were selected because they conferred fitness advantages upon ancestral humans. These algorithms do some heavy lifting in this model, in that they are able to compute courses of action for seemingly countless situations and factors involved.
The question is: To what extent is it useful to consider the decisions humans make in a social exchange game as the product of evolved cognitive mechanisms? Aside from the platitude that we are products of natural selection, can we gain any insight into the specifications of such a system through reverse-engineering our decisions to seek revenge or forgive our transgressors? From the non-developmental population genetic perspective of the authors, this is possible. That is, genes that give rise to particular, adaptive phenotypes were selected for in the past. Because the genotype is taken to be the source of developmental information, it follows that genes represent the entirety of the phenotypic outcomes that were once adaptive and selected to solve recurrent social problems. Environmental factors, at most, become a trigger for the initiation of a developmental program, and are thus deemed “equally important.”
The neo-Darwinian paradigm has been increasingly criticized for its neglect and mischaracterization of developmental processes (see e.g., Pigliucci & Müller Reference Pigliucci and Müller2010). Failing to use an evolutionary systems perspective that fully incorporates developmental processes into evolutionary theory leads McCullough et al. to mischaracterize the nature and source of developmental information. For example, McCullough et al. do not seriously consider that the evolutionarily relevant problems they outline not only occurred in our evolutionary past, but they are still occurring. The implication is that these problems are re-occurring developmental problems, that are, in part, created anew each generation, and with which each generation must contend. A specific genotype does not equate to a specific phenotype (Charney Reference Charney2012). Simply stated, genes do not contain the developmental information in the way needed to make McCullough et al.'s model tenable.
From an evolutionary systems perspective, examining a “revenge system” would include tracing the development of the capacities underlying such a system. The complexity of the “system” would constantly change (i.e., develop) over time, with various factors changing it in sometimes non-obvious ways. In the particulate, additive, non-developmental stance popular in EP, the “system” with all its potentialities are developmentally predetermined, a perspective that is contrary to the probabilistic nature of development (Gottlieb Reference Gottlieb2007). Further, selection only selects products of developmental processes. A selectionist perspective can at best only describe why some abilities persist, not how they appeared, which has little relevance for understanding the choices people make in a social exchange situation.
For McCullough et al., “evolved cognitive mechanisms” underlie decision-making processes. Decisions, however, are made by people with life histories. Decisions are influenced by knowledge and emotional and motivational states; they are a function, in part, of one's experience interacting with others within particular social and cultural norms of conduct based upon forms of interaction characteristic of biological humans. A developmental perspective is required to examine the many foundational psychological capacities that lead to the high level of social understanding of adult humans. This understanding has a long and complex ontogeny beginning in the first year of life with the capacity for joint attention, the ability to coordinate attention and activity with oneself and another. Young children develop a “theory of mind” around age 4 when they are able to understand false belief (Carpendale & Lewis Reference Carpendale and Lewis2006). Although the consistent age of false belief understanding has led many to assume that it is specified by genetic or biological factors (i.e., Baron-Cohen Reference Baron-Cohen1995; Gopnik Reference Gopnik, Carruthers and Smith1996; Leslie Reference Leslie1987), Boesch (Reference Boesch2007) demonstrates the extreme variability in false belief understanding across cultures, including those that do not pass a standard false belief test at age 14. Such findings reiterate the fact that consistent development takes place in the context of consistently recurring developmental factors. Little can be said about “evolutionary mechanisms” when the development of these capacities is not examined.
A fundamentally non-developmental evolutionary metatheory is not conducive to understanding the evolution of psychological capacities. From an evolutionary systems perspective, understanding developmental changes over generations is to understand the evolution of a trait or a cognitive system. A selectionist perspective and its inherently developmentally uncontexualized mechanisms does little to provide this understanding. The existence of revenge across cultures does not mean it is universal in the sense that it is based on genetic selection, but results from the common developmental conditions of our species.