McCullough et al. define revenge as a response to harm-imposing, “to deter cost-impositions […] in the future” (sect. 2.2.4, para. 1). As straightforward and clear-cut as this definition is, it is still reasonable to raise the question of who should evaluate the social reality of the response. The social reality/utility of an event depends on the manner and the social context in which the event is constructed by individuals. Being highly involved, both the enactor and the receiver of revenge are motivated by the same self-serving judgments, leading both of them to feel that the social order is under threat. So they have to penalize the transgressor for what he or she has done. In contrast, the perspective of third parties is hypothetically the most objective. This is particularly true if the third party is not directly or indirectly involved and is fully informed of the intervening processes that connect the instigating condition to the revengeful act.
However, judgments of third parties may also depend on their activated worldviews. If they believe in the social-psychological utility of revenge, such as its cathartic effect (psychological closure and cessation of mental rumination), then their attention might be focused on the course of revenge. This action-oriented process leads them to disengage from situational threats (Kuhl & Koole Reference Kuhl, Koole, Greenberg, Koole and Pyszczynski2004). However, if they do not believe in the social/psychological utility of revenge, they are forced to deal with it in other ways, for example, by deciding that, in a just world, it is useless to worry about the negative consequences of a person's actions. After all, “people get what they deserve and deserve what they get” (Lerner Reference Lerner1987).
Individuals who believe in an appropriate fit between getting and deserving can therefore move on and not think further about revenge. But research often shows that revenge can increase rumination related to one's ability to deter further transgressions (Carlsmith et al. Reference Carlsmith, Wilson and Gilbert2008). In both cases, however, people are forced to make a rational analysis of revenge, evaluating its pros and cons, to justify any punitive decisions they make and deal with the consequences.
Researchers have distinguished two types of punishment: social retribution and social deterrence, specifically when people are exposed to senseless violence (Rucker et al. Reference Rucker, Polifroni, Tetlock and Scott2004, p. 679). Consequently, the motive for retribution reflects deeply held beliefs about justice, and punishment is driven by a desire to see individuals pay for their deeds. The motive for deterrence is to discourage future threats, and punishment in this case is based on a profound desire to minimize the likelihood of transgression. Hence, witnessing senseless violence may lead bystanders to impose costs on the transgressor for his or her deeds or to deter future wrongdoing in order to restore justice, at least in regard to victims.
Nonetheless, research has shown that victims of aggression and revenge must cope not only with the negative consequences caused directly by the event (primary victimization; Brickman et al. Reference Brickman, Rabinowitz, Karuza, Coates, Cohen and Kidder1982), but also with the negative judgments (secondary victimization) made by others (hetero-victimization) or even by themselves (self-victimization). Secondary victimization seems to be a direct consequence of the Justice Motive, first introduced in Lerner's (Reference Lerner1980) “belief in a just world” theory (BJW) to describe people's deep-seated need to believe that the world is a fair place. To preserve this perception of the world, people are highly motivated to abide by moral norms and to protect them from disconfirming evidence. Witnessing others' unjust misfortunes may lead people to help victims in order to deter injustice, or to adopt cognitive strategies for denying the injustice (Lerner & Miller Reference Lerner and Miller1978). People's inalienable commitment to justice therefore constitutes one of their sacred values, causing them to react with outrage and anger whenever this value is violated (Tetlock Reference Tetlock2003).
Holding such a belief is congruent with the idea that the victim may not be innocent. Application of the deservingness strategy thus sometimes leads people to blame or derogate victims. Interestingly, the absence of an opportunity to blame or disparage the victim can lead people to a person identification (perception of a unit relation) or a position identification (perception of a non-unit relation) with the victim, the latter corresponding to a less compassionate understanding of the victim (Lerner et al. Reference Lerner, Miller, Holmes, Berkowitz and Walster1976). In addition, by suggesting a distinction between other-BJW (the world is fair to others; Sutton & Winnard Reference Sutton and Winnard2007) and self-BJW (the world is fair to me; Correia & Dalbert Reference Correia and Claudia Dalbert2008) research has shown that other-BJW is a better predictor of negative attitudes toward victims.
If we consider interpersonal relationships and differences/similarity as a form of social distance, then threats to the goodness of fit between getting and deserving lead to psychological distancing from victims, by moving them away from an individual's direct experience (Liberman et al. Reference Liberman, Trope, Stephan, Kruglanski and Higgins2007). Psychological distance involves self/other differentiations, which, through position identification and also other-BJW, activate higher-order cognitive strategies such as the use of language that is abstract (reconstructing inappropriate behavior through moral justification) and decontextualized (euphemistic), fostering a deeper sense of distance from the victims (dehumanization of the victim). In addition, such cognitive reconstructions dynamically change the event's construal level without any subsequent modification of the individual's moral standards. For Bandura (Reference Bandura1999), these psychological mechanisms prepare people to be dogmatic or punitive, and to quickly start looking for excuses, such as anger and outrage, for having abandoned their bedrock commitment to justice. When people blame others, they are not inclined to evaluate the correctness or accuracy per se. They care only about justifiability, a profoundly relational construct that depends on the identity of the protagonists and their evaluative standards, regardless of whether it captures essential aspects of reality.
Thus, although people may be unaware of the intra-individual effects or functions of the BJW, there seems to be no doubt about its social functions in terms of justification of interpersonal relationships. This supplies a good reason for switching off one's conscience, which equates to moral disengagement.
McCullough et al. define revenge as a response to harm-imposing, “to deter cost-impositions […] in the future” (sect. 2.2.4, para. 1). As straightforward and clear-cut as this definition is, it is still reasonable to raise the question of who should evaluate the social reality of the response. The social reality/utility of an event depends on the manner and the social context in which the event is constructed by individuals. Being highly involved, both the enactor and the receiver of revenge are motivated by the same self-serving judgments, leading both of them to feel that the social order is under threat. So they have to penalize the transgressor for what he or she has done. In contrast, the perspective of third parties is hypothetically the most objective. This is particularly true if the third party is not directly or indirectly involved and is fully informed of the intervening processes that connect the instigating condition to the revengeful act.
However, judgments of third parties may also depend on their activated worldviews. If they believe in the social-psychological utility of revenge, such as its cathartic effect (psychological closure and cessation of mental rumination), then their attention might be focused on the course of revenge. This action-oriented process leads them to disengage from situational threats (Kuhl & Koole Reference Kuhl, Koole, Greenberg, Koole and Pyszczynski2004). However, if they do not believe in the social/psychological utility of revenge, they are forced to deal with it in other ways, for example, by deciding that, in a just world, it is useless to worry about the negative consequences of a person's actions. After all, “people get what they deserve and deserve what they get” (Lerner Reference Lerner1987).
Individuals who believe in an appropriate fit between getting and deserving can therefore move on and not think further about revenge. But research often shows that revenge can increase rumination related to one's ability to deter further transgressions (Carlsmith et al. Reference Carlsmith, Wilson and Gilbert2008). In both cases, however, people are forced to make a rational analysis of revenge, evaluating its pros and cons, to justify any punitive decisions they make and deal with the consequences.
Researchers have distinguished two types of punishment: social retribution and social deterrence, specifically when people are exposed to senseless violence (Rucker et al. Reference Rucker, Polifroni, Tetlock and Scott2004, p. 679). Consequently, the motive for retribution reflects deeply held beliefs about justice, and punishment is driven by a desire to see individuals pay for their deeds. The motive for deterrence is to discourage future threats, and punishment in this case is based on a profound desire to minimize the likelihood of transgression. Hence, witnessing senseless violence may lead bystanders to impose costs on the transgressor for his or her deeds or to deter future wrongdoing in order to restore justice, at least in regard to victims.
Nonetheless, research has shown that victims of aggression and revenge must cope not only with the negative consequences caused directly by the event (primary victimization; Brickman et al. Reference Brickman, Rabinowitz, Karuza, Coates, Cohen and Kidder1982), but also with the negative judgments (secondary victimization) made by others (hetero-victimization) or even by themselves (self-victimization). Secondary victimization seems to be a direct consequence of the Justice Motive, first introduced in Lerner's (Reference Lerner1980) “belief in a just world” theory (BJW) to describe people's deep-seated need to believe that the world is a fair place. To preserve this perception of the world, people are highly motivated to abide by moral norms and to protect them from disconfirming evidence. Witnessing others' unjust misfortunes may lead people to help victims in order to deter injustice, or to adopt cognitive strategies for denying the injustice (Lerner & Miller Reference Lerner and Miller1978). People's inalienable commitment to justice therefore constitutes one of their sacred values, causing them to react with outrage and anger whenever this value is violated (Tetlock Reference Tetlock2003).
Holding such a belief is congruent with the idea that the victim may not be innocent. Application of the deservingness strategy thus sometimes leads people to blame or derogate victims. Interestingly, the absence of an opportunity to blame or disparage the victim can lead people to a person identification (perception of a unit relation) or a position identification (perception of a non-unit relation) with the victim, the latter corresponding to a less compassionate understanding of the victim (Lerner et al. Reference Lerner, Miller, Holmes, Berkowitz and Walster1976). In addition, by suggesting a distinction between other-BJW (the world is fair to others; Sutton & Winnard Reference Sutton and Winnard2007) and self-BJW (the world is fair to me; Correia & Dalbert Reference Correia and Claudia Dalbert2008) research has shown that other-BJW is a better predictor of negative attitudes toward victims.
If we consider interpersonal relationships and differences/similarity as a form of social distance, then threats to the goodness of fit between getting and deserving lead to psychological distancing from victims, by moving them away from an individual's direct experience (Liberman et al. Reference Liberman, Trope, Stephan, Kruglanski and Higgins2007). Psychological distance involves self/other differentiations, which, through position identification and also other-BJW, activate higher-order cognitive strategies such as the use of language that is abstract (reconstructing inappropriate behavior through moral justification) and decontextualized (euphemistic), fostering a deeper sense of distance from the victims (dehumanization of the victim). In addition, such cognitive reconstructions dynamically change the event's construal level without any subsequent modification of the individual's moral standards. For Bandura (Reference Bandura1999), these psychological mechanisms prepare people to be dogmatic or punitive, and to quickly start looking for excuses, such as anger and outrage, for having abandoned their bedrock commitment to justice. When people blame others, they are not inclined to evaluate the correctness or accuracy per se. They care only about justifiability, a profoundly relational construct that depends on the identity of the protagonists and their evaluative standards, regardless of whether it captures essential aspects of reality.
Thus, although people may be unaware of the intra-individual effects or functions of the BJW, there seems to be no doubt about its social functions in terms of justification of interpersonal relationships. This supplies a good reason for switching off one's conscience, which equates to moral disengagement.