It has long since become an accepted truism that “war made the state,” as Charles Tilly (The Formation of National States in Western Europe, 1975) famously remarked. Scholars of comparative politics are not surprised by this assertion, and have devoted much attention to understanding this important relationship. Yet the study of American politics is just beginning to grapple with its implications, both for state building and political development more broadly. A good place to start is this ambitious, well-written book by Robert Saldin, a successful effort that helps us better understand the impact that wars had on the American political system in the twentieth century.

Saldin's analysis starts with the Spanish-American War and covers all the major military conflicts of the century: World War I, World War II, Korea, and Vietnam. Each chapter focuses on one of those wars and its effects on the expansion of democratic rights, the growth of central state power, changes in party ideology, and elections. Saldin easily ranges across these disparate issues as well as a wide time frame, and also offers some concluding thoughts on the potential effects of the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq. He has also done an excellent job of speaking to a variety of literatures in the field of American politics. Those who come from the subfield of American political development will be particularly interested in the multiplicity of ways that the state has been “shaped by war and trade,” to borrow the title of a well-known volume. The author's linkage of international events to domestic developments is quite illuminating for those interested in the subfield, as well as those who study foreign policy. Scholars of parties and elections should also read this book, if for no other reason than its challenge to the conventional wisdom about realignments, especially the evidence presented that refutes claims of a so-called system of 1896.

Drawing on the literature in public policy regarding agenda setting, Saldin argues that “because wars are crises of the first order and expose serious problems requiring governmental solutions, they generate rare consensus for fundamental changes to the American state” (p. 12). This event-oriented perspective runs against the now-prevalent line of thinking about the ubiquity of path dependency. The author is by no means denying the existence of path dependence, and he explicitly states that changes caused by wars often remain in place for the long term due to institutional stickiness. However, he is offering a useful corrective that places emphasis upon important moments of change, which he might have usefully described as critical junctures. The changes engendered by war are not inevitable, in his view, but there are recurring shifts that occur during and after each war.

One such common thread is the expansion of democratic rights. Saldin argues that wars “have enhanced democracy by rewarding marginalized groups with fuller citizenship rights after they have contributed to a war effort” (p. 15). This theme is a major strength of the book. He persuasively demonstrates that both the Nineteenth Amendment's expansion of the suffrage to women and the Twenty-Sixth Amendment's expansion to those between the ages of 18 and 21 are directly linked to World War I and the Vietnam War, respectively. In a somewhat less direct manner, the contributions of African Americans during World War II opened up political space for the claims of the Civil Rights movement in the postwar period, and the Korean War caused the practical desegregation of the army by demonstrating the benefits of African American soldiers on the front lines.

In line with our expectation that “war made the state,” Saldin also documents instances of wars leading to permanent increases in central state authority. A particularly compelling example is the creation and institutionalization of the income tax. There was a tax on incomes prior to World War I, but as the author states, it was “merely a pale and undeveloped image of its contemporary self” (p. 69), applying only at low rates to very high incomes. Revenue needs at that time and especially during World War II dictated the broadening of the rate structure in a manner approximating our modern tax system. Similarly compelling is Saldin's contention that the Korean War unalterably shifted the debate regarding the country's national security apparatus. He specifically highlights how President Harry Truman's initial reluctance to sign on to Paul Nitze's famous NSC-68, a document that called for expanded measures to confront the Soviet Union, melted away after the outbreak of war. Saldin also argues that the campaign to enact nationwide prohibition laws gained, indirectly, from anti-German sentiment and the need to save grain supplies during World War I.

Central to the book's case are close studies of campaigns, elections, and changes in party ideologies during and following war. The evidence presented on the ways in which wars have shaped elections is powerful and persuasive. The author's critique of the “system of 1896” and theories of realignment that rely on that notion is especially incisive. As he notes, the elections of 1898 and 1900 were both deeply shaped by the Spanish-American War and the occupation of the Philippines. Contrary to those who see the 1896 election as a fundamental realignment in favor of the Republican Party, Saldin shows that without the war, Republicans likely would have performed quite poorly in the 1898 midterm. Furthermore, he demonstrates that the election of 1920, in which Republicans seized control of both Congress and the presidency for the first time since before 1912, was decisively shaped by Woodrow Wilson's failures at the war's end. The author argues that 1920 is at least as important as 1896, if not more so. Later, the elections of 1952 and 1968 would also be centered on the wars in Korea and Vietnam.

Some of Saldin's contentions seem to rely on more circuitous causal paths, however. For instance, he links the reforms of the McGovern-Fraser Commission to the war in Vietnam through the disaster of the 1968 Democratic Convention. This seems to be correct, and yet it is several steps removed from the war itself. Perhaps it would have been more helpful to distinguish between first-order and second-order effects of wars, in which some events are only indirectly linked to the preceding war.

This minor concern notwithstanding, Saldin has written an important book that should be read widely. He upends conventional wisdom in a number of ways, and scholars of parties, elections, and American political development will all have to contend with his argument.