potential and historical limits of cooperation within the Visegrad Group as an international organization, while Jozef Bátora engages with the interaction between individual CE countries' foreign policy and the pressure toward Europeanization and harmonization of their interests and policies. Finally, in a provocative essay, Aljaž Kunčič and Janez Šušteršič challenge the definition of the CE region provided by the editors, arguing that from the perspective of economic exchange and institutional commonalities, it is hard to argue that there is indeed such a thing as a CE region.

The volume's final section includes inquisitive studies by Šabič and Annette Freyberg-Inan on the interaction between the CE and the Balkan region (excluding Greece, Turkey, and Kosovo) and by Szymon Ananicz and Rafał Sadowski on relations with Eastern Europe (defined restrictively as Ukraine, Moldova, and Belarus). They are notable especially for pointing out that while Slovenia pays almost no attention to dealing with Eastern Europe, Poland is similarly detached from Balkan issues not involving Romania; thus, the two contributions showcase another limitation of the theoretical grouping of the Visegrad Four and Slovenia as sole members of a CE region.

Through its timely publication, coherent approach, and methodology, as well as the quality of its studies, *Regional and International Relations of Central Europe* is a most welcome and valuable addition to the area studies of Central and Eastern Europe in an especially turbulent economic period. While the list of contributors is solid, this reviewer could not help noticing a certain bias in the selection of contributors, most of whom eschew cultural but perhaps more importantly structural, economic, and political methodologies. The great majority of the contributors subscribe to a realist methodology and even mainstream neoliberal interpretations. One can only hope that local scholars of different persuasions will feel the need to respond to the challenging ideas raised by this important volume.

War, the American State, and Politics since 1898.
By Robert P. Saldin. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2011. 258p. $95.00.
doi:10.1017/S1537592713002004

— William D. Adler, *Northeastern Illinois University*

It has long since become an accepted truism that "war made the state," as Charles Tilly (*The Formation of National States in Western Europe,* 1975) famously remarked. Scholars of comparative politics are not surprised by this assertion, and have devoted much attention to understanding this important relationship. Yet the study of American politics is just beginning to grapple with its implications, both for state building and political development more broadly. A good place to start is this ambitious, well-written book by Robert Saldin, a successful effort that helps us better understand the impact that wars had on the American political system in the twentieth century.

Saldin's analysis starts with the Spanish-American War and covers all the major military conflicts of the century: World War I, World War II, Korea, and Vietnam. Each chapter focuses on one of those wars and its effects on the expansion of democratic rights, the growth of central state power, changes in party ideology, and elections. Saldin easily ranges across these disparate issues as well as a wide time frame, and also offers some concluding thoughts on the potential effects of the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq. He has also done an excellent job of speaking to a variety of literatures in the field of American politics. Those who come from the subfield of American political development will be particularly interested in the multiplicity of ways that the state has been "shaped by war and trade," to borrow the title of a well-known volume. The author's linkage of international events to domestic developments is quite illuminating for those interested in the subfield, as well as those who study foreign policy. Scholars of parties and elections should also read this book, if for no other reason than its challenge to the conventional wisdom about realignments, especially the evidence presented that refutes claims of a so-called system of 1896.

Drawing on the literature in public policy regarding agenda setting, Saldin argues that "because wars are crises of the first order and expose serious problems requiring governmental solutions, they generate rare consensus for fundamental changes to the American state" (p. 12). This event-oriented perspective runs against the now-prevalent line of thinking about the ubiquity of path dependency. The author is by no means denying the existence of path dependence, and he explicitly states that changes caused by wars often remain in place for the long term due to institutional stickiness. However, he is offering a useful corrective that places emphasis upon important moments of change, which he might have usefully described as critical junctures. The changes engendered by war are not inevitable, in his view, but there are recurring shifts that occur during and after each war.

One such common thread is the expansion of democratic rights. Saldin argues that wars "have enhanced democracy by rewarding marginalized groups with fuller citizenship rights after they have contributed to a war effort" (p. 15). This theme is a major strength of the book. He persuasively demonstrates that both the Nineteenth Amendment's expansion of the suffrage to women and the Twenty-Sixth Amendment's expansion to those between the ages of 18 and 21 are directly linked to World War I and the Vietnam War, respectively. In a somewhat less direct manner, the contributions of African Americans during World War II opened up political space for the claims of the Civil Rights movement in the postwar period, and the Korean War caused the practical