Framing may highlight some considerations and because of selective highlighting may generate “quasi-cyclical preferences.” If in a decision problem A, B, and C are options described certain ways, an agent may prefer A to B and prefer B to C despite knowing that A and C are the same option under different descriptions. Framing's generation of such quasi-cyclical preferences is rational, according to Bermúdez.
The received view in decision theory claims, roughly, that framing should not influence preferences among the options in a decision problem. A framing effect is irrational because options may be framed in multiple ways, and selection of a frame is arbitrary. Arbitrary matters should not influence an agent's preference-ranking of options.
To reconcile Bermúdez's view with the received view, I present a more precise version of the received view. Because the received view is a vague aggregation of theorists' views, it has multiple interpretations. I present an interpretation that limits its opposition to framing's effects.
The core principles of the received view evaluate choices. Suppose that an agent adopts an option at the top of the agent's preference-ranking of options and so meets a common standard of rational choice. Suppose also that the choice would have been different had the agent framed options differently. The core principles do not deem the choice irrational because different framing would have changed it. Their evaluation of a choice ignores the effect of framing on the choice.
The core principles evaluate not only single choices, but also sets of choices. A standard decision principle states that a pair of choices is irrational if the choices are inconsistent. It takes two choices as inconsistent if they arise from the same decision problem framed two ways. However, this principle prohibits inconsistency, not framing effects.
Evaluative principles outside the received view's core review the causes of a choice and prohibit some framing effects. The version of the received view I present includes such a principle but formulates it guardedly.
The principle relies on a familiar distinction concerning preferences. A traveler may want all-things-considered to fly economy-class even though putting aside price the traveler wants to fly first-class. Some desires and preferences are held all-things-considered, whereas others are held putting aside some considerations.
Bermúdez rejects an extensionality principle asserting that preferences, values, and decisions should be unaffected by how outcomes are framed. However, the received view's guarded principle prohibits the influence of framing on an agent's all-things-considered preferences among options, and through them an influence on the agent's choice. The principle does not address framing's effect on preferences that are not circumspect.
Another refinement adds more precision. Decision theory uses idealizing assumptions to form models of rational choice. It progresses by removing idealizations and generalizing decision principles. The received view, fully formulated, makes explicit the background assumptions of its principles. A standard decision principle states that a rational option in a decision problem is at the top of the agent's all-things-considered preference-ranking of options. The principle assumes an ideal agent in ideal circumstances facing a standard decision problem and possessing rational all-things-considered preferences among options. Without these assumptions, an agent's choice may be rational despite failing to comply with the principle, or it may be irrational despite complying with the principle. In a case of quasi-cyclical preferences, an agent treats an outcome differently under different descriptions despite awareness that the descriptions designate the same outcome; a lack of awareness would supply an easy excuse for the difference in treatment.
Standard decision principles address decision problems in which the decider has a complete all-things-considered preference-ranking of options. Bermúdez entertains decision problems in which the ranking is incomplete. As he notes, incommensurable options create such decision problems. A decider may be aware that different frames favor different options but, even with reflection, may fail to resolve the conflict and so fail to form an all-things-considered preference between two options.
In such a decision problem, suppose that an agent chooses according to some frame rather than other frames in play. Imagine that the guiding frame affects the choice without affecting all-things-considered preferences among options. The principle of extensionality Bermúdez formulates condemns the framing effect, but the received view is open-minded.
The received view, as I interpret it, welcomes a decision principle for decision problems with an incomplete all-things-considered preference-ranking of options. Although no such principle enjoys a consensus, at least one candidate permits a role for framing.
To set the stage for the principle, first consider a random process's effect on a choice in a decision problem. A prohibition of this effect is too strong because flipping a coin is a reasonable way of breaking a tie among options at the top of an all-things-considered preference-ranking of options. For example, it is reasonable to flip a coin to decide between chocolate and vanilla if these flavors are at the top. Although tie-breaking by flipping a coin affects a choice, it does not affect the agent's all-things-considered preferences among options, and so has a permitted effect on the choice. Framing may also break ties, but it has a more substantial role in decision problems without a complete all-things-considered preference-ranking of options.
A common principle for such decision problems classifies an option as rational if it is a top-preference according to a possible completion of the agent's all-things-considered preference-ranking of options (see, e.g., Weirich, Reference Weirich2021). Framing may suggest a possible completion of a preference-ranking of options and an option at the top of this possible completion. The decision principle allows choosing according to the frame's suggestion. It permits this framing effect despite the arbitrariness of framing.
The received view leaves a role for framing's effect on a choice. It prohibits framing's influence on all-things-considered preferences among options but does not prohibit other effects of framing on choices. The received view, as I interpret it, reaches a reconciliation with Bermúdez's view.
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Framing may highlight some considerations and because of selective highlighting may generate “quasi-cyclical preferences.” If in a decision problem A, B, and C are options described certain ways, an agent may prefer A to B and prefer B to C despite knowing that A and C are the same option under different descriptions. Framing's generation of such quasi-cyclical preferences is rational, according to Bermúdez.
The received view in decision theory claims, roughly, that framing should not influence preferences among the options in a decision problem. A framing effect is irrational because options may be framed in multiple ways, and selection of a frame is arbitrary. Arbitrary matters should not influence an agent's preference-ranking of options.
To reconcile Bermúdez's view with the received view, I present a more precise version of the received view. Because the received view is a vague aggregation of theorists' views, it has multiple interpretations. I present an interpretation that limits its opposition to framing's effects.
The core principles of the received view evaluate choices. Suppose that an agent adopts an option at the top of the agent's preference-ranking of options and so meets a common standard of rational choice. Suppose also that the choice would have been different had the agent framed options differently. The core principles do not deem the choice irrational because different framing would have changed it. Their evaluation of a choice ignores the effect of framing on the choice.
The core principles evaluate not only single choices, but also sets of choices. A standard decision principle states that a pair of choices is irrational if the choices are inconsistent. It takes two choices as inconsistent if they arise from the same decision problem framed two ways. However, this principle prohibits inconsistency, not framing effects.
Evaluative principles outside the received view's core review the causes of a choice and prohibit some framing effects. The version of the received view I present includes such a principle but formulates it guardedly.
The principle relies on a familiar distinction concerning preferences. A traveler may want all-things-considered to fly economy-class even though putting aside price the traveler wants to fly first-class. Some desires and preferences are held all-things-considered, whereas others are held putting aside some considerations.
Bermúdez rejects an extensionality principle asserting that preferences, values, and decisions should be unaffected by how outcomes are framed. However, the received view's guarded principle prohibits the influence of framing on an agent's all-things-considered preferences among options, and through them an influence on the agent's choice. The principle does not address framing's effect on preferences that are not circumspect.
Another refinement adds more precision. Decision theory uses idealizing assumptions to form models of rational choice. It progresses by removing idealizations and generalizing decision principles. The received view, fully formulated, makes explicit the background assumptions of its principles. A standard decision principle states that a rational option in a decision problem is at the top of the agent's all-things-considered preference-ranking of options. The principle assumes an ideal agent in ideal circumstances facing a standard decision problem and possessing rational all-things-considered preferences among options. Without these assumptions, an agent's choice may be rational despite failing to comply with the principle, or it may be irrational despite complying with the principle. In a case of quasi-cyclical preferences, an agent treats an outcome differently under different descriptions despite awareness that the descriptions designate the same outcome; a lack of awareness would supply an easy excuse for the difference in treatment.
Standard decision principles address decision problems in which the decider has a complete all-things-considered preference-ranking of options. Bermúdez entertains decision problems in which the ranking is incomplete. As he notes, incommensurable options create such decision problems. A decider may be aware that different frames favor different options but, even with reflection, may fail to resolve the conflict and so fail to form an all-things-considered preference between two options.
In such a decision problem, suppose that an agent chooses according to some frame rather than other frames in play. Imagine that the guiding frame affects the choice without affecting all-things-considered preferences among options. The principle of extensionality Bermúdez formulates condemns the framing effect, but the received view is open-minded.
The received view, as I interpret it, welcomes a decision principle for decision problems with an incomplete all-things-considered preference-ranking of options. Although no such principle enjoys a consensus, at least one candidate permits a role for framing.
To set the stage for the principle, first consider a random process's effect on a choice in a decision problem. A prohibition of this effect is too strong because flipping a coin is a reasonable way of breaking a tie among options at the top of an all-things-considered preference-ranking of options. For example, it is reasonable to flip a coin to decide between chocolate and vanilla if these flavors are at the top. Although tie-breaking by flipping a coin affects a choice, it does not affect the agent's all-things-considered preferences among options, and so has a permitted effect on the choice. Framing may also break ties, but it has a more substantial role in decision problems without a complete all-things-considered preference-ranking of options.
A common principle for such decision problems classifies an option as rational if it is a top-preference according to a possible completion of the agent's all-things-considered preference-ranking of options (see, e.g., Weirich, Reference Weirich2021). Framing may suggest a possible completion of a preference-ranking of options and an option at the top of this possible completion. The decision principle allows choosing according to the frame's suggestion. It permits this framing effect despite the arbitrariness of framing.
The received view leaves a role for framing's effect on a choice. It prohibits framing's influence on all-things-considered preferences among options but does not prohibit other effects of framing on choices. The received view, as I interpret it, reaches a reconciliation with Bermúdez's view.
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This research received no specific grant from any funding agency, commercial, or not-for-profit sectors.
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