Hoerl & McCormack (H&M) contend that a contradiction in people's naïve theory of time (Callender Reference Callender2017), which represents the movement of the now both as being an objective matter, independent of perspective, and as being a purely subjective matter, dependent on temporal perspective, can be traced to two mechanisms they posit: the temporal updating and temporal reasoning system Specifically, H&M suppose people believe both that only a single time is objectively now and that whatever time one is at, that time is now. H&M propose that the belief in the subjectivity of the now is enabled by our temporal reasoning system, and the contradictory belief in the objectivity of the now originates in the temporal updating system that we share with animals.
Very likely, people do believe that there is an objective moving now and simultaneously think that whatever time they are at, that time is now. However, unlike H&M, we do not think that this means they have an inconsistent representation of the world, as containing a now that is both objective and essentially perspectival. For if, as many have supposed, our naïve representation of time is one in which only one moment exists – the present – then that moment is both objectively now, and whichever moment one is located at, that moment is now (because there is only one moment at which to be located). This kind of naïve representation does not involve any inconsistent beliefs about the nature of the now.
We do think that there is a tension between the perspectival view of the now and aspects of mental life. H&M point out that “even Einstein … continued to be troubled by what he called the ‘problem of the Now’” (Carnap Reference Carnap and Schilpp1963, cited in the H&M, sect. 4, para. 10). But it is unlikely that Einstein held the contradictory beliefs relied on by H&M – that the now's location and movement are both an objective and subjective matter. Instead, we think that after Einstein acquired a sophisticated belief that there is no objectively moving now, in some sense it still seemed to him as though there was an objectively moving now. But this seeming may be different from a belief that there is an objectively moving now.
What is the source of the seeming that the now moves or the inclination to think that it seems to? A common approach is to suppose that there is a phenomenological seeming – an illusion – as of the now moving (Callender Reference Callender2008; Dainton Reference Dainton and Callender2011, p. 405; Hohwy et al. Reference Hohwy, Paton and Palmer2015; Ismael Reference Ismael and Bardon2012; Le Poidevin Reference Le Poidevin2007; Prosser Reference Prosser2012). Such an approach has an advantage over the view that the seeming is just a belief state, for we know that illusory phenomenal states can be difficult (or impossible) to eliminate even in the face of explicit beliefs that they are illusory, unlike beliefs themselves: typically, a belief that P is not difficult to eliminate when one comes to believe not P.
Therefore, the temporal updating system, or something like it (Prosser Reference Prosser2006; Hartle Reference Hartle2005), may generate phenomenology as of the now moving, which is resistant to change even in light of a more sophisticated empirically informed belief that the now does not move (a belief that may be possible only because of something like H&M's other system, the temporal reasoning system). In this view, this phenomenology is resistant to change even when one comes to believe that the now does not move because it is generated by a primitive system that is, at least in part, informationally encapsulated. Its output – the phenomenology as of a moving now – is not altered by explicit beliefs generated by other, higher-level systems. Hence, even when people come to believe that the now does not move, it still seems to them as though it does. In this view, when we say that it seems as though the now moves, this is because we are suffering from a phenomenal illusion. A number of aspects of experience have been highlighted in attempts to explain this illusion, such as our motion phenomenology (Ismael Reference Ismael and Bardon2012; Le Poidevin Reference Le Poidevin2007, p. 76; Paul Reference Paul2010), our phenomenology of change (Paul Reference Paul2010, p. 346), and now H&M's temporal updating system. We think it noteworthy that H&M's updating system bears some similarities to the system posted by Hohwy et al. (Reference Hohwy, Paton and Palmer2015), in the service of explaining why we suffer a phenomenal illusion as of a moving now. However, to us these accounts leave something to be desired, in that it is not clear exactly how motion, change, or other aspects of phenomenology might yield the phenomenology as of a moving now.
Recently it has been suggested that there is not a phenomenal seeming as of the now moving: instead, there is simply a belief that there is such a phenomenological seeming (Bardon Reference Bardon2013, p. 95; Braddon-Mitchell Reference Braddon-Mitchell2013; Deng Reference Deng2017; Hoerl Reference Hoerl2014a; Miller et al. Reference Miller, Holcombe and Latham2018.) In this view, people have a false belief about the content of their phenomenal states. Change phenomenology, and the temporal updating system posited by H&M, may contribute to a feeling that the now moves, but there may be no specific phenomenological content as of a moving now. Instead, people mistakenly believe that their phenomenology is as of a moving now. Miller et al. (Reference Miller, Holcombe and Latham2018) discuss a few possibilities for how people may have ended up with false beliefs about their phenomenology. One such possibility is that multiple factors lead us to misdescribe our phenomenology using language of a moving now, and that generates in us the belief that the world seems to contain a moving now. Conceivably, H&M's temporal updating mechanism may generate a phenomenology that could be mistakenly described as a phenomenology of a moving now.
Hoerl & McCormack (H&M) contend that a contradiction in people's naïve theory of time (Callender Reference Callender2017), which represents the movement of the now both as being an objective matter, independent of perspective, and as being a purely subjective matter, dependent on temporal perspective, can be traced to two mechanisms they posit: the temporal updating and temporal reasoning system Specifically, H&M suppose people believe both that only a single time is objectively now and that whatever time one is at, that time is now. H&M propose that the belief in the subjectivity of the now is enabled by our temporal reasoning system, and the contradictory belief in the objectivity of the now originates in the temporal updating system that we share with animals.
Very likely, people do believe that there is an objective moving now and simultaneously think that whatever time they are at, that time is now. However, unlike H&M, we do not think that this means they have an inconsistent representation of the world, as containing a now that is both objective and essentially perspectival. For if, as many have supposed, our naïve representation of time is one in which only one moment exists – the present – then that moment is both objectively now, and whichever moment one is located at, that moment is now (because there is only one moment at which to be located). This kind of naïve representation does not involve any inconsistent beliefs about the nature of the now.
We do think that there is a tension between the perspectival view of the now and aspects of mental life. H&M point out that “even Einstein … continued to be troubled by what he called the ‘problem of the Now’” (Carnap Reference Carnap and Schilpp1963, cited in the H&M, sect. 4, para. 10). But it is unlikely that Einstein held the contradictory beliefs relied on by H&M – that the now's location and movement are both an objective and subjective matter. Instead, we think that after Einstein acquired a sophisticated belief that there is no objectively moving now, in some sense it still seemed to him as though there was an objectively moving now. But this seeming may be different from a belief that there is an objectively moving now.
What is the source of the seeming that the now moves or the inclination to think that it seems to? A common approach is to suppose that there is a phenomenological seeming – an illusion – as of the now moving (Callender Reference Callender2008; Dainton Reference Dainton and Callender2011, p. 405; Hohwy et al. Reference Hohwy, Paton and Palmer2015; Ismael Reference Ismael and Bardon2012; Le Poidevin Reference Le Poidevin2007; Prosser Reference Prosser2012). Such an approach has an advantage over the view that the seeming is just a belief state, for we know that illusory phenomenal states can be difficult (or impossible) to eliminate even in the face of explicit beliefs that they are illusory, unlike beliefs themselves: typically, a belief that P is not difficult to eliminate when one comes to believe not P.
Therefore, the temporal updating system, or something like it (Prosser Reference Prosser2006; Hartle Reference Hartle2005), may generate phenomenology as of the now moving, which is resistant to change even in light of a more sophisticated empirically informed belief that the now does not move (a belief that may be possible only because of something like H&M's other system, the temporal reasoning system). In this view, this phenomenology is resistant to change even when one comes to believe that the now does not move because it is generated by a primitive system that is, at least in part, informationally encapsulated. Its output – the phenomenology as of a moving now – is not altered by explicit beliefs generated by other, higher-level systems. Hence, even when people come to believe that the now does not move, it still seems to them as though it does. In this view, when we say that it seems as though the now moves, this is because we are suffering from a phenomenal illusion. A number of aspects of experience have been highlighted in attempts to explain this illusion, such as our motion phenomenology (Ismael Reference Ismael and Bardon2012; Le Poidevin Reference Le Poidevin2007, p. 76; Paul Reference Paul2010), our phenomenology of change (Paul Reference Paul2010, p. 346), and now H&M's temporal updating system. We think it noteworthy that H&M's updating system bears some similarities to the system posted by Hohwy et al. (Reference Hohwy, Paton and Palmer2015), in the service of explaining why we suffer a phenomenal illusion as of a moving now. However, to us these accounts leave something to be desired, in that it is not clear exactly how motion, change, or other aspects of phenomenology might yield the phenomenology as of a moving now.
Recently it has been suggested that there is not a phenomenal seeming as of the now moving: instead, there is simply a belief that there is such a phenomenological seeming (Bardon Reference Bardon2013, p. 95; Braddon-Mitchell Reference Braddon-Mitchell2013; Deng Reference Deng2017; Hoerl Reference Hoerl2014a; Miller et al. Reference Miller, Holcombe and Latham2018.) In this view, people have a false belief about the content of their phenomenal states. Change phenomenology, and the temporal updating system posited by H&M, may contribute to a feeling that the now moves, but there may be no specific phenomenological content as of a moving now. Instead, people mistakenly believe that their phenomenology is as of a moving now. Miller et al. (Reference Miller, Holcombe and Latham2018) discuss a few possibilities for how people may have ended up with false beliefs about their phenomenology. One such possibility is that multiple factors lead us to misdescribe our phenomenology using language of a moving now, and that generates in us the belief that the world seems to contain a moving now. Conceivably, H&M's temporal updating mechanism may generate a phenomenology that could be mistakenly described as a phenomenology of a moving now.