In his book, Doris (2015b) develops an account of morally responsible agency based on repeated expressions of an actor's value. The book is ambitious and develops a complex argument with a lot of thought provoking points and observations. The author argues that if people exercise agency, they are also morally responsible. He further argues that cognition is socially embedded: People seem to think most efficiently in contexts where other people are around (or one imagines this, or in any case one does not feel isolated). We generally agree with this argument. In the end, Doris endorses pluralism in agency that allows various criteria to account independently for moral responsibility. Any alternative account may simply add to his picture. However, we think that the socially mediated development of (moral) agency should receive much more attention, as we think it is more than a simple addition. The (repeated) attributions of moral responsibility by observers may be much more important than the question of whether people are actually morally responsible agents. We argue that the collaborative nature of the development of agency should be extended to a full social endeavor.
To elaborate this suggestion, we will refer to factors that determine blame and praise and thereby responsibility attributions. These are illustrated by several psychological findings. We will then connect the attribution of responsibility to the problem of actual agency by suggesting that collective (dis-) approval expresses the observers' values and additionally enables actors to learn the adherence of standards.
In order to attribute responsibility to an actor, it may be enough to distinguish roughly between coerced and uncoerced behavior (Strawson Reference Strawson1962). Observers evaluate uncoerced behavior with reference to norms, standards, ideals, or values (further referred to as standards) that are perceived as appropriate in a particular context. These are usually standards that are shared because of a common group membership (Turner et al. Reference Turner, Hogg, Oakes, Reicher and Wetherell1987). Such groups could be families, moral communities, work teams, or occupational or national groups among others. Observers, usually fellow group members, blame actors for failing to live up to these standards, or praise and admire them for approximating them (Kessler & Cohrs Reference Kessler and Cohrs2008). Hence, they tend to punish deviation from standards (Darley et al. Reference Darley, Carlsmith and Robinson2000) and admire behavior that approximates high standards (Onu et al. Reference Onu, Smith and Kessler2015). Most of the time these are group-based standards, which can be found on different levels of inclusiveness. “Morality” may refer to the standards appraised within the most inclusive category, “humans.” However, reactions to deviants also allow for group-specific (e.g., cultural) norms, or go beyond humanity and, for example, include animals as proposed by animal rights organizations. Often, observers like to share their evaluations with others, which leads to effective coordination and closeness to the people with similar evaluations (Peters & Kashima Reference Peters and Kashima2007).
Like the actor's agency, the observer's attribution of responsibility may be driven by (arbitrary) causal psychological processes (“defeaters”). However, the attribution of responsibility (other than responsible agency as described in Doris's book) is usually performed by several observers. People validate their perceptions and beliefs with reference to their fellow group members (see, for example, Cialdini & Goldstein Reference Cialdini and Goldstein2004). Numerous observers that communicate in one or the other way produce consensus, such as conforming to what most people say, exchanging arguments, and correcting oneself (if one notices that one is affected by a defeater). Through this process, some accidental defeaters tend to cancel each other out because people are susceptible to the same defeaters to different degrees, and each observer may even be affected by different defeaters. Thus, mutual social influence suggests that expressions of values by different observers can clarify the appropriate standards more precisely than individuals could do because, as a collective, they are less threatened by individual defeaters.
Various findings show the importance of adherence to group standards: Observers react to particular behaviors with reference to whether they are performed by ingroup or outgroup members, and whether they affect ingroup or outgroup members (Hechler Reference Hechler2016). Group members remember ingroup deviants better than norm-conforming ingroup members and all outgroup members (Hechler et al. Reference Hechler, Neyer and Kessler2016). Group members also derogate deviant ingroup members more harshly than deviant outgroup members (Marques et al. Reference Marques, Abrams, Paez and Martinez-Taboada1998). Deviating new group members are treated more educationally, whereas deviating experienced ingroup members receive harsh punishment (Pinto et al. Reference Pinto, Marques, Levine and Abrams2010). The nature of the violated standards is also crucial for the assignment of punishment. Deviations from minimal standards (i.e., either-or-standards) lead to harsher punishment (including even social exclusion) than deviations from maximal standards (i.e., gradual standards; Berthold et al. Reference Berthold, Mummendey, Kessler, Luecke and Schubert2012; Fritsche et al. Reference Fritsche, Kessler, Mummendey and Neumann2009; Kessler et al. Reference Kessler, Neumann, Mummendey, Berthold, Schubert and Waldzus2010; see also sacred values, e.g., Baron & Spranca Reference Baron and Spranca1997).
Observers also praise and admire behavior revealing high competence or moral excellence, which causes them to emulate and learn from these admired persons (Onu et al. Reference Onu, Kessler and Smith2016a) or groups (Onu et al. Reference Onu, Smith and Kessler2015; Reference Onu, Kessler, Smith, Andnovskia-Trajkovska, Midson and Smith2016b). Such reactions to others' behavior (i.e., punishment and reward) both influence the targets' behavior; the targets tend to adhere more to the standards (Balliet et al. Reference Balliet, Mulder and Van Lange2011).
The blame and praise by observers attributes (or at least assumes) agency. However, how is it important for actual agency or the development of agency? We think that the assignment of blame and praise is itself valuational because any person evaluating another's behavior expresses her values. With several observers, individual defeaters may cancel each other out (see above) with the effect that their shared evaluation may approximate their actual value. Thus, the assignment of praise and blame is the group's expression of shared values. Deviations from standards tend to invalidate these standards. The communication of blame and praise allows observers to regain consensus and mutual endorsement of the standards. In the face of deviations from standards, people have to express condemnation in order to make the violated standard salient to all group members (Feinberg Reference Feinberg1965; Durkheim Reference Durkheim1893). In addition, the expression of blame for norm violations demonstrates that group members care about the norms and the group members protected by those norms. Finally, observers blame norm violators to distance themselves from the deed and avoid being associated with such misdeeds. Thus, in some sense the observers show agency when they blame and praise others' behavior because it expresses their values (usually, shared values). They may even express their values without caring too much for actual responsibility of the actors (i.e., they may not go further than differentiating between coerced and uncoerced behavior).
Moreover, we argue that the assignment of blame or praise for misdeeds also affects the actors' agency. Public condemnation indicates, claims, or even fosters group members' exercise of agency. As observers attribute responsibility to the actors, the actors may also perceive themselves as having agency (or an illusion of agency?). For example, children's agency develops by the guidance of sanctions. Agency may be considered an ability (that one could learn) instead of a habit. Habits denote what people are accustomed to do, whereas abilities include a normative component that denotes what would count as a correct or incorrect thing to do (Millikan Reference Millikan2000). This normative component specifies when we sometimes succeed in expressing our values and when we fail to express them. As mentioned above, praise and blame direct us thereby in the standard's (valued) direction. In contrast, habits could go in any direction, as they are not necessarily corrected by values. Moreover, by such development of ability over time (i.e., agency-training), we become more reliable in expressing our values in particular situations and apply them to more diverse situations.
As an additional mechanism, we suggest that reminders of our responsibility, such as blaming and praising of certain behaviors, activate the concept of personal agency. Activated concepts also tend to produce concept-related behavior (e.g., the belief that one excels in math enhances math performance, Miller et al. Reference Miller, Brickman and Bolen1975). Activated concepts also change cognitive processing characteristics that lead to the enactment of these concepts (Sassenberg et al. Reference Sassenberg, Moskowitz, Fetterman and Kessler2017). Accordingly, actors who are held responsible may activate their concept of “being responsible.” Thus, before acting, they may think twice, activate their main values, and take precautions to make sure that their behavior conforms to their values. Such a reflection of personal values in turn may lead to a stronger connection of these standards in their cognitive system; they may identify with them and thereby behave more in accordance to them. This is also a social process: it not only involves solitary thinking but also social negotiation and training in justifying behavior in the face of others. This may reward careful action, so that people may arrange their environment in order to avoid known “defeaters” (e.g., temptations). Moreover, being held responsible indicates being watched. This enhances objective self-awareness and thereby a person's own standards become more salient.
The social shaping of agency and responsibility may not always work out completely. Some people may be hard to train or unwilling to develop stable “virtues” (i.e., habits to act according to their own and commonly shared standards). However, this may be irrelevant, as others will still hold them responsible (even if this cannot apply literally) and punish them (e.g., go for incapacitation as a last resort). In addition, people may not want to wait until repeated misdeeds manifest the “negative” values of the actor. There may be an asymmetry in that many positive deeds are necessary to manifest positive values of people, whereas one negative deed can be enough to reveal the negative value of an actor. The extremity of the deed may itself be a clear indicator for moral responsibility (Pauer-Studer & Velleman Reference Pauer-Studer and Velleman2011). In such cases, where the social shaping of individual agency or responsibility may be impossible or come too late, the actor can only be made incapable. However, the general practice of collaboratively shaping agency may not be threatened by this because these examples remain exceptions.
In short, the emergence of agency and responsibility is a social process. Talking to others (including blaming and praising) is a particularly efficient way to develop one's own agency and help others become responsible actors.
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In his book, Doris (2015b) develops an account of morally responsible agency based on repeated expressions of an actor's value. The book is ambitious and develops a complex argument with a lot of thought provoking points and observations. The author argues that if people exercise agency, they are also morally responsible. He further argues that cognition is socially embedded: People seem to think most efficiently in contexts where other people are around (or one imagines this, or in any case one does not feel isolated). We generally agree with this argument. In the end, Doris endorses pluralism in agency that allows various criteria to account independently for moral responsibility. Any alternative account may simply add to his picture. However, we think that the socially mediated development of (moral) agency should receive much more attention, as we think it is more than a simple addition. The (repeated) attributions of moral responsibility by observers may be much more important than the question of whether people are actually morally responsible agents. We argue that the collaborative nature of the development of agency should be extended to a full social endeavor.
To elaborate this suggestion, we will refer to factors that determine blame and praise and thereby responsibility attributions. These are illustrated by several psychological findings. We will then connect the attribution of responsibility to the problem of actual agency by suggesting that collective (dis-) approval expresses the observers' values and additionally enables actors to learn the adherence of standards.
In order to attribute responsibility to an actor, it may be enough to distinguish roughly between coerced and uncoerced behavior (Strawson Reference Strawson1962). Observers evaluate uncoerced behavior with reference to norms, standards, ideals, or values (further referred to as standards) that are perceived as appropriate in a particular context. These are usually standards that are shared because of a common group membership (Turner et al. Reference Turner, Hogg, Oakes, Reicher and Wetherell1987). Such groups could be families, moral communities, work teams, or occupational or national groups among others. Observers, usually fellow group members, blame actors for failing to live up to these standards, or praise and admire them for approximating them (Kessler & Cohrs Reference Kessler and Cohrs2008). Hence, they tend to punish deviation from standards (Darley et al. Reference Darley, Carlsmith and Robinson2000) and admire behavior that approximates high standards (Onu et al. Reference Onu, Smith and Kessler2015). Most of the time these are group-based standards, which can be found on different levels of inclusiveness. “Morality” may refer to the standards appraised within the most inclusive category, “humans.” However, reactions to deviants also allow for group-specific (e.g., cultural) norms, or go beyond humanity and, for example, include animals as proposed by animal rights organizations. Often, observers like to share their evaluations with others, which leads to effective coordination and closeness to the people with similar evaluations (Peters & Kashima Reference Peters and Kashima2007).
Like the actor's agency, the observer's attribution of responsibility may be driven by (arbitrary) causal psychological processes (“defeaters”). However, the attribution of responsibility (other than responsible agency as described in Doris's book) is usually performed by several observers. People validate their perceptions and beliefs with reference to their fellow group members (see, for example, Cialdini & Goldstein Reference Cialdini and Goldstein2004). Numerous observers that communicate in one or the other way produce consensus, such as conforming to what most people say, exchanging arguments, and correcting oneself (if one notices that one is affected by a defeater). Through this process, some accidental defeaters tend to cancel each other out because people are susceptible to the same defeaters to different degrees, and each observer may even be affected by different defeaters. Thus, mutual social influence suggests that expressions of values by different observers can clarify the appropriate standards more precisely than individuals could do because, as a collective, they are less threatened by individual defeaters.
Various findings show the importance of adherence to group standards: Observers react to particular behaviors with reference to whether they are performed by ingroup or outgroup members, and whether they affect ingroup or outgroup members (Hechler Reference Hechler2016). Group members remember ingroup deviants better than norm-conforming ingroup members and all outgroup members (Hechler et al. Reference Hechler, Neyer and Kessler2016). Group members also derogate deviant ingroup members more harshly than deviant outgroup members (Marques et al. Reference Marques, Abrams, Paez and Martinez-Taboada1998). Deviating new group members are treated more educationally, whereas deviating experienced ingroup members receive harsh punishment (Pinto et al. Reference Pinto, Marques, Levine and Abrams2010). The nature of the violated standards is also crucial for the assignment of punishment. Deviations from minimal standards (i.e., either-or-standards) lead to harsher punishment (including even social exclusion) than deviations from maximal standards (i.e., gradual standards; Berthold et al. Reference Berthold, Mummendey, Kessler, Luecke and Schubert2012; Fritsche et al. Reference Fritsche, Kessler, Mummendey and Neumann2009; Kessler et al. Reference Kessler, Neumann, Mummendey, Berthold, Schubert and Waldzus2010; see also sacred values, e.g., Baron & Spranca Reference Baron and Spranca1997).
Observers also praise and admire behavior revealing high competence or moral excellence, which causes them to emulate and learn from these admired persons (Onu et al. Reference Onu, Kessler and Smith2016a) or groups (Onu et al. Reference Onu, Smith and Kessler2015; Reference Onu, Kessler, Smith, Andnovskia-Trajkovska, Midson and Smith2016b). Such reactions to others' behavior (i.e., punishment and reward) both influence the targets' behavior; the targets tend to adhere more to the standards (Balliet et al. Reference Balliet, Mulder and Van Lange2011).
The blame and praise by observers attributes (or at least assumes) agency. However, how is it important for actual agency or the development of agency? We think that the assignment of blame and praise is itself valuational because any person evaluating another's behavior expresses her values. With several observers, individual defeaters may cancel each other out (see above) with the effect that their shared evaluation may approximate their actual value. Thus, the assignment of praise and blame is the group's expression of shared values. Deviations from standards tend to invalidate these standards. The communication of blame and praise allows observers to regain consensus and mutual endorsement of the standards. In the face of deviations from standards, people have to express condemnation in order to make the violated standard salient to all group members (Feinberg Reference Feinberg1965; Durkheim Reference Durkheim1893). In addition, the expression of blame for norm violations demonstrates that group members care about the norms and the group members protected by those norms. Finally, observers blame norm violators to distance themselves from the deed and avoid being associated with such misdeeds. Thus, in some sense the observers show agency when they blame and praise others' behavior because it expresses their values (usually, shared values). They may even express their values without caring too much for actual responsibility of the actors (i.e., they may not go further than differentiating between coerced and uncoerced behavior).
Moreover, we argue that the assignment of blame or praise for misdeeds also affects the actors' agency. Public condemnation indicates, claims, or even fosters group members' exercise of agency. As observers attribute responsibility to the actors, the actors may also perceive themselves as having agency (or an illusion of agency?). For example, children's agency develops by the guidance of sanctions. Agency may be considered an ability (that one could learn) instead of a habit. Habits denote what people are accustomed to do, whereas abilities include a normative component that denotes what would count as a correct or incorrect thing to do (Millikan Reference Millikan2000). This normative component specifies when we sometimes succeed in expressing our values and when we fail to express them. As mentioned above, praise and blame direct us thereby in the standard's (valued) direction. In contrast, habits could go in any direction, as they are not necessarily corrected by values. Moreover, by such development of ability over time (i.e., agency-training), we become more reliable in expressing our values in particular situations and apply them to more diverse situations.
As an additional mechanism, we suggest that reminders of our responsibility, such as blaming and praising of certain behaviors, activate the concept of personal agency. Activated concepts also tend to produce concept-related behavior (e.g., the belief that one excels in math enhances math performance, Miller et al. Reference Miller, Brickman and Bolen1975). Activated concepts also change cognitive processing characteristics that lead to the enactment of these concepts (Sassenberg et al. Reference Sassenberg, Moskowitz, Fetterman and Kessler2017). Accordingly, actors who are held responsible may activate their concept of “being responsible.” Thus, before acting, they may think twice, activate their main values, and take precautions to make sure that their behavior conforms to their values. Such a reflection of personal values in turn may lead to a stronger connection of these standards in their cognitive system; they may identify with them and thereby behave more in accordance to them. This is also a social process: it not only involves solitary thinking but also social negotiation and training in justifying behavior in the face of others. This may reward careful action, so that people may arrange their environment in order to avoid known “defeaters” (e.g., temptations). Moreover, being held responsible indicates being watched. This enhances objective self-awareness and thereby a person's own standards become more salient.
The social shaping of agency and responsibility may not always work out completely. Some people may be hard to train or unwilling to develop stable “virtues” (i.e., habits to act according to their own and commonly shared standards). However, this may be irrelevant, as others will still hold them responsible (even if this cannot apply literally) and punish them (e.g., go for incapacitation as a last resort). In addition, people may not want to wait until repeated misdeeds manifest the “negative” values of the actor. There may be an asymmetry in that many positive deeds are necessary to manifest positive values of people, whereas one negative deed can be enough to reveal the negative value of an actor. The extremity of the deed may itself be a clear indicator for moral responsibility (Pauer-Studer & Velleman Reference Pauer-Studer and Velleman2011). In such cases, where the social shaping of individual agency or responsibility may be impossible or come too late, the actor can only be made incapable. However, the general practice of collaboratively shaping agency may not be threatened by this because these examples remain exceptions.
In short, the emergence of agency and responsibility is a social process. Talking to others (including blaming and praising) is a particularly efficient way to develop one's own agency and help others become responsible actors.