Much progress has been made in mapping the mechanisms by which individuals develop stereotypes (i.e., ascribing attributes to others on the basis of membership in a particular social group) and prejudices (i.e., positive or negative affective reactions to others on the basis of membership in a particular social group). Nonetheless, aspects of the complex processes remain unexplained. Cimpian and Salomon's (C&S's) proposal that human thought is characterized by a bias to explain observed patterns in terms of the inherent properties of their components makes an important contribution to our understanding of the ontogeny of social stereotyping and prejudice. We review some of what is known about the causes of stereotyping and prejudice and describe novel insights that stem from C&S's work.
Stereotypes and prejudice are founded on categorization. There are myriad bases on which humans might be parsed into groups, and thus one or more mechanisms lead children to attend to some (and ignore other) bases for classifying people. Bigler and Liben's (Reference Bigler and Liben2006; Reference Bigler and Liben2007) developmental intergroup theory (DIT) posited that evolution led to a flexible cognitive system that motivates and equips children to infer from environmental data which bases of classification are important within a given context. DIT proposes that the psychological salience of grouping criteria (e.g., gender, age) increases when adults label groups needlessly (e.g., “Good morning, girls and boys” rather than “Good morning, students”) or in the service of organizing the environment (e.g., assigning desks by gender).
In addition to the explicit marking of attributes, DIT posits that implicit sorting of humans by particular dimensions (e.g., race, age) increases the psychological salience of such group criteria. One powerful example is de facto segregation. Although segregation affects stereotyping and prejudice via its effect on familiarity (Pettigrew & Tropp Reference Pettigrew, Tropp and Oskamp2000), DIT proposes an additional, inferential, constructivist process in which children notice perceptual similarities among those who live, work, and socialize together and then infer that these observed social divisions are caused by meaningful, inherent differences among groups (Bigler & Liben Reference Bigler and Liben2006). The inherence heuristic is just such an inferential process and adds a novel component: it leads children to view the patterns of group sorting as natural, legitimate, and good.
Bigler and Liben (Reference Bigler and Liben2006) argued that once a particular basis of classification becomes salient and is used to parse humans into groups, multiple mechanisms contribute to the development of social stereotypes and prejudice. In addition to constructivist processes (e.g., essentialist thought, illusory correlations, in-group bias), DIT proposes that children detect veridical correlates (e.g., activities, roles) associated with particular social groups (e.g., women and cheerleading; men and football). The inherence heuristic expands this account by arguing that children interpret (rather than merely learn) such links. Specifically, children construct schemata about social groups that reflect their belief that the observed correlates (e.g., roles) are inherent to the groups. Simultaneously, correlates are interpreted through stereotypic views of the groups with which they are linked. (For example, medical professions are viewed as more nurturing when performed by women than men.)
We provide two illustrations of the utility of the inherence heuristic for understanding stereotyping and prejudice. The first case concerns the development of heterosexist attitudes (Clark & Bigler Reference Clark and Bigler2013). Heterosexual couples and parents appear more often in children's environments than their nonheterosexual counterparts, as a result both of the greater statistical frequency of the former and societal prejudice against the latter (Martin Reference Martin2009). Thus, children repeatedly observe that romantic relationships include one man and one woman, an implicit sorting of the type hypothesized by DIT to facilitate attention to gender. According to C&S, children should use the inherence heuristic to explain the pattern of cross-sex romantic relationships and, as a consequence, view heterosexual romantic pairings as natural, inevitable, and legitimate. Such romantic pairings should also be viewed as a product of the inherent qualities of maleness and femaleness: to be a member of one group requires romantically desiring members of the other. Deviance from the pattern should be viewed as wrong and unnatural. In an ongoing study, we present children with images of straight, gay, and lesbian couples, and ask them to rate their liking of the targets (among other questions). Preliminary findings are consistent with the operation of the inherence heuristic: 5- to 7-year-old children's responses to advertisements featuring same-sex couples often include rejection and disgust (e.g., “The two people cannot go together; it's just not good” and “They're two girls. They're not supposed to marry each other. Eww, eww, eww”).
A second illustration comes from three studies, conducted before President Barack Obama's election, that examined 5- to 10-year-olds' knowledge of and explanations for the lack of female, African American, and Latino U.S. presidents (Bigler et al. Reference Bigler, Arthur, Hughes and Patterson2008). Most children knew that these three groups had been excluded (i.e., they had detected the patterns linking the presidency exclusively to white men). When asked to explain the absence of women and people of color from the role, children's answers frequently reflected the operation of the inherence heuristic. So, for example, most children failed to note past circumstances or external constraints (e.g., legal restrictions, discrimination) and instead reasoned that the excluded individuals were ill-suited for or uninterested in the role (e.g., “Women aren't as smart as men” and “Latinos would rather do other things, like drive trucks”). They also frequently relied on precedent to justify their belief that women, Latinos, and African-Americans should be excluded (e.g., “The presidents are always boys”).
Finally, the inherence heuristic is a promising theoretical base for the design of intervention programs aimed at reducing stereotyping and prejudice. Many extant interventions have proven ineffective or impractical for reducing prejudice. For example, counterstereotypic models are relatively ineffective because they are outnumbered by traditional, stereotypic models and are often misremembered. Explicitly teaching children about discrimination – an external attribution for observed group differences – might reduce reliance on the inherence heuristic, thereby reducing intergroup biases. The recommendation to discuss intergroup biases explicitly with children is consistent with the DIT and assessments of the benefits versus risks of such lessons (Bigler & Liben Reference Bigler and Liben2007; Bigler & Wright Reference Bigler and Wright2014).
Much progress has been made in mapping the mechanisms by which individuals develop stereotypes (i.e., ascribing attributes to others on the basis of membership in a particular social group) and prejudices (i.e., positive or negative affective reactions to others on the basis of membership in a particular social group). Nonetheless, aspects of the complex processes remain unexplained. Cimpian and Salomon's (C&S's) proposal that human thought is characterized by a bias to explain observed patterns in terms of the inherent properties of their components makes an important contribution to our understanding of the ontogeny of social stereotyping and prejudice. We review some of what is known about the causes of stereotyping and prejudice and describe novel insights that stem from C&S's work.
Stereotypes and prejudice are founded on categorization. There are myriad bases on which humans might be parsed into groups, and thus one or more mechanisms lead children to attend to some (and ignore other) bases for classifying people. Bigler and Liben's (Reference Bigler and Liben2006; Reference Bigler and Liben2007) developmental intergroup theory (DIT) posited that evolution led to a flexible cognitive system that motivates and equips children to infer from environmental data which bases of classification are important within a given context. DIT proposes that the psychological salience of grouping criteria (e.g., gender, age) increases when adults label groups needlessly (e.g., “Good morning, girls and boys” rather than “Good morning, students”) or in the service of organizing the environment (e.g., assigning desks by gender).
In addition to the explicit marking of attributes, DIT posits that implicit sorting of humans by particular dimensions (e.g., race, age) increases the psychological salience of such group criteria. One powerful example is de facto segregation. Although segregation affects stereotyping and prejudice via its effect on familiarity (Pettigrew & Tropp Reference Pettigrew, Tropp and Oskamp2000), DIT proposes an additional, inferential, constructivist process in which children notice perceptual similarities among those who live, work, and socialize together and then infer that these observed social divisions are caused by meaningful, inherent differences among groups (Bigler & Liben Reference Bigler and Liben2006). The inherence heuristic is just such an inferential process and adds a novel component: it leads children to view the patterns of group sorting as natural, legitimate, and good.
Bigler and Liben (Reference Bigler and Liben2006) argued that once a particular basis of classification becomes salient and is used to parse humans into groups, multiple mechanisms contribute to the development of social stereotypes and prejudice. In addition to constructivist processes (e.g., essentialist thought, illusory correlations, in-group bias), DIT proposes that children detect veridical correlates (e.g., activities, roles) associated with particular social groups (e.g., women and cheerleading; men and football). The inherence heuristic expands this account by arguing that children interpret (rather than merely learn) such links. Specifically, children construct schemata about social groups that reflect their belief that the observed correlates (e.g., roles) are inherent to the groups. Simultaneously, correlates are interpreted through stereotypic views of the groups with which they are linked. (For example, medical professions are viewed as more nurturing when performed by women than men.)
We provide two illustrations of the utility of the inherence heuristic for understanding stereotyping and prejudice. The first case concerns the development of heterosexist attitudes (Clark & Bigler Reference Clark and Bigler2013). Heterosexual couples and parents appear more often in children's environments than their nonheterosexual counterparts, as a result both of the greater statistical frequency of the former and societal prejudice against the latter (Martin Reference Martin2009). Thus, children repeatedly observe that romantic relationships include one man and one woman, an implicit sorting of the type hypothesized by DIT to facilitate attention to gender. According to C&S, children should use the inherence heuristic to explain the pattern of cross-sex romantic relationships and, as a consequence, view heterosexual romantic pairings as natural, inevitable, and legitimate. Such romantic pairings should also be viewed as a product of the inherent qualities of maleness and femaleness: to be a member of one group requires romantically desiring members of the other. Deviance from the pattern should be viewed as wrong and unnatural. In an ongoing study, we present children with images of straight, gay, and lesbian couples, and ask them to rate their liking of the targets (among other questions). Preliminary findings are consistent with the operation of the inherence heuristic: 5- to 7-year-old children's responses to advertisements featuring same-sex couples often include rejection and disgust (e.g., “The two people cannot go together; it's just not good” and “They're two girls. They're not supposed to marry each other. Eww, eww, eww”).
A second illustration comes from three studies, conducted before President Barack Obama's election, that examined 5- to 10-year-olds' knowledge of and explanations for the lack of female, African American, and Latino U.S. presidents (Bigler et al. Reference Bigler, Arthur, Hughes and Patterson2008). Most children knew that these three groups had been excluded (i.e., they had detected the patterns linking the presidency exclusively to white men). When asked to explain the absence of women and people of color from the role, children's answers frequently reflected the operation of the inherence heuristic. So, for example, most children failed to note past circumstances or external constraints (e.g., legal restrictions, discrimination) and instead reasoned that the excluded individuals were ill-suited for or uninterested in the role (e.g., “Women aren't as smart as men” and “Latinos would rather do other things, like drive trucks”). They also frequently relied on precedent to justify their belief that women, Latinos, and African-Americans should be excluded (e.g., “The presidents are always boys”).
Finally, the inherence heuristic is a promising theoretical base for the design of intervention programs aimed at reducing stereotyping and prejudice. Many extant interventions have proven ineffective or impractical for reducing prejudice. For example, counterstereotypic models are relatively ineffective because they are outnumbered by traditional, stereotypic models and are often misremembered. Explicitly teaching children about discrimination – an external attribution for observed group differences – might reduce reliance on the inherence heuristic, thereby reducing intergroup biases. The recommendation to discuss intergroup biases explicitly with children is consistent with the DIT and assessments of the benefits versus risks of such lessons (Bigler & Liben Reference Bigler and Liben2007; Bigler & Wright Reference Bigler and Wright2014).