Cimpian & Salomon (C&S) argue that humans generate causal/explanatory accounts of observed patterns by using the naïve reasoner's inherent heuristic model (IHM) and later the developmentally sophisticated essentialist model (EM). We worry that there is little to distinguish the IHM from existing psychological accounts relying on traditional cues to causality; further, there is no mechanism for the transition from IHM to EM.
C&S propose that a naïve reasoner selects features of objects that are inherent (i.e., properties of the here and now that are salient and immediately accessible or semantically associated). Using this information, the reasoner develops a causal/explanatory story about the observed pattern. Our questions are: How does the reasoner make up this causal story from these inherent properties? What makes it a causal story and not, simply, a sequence of juxtaposed salient properties? The IHM seems to require that the causal story preexist in the mind of the reasoner.
To bootstrap her story, the reasoner needs to use already established causal links, or something else, not included in C&S's theory. For instance, in the orange juice example, the reasoner builds a causal story associating the tanginess of the orange juice with waking. But why think that a tangy flavor rather than any other equally salient property of orange juice causes one to become alert? One way to answer this question is to assume the reasoner uses previously acquired associations to provide this causal link. But if so, building a causal story becomes an altogether different activity than the authors describe. Reasoners build causal stories from a rich repertoire of established causal links, seeking explanatory fit between the existing causal network and the new causal element. Before generating her story, the reasoner is already aware of many causal links between the inherent properties of the focal object. For instance, breakfast may be associated with the coldness of orange juice, its tanginess, its bright yellow color, or its sweetness. Why prefer tanginess to any other salient characteristic to build the explanation of why people drink OJ in the morning, unless the basis of this story was somehow already formed in the reasoner's mind? Furthermore, invoking semantic associations seems to allow significant room for story generation. Additionally, the IHM lacks reference to the significant body of research that illuminates how cues might acquire salience based not only on physical stimulus properties but learned and unlearned properties (e.g., Baker et al. Reference Baker, Murphy, Vallée-Tourangeau, Shanks, Holyoak and Medin1996). For example, C&S reject the statistical predictiveness of a cue as particularly relevant; but research on association formation describes in detail the mechanisms related to predictiveness and to salience or associability that accompanies learning (e.g., Baetu & Baker Reference Baetu and Baker2009; Le Pelley et al. Reference Le Pelley, Reimers, Calvini, Spears, Beesley and Murphy2010; Mackintosh Reference Mackintosh1975; Murphy et al. Reference Murphy, Mondragón and Murphy2009). An altogether different property of a cue involves preparedness (e.g., Garcia & Koelling Reference Garcia and Koelling1966; Öhman & Mineka Reference Öhman and Mineka2001). Certain cues go together better than others. For example, animals learn that flavor cues are much more readily associated with illness than are audiovisual cues. Is this because of an existing causal story? If not, why not? How would we distinguish it from one?
The second set of difficulties we wish to raise concerns the transition from the physical salient properties in the IHM to the essences in the EM. By essence, C&S mean “a certain internal, physical, microstructural je ne sais quoi that is unique to each kind and that invariably causes its members to display the full complement of typical features” (sect. 4.1, para. 1). We ask, how does the reasoner transition from believing that salient inherent properties to believing that internal, invisible essences have a causal/explanatory role? What relates a salient property to an essence? Possibly, the inherent features of an object picked out by the naïve reasoner are part of the essence that the sophisticated reasoner believes have a causal/explanatory role. Initially, C&S express this view but later claim that the part–whole relation is too formal to capture the real connection between inherent features and causal essences of things. But then, what is this connection?
C&S need to supply much more to bridge the gap between IHM and EM. The reasoner's transition from IHM to EM is not self-justifying. Why would the reasoner prefer causal explanations of observed patterns in terms of unobservable (and possibly undeterminable) essences? Is the transition from IHM to EM something reasoners find rationally compelling, or is it something they learn? What is gained by appealing to such mysterious entities as essences? Why assume that an object's relatively few essential properties explain its behavior? Why does the “inside” that accounts for the whole need to be a single property (the essence of a thing on C&S's understanding seems to be a “single inherent [internal] feature” [sect. 4.3, para. 2])? Instead, could the reasoner think that the many observable properties of a thing explain its few internal and unobservable ones? Would that still count as an EM and, if not, why not (see Oderberg Reference Oderberg2007)?
Why is the EM a developmental advance over the IHM, when on the one hand the IHM requires more than an ability to pick out merely inherent properties, and on the other hand the EM does not tell us what distinctive and supposedly cognitively advantageous role that essences play for the reasoner when she provides causal/explanatory accounts of observed patterns?
As described by Tversky and Kahneman (Reference Tversky and Kahneman1974), an heuristic is not simply a shorthand story but a testable model with a small number of variables that determine behavior. The model here is so unconstrained that any number of variables might be at work. C&S provide a descriptive phenomenology that does not elucidate the development processes involved.
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Cimpian & Salomon (C&S) argue that humans generate causal/explanatory accounts of observed patterns by using the naïve reasoner's inherent heuristic model (IHM) and later the developmentally sophisticated essentialist model (EM). We worry that there is little to distinguish the IHM from existing psychological accounts relying on traditional cues to causality; further, there is no mechanism for the transition from IHM to EM.
C&S propose that a naïve reasoner selects features of objects that are inherent (i.e., properties of the here and now that are salient and immediately accessible or semantically associated). Using this information, the reasoner develops a causal/explanatory story about the observed pattern. Our questions are: How does the reasoner make up this causal story from these inherent properties? What makes it a causal story and not, simply, a sequence of juxtaposed salient properties? The IHM seems to require that the causal story preexist in the mind of the reasoner.
To bootstrap her story, the reasoner needs to use already established causal links, or something else, not included in C&S's theory. For instance, in the orange juice example, the reasoner builds a causal story associating the tanginess of the orange juice with waking. But why think that a tangy flavor rather than any other equally salient property of orange juice causes one to become alert? One way to answer this question is to assume the reasoner uses previously acquired associations to provide this causal link. But if so, building a causal story becomes an altogether different activity than the authors describe. Reasoners build causal stories from a rich repertoire of established causal links, seeking explanatory fit between the existing causal network and the new causal element. Before generating her story, the reasoner is already aware of many causal links between the inherent properties of the focal object. For instance, breakfast may be associated with the coldness of orange juice, its tanginess, its bright yellow color, or its sweetness. Why prefer tanginess to any other salient characteristic to build the explanation of why people drink OJ in the morning, unless the basis of this story was somehow already formed in the reasoner's mind? Furthermore, invoking semantic associations seems to allow significant room for story generation. Additionally, the IHM lacks reference to the significant body of research that illuminates how cues might acquire salience based not only on physical stimulus properties but learned and unlearned properties (e.g., Baker et al. Reference Baker, Murphy, Vallée-Tourangeau, Shanks, Holyoak and Medin1996). For example, C&S reject the statistical predictiveness of a cue as particularly relevant; but research on association formation describes in detail the mechanisms related to predictiveness and to salience or associability that accompanies learning (e.g., Baetu & Baker Reference Baetu and Baker2009; Le Pelley et al. Reference Le Pelley, Reimers, Calvini, Spears, Beesley and Murphy2010; Mackintosh Reference Mackintosh1975; Murphy et al. Reference Murphy, Mondragón and Murphy2009). An altogether different property of a cue involves preparedness (e.g., Garcia & Koelling Reference Garcia and Koelling1966; Öhman & Mineka Reference Öhman and Mineka2001). Certain cues go together better than others. For example, animals learn that flavor cues are much more readily associated with illness than are audiovisual cues. Is this because of an existing causal story? If not, why not? How would we distinguish it from one?
The second set of difficulties we wish to raise concerns the transition from the physical salient properties in the IHM to the essences in the EM. By essence, C&S mean “a certain internal, physical, microstructural je ne sais quoi that is unique to each kind and that invariably causes its members to display the full complement of typical features” (sect. 4.1, para. 1). We ask, how does the reasoner transition from believing that salient inherent properties to believing that internal, invisible essences have a causal/explanatory role? What relates a salient property to an essence? Possibly, the inherent features of an object picked out by the naïve reasoner are part of the essence that the sophisticated reasoner believes have a causal/explanatory role. Initially, C&S express this view but later claim that the part–whole relation is too formal to capture the real connection between inherent features and causal essences of things. But then, what is this connection?
C&S need to supply much more to bridge the gap between IHM and EM. The reasoner's transition from IHM to EM is not self-justifying. Why would the reasoner prefer causal explanations of observed patterns in terms of unobservable (and possibly undeterminable) essences? Is the transition from IHM to EM something reasoners find rationally compelling, or is it something they learn? What is gained by appealing to such mysterious entities as essences? Why assume that an object's relatively few essential properties explain its behavior? Why does the “inside” that accounts for the whole need to be a single property (the essence of a thing on C&S's understanding seems to be a “single inherent [internal] feature” [sect. 4.3, para. 2])? Instead, could the reasoner think that the many observable properties of a thing explain its few internal and unobservable ones? Would that still count as an EM and, if not, why not (see Oderberg Reference Oderberg2007)?
Why is the EM a developmental advance over the IHM, when on the one hand the IHM requires more than an ability to pick out merely inherent properties, and on the other hand the EM does not tell us what distinctive and supposedly cognitively advantageous role that essences play for the reasoner when she provides causal/explanatory accounts of observed patterns?
As described by Tversky and Kahneman (Reference Tversky and Kahneman1974), an heuristic is not simply a shorthand story but a testable model with a small number of variables that determine behavior. The model here is so unconstrained that any number of variables might be at work. C&S provide a descriptive phenomenology that does not elucidate the development processes involved.