2. The view that suicide terrorists are psychologically normal and not suicidal

In retrospect, it is easy to understand why most scholars initially believed that suicide terrorists are psychologically normal and not suicidal. After all:

1. 1. Most commentators who have claimed otherwise seem to be committing the fundamental attribution error.

2. 2. Past research has shown that most people who carry out violence for organizations are socially influenced but psychologically normal.

3. 3. Most organizations specifically prohibit mentally disturbed people from joining, so they can avoid potential security risks.

4. 4. Most people who personally knew past suicide attackers reported that they were psychologically normal and driven by self-sacrifice.

5. 5. Initial studies of suicide terrorists did not uncover any evidence of psychopathology or suicidality.

I agree that these points are each true. However, I question their relevance and application to suicide terrorists' underlying psychology.

It is certainly accurate that controlled experiments have shown that ordinary people can be transformed into violent actors through a series of social psychological techniques (Milgram Reference Milgram1963; Sherif et al. Reference Sherif, Harvey, White, Hood and Sherif1961; Zimbardo Reference Zimbardo1972). And in accordance with past studies on mass killing and institutional violence (Browning Reference Browning1998; Staub Reference Staub1989; Waller Reference Waller2002), previous research on terrorists has found that the vast majority do not have personal pathologies or psychological disorders – they were relatively ordinary before they were recruited and indoctrinated by terrorist organizations (Gunaratna Reference Gunaratna2002; Hoffman Reference Hoffman1998; Williams Reference Williams2002). But it is simultaneously possible that this past research is valuable and accurate, and that it does not explain suicide terrorists. Atran (Reference Atran2003) seems to have overlooked this possibility, concluding that because Milgram (Reference Milgram1963) showed that “extreme behaviors may be elicited and rendered commonplace by particular historical, political, social, and ideological contexts,” suicide terrorists must be “nonpathological individuals” who “respond to novel situational factors” (Atran Reference Atran2003, p. 1536).

As far as I know, there are no replications or extensions of the Milgram (Reference Milgram1963), Sherif et al. (Reference Sherif, Harvey, White, Hood and Sherif1961), or Zimbardo (Reference Zimbardo1972) experiments which show that many psychologically healthy people can be convinced to commit suicide to serve a greater good. Following orders to harm others seems very different from following orders to kill oneself.

Similarly, Post et al. (Reference Post, Ali, Henderson, Shanfield, Victoroff and Weine2009) asserted that “Understanding the psychology of suicide terrorism must necessarily be rooted in an understanding of the psychology of terrorism” (p. 18), and then inferred that the psychological normalcy of regular terrorists denotes a similar psychological normalcy among suicide attackers. But upon closer examination, it appears there are fundamental psychological differences between the tens of thousands of terrorists who risk their lives for the cause – but fight to survive – and the tiny percentage who intentionally blow themselves up. In fact, many suicide bombers are barely terrorist members at all – they are community members with no prior terrorist experience or affiliation who are only there to carry out suicide attacks (Pedahzur Reference Pedahzur2005). And they largely constitute a self-selected sample, having chosen to volunteer for suicide missions, unlike the vast majority of their peers. Of course, by definition, self-selection suggests a difference.

Interviews of other members of terrorist organizations conducted by Berko (Reference Berko2007) and Merari (Reference Merari2010) showed further differences between them and suicide attackers. Notably, when asked if they had ever considered carrying out a “martyrdom operation,” most regular terrorists and terrorist dispatchers said no.

In general, when assessing whether people are lying, it helps to consider whether their statements benefit them or not. Historians have referred to this as the “criterion of embarrassment,” and the United States legal system has a similar classification for admissions people make against their own self-interest. The rationale is that when a speaker “reveals something incriminating, embarrassing, or otherwise damaging…the lack of incentive to make a damaging statement is an indication of the statement's reliability” (U.S. Legal 2011).

When regular terrorists say they would not intentionally die for the cause, their statements directly contradict terrorist propaganda and the claims about total commitment made by their leaders. Furthermore, it seems unlikely that they are lying, because in their social context, admitting that they would not volunteer for “martyrdom operations” is almost like saying that they don't have what it takes to be heroes. Many seemed almost ashamed or defensive about their admissions, and some offered excuses (Merari Reference Merari2010). Overall, it appears that most terrorists are very different from those who self-select for suicide missions.

Another well-established principle that may have been applied to suicide terrorists rather prematurely is that organizations specifically prohibit mentally disturbed people from joining. In general, this is often true. But the founder of the CIA's Center for the Analysis of Personality and Political Behavior and current chair of the American Psychiatric Association's Task Force for National and International Terrorism and Violence may have gone too far when he stated – in reference to the 9/11 hijackers – “terrorist groups make it a point to expel, or not to admit, emotionally unstable people. After all, they'd be a security risk. You wouldn't want an emotionally unstable person in the Green Berets; you wouldn't want an emotionally unstable person in a terrorist operation or cell” (Weaver Reference Weaver2006).

This view has been repeated by experts around the world, and at first, it sounds very logical. There is no doubt that many organizations screen applicants for mental health prior to entry. And if this claim is accurate, scholars could reasonably argue that most suicide bombers must be psychologically normal, because if they were not, they would never get the organizational support they usually rely upon.

Despite extensive research, however, I was unable to find compelling evidence that terrorist organizations actually behave in this manner. Although Brym (Reference Brym2007), Hassan (Reference Hassan2010), Post et al. (Reference Post, Ali, Henderson, Shanfield, Victoroff and Weine2009), and Taarnby (Reference Taarnby2003) each make this claim, only Post et al. (Reference Post, Ali, Henderson, Shanfield, Victoroff and Weine2009) provide any support for it. They purport to have confirmed that terrorist organizations prioritize the mental health of their members based on the example of just one terrorist – not a suicide attacker – who was sent to a psychiatrist after struggling with post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) symptoms.

I have come to believe that the security risks of using emotionally unstable people for suicide attacks have been overstated. Like anyone handling a potentially dangerous substance or weapon, terrorist organizations naturally take precautions to minimize risks. They keep most suicide attackers in the dark about their operational priorities; information is only shared on a need-to-know basis (Gunaratna Reference Gunaratna2002; Hassan Reference Hassan2001; Williams Reference Williams2002). They certainly do not take a suicidal recruit, give him directions to their leaders' houses, give him a map of all hidden weapons caches, and then give him that month's schedule of upcoming attacks.

In fact, a number of past suicide bombers have been arrested and successfully interrogated, and their sponsoring organizations have not simply crumbled because of it. And even if someone is emotionally unstable, that does not mean he or she cannot be strategically used. In the vast majority of cases, it makes more sense for terrorist organizations to use their most expendable assets to carry out suicide attacks, because they can only use them once.

On rare occasions, recruiters have openly acknowledged this. In interviews with Berko (Reference Berko2007), a suicide bomber dispatcher known as Mahmoud admitted that “I asked them to find me guys who were desperate and sad” (p. 1). Berko (Reference Berko2007) adds that Mahmoud sought “social nonentities … men and women who have trouble finding themselves, sometimes influenced by anger and bitterness at their marginality” (p. 7). Along similar lines, a Palestinian Authority general told Stern (Reference Stern2003) that the profile of a typical Hamas suicide bomber was:

But again, these accounts of suicide bombers were the exception, not the norm.

In fact, another major reason for the scholarly consensus that suicide terrorists are psychologically normal, not suicidal, and driven by self-sacrifice, is that this was the most common description offered by those who personally knew them. For instance, from 1996 to 1999, an international relief worker interviewed many dispatchers, friends, and family members of deceased suicide bombers. She also reportedly interviewed some failed suicide attackers themselves. Her conclusion, which was published in The New Yorker just two months after 9/11, was that “None of the suicide bombers – they ranged in age from eighteen to thirty-eight – conformed to the typical profile of the suicidal personality. None of them were uneducated, desperately poor, simple-minded, or depressed … They all seemed to be entirely normal members of their families. They were polite and serious, and in their communities they were considered to be model youths” (Hassan Reference Hassan2001, para. 14). Her later publications seem to indicate that this description was mostly based on second-hand accounts: “Almost all were described as courageous, resolute, and serious with no evidence of brainwashing, coercion, or psychological problems” (Hassan Reference Hassan and Richardson2006, p. 39).

Similarly, Townsend (Reference Townsend2007) conducted a review of five “empirical reports” on the subject: three that depended largely upon interviews of the deceased suicide terrorist's friends and family members, and two that were based on interviews of regular terrorists, not suicide terrorists. As she concluded, “The results of [her] review strongly suggest that suicide terrorists are not truly suicidal, and that attempting to find commonalities between suicide terrorists and others who die by suicide is likely to be an unhelpful path for any discipline wishing to further understanding of suicidal behavior” (p. 47).

Interviews can yield valuable information, and the statements of those who knew suicide attackers can be enlightening. In the absence of other information, they are sometimes all we have to go on. However, even when sources provide consistent answers, that does not necessarily mean they are reliable. When it comes to suicide attacks, the vast majority of terrorists, family members, and suicide terrorists have insisted that these are actually “martyrdom operations” inspired by the desire to sacrifice for God and the cause, and that those who carry them out are mentally healthy. But their statements often appear laden with terrorist propaganda. As Hassan (Reference Hassan2001) acknowledged, “When they spoke, they all tended to use the same phrases” (para. 14). Their statements passed neither the “criterion of embarrassment” nor the “admission against interest” tests, and as I outline in Chapter 2, there are a number of reasons to doubt their veracity.

A final reason why many scholars believe that suicide terrorists are psychologically normal and not suicidal is that initial studies did not uncover any evidence of psychopathology.

One widely cited example comes from a prominent scholar and former adviser for two presidential campaigns who purported to have conducted the most “comprehensive and reliable survey now available” of all 462 suicide terrorists from 1980 to 2003 (Pape Reference Pape2005, p. 202). He found:

By logging every suicide attack they could find from 1980 to 2003, Pape (Reference Pape2005) and his research team created a valuable database that can be used to assess suicide terrorism on a global level. And even more impressively, in the years that followed, they expanded their database to include more than 2,200 attacks from 1980 to 2011.

But this research seems better on breadth than depth, and does not appear to have accurately captured the psychology of suicide attackers. The U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention's data indicate that approximately 5% of the population is depressed – and this percentage may be even higher in certain war-torn contexts. If suicide terrorists are representative of the population at large, the chances that none of the 462 suicide terrorists from this sample were depressed would be approximately 1 in 19,574,665,823. It seems implausible that any group of 462 people, anywhere on the globe, would fit the description of what this study found: zero members who were depressed, major criminals, gay, adulterers, or living with shame. The United States Congress would not pass this test; I doubt a large monastery would.

The lesson I draw from this is that in many cases, we know next to nothing about an individual suicide terrorist. And for many of the incidents in Pape's database, only the suicide terrorist's gender, organizational sponsor, and attack details were available. We should be careful to avoid assuming that their mental health problems will be widely reported and easily identifiable – and that the absence of such reports indicates their psychologically normalcy.

3. Comparisons with people who commit conventional suicide

One of the first post-9/11 studies to suggest a significant connection between conventional suicide and suicide terrorism was authored by Lester et al. (Reference Lester, Yang and Lindsay2004), who recommended that “if detailed biographies of terrorists and suicide bombers were to be collected, evidence might well be found of a high frequency of risk factors for suicide” (p. 292). In response to this call, I conducted an in-depth review of primary sources, such as suicide notes, manifestos, diary entries, internet posts, love letters, and martyrdom videos, as well as secondary sources, such as previous scholarly research, government reports, electronic news and video archives, existing data sets, and legal documents. I present the results throughout the book, but particularly in Chapter 3 and Appendix A.

I found evidence of more than 130 suicide terrorists who appeared to have risk factors for conventional suicide: 44 with depression, PTSD, or other mental health problems; 12 with serious physical injuries or disabilities; 66 who had suffered the unexpected death of a loved one or close friend; and 104 who had struggled with a precipitating crisis event. This is certainly not an exhaustive list; there may be thousands of suicide terrorists whose secret struggles still remain hidden. But obtaining more information about these attackers' lives is a step in the right direction.

The suicide terrorists' personal crises included divorce and adultery scandals, unwanted pregnancies, major job problems, serious health problems, and the death of a loved one. Other suicide attackers, who could not be quantified, had reportedly been raped or sexually assaulted, addicted to heroin or other drugs, or struggling with other physical or mental health problems. Of course, not everyone who has these problems becomes suicidal. But past research has identified very similar personal crises among those who commit conventional suicide, including the loss of employment, economic distress, family problems, romantic problems, poor health, and the death of a loved one (Durkheim Reference Durkheim1897; Farber Reference Farber1968; Maris et al. Reference Maris, Berman and Silverman2000).

In a number of these cases, there appeared to be a direct cause-and-effect link between the crisis and the individual's decision to seek death. The crisis – and the individual's subsequent inability to cope – could help explain why many of these people who had no prior terrorism experience or terrorist affiliation suddenly volunteered to blow themselves up. Something must have changed in their lives, and the crisis event seems like the most obvious factor. For example, Wafa Idris, the first Palestinian female suicide bomber, suffered a miscarriage that left her unable to get pregnant again, and she was subsequently divorced by her husband. Intensely shamed, she returned home to live with her mother, and then eventually blew herself up. Although this is purely speculative, it seems possible that if not for the miscarriage and divorce, she might still be alive today.

A reasonable question is whether these mental health problems and personal crises are more common among suicide terrorists than other terrorists. Merari's (Reference Merari2010) interviews and psychological assessments of preemptively arrested suicide bombers, regular terrorists, and organizers of suicide attacks suggest so. Although his sample was relatively small (n = 41), his research team found significantly more suicidal tendencies, depressive tendencies, PTSD, previous (non-terrorist) suicide attempts, and dependent/avoidant personality types among the suicide bombers (Merari Reference Merari2010). The regular terrorists and organizers of suicide attacks genuinely appeared more psychologically normal. I provide a detailed analysis of this study in Chapter 3.

I also uncovered a number of direct quotes from suicide terrorists that revealed their psychological pain. Given the “criterion of embarrassment” and “admission against interest” tests discussed earlier – and the powerful stigmas against admitting mental health problems in these attackers' social contexts – their statements appear credible.

For example, Umar Abdulmutallab, who attempted to blow up an airplane over Detroit on Christmas day 2009, had previously posted online that: “i am in a situation where i do not have a friend… i have no one to speak too, no one to consult, no one to support me and i feel depressed and lonely. i do not know what to do” (Greene Reference Greene2009, para. 18). Bryant Neal Vinas confessed that after dropping out of the army because it was too “mentally overwhelming,” he ultimately volunteered for a suicide attack in Pakistan because he was “having difficult time with the altitude. I was getting very sick, so I felt that it would be easier” (Neumeister & Hays Reference Neumeister and Hays2012, para. 23). And a female suicide bomber interviewed by Berko (Reference Berko2007) revealed that after she missed what she thought was her last chance for marriage, “my life wasn't worth anything and my father wouldn't let me marry the boy I wanted to, so I found a Fatah operative in Jenin and volunteered, to get back at my father” (p. 1).

Another example I recently discovered comes from FBI records of an intercepted phone call between Shaker Masri and his girlfriend. Just days after she dumped him, he decided to become a suicide bomber. And then he seemed to melt down over the phone, exclaiming “I, for myself, I cannot; I cannot; I cannot; I cannot, cannot, cannot. I do not; I do not. Life is not worth living for me. I cannot enjoy life. I have not enjoyed it since I was eighteen. I have not enjoyed life since I was a child. I lost that innocence. I need to regain it back” (Parker Reference Parker2010, p. 17).

In the majority of cases, the suicide terrorists did not make admissions of this sort – or if they did, I could not find evidence of them. Of course, this does not necessarily mean they were psychologically normal or selflessly sacrificing their lives for an ideological cause. After all, even if these attackers were suicidal, they would have a very good reason to lie: Given the ability to control their public reputation through the words they utter, most people would rather be remembered as heroic martyrs than suicidal cowards.

In some cases, there seemed to be a clear discrepancy between the ways suicide terrorists described their own mental health and the evidence from other sources. For instance, in the note left behind by Nicky Reilly, a.k.a. Mohamad Abdulaziz Rashid Saeed, he insisted, “I have not been brainwashed or indoctrinated. I am not insane. I am not doing it to escape a life of problems or hardships. I am doing what God wants from his mujahideen” (Reilly Reference Reilly2008). But after his attempted attack, psychiatrists reported that Reilly had an IQ of 83, was thought to have the mental age of a 10-year-old, and suffered from Asperger's syndrome and obsessive-compulsive disorder, among other psychological problems. His family was also a disaster: His parents separated before he was born, his stepfather was a convicted heroin dealer, and his younger brother had been sent to prison for 6 years after robbing a man and beating him unconscious. And Reilly had previously attempted suicide by intentionally overdosing on drugs, stabbing himself in the stomach, and slitting his own wrists.

Mohamed Atta, ringleader of the 19 hijackers who struck on 9/11 and the first pilot to crash into the World Trade Center towers, also seemed quite comparable to people who commit conventional suicide, although he never admitted it. In Chapter 4, I present results from my psychological autopsy of Atta, which uncovered evidence that he struggled with at least four risk factors for suicide: (1) social isolation, (2) depression, (3) guilt and shame, and (4) hopelessness (see also Lankford Reference Lankford2012a).

Atta appears to have displayed 8 of the 11 symptoms of depression identified by the National Institute of Mental Health (2009): (1) persistent sad, anxious, or “empty” mood; (2) feelings of hopelessness, pessimism; (3) feelings of guilt, worthlessness, helplessness; (4) loss of interest or pleasure in hobbies and activities; (5) decreased energy, fatigue, being “slowed down”; (6) appetite and/or weight changes; (7) thoughts of death or suicide, suicide attempts; and (8) restlessness, irritability. For comparison's sake, many clinically depressed people exhibit fewer symptoms than Atta did. Among the details that stand out: Atta had struggled with social isolation since childhood; insisted that “joy kills the heart;” avoided laughing whenever possible; condemned fun, music, and delicious food; complained about needing to eat to stay alive; wrote an angry last will and testament at age 27; was overcome by shame about the subject of sex; and lamented, “how much time have we wasted in our lives?”

Past research on suicide pacts suggests that every member of a group need not be suicidal, at least in the conventional sense, for them all to kill themselves (Maris et al. Reference Maris, Berman and Silverman2000). So one possibility is that some of the other 9/11 hijackers were suicidal in unconventional or indirectly self-destructive ways. Nevertheless, a preliminary review presented in Chapter 4 reveals similarities between some of them and others who commit suicide for conventional reasons. For example, Tawfiq bin Attash, who volunteered to be one of the hijackers but failed to gain entry to the United States, had lost both his brother and his lower right leg in a traumatic battle in Afghanistan. Marwan al-Shehhi, who crashed the second plane into the World Trade Center, had suffered from the unexpected death of his father when he was 19 years old, had struggled to cope, and had withdrawn from his family. Hani Hanjour, who crashed into the U.S. Pentagon, was apparently crippled by insecurity and failure, which had depressed him. Pilot Ziad Jarrah, who intended to strike the U.S. Capitol Building but failed, had complained about being “dissatisfied with his life” and had insisted that he “didn't want to leave Earth in a natural way” (McDermott Reference McDermott2005, p. 206; National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States 2004). In addition, hijacker Wail al Shehri reportedly “fell into a deep depression” in late 1999 that was so bad that he had to leave his job and seek medical treatment: “His friends say it was not just depression, but perhaps even a suicidal tendency” (Sennott Reference Sennott2002, para. 13). And hijacker Ahmed al Nami's behavior apparently became so strange that his family feared a “bipolar disorder” (Sennott Reference Sennott2002, para. 18). Less is known about the others, but there is certainly sufficient reason to question their mental health.

4. Comparisons with people who commit murder-suicide

Within the broader category of murder-suicide, there is a subset of offenders who seem to be a natural comparison to suicide terrorists: rampage, workplace, and school shooters who similarly carry out premeditated, mass murder-suicide attacks that kill innocent bystanders, before killing themselves. Like certain suicide terrorists, some of these mass shooters planned their attacks for months or years before finally striking, and some of them also left behind notes or explanations in which they claimed to be fighting for a cause.

On the surface, perhaps the most significant difference between suicide terrorists and suicidal rampage, workplace, and school shooters is the role of organizations: suicide terrorists usually work with them, whereas mass shooters almost always act on their own. However, as reviewed earlier, many suicide terrorists are self-selected and decide for themselves that they are ready to die. For these attackers, the organization may provide rationalizations for violence, suggested targets, and the explosive device. But those who act alone can obtain these same things, just from different sources. They may get their rationalizations for violence from radical websites, their ideas for targets from news coverage of previous attacks, and their weapons from local shops.

To begin identifying other similarities and differences between these types of attackers, I conducted the first combined quantitative assessment of suicide terrorists and rampage, workplace, and school shooters who attempted suicide, which I detail in Chapter 6 (see also Lankford Reference Lankford2013a). The study was of all suicide attacks that could be identified from previous scholarship, government reports, or media databases, occurred in the United States between 1990 and 2010, yielded a minimum of two casualties, and were not primarily domestic in nature (targeting family members or significant others). The FBI definition was used to assign attacks to the terrorist category, and all remaining public attacks that did not land in the school or workplace categories were designated as rampage shootings. The resulting dataset included 81 suicide attacks in total: 12 suicide terrorist strikes, 18 rampage shootings, 16 school shootings, and 35 workplace shootings.

For details about each attacker's life, I searched primary source documents, previous scholarship, government reports, and media databases. This data collection method has been valuable for research on similar attackers in the past (Kelly Reference Kelly2010; Larkin Reference Larkin2009; Newman et al. Reference Newman, Fox, Roth, Mehta and Harding2004). Overall, ANOVA, chi-square, and multinomial logistic regression tests did not indicate that the pre-attack struggles of suicide terrorists were significantly different from the pre-attack struggles of rampage shooters and school shooters who attempted suicide. All three types of attackers appeared about equally likely to have struggled with mental health problems, social marginalization, family problems, work or school problems, and precipitating crisis events; almost equally likely to have prepared an explanation or suicide note before striking; and almost equally likely to have successfully ended up dead as a result of their attacks. It was the workplace shooters who seemed to be the most different type: their attacks occurred almost twice as often, yielded about half as many casualties, and appeared to be more directly linked to grudges against specific targeted victims.

Beyond some expected differences in their rhetoric, the biggest behavioral difference between the suicide terrorists, rampage shooters, and school shooters was their method of suicide attempt. Most rampage and school shooters shot themselves in the head, but only one suicide terrorist did this. It may be that the terrorist attackers were the most concerned with disguising their suicidal intent, which is more easily done by detonating an explosives-laden suicide vest, provoking “suicide by cop,” or crashing an airplane at a high rate of speed. With these attack methods, onlookers may be more apt to conclude that these attackers did not want to die, they were just willing to die, in order to accomplish their mission.

But if maximizing enemy fatalities was these suicide terrorists' primary goal, they were not particularly good at it. With the exception of 9/11, suicide terrorist attacks in the United States from 1990 to 2010 were actually less lethal than rampage and school shootings involving suicide attempts over the same period. This seems at odds with the conventional wisdom that suicide terrorists are psychologically normal attackers who sacrifice their lives for mission success, while rampage and school shooters are mentally unbalanced individuals who simply “snap” and begin shooting.

Upon closer inspection, the similarities between these various perpetrators of murder-suicide become even more clear. There have been cases of suicide terrorists who act and attack like suicidal mass shooters, and cases of suicidal mass shooters who act and attack like typical suicide terrorists. For instance, suicide terrorists Ali Hassan Abu Kamal, who opened fire at the Empire State building, Mir Aimal Kansi, who struck CIA headquarters, Hesham Mohamed Hadayet, who attacked Los Angeles International Airport, and Nidal Hasan, who struck the Fort Hood Army base, each claimed to be driven by the desire to serve their ideological cause. But much like suicidal mass shooters, they were each struggling with serious personal problems, attacked with firearms, and apparently intended to die as a result of their attacks. Abu Kamal shot himself in the head, while the other three expected to be shot and killed by police, which would constitute “suicide by cop.” On the other hand, Virgina Tech shooter Seung Hui Cho referred to himself as a “martyr” and claimed to be sacrificing his life for God, which sounds very similar to the statements made by Islamic suicide terrorists. And George Sodini reportedly considered blowing himself up on a public bus – much like a suicide bomber – a week before he opened fire on a Pittsburgh aerobics class and then shot himself in the head. Similarly, when Sebastian Bosse was found after shooting five people at his high school and then killing himself, he had explosive devices strapped to his body. And perhaps most dramatically, Columbine killers Eric Harris and Dylan Klebold had fantasized about using suicide terrorist tactics as well. Three years before 9/11, Harris stated that he and Klebold would like to “hijack a hell of a lot of bombs and crash a plane into NYC with us inside” (CNN 2001). This is eerily similar to what Al Qaeda's 19 hijackers eventually did, and suggests that these attackers may have been attracted to similarly grandiose methods of suicide due to their underlying psychological similarities.

Overall, a number of these attackers seemed to recognize that by committing acts of mass murder-suicide against random, innocent victims, they could combine the only surefire way for an average person to become famous with the only foolproof way to kill people and get away with it. After years of feeling like a failure, loser, victim, or outcast, they attempted to compensate through a desperate grasp for attention, social recognition, fame, and glory. But they also avoided the potential humiliation of arrest, detainment, and criminal punishment by committing suicide before they were caught. For suicide terrorists, this seems like one of those times when the terrorist organization's priorities are the same as the suicidal individual's. Both want attention. The terrorist organization benefits from publicity because its strategy is based on reaching as many hearts and minds as possible, then rallying them to the cause. And by filming martyrdom videos prior to their attacks, suicide bombers become convinced that in death they will be respected and worshipped, even though they will not get to experience their glory in the physical world. It should be emphasized that when it comes to homicide, the desire for fame and glory is an extraordinarily rare motive. The fact that it appears to be so common among certain suicide terrorists, rampage shooters, and school shooters seems to be another sign of their underlying similarities.

5. Comparisons with coerced, escapist, and indirectly suicidal people

In Chapter 7, I propose that there are four basic types of suicide terrorists: (1) conventional, (2) coerced, (3) escapist, and (4) indirect (see also Lankford Reference Lankford2014). Conventional suicide terrorists are comparable to people who commit suicide for conventional reasons. Coerced suicide terrorists become suicidal because they feel pressured and fear the organizational consequences of not carrying out a suicide attack. Escapist suicide terrorists become suicidal because they fear being captured or punished by the enemy. And indirect suicide terrorists become suicidal at an unconscious level: they orchestrate their deaths in ways that disguise their desire to die, even from themselves.

Because human psychology is so complex, it seems likely that some attackers will defy perfect categorization and thus be a combination of types. However, this typology could be useful for quickly assessing an individual suicide terrorist and identifying his or her primary motive for seeking death, be it personal problems, pressure from others, fear of an approaching enemy, or hidden self-destructive urges. In Appendix C, I present a chart with behavioral expectations and potential security countermeasures for each type.

To better understand the psychology of the coerced, escapist, and indirect types, it may help to compare them with people who commit suicide for similar reasons. For instance, consider the famous kamikaze pilots of Japan, who appear to have been long misunderstood. Atran (Reference Atran2003) subscribes to the conventional wisdom, describing them as “young, fairly well educated pilots who understood that pursuing conventional warfare would likely end in defeat. When collectively asked by Adm. Takijiro Onishi to volunteer for ‘special attack’ (tokkōtai) ‘transcending life and death,’ all stepped forward, despite assurances that refusal would carry no shame or punishment” (p. 1535). By this view, the kamikaze pilots were greatly influenced by social and situational factors, which inspired them to sacrifice their lives for a noble cause.

This is what many of us were taught in school, and until recently, I assumed it was accurate. But as renowned kamikaze expert Ohnuki-Tierney (Reference Ohnuki-Tierney2006) explains based on her extensive research, when the tokkōtai program was instituted, “none of the professional soldiers who had graduated from the naval and army academies volunteered” (p. 166). Lacking volunteers, the military drafted 4,000 boys and university students for this purpose. I contend that it was not ideology, not group commitment, and not altruistic self-sacrifice that led these pilots to carry out suicide attacks; I believe the Japanese military used coercion and brutality to essentially make them suicidal. In other words, these boys may have been psychologically normal prior to being drafted, but they quickly became psychologically compromised because of the crisis they found themselves in, the way they were treated, and the pressures upon them. In general, a recent meta-analysis of 37 studies found that bullying greatly increases victims' likelihood of suicidal behavior (Kim & Leventhal Reference Kim and Leventhal2008). Far worse pressures and mistreatment were present in this case.

The military systematically broke new recruits with regular beatings and abuse. As one would-be kamikaze recalls, “‘training’ took place day after day. I was struck on the face so hard and frequently that my face was no longer recognizable” (Ohnuki-Tierney Reference Ohnuki-Tierney2006, p. 168). Another explains, “I felt little desire to rush out and die gloriously for some great cause. Like all the others, I was overwhelmingly demoralized and intimidated … Anxiety had left me exhausted yet too nervous for sleep … By the first month's end, many in our group were breaking emotionally, beyond remedy. Continual pain, continual humiliation, continual pressure. Endless stress! It could not be endured forever” (Kuwahara & Allred Reference Kuwahara and Allred1957, pp. 29, 64). Because of these psychological pressures, 9 of 60 recruits in one unit actually killed themselves during training. However, the majority gave in and carried out their kamikaze missions as intended. Many were deeply traumatized and threatened with further punishment if they disobeyed, which is why they decided to die.

In some sense, the kamikaze pilots may have had a rational motive for suicide: they preferred death over future pain. But I would emphasize that this is the underlying motive for most suicidal people, whether the pain they want to avoid is already present or only anticipated, and whether it is physical or psychological. As discussed earlier, past suicidal people have killed themselves to escape the psychological pain of loss of employment, economic distress, family problems, romantic problems, and the death of a loved one, or the physical pain of living with serious health problems (Durkheim Reference Durkheim1897; Farber Reference Farber1968; Maris et al. Reference Maris, Berman and Silverman2000). Some of their suicidal decisions could be considered rational as well.

I propose that, much like the kamikaze, many coerced suicide terrorists may have been psychologically healthy for most of their lives, but they became psychologically compromised and made suicidal decisions because of the abnormal pressures upon them. From the terrorist organization's perspective, levying these pressures makes a lot of sense: If you need people to perform a task that only a suicidal person would do – and you don't have enough suicidal individuals on hand – you should try to create new ones. For instance, in Afghanistan and Pakistan, teenagers have been kidnapped and beaten by their captors, who attempted to break their spirits, make them suicidal, and then funnel them into suicide attacks. In rare cases where the teenagers were rescued and assessed by a psychiatrist, they appeared to have signs of depression and other psychological disorders. Along similar lines, in Iraq, women have reportedly been raped by terrorists and then encouraged to carry out “martyrdom operations” to atone for their “crime” of sexual victimization.

Naturally, the amount of pressure required to make a person choose death depends upon that individual's psychological strengths or weaknesses. Some people will endure almost anything in order to survive, as most concentration camp prisoners during the Holocaust did. Others have a relatively low threshold for pressure or pain: they would prefer to commit suicide than risk the uncertainty or discomfort of trying to cope, resist, or escape.

For example, a preemptively arrested suicide bomber named Nazima volunteered for weapons training with a terrorist group, and then was repeatedly pressured to carry out a suicide attack, until she found herself in the midst of a major psychological crisis. As she later recalled:

Nazima knew that her best chance for survival was to ask her father for help, but although she had the opportunity, she feared doing so, and instead decided she would rather blow herself up.

Coerced suicide terrorists are not primarily driven by ideological commitment or the desire to sacrifice their lives for a cause. They find themselves caught between the proverbial rock and a hard place, and become psychologically compromised because of the pressures upon them. I wonder about their mental health as the end draws near. In the days leading up to their suicide attacks – when they have surrendered all hope and stopped looking for options – perhaps their psychology becomes similar to many other suicidal people.

Another type of suicide terrorist appears comparable to people who kill themselves to escape the imminent arrival of police, security, or military forces. People who commit escapist suicides sometimes claim to be doing it for ideological reasons, and that they are demonstrating defiance or commitment to the cause. For instance, Adolf Hitler insisted that the Nazis' self-orchestrated deaths would not constitute suicide because they were heroic self-sacrifices, made by those who courageously refused to negotiate or surrender, because only cowards would cling to life. Similarly, shortly after 9/11, Osama bin Laden instructed his bodyguards to shoot him in the back if capture by American forces was ever imminent, but claimed his death would be “martyrdom,” not suicide.

These claims do not stand up to scrutiny. They do not pass the previously discussed criteria for evaluating statements' credibility, because they portray the speakers in a better light, not a worse one. And in each case, the primary benefactor of the suicide would be the person who died, escaped, and thus avoided the consequences of remaining alive – not his followers or the broader cause. I suggest that when people commit suicide to avoid serious punishment, they are generally driven by fear, not ideology.

Similar to those who kill themselves due to coercive pressures, people who commit escapist suicides may have a rational motive: they find themselves in a major crisis, and decide they would rather die than suffer future discomfort, humiliation, or pain. Historical records suggest that there have been a number of mass suicides for this reason, primarily by people who were besieged by their enemies and believed that execution, rape, and/or enslavement were inevitable. In cases of mass suicides, the vast majority of participants were probably psychologically healthy prior to their crises; it was the impending arrival of the enemy that left them psychologically compromised and desperate for the least painful way out. Of course, it is also possible that the consensus among those who killed themselves in these groups is exaggerated in the historical record, and that coercion played a significant role.

In modern cases of escapist suicides, there may be more interaction between the situational crisis and individual's psychological tendencies, because of the limits on what most approaching enemies will do to their captives. Systematic rape, medieval-styled torture, and summary execution are rarer than in the past, which may be why mass escapist suicides are less common. For example, when Nazi Germany was defeated in 1945, less than 15% of the upper echelon killed themselves: 8 of 41 party regional leaders, 7 of 47 high-ranking SS and police leaders, 53 of 554 army generals, 14 of 98 Luftwaffe generals, and 11 of 53 admirals (Goeschel Reference Goeschel2009).

In many cases, it appears that those who commit escapist suicides are not just making hasty decisions in the heat of the moment. Some appear to have already considered an eventual suicide long before the emergency situation arose. For days, weeks, months, or years, they seem to have been emboldened by the knowledge that if they were ever cornered and trapped, suicide would become their self-imposed exit strategy.

One of the most notable cases of escapist suicide terrorism comes from Madrid, where in 2004, seven men blew themselves up in their apartment after they were cornered by police. Their suicidal explosion killed one Spanish police officer and wounded several others, but three weeks earlier, they had planted bombs on commuter trains in a much deadlier attack. Notably, a number of those who eventually killed themselves had previously served time in prison, which may explain their desperation to avoid going back. Attacker Allekema Lamari – who was reportedly a 40-year-old virgin with a mental disorder – had specifically told a friend that he would never be caught alive again. And fellow terrorist Abdennabi Kounjaa, who also had a criminal record, had written a final letter to his family in Morocco that sheds some light on his psychology. Although Kounjaa was in Spain voluntarily, he called it “hell” and warned his children to never follow him there. He also lamented that “I can't put up with this life living like a weak and humiliated person under the scrutiny of infidels and tyrants,” adding that “this life is the path towards death” and that he preferred “death instead of life” (Alonso & Reinares Reference Alonso, Reinares and Pedahzur2006, p. 190). In other cases, terrorists have blown themselves up to escape arrest or punishment in Iraq, Afghanistan, and Uzbekistan, and it seems likely that this type of suicide attack has occurred in many other countries as well.

A final type of suicide terrorist should be compared with individuals who are indirectly suicidal. Such people are usually in denial about their suicidal urges, so they orchestrate their own deaths in ways that disguise their desire to die, even from themselves. For instance, by repeatedly engaging in risky, self-destructive behaviors, such as substance abuse, high-risk recreation, deviant sexual behavior, erratic driving, and self-mutilation, they ensure that their final day will come – sooner, rather than later. Of course, other people take similar risks without being suicidal at all. The key distinction is that somewhere deep inside, indirectly suicidal people engage in risky behaviors and actually hope to fail. And if an “accidental” death does not come quickly enough, sometimes they end up committing suicide by their own hand.

Perhaps the clearest form of indirect suicidality is the game of Russian roulette, in which players insert one bullet into a six-chambered revolver, and then spin the chamber so that the bullet's placement is determined by chance. Each participant aims the gun at his or her own head and pulls the trigger, taking an approximately 16% chance of death. Russian roulette players often claim that they are not suicidal, and that “the goal of the game is to experience the rush of excitement in cheating fate” (Maris et al. Reference Maris, Berman and Silverman2000, p. 451). But their lives have often been filled with depression, substance abuse, and a range of high-risk and self-destructive behaviors. In addition, many are under the influence of alcohol or drugs when they play the game, which helps them mask their suicidal intentions from themselves.

I propose that indirect suicide terrorists often launch armed assaults on police stations, military bases, or other hard targets where they expect to be greeted by a hail of bullets that result in “suicide by cop.” However, although their chances of death are much greater than the 16% odds offered by Russian roulette, their suicidal intentions are much more easily camouflaged by the nature of the act. After all, it can be extremely difficult to differentiate between someone who engages in a high-risk terrorist mission and wants to survive and someone who mounts the exact same attack and wants to die. What stands out is that in many of these scenarios, the attackers could have picked much softer targets elsewhere and would have almost certainly killed more of the enemy. Instead, they chose riskier targets that offered an increased likelihood of their own deaths – which was probably part of the appeal. In Chapter 7, I provide several examples of suicide terrorists who seemed to fit this description.

A number of terrorist hostage-takers may be indirectly suicidal as well. For example, during the 1995 Budennovsk hospital attack, tactical leader Shamil Basayev, who was understandably distraught after the death of his wife and family just a few weeks earlier, told journalists that “It does not matter to us when we die” (Kohan Reference Kohan1995). Much like other indirectly suicidal people who gamble on death but survive, Basayev and some of his fellow terrorists lived through that first attack, but nevertheless found a premature end. Many were later killed by Russian security forces. And Basayev died in a mysterious bomb explosion at age forty-one. In other incidents, terrorists appear to have taken hostages primarily to force people to pay attention to them, even though they realized that, at any moment, government security forces might assault the complex and kill them. At some level, they may have wanted that to happen.

6. Comparisons with sacrificial heroes

Suicide terrorists have been commonly considered to be the psychological equivalent of others who sacrifice their lives for a greater cause. However, I propose that the similarities between suicide attackers and legitimate sacrificial heroes have been significantly overstated.

In general, suicide terrorists are often assumed to be brave because they embrace death, which most people are afraid to do. But when evaluating bravery and fear, we should consider the actor's contextual alternatives. Although it may seem bold to jump from a window, it is much less so if you're fleeing a room that is on fire. Suicide terrorists often appear to be so desperate to escape unbearable pain – be it real or imagined, physical or psychological – that death may feel like the less intimidating alternative. Of course, perceptions of risk vary as well. For many suicide terrorists, blowing themselves up may feel like the least risky thing they could do – it could offer the greatest certainty that their overwhelming crisis will no longer plague them. For these individuals, the risky thing may be to face their uncertain future, tackle their problems one day at a time, or swallow their pride and ask for help.

Along these lines, by definition, sacrifice requires “the forfeiture of something highly valued for the sake of one considered to have a greater value or claim” (American Heritage Dictionary 2004). This means that suicide terrorists could only “sacrifice” their lives if they attribute high value to them. If they are intending to trade something they put a low value on (continued suffering in this “transient” and “dirty” world, according to their own statements) for something they value highly (heavenly rewards), that would be an upgrade, not a sacrifice. And this difference in how suicide attackers perceive life would make them psychologically different from millions of mentally healthy people who genuinely believe in heaven, but also value their lives – which seems to be why they are content to wait for a natural end.

To shed further light on the psychological and behavioral differences between suicide terrorists and sacrificial heroes, I examine specific cases in Chapter 5 and compare them across key variables (see also Lankford Reference Lankford2012b). The suicide attacks include Hanadi Jaradat's suicide bombing of an Israeli restaurant and Mohamed Atta's 9/11 attack on the World Trade Center. The sacrificial actions include Secret Service agent Tim McCarthy stepping in front of the president to take a bullet, and the separate cases of soldiers Ross McGinnis, Leroy Petry, and Matthew Croucher each jumping on a grenade to protect their comrades.

One key difference is the amount of decision time. Suicide attacks are almost always planned in advance, and many attackers spend months or years deciding that they want to die. Jaradat and Atta were no different. Even when a suicide terrorist's behavior is triggered by an unexpected crisis, significant premeditation is usually involved in planning the attack. By contrast, McCarthy, McGinnis, Petry, and Croucher had to make split-second decisions in the heat of the moment. Unlike most suicide terrorists, they did not orchestrate their situations. These deadly threats – the bullet, the grenade – found them, not the other way around. And unlike most suicide terrorists, they did not have days, weeks, months, or years to weigh the options and look for better solutions. McCarthy specifically recalls that he barely had the chance to think before jumping in front of the president, and thus attributes his behavior to “reaction based upon the training” (Crean Reference Crean2007).

Another critical difference is whether the actor had the intention of dying. Although some explosive vests malfunction and some suicide terrorists are arrested before they can strike, it does not seem that any of those who attempt their attacks actually intend to survive. In fact, they often explicitly clarify their intention of dying in suicide notes or “martyrdom” videos, as Jaradat and Atta both did. On the other hand, Secret Service agents who take a bullet for the president and soldiers who jump on a grenade to protect their comrades actually do hope to survive. Secret Service agents specifically wear bulletproof vests to protect themselves in the extremely unlikely event that they do get shot. And soldiers who jump on a grenade seem to have a realistic – albeit uncertain – chance of living. If they get to the grenade quickly enough, they can attempt to throw it back at their attacker. Petry tried this, although the grenade exploded just as he released it, costing him his right hand. Or they can attempt to smother it with a backpack or other equipment, as Croucher did, and may be fortunate enough to escape unscathed. Croucher later explained that he “fully expected” to lose a limb, but that he was willing to make that sacrifice “if I could keep my torso and head intact” (Harding Reference Harding2008). Of course, he also realized that the selfless action could have cost him his life: “It took 30 seconds before I realized I was definitely not dead” (Harding Reference Harding2008).

A final difference is whether the actor's behavior has the direct result of saving others or harming them. Terrorist leaders often claim that in the long run, suicide attacks save lives, because every enemy killed brings their people a step closer to victory. After 9/11, bin Laden argued that defeating the United States would save millions of innocent Muslims. But even if suicide terrorists were actually sacrificing their own lives in an attempt to save their countrymen, that goal would be an indirect and potential outcome, not a direct and nearly certain one.

The further the gap between one's actions and the desired payoff, the less likely those benefits will ever occur. Even if we give suicide terrorists such as Atta and Jaradat the benefit of the doubt, the indisputable fact remains that a tremendous number of dominoes would have to fall between their attacks and any lives being (indirectly) saved. In fact, suicide attacks often provoke a violent backlash against the families and countrymen of attackers, putting them in more danger, not less. All suicide terrorists can really count on is that their self-destructive acts will probably kill themselves and harm others.

By contrast, McCarthy instantly knew that by stepping in front of the president and taking the bullet, he greatly increased the chance that the president's life would be saved. And McGinnis, Petry, and Croucher each jumped on a grenade, instead of running in the opposite direction, because they immediately realized that it was their only way to save lives. As Croucher recalls, “I knew a grenade like this has a killing circumference of about five meters … It was a case of either having four of us as fatalities or badly wounded – or one” (Harding Reference Harding2008). Even though, at a minimum, he fully expected to lose a limb, Croucher did everything he could to protect his comrades.

In Chapter 5, I discuss criteria for sacrificial heroism in much greater depth. I acknowledge that heroic figures like McGinnis, Petry, and Croucher may have also been killers. And some suicide terrorists may have legitimately done heroic things during their lives. But a close examination of these specific behaviors suggests that carrying out a suicide attack was not one of them.

7. Explaining, predicting, and preventing suicide attacks

Why are suicide terrorism attacks so common in certain international hot spots? Why are they so rare in the United States? And how can we identify suicide terrorists and suicidal mass shooters, before it is too late? By better understanding the psychology of suicide attackers, we should be able to answer each of these questions more accurately than ever before. However, we should consider several other critical variables as well.

In Chapter 8, I propose that there are three minimum requirements for suicide attacks: (1) suicidal intent (whether it is conventional, coerced, escapist, or indirect), (2) access to weapons, and (3) access to enemy targets. If these factors are present, a suicide attack could occur; if they are not, a suicide attack is essentially impossible. I also identify four additional facilitators for the most deadly attacks and prolonged suicide terrorism campaigns: (4) homicidal intent, (5) a sponsoring terrorist organization, (6) social stigmas against conventional suicide, and (7) social approval of suicide terrorism (see also Lankford Reference Lankford2011c). Although some attackers are primarily suicidal and largely indifferent to the casualties they cause, others with both suicidal and homicidal intent want to take as many victims with them as possible. In turn, sponsoring terrorist organizations may increase suicidal and homicidal intent, provide access to weapons and enemy targets, and boost social approval of suicide terrorism through their propaganda.

Social stigmas against conventional suicide and social approval of suicide terrorism often work together. When a community strongly condemns conventional suicide as a certain path to hell, it virtually disappears as a potential escape route. This may be one of the primary reasons why suicide rates in the Islamic world are so low. On the other hand, when a significant percentage of people believe that suicide terrorism is justified, a new door opens for desperate individuals looking for a way out.

As I detail in the book, these factors may help explain why suicide terrorism has been so common in certain international hot spots, such as Iraq and Afghanistan. Some scholars have blamed Western occupation, making the argument that local inhabitants carry out suicide attacks because they are inspired to defend their homeland and political sovereignty (Pape & Feldman Reference Pape and Feldman2010). And, certainly, foreign occupation can provoke significant anger. However, I suggest that mentally healthy people find many alternative ways to fight without intentionally dying.

The key is that foreign occupation and war do not only provoke political backlash, they also have major psychological consequences on the local populace. For example, during the first two years of the Iraq War, more than 67,000 civilians were documented as killed or wounded, and many more went missing (Iraq Body Count 2005). Others lost their jobs and homes. It seems virtually inevitable that this would lead to a rise in suicidal and homicidal intent. And there are other indications that access to weapons, access to targets, social approval of suicide terrorism, and the presence of sponsoring terrorist organizations also increased. But it should be emphasized that foreign occupation is not inexorably linked to suicide terrorism. Civil war, sectarian violence, and drone strikes may produce an increase in many of these variables as well.

Separately, many scholars and government leaders have been baffled by the scarcity of suicide terrorism attacks on American soil. From 1990 to 2010, there were just thirteen attacks in the United States that met the definition of suicide terrorism – fewer than one per year. In Chapter 8, I suggest that this can be explained by a number of factors, including low social approval of this tactic domestically, weak social stigmas against conventional suicide, lack of access to pre-made explosive vests, and the absence of a local terrorist organization that could arm and deploy a procession of bombers. But given that about 34,000 Americans kill themselves each year and that many others could be coerced into doing so, the United States is certainly not immune to a sudden spike in suicide attacks.

Fortunately, much more can be done to identify future suicide terrorists and suicidal mass shooters before they strike. For instance, previous homeland security initiatives have emphasized the need for public vigilance, calling on citizens to report suspicious behavior. But most people have assumed this refers to the suspicious behavior of strangers, not to their own friends and family. With the help of scholars who can share their latest findings about the critical warning signs, members of the public could be much better educated on how to recognize suicidal people in their midst. In the past, due to their intimate knowledge of those closest to them, family members have sometimes proven to be more effective at detecting at-risk individuals than the FBI or CIA. Educating them on exactly what to look for would increase their ability to help.

Furthermore, the ubiquity of Internet communications offers an unprecedented opportunity to find and monitor potential suicide attackers. Our lives are more interconnected than ever before, which makes it far easier to see into the hearts and minds of people we have never met. It might be easy to assume that suicide terrorists and mass shooters would not put clues about their attack plans online. But like the rest of us, they are not purely rational. They are often psychologically compromised, emotionally conflicted, and deeply consumed by pain. Before they attempt suicide – which is often referred to as a “cry for help” – they sometimes cry out by posting online. In addition, suicide attackers are often socially isolated and desperate for attention, which makes Internet forums, online communities, dating web sites, and social networking platforms especially attractive for fulfilling their needs. And if they have bottled-up anger that they cannot share with those around them, they may be particularly likely to vent it online, where many users still feel essentially anonymous and free to say whatever is on their minds. By identifying behavioral patterns in online activity, scholars may be able to assist security officials in fine-tuning systems for Internet surveillance. For efficiency's sake, I suggest that the surveillance should largely be done by computer programs, not human analysts. But in order to minimize false positives and privacy infringement, the software must be based on good science.

These are just a few of the many possibilities. Given the evidence that suicide terrorists are suicidal, experts from the behavioral and brain sciences may be able to pioneer a series of major breakthroughs in threat assessment, security screening, suicide prevention, and other exciting areas.