Recent years have seen a renewed scholarly interest in Cicero's philosophical works, and it is now routine to talk of the innovative and sophisticated elements of Cicero's own philosophical thought and practice. This volume heralds a substantial advance in that it moves well beyond the project of rehabilitation and undertakes a concerted and multi-pronged philosophical analysis of a specific key text, the De finibus. This work has often been held up as an excellent example of the relatively tame philosophising undertaken by Cicero, which relies heavily on reproducing and critically assessing the ethical arguments and standpoints to be found among the Hellenistic schools of philosophy. Classical scholars have focused predominately on the doxography and on the literary and political dimensions of the De finibus; the various contributors to this volume approach the text from a variety of (often technical) philosophical perspectives and with a powerful methodology, close and rigorous analytic reading of the Latin text, and the result is overwhelmingly clear: the volume as a whole transforms our understanding of the De finibus as a work of philosophy.
The volume comprises nine papers delivered to the 12th Symposium Hellenisticum held in Budapest in June 2010, together with a short introduction by Julia Annas. The first chapter by Charles Brittain focuses on the precise nature of Cicero's sceptical methods in the De finibus. Brittain argues that Cicero is not a ‘mitigated’ Philonian sceptic who ultimately finds Antiochus’ ethics most plausible at the concluding end of the dialogue, but rather he is a more ‘radical’ Carneadean sceptic who is uncertain about the ultimate truth throughout the proceedings. The case relies heavily on comparing Cicero's treatment of epistemological issues in the Academica and seeing strong parallels with his treatment of ethical issues in the De finibus. It is compelling in so far as it brings out much more strongly the epistemological underpinning of the De finibus and the philosophical dynamics of the dialogue — it is much more than a procession from bad Epicureanism, through attractive yet problematic Stoicism, to the more compelling views of Antiochus. However, it is unclear how far ‘radical’ Carneadean scepticism can be seen in Cicero's other philosophical works, as Brittain is wont to imply; perhaps different sceptical stances were adopted by Cicero depending on the subject matter, for in some cases Cicero does appear happy to indicate his assent to specific positions, in accordance with the Philonian model.
Three chapters focus on Cicero's treatment of Epicureanism in Books 1 and 2. James Warren looks at Cicero's critical account of Epicurean pleasure and demonstrates that far from being unfair and maliciously hostile, Cicero's objections and criticisms are philosophically astute, posing fundamental dilemmas for the Epicurean to navigate that are yet to be satisfactorily answered by modern scholars of Epicureanism. Pierre-Marie Morel focuses on the Epicurean account of the virtues and the efforts to align Epicureanism with the model of the cardinal virtues and traditional Roman mores. Dorothea Frede enters the vexed debate surrounding Epicurean friendship: as Cicero objects in De finibus, given their egoistic hedonism, how can an Epicurean value his friend for his own sake, and what would their friendship actually involve in practice? Frede ultimately suggests that Epicurean friendship is best seen as a natural and unnecessary kinetic pleasure. This is a reasonable line to take, but the chapter might have benefited from some detailed engagement with Philodemus, who has much to say about the activities of Epicurean communal life.
Two chapters examine philosophical issues in Book 3. Margaret Graver critically assesses Cicero's translation of the Greek καλόν as honestum, stressing Cicero's preoccupation with the public or ‘seen’ element of moral life, in particular with the notion of ‘honour’ that was centrally important to the Roman elite. The Stoics focus most on the internal state of the agent: if a person has a virtuous soul then she is truly honourable regardless of what others see or do. Cicero's use of honestum keeps to the fore the notion that public visibility really does matter, and Graver illustrates well how the disconnect between what is honoured in society and what is truly honourable is rich ground for Cicero's own philosophical investigations in De finibus and elsewhere. Brad Inwood offers an engaging and insightful analysis of the Stoic cradle-argument in Book 3, arguing that it struggles to justify our social nature and the moral obligations we have to each other in the manner that the Stoics expect.
Two chapters focus on the critique of Stoicism in Book 4. Anna Maria Ioppolo traces the debate over the status of the so-called ‘indifferents’, showing how Cicero does well in exposing major problems for the Stoics, particularly the slide into a Peripatetic or Antiochean position regarding external goods. Thomas Bénatouïl offers a reassessment of the structure of Book 4, which has often been seen as repetitive and poorly organised. Bénatouïl uncovers the careful method Cicero employs when critiquing the Stoics, which unlocks the rationale behind the book's structure and leads to a much more satisfying experience for the reader of De finibus.
The final chapter by Christopher Gill discusses Antiochus’ theory of ethical development in Book 5 against the Stoic alternative presented in Book 3. Gill evaluates the philosophical strengths and weaknesses of each account, concluding that both have their own peculiar problems. Gill suggests that Cicero is happy to leave the dialogue with things at a stand-off, rather than concluding that on balance Antiochus has the most persuasive position; the final chapter thus returns to the points made by Brittain in the first.
On the whole, this is a first-rate collection of papers, essential reading for specialists, and a great advertisement for the quality of contemporary philosophical work on Cicero.
