

them. A man of deep literary learning who knows just how silly and pretentious such learning can often be. An author who is as wide-ranging in his linguistic dexterity (Greek, Oscan, Latin, etc.) as he is in the travels he describes — everything from the mansions and back street taverns of Rome, to the tip of Italy's toe. And yet, he somehow manages to come off as 'one of us' wherever he goes. In so doing, he exemplifies Rome's newly consolidated control over the whole of Italy in the self that he writes.

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doi:10.1017/S007543581900087X

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J. ANNAS and G. BETEGH (EDS), *CICERO'S DE FINIBUS: PHILOSOPHICAL APPROACHES*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2016. Pp. vii + 266. ISBN 9781107074835. £64.99/US\$99.99.

Recent years have seen a renewed scholarly interest in Cicero's philosophical works, and it is now routine to talk of the innovative and sophisticated elements of Cicero's own philosophical thought and practice. This volume heralds a substantial advance in that it moves well beyond the project of rehabilitation and undertakes a concerted and multi-pronged philosophical analysis of a specific key text, the *De finibus*. This work has often been held up as an excellent example of the relatively tame philosophising undertaken by Cicero, which relies heavily on reproducing and critically assessing the ethical arguments and standpoints to be found among the Hellenistic schools of philosophy. Classical scholars have focused predominately on the doxography and on the literary and political dimensions of the *De finibus*; the various contributors to this volume approach the text from a variety of (often technical) philosophical perspectives and with a powerful methodology, close and rigorous analytic reading of the Latin text, and the result is overwhelmingly clear: the volume as a whole transforms our understanding of the *De finibus* as a work of philosophy.

The volume comprises nine papers delivered to the 12th Symposium Hellenisticum held in Budapest in June 2010, together with a short introduction by Julia Annas. The first chapter by Charles Brittain focuses on the precise nature of Cicero's sceptical methods in the *De finibus*. Brittain argues that Cicero is not a 'mitigated' Philonian sceptic who ultimately finds Antiochus' ethics most plausible at the concluding end of the dialogue, but rather he is a more 'radical' Carneadean sceptic who is uncertain about the ultimate truth throughout the proceedings. The case relies heavily on comparing Cicero's treatment of epistemological issues in the *Academica* and seeing strong parallels with his treatment of ethical issues in the *De finibus*. It is compelling in so far as it brings out much more strongly the epistemological underpinning of the *De finibus* and the philosophical dynamics of the dialogue — it is much more than a procession from bad Epicureanism, through attractive yet problematic Stoicism, to the more compelling views of Antiochus. However, it is unclear how far 'radical' Carneadean scepticism can be seen in Cicero's other philosophical works, as Brittain is wont to imply; perhaps different sceptical stances were adopted by Cicero depending on the subject matter, for in some cases Cicero does appear happy to indicate his assent to specific positions, in accordance with the Philonian model.

Three chapters focus on Cicero's treatment of Epicureanism in Books 1 and 2. James Warren looks at Cicero's critical account of Epicurean pleasure and demonstrates that far from being unfair and maliciously hostile, Cicero's objections and criticisms are philosophically astute, posing fundamental dilemmas for the Epicurean to navigate that are yet to be satisfactorily answered by modern scholars of Epicureanism. Pierre-Marie Morel focuses on the Epicurean account of the virtues and the efforts to align Epicureanism with the model of the cardinal virtues and traditional Roman *mores*. Dorothea Frede enters the vexed debate surrounding Epicurean friendship: as Cicero objects in *De finibus*, given their egoistic hedonism, how can an Epicurean value his friend for his own sake, and what would their friendship actually involve in practice? Frede ultimately suggests that Epicurean friendship is best seen as a natural and unnecessary kinetic pleasure. This

is a reasonable line to take, but the chapter might have benefited from some detailed engagement with Philodemus, who has much to say about the activities of Epicurean communal life.

Two chapters examine philosophical issues in Book 3. Margaret Graver critically assesses Cicero's translation of the Greek *καλόν* as *honestum*, stressing Cicero's preoccupation with the public or 'seen' element of moral life, in particular with the notion of 'honour' that was centrally important to the Roman elite. The Stoics focus most on the internal state of the agent: if a person has a virtuous soul then she is truly honourable regardless of what others see or do. Cicero's use of *honestum* keeps to the fore the notion that public visibility really does matter, and Graver illustrates well how the disconnect between what is honoured in society and what is truly honourable is rich ground for Cicero's own philosophical investigations in *De finibus* and elsewhere. Brad Inwood offers an engaging and insightful analysis of the Stoic cradle-argument in Book 3, arguing that it struggles to justify our social nature and the moral obligations we have to each other in the manner that the Stoics expect.

Two chapters focus on the critique of Stoicism in Book 4. Anna Maria Ioppolo traces the debate over the status of the so-called 'indifferents', showing how Cicero does well in exposing major problems for the Stoics, particularly the slide into a Peripatetic or Antiochean position regarding external goods. Thomas Bénatouil offers a reassessment of the structure of Book 4, which has often been seen as repetitive and poorly organised. Bénatouil uncovers the careful method Cicero employs when critiquing the Stoics, which unlocks the rationale behind the book's structure and leads to a much more satisfying experience for the reader of *De finibus*.

The final chapter by Christopher Gill discusses Antiochus' theory of ethical development in Book 5 against the Stoic alternative presented in Book 3. Gill evaluates the philosophical strengths and weaknesses of each account, concluding that both have their own peculiar problems. Gill suggests that Cicero is happy to leave the dialogue with things at a stand-off, rather than concluding that on balance Antiochus has the most persuasive position; the final chapter thus returns to the points made by Brittain in the first.

On the whole, this is a first-rate collection of papers, essential reading for specialists, and a great advertisement for the quality of contemporary philosophical work on Cicero.

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 doi:10.1017/S007543581900039X

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T. J. KEELINE, *THE RECEPTION OF CICERO IN THE EARLY ROMAN EMPIRE: THE RHETORICAL SCHOOLROOM AND THE CREATION OF A CULTURAL LEGEND*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2018. Pp. xi + 375. ISBN 9781108426237. £90.00.

In this book, based on the dissertation he wrote at Harvard, Thomas Keeline persuasively demonstrates that the declamatory classroom was central to Cicero's reception in the early Roman Empire. Like the imperial authors he studies, K. exhibits a comprehensive grasp of the Ciceronian corpus. His work is masterful in research, thorough in its attention to detail and provides a useful analysis of the ways in which the schoolroom portrayal of Cicero became embedded in the historical tradition.

The book consists of seven chapters. In ch. 1, K. begins with an intriguing account of how Cicero's texts were taught in the schools of the early Empire. Using the *Pro Milone* as a template, he brings the Roman classroom to life as he investigates the methods followed by Quintilian, Asconius and the scholia Bobiensia. Through his careful examination of sources, K. confirms that Cicero's dominant place within the classroom was predicated on his eloquence as an orator and that students' engagement with Cicero was essentially limited to his speeches as models for study and imitation. K. shows sensitivity in arguing for shared educational approaches throughout the Empire, while still recognising cultural differences between authors, and maintaining that earlier ones such as Pollio and Livy would not have been heavily influenced by the declamatory classroom. A minor issue in this chapter is K.'s over-statement of the point that truth was not a concern of rhetoric. On the contrary, Quintilian's extended defence of lying as a means of upholding justice (*Inst.* 12.1.34–45), which K. himself references, echoes Cicero's argument that