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Humans are ultrasocial and emotional

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  30 June 2016

Lisa A. Williams
Affiliation:
School of Psychology, University of New South Wales, Sydney, NSW 2052, Australia. lwilliams@unsw.edu.auwww.williamssocialemotionslab.com
Eliza Bliss-Moreau
Affiliation:
California National Primate Research Center, University of California, Davis, Davis, CA 95616. eblissmoreau@ucdavis.eduwww.elizablissmoreau.com

Abstract

Given the highly social nature of the human emotion system, it is likely that it subserved the evolution of ultrasociality. We review how the experience and functions of human emotions enable social processes that promote ultrasociality (e.g., cooperation). We also point out that emotion may represent one route to redress one of the negative consequences of ultrasociality: ecosystem domination.

Type
Open Peer Commentary
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2016 

Human emotions are not only often experienced in social contexts, but also shape social behavior. These social features point to a potential role for emotion in the evolution of ultrasociality. We propose that human emotion played and continues to play a core role in the evolution of sociality and therefore of ultrasociality.

Successful survival for all animal species, human and nonhuman alike, requires engaging in behavior on the basis of differentiating what is good from what is bad. That is, successful navigation of one's environment involves computing the affective value of features in the environment and then using that affective information to avoid that which can cause harm and approach that which might serve a benefit (for a review on affect, see Barrett & Bliss-Moreau Reference Barrett and Bliss-Moreau2009).

Like other animals, humans possess an affective system that enables distinguishing good from bad – food from poison, threat from opportunity, and friend from foe. But the human affective system also has unique characteristics, including highly developed conceptual information about what emotions are and the ability to represent internal states using language (for reviews, see Barrett Reference Barrett2011; Barrett et al. Reference Barrett, Wilson-Mendenhall, Barsalou, Barrett and Russell2015; Lindquist et al. Reference Lindquist, Satpute and Gendron2015). These features of the human affective system enable experiences that are more complex and nuanced than broad positive or negative affective states. For example, humans do not simply experience a threat as bad – threat is met with fear or dread, anger or rage. In this view, humans are most certainly emotional.

Human emotions are theorized to have adaptive functions: they shape behaviors in ways that are responsive to context and that promote outcomes beneficial to the individual (e.g., Barrett & Campos Reference Barrett, Campos and Osofsky1987; Keltner & Gross Reference Keltner and Gross1999; Tooby & Cosmides Reference Tooby, Cosmides, Lewis, Haviland-Jones and Barrett2008). For example, disgust felt at the sight of rotting food guides avoidance of consuming it in order to prevent disease (Oaten et al. Reference Oaten, Stevenson and Case2009). Many emotions have social functions that may have subserved the development of human ultrasociality. Gratitude prompts prosociality (e.g., DeSteno et al. Reference DeSteno, Bartlett, Baumann, Williams and Dickens2010) and contempt drives social exclusion of errant peers (Fischer & Roseman Reference Fischer and Roseman2007). Given that so much of human experience is in the real, imagined, or implied presence of others (Baumeister & Leary Reference Baumeister and Leary1995), this social orientation of human emotion functionality is sensible.

In fact, some theorists have suggested that there is a special class of emotions that are uniquely social (e.g., compassion, embarrassment, jealousy, and pride; see Hareli & Parkinson [Reference Hareli and Parkinson2008] for a review). But a closer look at the literature suggests that many emotions, even those not typically considered to be “social” in nature are, in fact, social in many respects. For example, humor-evoked positivity is enhanced in the presence of other humans (Jakobs et al. Reference Jakobs, Manstead and Fischer1999), and disgust can take human targets (Chapman & Anderson Reference Chapman and Anderson2013). As such, a case can be made that many if not all human emotions are social in nature.

Humans also possess sophisticated emotional language that can be used to communicate about internal states. One possibility is that language-enhanced emotion communication provides an adaptive advantage because individuals can use that information to predict the intentionality of others, to coordinate shared experience, and to enhance group performance. Extant evidence suggests this may be the case: Groups that share emotions are more cohesive (Páez et al. Reference Páez, Rime, Basabe, Wlodarczyk and Zumeta2015), and cohesive groups are more productive (Beal et al. Reference Beal, Cohen, Burke and McLendon2003).

How did the human emotion system promote the evolution of ultrasociality? While there are many possible routes, one possibility is that emotions supported the cooperation required to maintain effective division of labor. With increasing reliance on others, ultrasocial humans would have needed mechanisms to encourage and maintain cooperation. Robert Frank's (Reference Frank1988) proposal that emotions serve this role has received abundant empirical evidence. For example, feeling gratitude promotes reciprocation of a received favor or resource (Bartlett & DeSteno Reference Bartlett and DeSteno2006). Furthermore, individuals who say thank you, indicating that they are the type of person who feels grateful, leads to them being the target of social affiliation (Williams & Bartlett Reference Williams and Bartlett2015). Thus, human emotions such as gratitude may subserve cooperation via the behaviors they shape and reputations they build.

Given our brief review above, it might appear that emotions serve strictly positive social functions. Yet, as Gowdy & Krall (G&K) point out, human ultrasociality can have negative consequences, such as ecosystem dominance. Modern humans have had and will continue to have a radical impact on the natural world that often has severe negative consequences (Goudie Reference Goudie2013). While emotions may have contributed to human's “way in” to the current perilous state of ecosystem dominance by promoting ultrasociality, we suggest that emotions may also represent a “way out.” Indeed, scholars recognize that emotion is an important piece of the sustainability-mindset puzzle (e.g., Kals et al. Reference Kals, Schumacher and Montada1999; Searles Reference Searles2010; Vining & Ebreo Reference Vining, Ebreo, Bechtel and Churchman2002). Empirical evidence highlights how many socially oriented emotions (e.g., guilt, pride) are important determinants of environmentally sustainable actions (e.g., Antonetti & Maklan Reference Antonetti and Maklan2014; Onwezen et al. Reference Onwezen, Antonides and Bartels2013). It should therefore be possible to capitalize on the social-behavior–shaping design of the human emotion system in order to promote conservation efforts.

One particular socially oriented emotion appears to be a viable candidate for promoting sustainability and conservation: compassion. When directed towards other humans, compassion promotes efforts to alleviate suffering and protection (Goetz et al. Reference Goetz, Keltner and Simon-Thomas2010). G&K rightly question whether compassion is sufficient for promoting conservation. The key may rely on the recognition that the targets of compassion need not be human. Just as compassion felt towards another human promotes aid, compassion towards one's ecosystem might impel protective action. As yet, little is known about which other emotions might be harnessed to effectively address the negative effects of ecosystem dominance, and, further, when and how those emotions might be harnessed. Hence, multidisciplinary work informed by emotion theory is needed.

In conclusion, while human emotion may have been one mechanism by which ultrasociality – with all of its benefits and drawbacks – arose, it may be a route via which humans are able to correct its effects.

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