Boyer & Petersen (B&P) offer an enlightening overview of citizens' economic beliefs and account of their psychological roots. Here, we advance a perspective that is underplayed in the target article: the importance of partisan elites in shaping citizens' economic beliefs. First, we offer a theoretical argument for why “folk-economic beliefs” (FEBs) – given the nature of democratic politics – must be understood within a context where political parties are center stage. This perspective is vital because B&P justify the importance of FEBs on grounds that these beliefs “play a critical role in political choices” (sect. 1.2, para. 1). Second, we review recent empirical findings supporting our theoretical perspective, highlighting why future work on FEBs must attend to the partisan nature of beliefs in the political domain.
Theoretically, our point of departure is that competition between political parties is a fundamental feature of democracy. Today, political parties provide the key link between citizens and democratic decision-makers (e.g., legislators, governments) (Aldrich Reference Aldrich2011; Leeper & Slothuus Reference Leeper and Slothuus2014). Among their important functions, “parties simplify the choices that are open to voters, thereby reducing the policy complexity of modern government into a small number of options that voters can easily understand. Parties educate citizens into the advantages and disadvantages of the policy choices that are on offer. [Parties] mobilize citizens to actively participate in the political process” (Dalton et al. Reference Dalton, Farrell and McAllister2011, p. 6).
To see why these functions of political parties are crucial for understanding FEBs, consider B&P's Figure 1 (words in italic refer to concepts in their figure). First, political parties define the political choices FEBs are theorized to influence, as parties nominate candidates for political office and propose the policies debated prominently on the public and legislative agenda (Sniderman & Bullock Reference Sniderman, Bullock, Saris and Sniderman2004). Second, as prominent actors in the news media, partisan elites are the sources of much external information about economic phenomena feeding into mental systems. Third, as we will show, political parties sometimes directly shape folk-economic beliefs.
Fourth, and perhaps most important, political parties can powerfully condition the relationship between folk-economic beliefs and political choices. Leeper and Slothuus (Reference Leeper and Slothuus2014, p. 131) note, “While humans are born with and socialized into predispositions, they are not born with the political information necessary to apply these predispositions to the specific tasks citizens are expected to perform in a democracy: forming policy opinions and candidate preferences.” The relevance of this general notion for understanding FEBs is aptly illustrated by B&P's own examples (sect. 2.1). Considering FEB 2, for example, it is far from obvious whether the belief that “immigrants ‘steal’ jobs” should lead a citizen to support Policy A (e.g., closing the borders for foreign workers) or Policy B (e.g., stronger efforts to retrain domestic workers). We contend that the supply of information and arguments as part of the parties' competition for popular support helps citizens connect their predispositions (including FEBs) to political choices (Petersen et al. Reference Petersen, Slothuus and Togeby2010). In essence, to adequately understand how and when citizens' economic beliefs are consequential for political choices, we need to consider the impact of partisan competition. Hence, we see political parties as ubiquitous in B&P's Figure 1.
Our recent research offers empirical support for our theoretical perspective. In one study, we show that messages from partisan elites can change the FEBs among citizens' identifying with that party (Bisgaard & Slothuus Reference Bisgaard and Slothuus2018b). With observational data from a quasi-experimental setting and randomized experiments conducted in Denmark, we find that partisans alter their interpretations of public deficits and unemployment levels (i.e., two examples of FEBs) in response to a changing message from their party. Our findings help advance a puzzle in B&P's framework by illuminating “how people generate the particular beliefs about the workings of the economy” (sect. 2.2.2). We agree with B&P that partisanship often motivates citizens to attribute political responsibility for economic circumstances selectively (Bisgaard Reference Bisgaard2015), but we suggest that partisan elites can even shape FEBs. In other work, we show that when partisan elites take positions on policy issues relevant to FEBs – such as international trade, contracting out public welfare services, unemployment benefits, immigration, pensions – partisans tend to support the same policy positions (Bisgaard & Slothuus Reference Bisgaard and Slothuus2018a; Druckman et al. Reference Druckman, Peterson and Slothuus2013; Slothuus & de Vreese Reference Slothuus and de Vreese2010). Taken together, these results show the power of political parties to shape citizens' policy choices.
As a final example, we have empirical results consistent with the suggested ability of political parties to help citizens connect their economic beliefs to specific policy choices. In this case, the Social Democratic Party in Denmark changed its policy position and proposed to cut down an early retirement benefits scheme (Slothuus Reference Slothuus2010). In response to this shift in policy position, the supporters of the Social Democratic Party changed their policy opinion. However, only some partisans toed the party line: those partisans who were concerned about strains on public welfare budgets (i.e., a FEB). The point is that not until their party shifted policy position – and justified it with economic constrains – did these partisans see that the answer to their economic concern could be to cut down the early retirement benefits. On the one hand, this study (Slothuus Reference Slothuus2010) seems to fit with B&P's argument that FEBs “are politically important because they constrain how politicians can talk about policies to the public” (sect. 6.4, para. 4). On the other hand, it also shows that partisan elites can link citizens' economic concerns to specific policy solutions (see Petersen et al. Reference Petersen, Slothuus and Togeby2010).
In sum, although we are impressed by the scope of B&P's framework, we think they vastly underplay the competition between political parties as a fundamental force in democratic politics shaping the content and consequences of FEBs. Citizens do not automatically form economic beliefs and use them to make political choices; indeed, many FEBs are only remotely linked to political choices. We argue that a more complete understanding of the impact of FEBs on political behavior must consider the power of political parties to both shape citizens' economic beliefs and connect them to political choices.
Boyer & Petersen (B&P) offer an enlightening overview of citizens' economic beliefs and account of their psychological roots. Here, we advance a perspective that is underplayed in the target article: the importance of partisan elites in shaping citizens' economic beliefs. First, we offer a theoretical argument for why “folk-economic beliefs” (FEBs) – given the nature of democratic politics – must be understood within a context where political parties are center stage. This perspective is vital because B&P justify the importance of FEBs on grounds that these beliefs “play a critical role in political choices” (sect. 1.2, para. 1). Second, we review recent empirical findings supporting our theoretical perspective, highlighting why future work on FEBs must attend to the partisan nature of beliefs in the political domain.
Theoretically, our point of departure is that competition between political parties is a fundamental feature of democracy. Today, political parties provide the key link between citizens and democratic decision-makers (e.g., legislators, governments) (Aldrich Reference Aldrich2011; Leeper & Slothuus Reference Leeper and Slothuus2014). Among their important functions, “parties simplify the choices that are open to voters, thereby reducing the policy complexity of modern government into a small number of options that voters can easily understand. Parties educate citizens into the advantages and disadvantages of the policy choices that are on offer. [Parties] mobilize citizens to actively participate in the political process” (Dalton et al. Reference Dalton, Farrell and McAllister2011, p. 6).
To see why these functions of political parties are crucial for understanding FEBs, consider B&P's Figure 1 (words in italic refer to concepts in their figure). First, political parties define the political choices FEBs are theorized to influence, as parties nominate candidates for political office and propose the policies debated prominently on the public and legislative agenda (Sniderman & Bullock Reference Sniderman, Bullock, Saris and Sniderman2004). Second, as prominent actors in the news media, partisan elites are the sources of much external information about economic phenomena feeding into mental systems. Third, as we will show, political parties sometimes directly shape folk-economic beliefs.
Fourth, and perhaps most important, political parties can powerfully condition the relationship between folk-economic beliefs and political choices. Leeper and Slothuus (Reference Leeper and Slothuus2014, p. 131) note, “While humans are born with and socialized into predispositions, they are not born with the political information necessary to apply these predispositions to the specific tasks citizens are expected to perform in a democracy: forming policy opinions and candidate preferences.” The relevance of this general notion for understanding FEBs is aptly illustrated by B&P's own examples (sect. 2.1). Considering FEB 2, for example, it is far from obvious whether the belief that “immigrants ‘steal’ jobs” should lead a citizen to support Policy A (e.g., closing the borders for foreign workers) or Policy B (e.g., stronger efforts to retrain domestic workers). We contend that the supply of information and arguments as part of the parties' competition for popular support helps citizens connect their predispositions (including FEBs) to political choices (Petersen et al. Reference Petersen, Slothuus and Togeby2010). In essence, to adequately understand how and when citizens' economic beliefs are consequential for political choices, we need to consider the impact of partisan competition. Hence, we see political parties as ubiquitous in B&P's Figure 1.
Our recent research offers empirical support for our theoretical perspective. In one study, we show that messages from partisan elites can change the FEBs among citizens' identifying with that party (Bisgaard & Slothuus Reference Bisgaard and Slothuus2018b). With observational data from a quasi-experimental setting and randomized experiments conducted in Denmark, we find that partisans alter their interpretations of public deficits and unemployment levels (i.e., two examples of FEBs) in response to a changing message from their party. Our findings help advance a puzzle in B&P's framework by illuminating “how people generate the particular beliefs about the workings of the economy” (sect. 2.2.2). We agree with B&P that partisanship often motivates citizens to attribute political responsibility for economic circumstances selectively (Bisgaard Reference Bisgaard2015), but we suggest that partisan elites can even shape FEBs. In other work, we show that when partisan elites take positions on policy issues relevant to FEBs – such as international trade, contracting out public welfare services, unemployment benefits, immigration, pensions – partisans tend to support the same policy positions (Bisgaard & Slothuus Reference Bisgaard and Slothuus2018a; Druckman et al. Reference Druckman, Peterson and Slothuus2013; Slothuus & de Vreese Reference Slothuus and de Vreese2010). Taken together, these results show the power of political parties to shape citizens' policy choices.
As a final example, we have empirical results consistent with the suggested ability of political parties to help citizens connect their economic beliefs to specific policy choices. In this case, the Social Democratic Party in Denmark changed its policy position and proposed to cut down an early retirement benefits scheme (Slothuus Reference Slothuus2010). In response to this shift in policy position, the supporters of the Social Democratic Party changed their policy opinion. However, only some partisans toed the party line: those partisans who were concerned about strains on public welfare budgets (i.e., a FEB). The point is that not until their party shifted policy position – and justified it with economic constrains – did these partisans see that the answer to their economic concern could be to cut down the early retirement benefits. On the one hand, this study (Slothuus Reference Slothuus2010) seems to fit with B&P's argument that FEBs “are politically important because they constrain how politicians can talk about policies to the public” (sect. 6.4, para. 4). On the other hand, it also shows that partisan elites can link citizens' economic concerns to specific policy solutions (see Petersen et al. Reference Petersen, Slothuus and Togeby2010).
In sum, although we are impressed by the scope of B&P's framework, we think they vastly underplay the competition between political parties as a fundamental force in democratic politics shaping the content and consequences of FEBs. Citizens do not automatically form economic beliefs and use them to make political choices; indeed, many FEBs are only remotely linked to political choices. We argue that a more complete understanding of the impact of FEBs on political behavior must consider the power of political parties to both shape citizens' economic beliefs and connect them to political choices.