Boyer & Petersen (B&P) take great strides to bring the light of evolution into the murky waters of economic phenomena. We wholeheartedly agree with B&P that evolutionary thinking is crucial for understanding folk-economic beliefs and seeming irrationality in making economic decisions. Our concern is that they lean heavily upon Evolutionary Psychology (EP) theory positing a set of domain-specific, cognitive computational modules that evolved early in human ancestry and remain unchanged since then. As a consequence, their framework suffers from the limitations of this form of EP theory: over-reliance on strict computational models of cognition, exaggerated assumptions of universality and uniformity, and questionable assumptions of a singular Environment of Evolutionary Adaptiveness (EEA) with a singular set of social exchange conditions. We argue that ecological and cultural environments, along with cultural evolutionary processes, are relevant. It is therefore implausible to focus on a single evolutionary model. Our commentary focuses on the role of culture when examining both evolved cognitive systems and social exchange contexts, examining the role of domain-specificity of cognition and the role of context for cognition. We then focus on two specific examples to illustrate our points: intentionality reasoning and notions of ownership and fairness.
Classic EP theory of the sort that B&P rely upon focuses on the idea that cognition is best accomplished by a broad array of purpose-built, domain-specific, algorithmic information processing units to solve computational problems in the ancestral environment (L. Barrett et al. Reference Barrett, Pollet and Stulp2014). Recent advances in understanding the mind as a predictive, Bayesian processor suggest that (a) consciousness can be studied with domain-general information processing modules in which (b) culturally driven, top-down processing interacts with bottom-up sensory input. Importantly, much of this Bayesian, priors driven, top-down processing is likely encoded into environments through cultural systems like kinship, marriage rules, and parenting strategies that can stabilize the learning beyond individual brains (Mesoudi Reference Mesoudi2011; Smaldino Reference Smaldino2014).
Debates about modularity and processing arguments aside, much of the research supporting domain-specific cognitive systems is situated in evolutionary unusual settings (Henrich et al. Reference Henrich, Heine and Norenzayan2010). Cognitive experiments are typically conducted with university students in settings that are significantly different from our collective evolutionary history. Even when focusing on modern-day hunter-gatherer societies as an analogue to ancestral groups, issues of representativeness remain. Modern hunter-gatherer groups have been exposed to various other cultural and social systems, and most groups have been systematically displaced over the last few hundred years, leading to divergent cultural and social structures. For example, the endowment effect does not have equal impact even among the Hadza; instead, it appears to be sensitive to exposure to economic market-based exchange (Apicella et al. Reference Apicella, Azevedo, Christakis and Fowler2014). Focusing on social exchange, different modes of social exchange across societies (as noted by, e.g., Fiske Reference Fiske1992) call into question the plausibility of a single evolutionary model. Rules and norms in one's social context are internalized and in turn shape specific beliefs about the economy (Kunst et al. Reference Kunst, Fischer, Sidanius and Thomsen2017). In short, it is possible and informative to consider the contextual nature of economic beliefs while acknowledging the role of evolutionary constraints.
A first example is reasoning about intent. Small-scale societies vary in emphasis on intent (H. C. Barrett et al. Reference Barrett, Bolyanatz, Crittenden, Fessler, Fitzpatrick, Gurven, Henrich, Kanovsky, Kushnick, Pisor, Scelza, Stich, von Rueden, Zhao and Laurence2016), to the extent that some societies have culturally conditioned rules against mental state inference to explain behavior (Duranti Reference Duranti2015; Luhrmann Reference Luhrmann2011). This provides a significant challenge to a universalistic evolutionary account. Local norms and scripts can greatly reduce the information space needed to execute theory of mind functions such as intent reasoning (Apperly Reference Apperly2011). More communal settings, where norms more strictly dictate behavior than in more individualistic contexts, may therefore make situational factors more efficient and effective sources of behavioral information and prediction than thinking about minds (Ames et al. Reference Ames, Knowles, Morris, Kalish, Rosati, Gopnik, Malle, Moses and Baldwin2001; Hughes et al. Reference Hughes, Devine and Wang2017; Shahaeian et al. Reference Shahaeian, Peterson, Slaughter and Wellman2011). Indeed, one might argue that the intent focus in previous cheater-detection research may in large part be due to studying this process among American undergraduates, who are among the most mind-focused populations (Choi & Nisbett Reference Choi and Nisbett1998; Delton et al. Reference Delton, Cosmides, Guemo, Robertson and Tooby2012; Lillard Reference Lillard1998).
Similarly, B&P place too much emphasis on universal notions of ownership and fairness. While the idea of labor as ownership dates back to John Locke, ideas about ownership and resource distributions vary in small-scale societies along kinship and hierarchical lines (Pierce et al. Reference Pierce, Kostova and Dirks2003; also see Fiske Reference Fiske1992) as well as ecology (Gurven Reference Gurven2004). For example: In rural Fiji, labor and ownership are not perfectly correlated because social life is largely structured by deference to a hereditary chief. Community members may be expected to do manual labor and still not be allowed to freely partake of the resources (such as coconuts or certain kinds of fish) on that land if it is the property of the chief. Similarly, cross-cultural developmental research shows a consistent pattern of rule learning in children in response to local norms instead of universal norms of fairness (Gampe & Daum Reference Gampe and Daum2018; House et al. Reference House, Silk, Henrich, Barrett, Scelza, Boyette, Hewlett, McElreath and Laurence2013). These learned norms reflect local ecological and social conditions, which may in turn influence folk-economic beliefs.
In summary, we agree that evolutionary analysis of economic phenomena is necessary, but we suggest that B&P miss important cultural and environmental inputs into the cognitive system. We strongly support evolutionary investigations of economic beliefs, but encourage greater attention to cultural evolution models and local ecology and social context as shaping cognition. With humans, it is difficult (if not impossible) to completely ignore culture in such cognitive models, because culturally transmitted factors can constrain the learning space in a way that leads to outputs indistinguishable from domain-specific processing units (L. Barrett et al. Reference Barrett, Pollet and Stulp2014). We therefore suggest that B&P's evolutionarily grounded model of economic cognition cannot be complete without further consideration of these contextual factors and how they affect cognitive processing.
Boyer & Petersen (B&P) take great strides to bring the light of evolution into the murky waters of economic phenomena. We wholeheartedly agree with B&P that evolutionary thinking is crucial for understanding folk-economic beliefs and seeming irrationality in making economic decisions. Our concern is that they lean heavily upon Evolutionary Psychology (EP) theory positing a set of domain-specific, cognitive computational modules that evolved early in human ancestry and remain unchanged since then. As a consequence, their framework suffers from the limitations of this form of EP theory: over-reliance on strict computational models of cognition, exaggerated assumptions of universality and uniformity, and questionable assumptions of a singular Environment of Evolutionary Adaptiveness (EEA) with a singular set of social exchange conditions. We argue that ecological and cultural environments, along with cultural evolutionary processes, are relevant. It is therefore implausible to focus on a single evolutionary model. Our commentary focuses on the role of culture when examining both evolved cognitive systems and social exchange contexts, examining the role of domain-specificity of cognition and the role of context for cognition. We then focus on two specific examples to illustrate our points: intentionality reasoning and notions of ownership and fairness.
Classic EP theory of the sort that B&P rely upon focuses on the idea that cognition is best accomplished by a broad array of purpose-built, domain-specific, algorithmic information processing units to solve computational problems in the ancestral environment (L. Barrett et al. Reference Barrett, Pollet and Stulp2014). Recent advances in understanding the mind as a predictive, Bayesian processor suggest that (a) consciousness can be studied with domain-general information processing modules in which (b) culturally driven, top-down processing interacts with bottom-up sensory input. Importantly, much of this Bayesian, priors driven, top-down processing is likely encoded into environments through cultural systems like kinship, marriage rules, and parenting strategies that can stabilize the learning beyond individual brains (Mesoudi Reference Mesoudi2011; Smaldino Reference Smaldino2014).
Debates about modularity and processing arguments aside, much of the research supporting domain-specific cognitive systems is situated in evolutionary unusual settings (Henrich et al. Reference Henrich, Heine and Norenzayan2010). Cognitive experiments are typically conducted with university students in settings that are significantly different from our collective evolutionary history. Even when focusing on modern-day hunter-gatherer societies as an analogue to ancestral groups, issues of representativeness remain. Modern hunter-gatherer groups have been exposed to various other cultural and social systems, and most groups have been systematically displaced over the last few hundred years, leading to divergent cultural and social structures. For example, the endowment effect does not have equal impact even among the Hadza; instead, it appears to be sensitive to exposure to economic market-based exchange (Apicella et al. Reference Apicella, Azevedo, Christakis and Fowler2014). Focusing on social exchange, different modes of social exchange across societies (as noted by, e.g., Fiske Reference Fiske1992) call into question the plausibility of a single evolutionary model. Rules and norms in one's social context are internalized and in turn shape specific beliefs about the economy (Kunst et al. Reference Kunst, Fischer, Sidanius and Thomsen2017). In short, it is possible and informative to consider the contextual nature of economic beliefs while acknowledging the role of evolutionary constraints.
A first example is reasoning about intent. Small-scale societies vary in emphasis on intent (H. C. Barrett et al. Reference Barrett, Bolyanatz, Crittenden, Fessler, Fitzpatrick, Gurven, Henrich, Kanovsky, Kushnick, Pisor, Scelza, Stich, von Rueden, Zhao and Laurence2016), to the extent that some societies have culturally conditioned rules against mental state inference to explain behavior (Duranti Reference Duranti2015; Luhrmann Reference Luhrmann2011). This provides a significant challenge to a universalistic evolutionary account. Local norms and scripts can greatly reduce the information space needed to execute theory of mind functions such as intent reasoning (Apperly Reference Apperly2011). More communal settings, where norms more strictly dictate behavior than in more individualistic contexts, may therefore make situational factors more efficient and effective sources of behavioral information and prediction than thinking about minds (Ames et al. Reference Ames, Knowles, Morris, Kalish, Rosati, Gopnik, Malle, Moses and Baldwin2001; Hughes et al. Reference Hughes, Devine and Wang2017; Shahaeian et al. Reference Shahaeian, Peterson, Slaughter and Wellman2011). Indeed, one might argue that the intent focus in previous cheater-detection research may in large part be due to studying this process among American undergraduates, who are among the most mind-focused populations (Choi & Nisbett Reference Choi and Nisbett1998; Delton et al. Reference Delton, Cosmides, Guemo, Robertson and Tooby2012; Lillard Reference Lillard1998).
Similarly, B&P place too much emphasis on universal notions of ownership and fairness. While the idea of labor as ownership dates back to John Locke, ideas about ownership and resource distributions vary in small-scale societies along kinship and hierarchical lines (Pierce et al. Reference Pierce, Kostova and Dirks2003; also see Fiske Reference Fiske1992) as well as ecology (Gurven Reference Gurven2004). For example: In rural Fiji, labor and ownership are not perfectly correlated because social life is largely structured by deference to a hereditary chief. Community members may be expected to do manual labor and still not be allowed to freely partake of the resources (such as coconuts or certain kinds of fish) on that land if it is the property of the chief. Similarly, cross-cultural developmental research shows a consistent pattern of rule learning in children in response to local norms instead of universal norms of fairness (Gampe & Daum Reference Gampe and Daum2018; House et al. Reference House, Silk, Henrich, Barrett, Scelza, Boyette, Hewlett, McElreath and Laurence2013). These learned norms reflect local ecological and social conditions, which may in turn influence folk-economic beliefs.
In summary, we agree that evolutionary analysis of economic phenomena is necessary, but we suggest that B&P miss important cultural and environmental inputs into the cognitive system. We strongly support evolutionary investigations of economic beliefs, but encourage greater attention to cultural evolution models and local ecology and social context as shaping cognition. With humans, it is difficult (if not impossible) to completely ignore culture in such cognitive models, because culturally transmitted factors can constrain the learning space in a way that leads to outputs indistinguishable from domain-specific processing units (L. Barrett et al. Reference Barrett, Pollet and Stulp2014). We therefore suggest that B&P's evolutionarily grounded model of economic cognition cannot be complete without further consideration of these contextual factors and how they affect cognitive processing.