As a Japanese (and Asian) reviewer, I would have simply explained the reason for the relatively weak relationship and lack of diplomatic dialogue between Japan and the European Union (EU) in the post-World War II era, compared to those with the US, as due to both Japan and EU member states' stronger relations with the US. With certain brevity, Frattolillo, who entered into social science by studying Japanese political philosophy, invites a new aspect into the analysis of Japan‒EU relations. He chooses the Asia‒Europe Meeting (ASEM) and the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) as case studies, the US participating at neither. Frattolillo not only investigates the diplomatic dialogues between Japan and the EU, but also sheds light on mutual perceptions and identities of both Japan and Europe. He argues that both help to shape the dialogues and define future roles.
The dialogues of the ASEM have already been well looked into by Gilson (2000) and is frequently described, in Frattolillo's terms, as ‘nothing more than a talking shop'. Frattolillo does not totally deny these views, but adds to the debate by arguing that mutual perceptions of Japan and the EU and their identities in economic, cultural, and political issues have influenced and shaped diplomatic dialogue and, accordingly, its role in both regions. Frattolillo analyzes the relationship by going back to the 1950s, then reviewing each decade in chronological order up to the present day, focusing on three aspects: international structure, pragmatic nationalism, and identity.
The first aspect points to the Cold War and its end, which changed Japan and EC's (European Community) distance in relation to the US. During the Cold War, Japan relied heavily on the US in security issues of East Asia, and therefore allowed little space for the EC to play a role. Trade conflicts merely increased misunderstandings for both sides. Despite such tendencies, Japan and the EC did start to view each other as partners during the 1980s. This was due to Japan witnessing the EC's enlargement and economic prosperity, which helped to expand the EC's presence and role outside Europe. Trade conflicts, however, discouraged the development of any political dialogue, merely expending time and effort on economic issues. The end of the Cold War, economic globalization, and the rise of China has changed this situation, and the EU, more than Japan, has become much more eager and prepared, although with certain limits of capability, to expand mutual dialogue regarding East Asia's security.
The second stands for the realistic pursuit of (Japanese) national and (European) collective interests. In the post-war era, Japanese diplomacy has long been shaped by the Yoshida doctrine of the 1950s, a mercantilist approach which gives the economy primacy over politics. Although economic globalization accelerated such tendencies, the end of the Cold War added a new dimension. Japan obtained a new perspective: to become more involved in global security, namely human security issues ‒ expansion of aid for developing countries and the former communist countries of Central Eastern Europe are examples. The Joint Japan‒EU Action Plan of 2001 marked the highlight of such changes and became a turning point in the renewed partnership. Peace-keeping and peace-building operations became Japan and the EU's field of cooperation. The EU started to see Japan as an interlocutor in security issues, and the ASEM became the platform for discussing terrorism, weapons of mass destruction, migration, human rights, and so forth. Despite the development of dialogue between equal civilian ‘soft power’ partners, the EU has been excluded from the Six Party Talks concerning North Korean related security issues, disappointing for the Europeans and showing an ‘expectation gap’.
The final point, which is related to the second, is identity. In the Japanese case, post-war diplomacy meant opportunistic pursue of national goals. Such an attitude has been criticized as her weak point. Frattolillo, however, invites Watsuji, a prominent Japanese philosopher of modernization, into his argument and concludes that Japanese diplomacy has not merely been a case-by-case patchwork, but has had a consistent and continued ideological background. According to Watsuji, who's philosophy is identical to those of the Chinese philosopher Zhao, Japan(ese) defines her ‘Self’ based on her relationship with the outside ‘Other(s)’. By referring to this self-identity based on relationship and mirroring, Frattolillo indicates, seemingly, the possibility that the EU's ambition and rising capability to play a role in East Asian security, although limited to non-military, could significantly change Japan's perception of the EU and the EU's future admitted role.
The strength of this book, already pointed out at the beginning, is that Frattolillo analyzes the cultural and ideological aspects of both Japan and China. These new aspects allow him to discuss the EU's potential and future role, if there is any, in East Asian security issues. Otherwise the EU would scarcely appear in literature. The hypothesis is, however, not free from critics. Some readers might find the argument frustrating, because it seems speculative of future roles of the EU, rather than an analysis of concrete achievements. Is Frattolillo another ‘should-be policy’ teller of the EU in a new disguise? One would also want to hear further definition of why Watshuji was chosen, but not Fukuzawa, Natsume, or Maruyama, as a central figure when explaining Japan's modernization history. Although not diminishing the value of this book, inconsistency in the order of Japanese family names (Ono, Kaifu, and Iriye) should also be pointed out.
Regardless of such minor technical critics, there is no doubt that this book is a new and original work, exploring one of the most significant and debatable issues. One would want to hear more from Frattolillo, because Japan has expanded her legal definition of oversees' military operations in September 2015. Japan's ‘break-away’ from her post-war peace constitution and her turn towards hard power methods, welcomed by the US, could disagree with and jeopardize what Frattolillo describes, the EU's self-definition and identity as a global civilian power. Nevertheless this book is a highly recommended read for those who are interested in the weaker triangle of the US, Europe, and Japan, once you are able to bear the financial cost.
