Western Europe, the post-World War II liberal order was commenced in East Asia without explicit consent: at the war's end, there was the division of Korea and China, while no comprehensive settlement treaties were concluded among major states. The emergence and continuation of the Cold War left these issues virtually unresolved and susceptible to political manipulations that perpetuated territorial and sovereignty disputes as well as hindered reconciliation and cooperation between states.

Institutionally, the global liberal order has not permeated the domestic political and economic arrangements of several states in the region: there still exist one-party and dictatorial states that routinely violate human rights and the rule of law. Their illiberal characters and deeds contradict the author's claim that 'they (East Asian states) have not fundamentally resisted or rejected the normative values and structures preferred by Washington' (p. 207). East Asia represents pluralism at maximum. Without internalizing the liberal order, East Asian states could hang together only through minimal joint interests in negative peace and economic opportunities, rather than inter-subjective consensus about the basic goals and means of conducting international affairs.

In this sense, Goh's work nicely illuminates the legitimacy of the US hegemonic order that relies on America's will and ability to provide regional security and manage global economic institutions. But the author's bifocal conceptual framework composed of norms and power exemplifies its internal inconsistency in analyzing a non-western region where the underlying principles of territoriality, sovereignty, and the rule of law for the liberal order remain unsettled. The inconsistency becomes even more serious when an ascendant state begins to challenge these principles.

Motoshi Suzuki
Kyoto University

Oliviero Frattolillo, *Diplomacy in Japan–EU Relations: From the Cold War to the Post-Bipolar Era*, Routledge, 2013, 352 pp.
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As a Japanese (and Asian) reviewer, I would have simply explained the reason for the relatively weak relationship and lack of diplomatic dialogue between Japan and the European Union (EU) in the post-World War II era, compared to those with the US, as due to both Japan and EU member states' stronger relations with the US. With certain brevity, Frattolillo, who entered into social science by studying Japanese political philosophy, invites a new aspect into the analysis of Japan–EU relations. He chooses the Asia–Europe Meeting (ASEM) and the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) as case studies, the US participating at neither. Frattolillo not only investigates the diplomatic dialogues between Japan and the EU, but also sheds light on mutual perceptions and identities of both Japan and Europe. He argues that both help to shape the dialogues and define future roles.

The dialogues of the ASEM have already been well looked into by Gilson (2000) and is frequently described, in Frattolillo's terms, as 'nothing more than a talking shop'. Frattolillo does

not totally deny these views, but adds to the debate by arguing that mutual perceptions of Japan and the EU and their identities in economic, cultural, and political issues have influenced and shaped diplomatic dialogue and, accordingly, its role in both regions. Frattolillo analyzes the relationship by going back to the 1950s, then reviewing each decade in chronological order up to the present day, focusing on three aspects: international structure, pragmatic nationalism, and identity.

The first aspect points to the Cold War and its end, which changed Japan and EC's (European Community) distance in relation to the US. During the Cold War, Japan relied heavily on the US in security issues of East Asia, and therefore allowed little space for the EC to play a role. Trade conflicts merely increased misunderstandings for both sides. Despite such tendencies, Japan and the EC did start to view each other as partners during the 1980s. This was due to Japan witnessing the EC's enlargement and economic prosperity, which helped to expand the EC's presence and role outside Europe. Trade conflicts, however, discouraged the development of any political dialogue, merely expending time and effort on economic issues. The end of the Cold War, economic globalization, and the rise of China has changed this situation, and the EU, more than Japan, has become much more eager and prepared, although with certain limits of capability, to expand mutual dialogue regarding East Asia's security.

The second stands for the realistic pursuit of (Japanese) national and (European) collective interests. In the post-war era, Japanese diplomacy has long been shaped by the Yoshida doctrine of the 1950s, a mercantilist approach which gives the economy primacy over politics. Although economic globalization accelerated such tendencies, the end of the Cold War added a new dimension. Japan obtained a new perspective: to become more involved in global security, namely human security issues – expansion of aid for developing countries and the former communist countries of Central Eastern Europe are examples. The Joint Japan–EU Action Plan of 2001 marked the highlight of such changes and became a turning point in the renewed partnership. Peace-keeping and peace-building operations became Japan and the EU's field of cooperation. The EU started to see Japan as an interlocutor in security issues, and the ASEM became the platform for discussing terrorism, weapons of mass destruction, migration, human rights, and so forth. Despite the development of dialogue between equal civilian 'soft power' partners, the EU has been excluded from the Six Party Talks concerning North Korean related security issues, disappointing for the Europeans and showing an 'expectation gap'.

The final point, which is related to the second, is identity. In the Japanese case, post-war diplomacy meant opportunistic pursue of national goals. Such an attitude has been criticized as her weak point. Frattolillo, however, invites Watsuji, a prominent Japanese philosopher of modernization, into his argument and concludes that Japanese diplomacy has not merely been a case-by-case patchwork, but has had a consistent and continued ideological background. According to Watsuji, who's philosophy is identical to those of the Chinese philosopher Zhao, Japan(ese) defines her 'Self' based on her relationship with the outside '*Other(s)*'. By referring to this self-identity based on relationship and mirroring, Frattolillo indicates, seemingly, the possibility that the EU's ambition and rising capability to play a role in East Asian security, although limited to non-military, could significantly change Japan's perception of the EU and the EU's future admitted role.

The strength of this book, already pointed out at the beginning, is that Frattolillo analyzes the cultural and ideological aspects of both Japan and China. These new aspects allow him to discuss the EU's potential and future role, if there is any, in East Asian security issues. Otherwise

the EU would scarcely appear in literature. The hypothesis is, however, not free from critics. Some readers might find the argument frustrating, because it seems speculative of future roles of the EU, rather than an analysis of concrete achievements. Is Frattolillo another 'should-be policy' teller of the EU in a new disguise? One would also want to hear further definition of why Watshuji was chosen, but not Fukuzawa, Natsume, or Maruyama, as a central figure when explaining Japan's modernization history. Although not diminishing the value of this book, inconsistency in the order of Japanese family names (Ono, Kaifu, and Iriye) should also be pointed out.

Regardless of such minor technical critics, there is no doubt that this book is a new and original work, exploring one of the most significant and debatable issues. One would want to hear more from Frattolillo, because Japan has expanded her legal definition of oversees' military operations in September 2015. Japan's 'break-away' from her post-war peace constitution and her turn towards hard power methods, welcomed by the US, could disagree with and jeopardize what Frattolillo describes, the EU's self-definition and identity as a global *civilian* power. Nevertheless this book is a highly recommended read for those who are interested in the weaker triangle of the US, Europe, and Japan, once you are able to bear the financial cost.

Hitoshi Suzuki
University of Niigata Prefecture

Jeffrey L. Richey, *Confucius in East Asia: Confucianism's History in China, Korea, Japan, and Vietnam*, Association of Asian Studies, 2013, xvii + 99 pp.
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In this introductory volume on Confucianism in East Asia, Jeffrey L. Richey draws on both original Confucian classics and the latest relevant research and offers a well-structured presentation of Confucian traditions and their dominant influence on the moral, social, and political life in China, Korea, Japan, and Vietnam.

The whole volume is both balanced and engaging partly because it tends to present issues and problems in an ingenious way, without proposing solutions. That is why it is beneficial for both outsiders and alleged insiders of Confucian traditions, for both beginners and experienced researchers: other than acquiring more historical and theoretical perspectives and developing some insight that is more comprehensive and more comparative, readers can also learn about methodology as well as research issues such as the Neo-Confucianism Movement and its influences, different relationships between Confucian individuals and the ruling groups with or without Confucianism as a state-sponsored ideology, and combinations of and conflicts between Confucianism and modern political ideologies (e.g., nationalism, imperialism, and even communism) in the context of modernization and political legitimacy.

This volume is well structured, not just due to its uniform chapter–section division but also because of the selection and arrangement of the content. Except for the first chapter on China, each one commences with circumstances or events at present, which highlights the contemporary relevance. Richey also helpfully highlights key words for each chapter. The key words for the Korea chapter are *paradox* or *ambivalence*, since this chapter focuses on the ethical