1. Basic exposure and art historical knowledge
Understanding art is often a matter of grasping representational content. It is unclear how that is to be construed on the psycho-historical model. On the one hand, the direction of the causal arrows in the flowchart (B&R Fig. 1) and the heavy emphasis on reasoning and inference suggest a sequence: Basic exposure provides visual input into an interpretive process in which the viewer then uses historical knowledge to reason about the meaning of the work. But that way of blending perceptual psychology and history is less novel and less integrative than what Bullot & Reber (B&R) suggest, and it is threatened by evidence for perceptual plasticity in early vision. On the other hand, the authors acknowledge top-down effects. They suggest that knowledge of art history can influence basic exposure from the first encounter with a work. But that possibility seems inconsistent with two important aspects of the psycho-historical approach:
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a. It undercuts the argument from indiscernibility that is used to motivate the appeal to history (i.e., two physically identical paintings can have different meanings because they have different causal etiologies). If knowledge depends on beliefs, and beliefs can affect early vision, then physically identical works will be perceived differently under the influence of different beliefs (cf. Dutton Reference Dutton and Carroll2000; Wollheim Reference Wollheim and Rollins1993). This will be so, even if the beliefs are false. Perceiving two physically identical works differently and holding the beliefs that differentiate them with conviction, appreciators will have neither the incentive nor the need to search for actual historical knowledge. Nor can the need for historical knowledge be said to be driven by level of perceptual fluency. There is no reason to think that false beliefs inevitably cause dysfluency.
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b. If basic exposure is modulated by beliefs, then there may be problems with the idea that artistic devices cause an experience by manipulating processing fluency. The point of strategic manipulations would seem to be to inhibit a reasoned response that depends on the perceiver's existing beliefs, because such a response could override the intended effects of the artist's technique.
Hence, the psycho-historical model faces a dilemma: a strict sequence of processing stages is empirically dubious; yet the possibility that even basic exposure might be knowledge- and theory-dependent does not fit well with other aspects of the account.
One way to avoid the dilemma is to adopt a more interactive theory of vision according to which the processing fluency that enters into experience in basic exposure is partly a function of characteristic or habitual ways of deploying neural systems or subsystems. These interactions ground a richer mode of experience at the basic level than the psycho-historical account allows, in part because they are affected by past encounters with works of art encoded as episodic memories. In that case, the contexts in which paintings are seen may serve to differentiate physically identical images. Yet, as subpersonal neurological habits, the viewer's own basic perceptual strategies are also more susceptible to manipulation by artistic strategies that challenge them than entrenched and conscious beliefs would be (cf. Rollins 2011).
2. The intentions of the artist
The second problem is that the psycho-historical approach tends to conflate the question of how art is typically understood with the issue of how it should be appreciated; that is, how appreciation works when viewers get things right. This is apparent when the authors emphasize that the outcome of the artistic design stance is an increase in “proficiency,” where that means identifying the intentions of the actual artist (or other relevant agents).
Rejecting the argument by Fodor (1993) and others that art should be understood by positing hypothetical or virtual intentions, B&R claim that such a process is likely to lead to mistakes in artistic understanding. But that leads to the question of why plausible accounts of hypothetical intentions that do not track actual intentions should be viewed as mistaken, and it does not fit well with the authors' construal of the artistic design stance. Among other things, that stance is modeled on Dennett's (Reference Dennett1987) notion of an intentional stance, and to that extent, the intentions that are ascribed will be useful fictions. Of course, that may imply only that what are posited are mental states of the actual artist, which are warranted on instrumental grounds, just as all mental state attributions are.
When combined, however, with the idea that intentions are ascribed on the psycho-historical account through inference to the best explanation, this construal of the artistic design stance opens the door to cases in which the best explanation runs counter to what is known about what the actual author had in mind. Given the importance of experience on the psycho-historical account, adopting such an explanation could be justified on the grounds that experience is thereby enriched. Moreover, B&R argue that mindreading abilities are involved in identifying intentions. But as proponents of both versions of mindreading (as applying a theory of mind or as simulation) often point out, this ability may be best construed in terms of positing hypothetical intentions, based on beliefs about the actual historical context in which the work was produced. It is not necessary to claim that the experience of art tracks actual intentions to provide a role for historical knowledge.
Nonetheless, as B&R suggest, a work of art contains visible traces of actions performed by the actual artist, and understanding causal etiologies in terms of those plays a fundamental role in our experience of art. That fact can be accommodated, while appealing to hypothetical intentions in adopting the artistic design stance, by distinguishing between categorial and semantic intentions. Categorial intentions are about the status of the artifact as an artwork, which is in a certain style. Semantic intentions concern the meaning or content of the work (cf. Levinson Reference Levinson1996b; Rollins Reference Rollins2004). The former are those of the actual artist. The latter are hypothetical posits. Properly construed, identifying categorial intentions does not require mindreading and thus is not vulnerable to the argument that the intentions are best construed as hypothetical. Rather, categorial intentions are embodied in artistic devices that cause a distinctive mode of response, which is defined in terms of the engagement of neuropsychological resources at the level of subpersonal processing habits. The distinction between categorial and semantic intentions is compatible with the “hierarchical” model of B&R. At the same time, it does not imply that combining psychology with history (at various levels in the processing hierarchy) requires tracking actual intentions across the board.
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The psycho-historical account of art appreciation raises two related issues: how basic exposure is related to art historical knowledge in the process of interpretation; and whether understanding art requires tracking the actual intentions of the artist.
1. Basic exposure and art historical knowledge
Understanding art is often a matter of grasping representational content. It is unclear how that is to be construed on the psycho-historical model. On the one hand, the direction of the causal arrows in the flowchart (B&R Fig. 1) and the heavy emphasis on reasoning and inference suggest a sequence: Basic exposure provides visual input into an interpretive process in which the viewer then uses historical knowledge to reason about the meaning of the work. But that way of blending perceptual psychology and history is less novel and less integrative than what Bullot & Reber (B&R) suggest, and it is threatened by evidence for perceptual plasticity in early vision. On the other hand, the authors acknowledge top-down effects. They suggest that knowledge of art history can influence basic exposure from the first encounter with a work. But that possibility seems inconsistent with two important aspects of the psycho-historical approach:
a. It undercuts the argument from indiscernibility that is used to motivate the appeal to history (i.e., two physically identical paintings can have different meanings because they have different causal etiologies). If knowledge depends on beliefs, and beliefs can affect early vision, then physically identical works will be perceived differently under the influence of different beliefs (cf. Dutton Reference Dutton and Carroll2000; Wollheim Reference Wollheim and Rollins1993). This will be so, even if the beliefs are false. Perceiving two physically identical works differently and holding the beliefs that differentiate them with conviction, appreciators will have neither the incentive nor the need to search for actual historical knowledge. Nor can the need for historical knowledge be said to be driven by level of perceptual fluency. There is no reason to think that false beliefs inevitably cause dysfluency.
b. If basic exposure is modulated by beliefs, then there may be problems with the idea that artistic devices cause an experience by manipulating processing fluency. The point of strategic manipulations would seem to be to inhibit a reasoned response that depends on the perceiver's existing beliefs, because such a response could override the intended effects of the artist's technique.
Hence, the psycho-historical model faces a dilemma: a strict sequence of processing stages is empirically dubious; yet the possibility that even basic exposure might be knowledge- and theory-dependent does not fit well with other aspects of the account.
One way to avoid the dilemma is to adopt a more interactive theory of vision according to which the processing fluency that enters into experience in basic exposure is partly a function of characteristic or habitual ways of deploying neural systems or subsystems. These interactions ground a richer mode of experience at the basic level than the psycho-historical account allows, in part because they are affected by past encounters with works of art encoded as episodic memories. In that case, the contexts in which paintings are seen may serve to differentiate physically identical images. Yet, as subpersonal neurological habits, the viewer's own basic perceptual strategies are also more susceptible to manipulation by artistic strategies that challenge them than entrenched and conscious beliefs would be (cf. Rollins 2011).
2. The intentions of the artist
The second problem is that the psycho-historical approach tends to conflate the question of how art is typically understood with the issue of how it should be appreciated; that is, how appreciation works when viewers get things right. This is apparent when the authors emphasize that the outcome of the artistic design stance is an increase in “proficiency,” where that means identifying the intentions of the actual artist (or other relevant agents).
Rejecting the argument by Fodor (1993) and others that art should be understood by positing hypothetical or virtual intentions, B&R claim that such a process is likely to lead to mistakes in artistic understanding. But that leads to the question of why plausible accounts of hypothetical intentions that do not track actual intentions should be viewed as mistaken, and it does not fit well with the authors' construal of the artistic design stance. Among other things, that stance is modeled on Dennett's (Reference Dennett1987) notion of an intentional stance, and to that extent, the intentions that are ascribed will be useful fictions. Of course, that may imply only that what are posited are mental states of the actual artist, which are warranted on instrumental grounds, just as all mental state attributions are.
When combined, however, with the idea that intentions are ascribed on the psycho-historical account through inference to the best explanation, this construal of the artistic design stance opens the door to cases in which the best explanation runs counter to what is known about what the actual author had in mind. Given the importance of experience on the psycho-historical account, adopting such an explanation could be justified on the grounds that experience is thereby enriched. Moreover, B&R argue that mindreading abilities are involved in identifying intentions. But as proponents of both versions of mindreading (as applying a theory of mind or as simulation) often point out, this ability may be best construed in terms of positing hypothetical intentions, based on beliefs about the actual historical context in which the work was produced. It is not necessary to claim that the experience of art tracks actual intentions to provide a role for historical knowledge.
Nonetheless, as B&R suggest, a work of art contains visible traces of actions performed by the actual artist, and understanding causal etiologies in terms of those plays a fundamental role in our experience of art. That fact can be accommodated, while appealing to hypothetical intentions in adopting the artistic design stance, by distinguishing between categorial and semantic intentions. Categorial intentions are about the status of the artifact as an artwork, which is in a certain style. Semantic intentions concern the meaning or content of the work (cf. Levinson Reference Levinson1996b; Rollins Reference Rollins2004). The former are those of the actual artist. The latter are hypothetical posits. Properly construed, identifying categorial intentions does not require mindreading and thus is not vulnerable to the argument that the intentions are best construed as hypothetical. Rather, categorial intentions are embodied in artistic devices that cause a distinctive mode of response, which is defined in terms of the engagement of neuropsychological resources at the level of subpersonal processing habits. The distinction between categorial and semantic intentions is compatible with the “hierarchical” model of B&R. At the same time, it does not imply that combining psychology with history (at various levels in the processing hierarchy) requires tracking actual intentions across the board.