Controlled laboratory conditions using monetary incentives have been utilized in previous studies that examine individual discount rates, and researchers have found several apparently robust anomalies. We conjecture that subject behavior in these experiments may be affected by (uncontrolled) factors other than discount rates. We address some experimental design issues and report a new series of experiments designed to elicit individual discount rates. Our primary treatments include: (i) informing subjects of the annual and effective interest rates associated with alternative payment streams, and (ii) informing subjects of current market interest rates. We also test for the effect of real (vs. hypothetical) payments and for the effect of delaying both payment options (vs. offering an immediate payment option). The statistical analysis uses censored data techniques to account for the interactions between field and lab incentives. Each of the information treatments appears to reduce revealed discount rates. When both types of information are provided, annual rates in the interval of 15%—17.5% are revealed, whereas rates of 20%-25% are revealed in the control session. Each of the treatments also lowers the residual variance of subject responses.

This paper reports an experiment to determine whether subjects will learn to stop using a strictly dominated strategy that can be an above average reply. It is difficult to find an experimental design that eliminates the play of the strictly dominated strategy completely. The least effective treatment used money to motivate behavior directly. The most effective treatment used a binary-lottery with money prizes to induce preferences, but even this treatment required giving subjects plenty of experience. Doing so reduced the play of the strictly dominated strategy to around 10 percent by the end of a session. There is no evidence for the explosive cycling needed to make the strictly dominated strategy an above average reply.

This paper constructs a structural model for behavior in expeiments where subjects play a simple coordination game repeatedly under a rotating partner scheme. The model assumes subjects’ actions are stochastic best responses to beliefs about opponents’ choices, and these beliefs update as subjects observe actual choices during the experiment. The model accounts for heterogeneity across subjects by regarding prior beliefs as random effects and estimating their distribution. Maximum likelihood estimates from experimental data suggest that distributions of initial beliefs vary across games, but in all games studied imply a convergence dynamic toward risk-dominant equilibrium.