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What Does it Take to Eliminate the use of a Strategy Strictly Dominated by a Mixture?

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  14 March 2025

John Van Huyck ,
Frederick Rankin  and
Raymond Battalio
John Van Huyck*
Affiliation:
Texas A&M University
Frederick Rankin
Affiliation:
Washington University
Raymond Battalio
Affiliation:
Texas A&M University
*
email: john.vanhuyck@tamu.edu
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Abstract

This paper reports an experiment to determine whether subjects will learn to stop using a strictly dominated strategy that can be an above average reply. It is difficult to find an experimental design that eliminates the play of the strictly dominated strategy completely. The least effective treatment used money to motivate behavior directly. The most effective treatment used a binary-lottery with money prizes to induce preferences, but even this treatment required giving subjects plenty of experience. Doing so reduced the play of the strictly dominated strategy to around 10 percent by the end of a session. There is no evidence for the explosive cycling needed to make the strictly dominated strategy an above average reply.

Keywords

game theorymixed strategiesdominanceinduced value theoryrisk aversionbinary lotteriesuncertainty aversionspitehuman behavior

JEL classification

C78: Bargaining Theory • Matching Theory C92: Laboratory, Group Behavior D83: Search • Learning • Information and Knowledge • Communication • Belief • Unawareness C72: Noncooperative Games
Type
Research Article
Information
Experimental Economics , Volume 2 , Issue 2 , December 1999 , pp. 129 - 150
Copyright
Copyright © 1999 Economic Science Association

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Footnotes

1

Related research available at http://erl.tamu.edu/

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